The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 20-0936V
IJEOMA CHUKWUDUM, Chief Special Master Corcoran
Petitioner,
v. Filed: March 17, 2025
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
Sean Frank Greenwood, Greenwood Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Petitioner.
Mitchell Jones, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1
On July 31, 2020, Ijeoma Chukwudum filed a petition for compensation under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the
“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she sustained a shoulder injury related to vaccine
administration (“SIRVA”) due to an influenza (“flu”) vaccine received on October 13, 2017.
Petition (ECF No. 1). The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office
of Special Masters (the “SPU”).
I previously concluded that Petitioner had preponderantly established the onset of
shoulder pain within 48 hours after vaccination, and all other criteria and requirements for
1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In
accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other
information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I
agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2012).
a Table SIRVA claim, and she was thus entitled to compensation. Ruling on Entitlement
(ECF No. 51), available at Chukwudum v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-936V,
2023 WL 8112957 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 17, 2023). That decision – including the
summary of the previous procedural history, and the evidence – is fully incorporated and
relied upon herein especially because the parties have declined to submit any additional
evidence, although they did brief the unresolved damages components. Damages Brief
filed Dec. 12, 2024 (ECF No. 64); Response filed. 3, 2025 (ECF No. 66); Reply filed Feb.
17, 2025 (ECF No. 67). The matter is now ripe for adjudication.
For the following reasons, I find that Petitioner is entitled to $130,000.00 for
her past pain and suffering, and stipulated past medical expenses – but no award of
future pain and suffering, past lost earnings, or housecleaning costs.
I. Pain and Suffering
A. Authority
In another recent decision, I discussed at length the legal standard to be
considered in determining SIRVA damages, taking into account prior compensation
determinations within SPU. I fully adopt and hereby incorporate my prior discussion in
Sections I and II of Timberlake v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1905V, 2025 WL
721730 at *1 – 3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 19, 2025).
In sum, compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or
actual and projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related
injury, an award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). The petitioner bears the
burden of proof with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Mar. 18, 1996). Factors to be considered when determining an award for pain and
suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3) duration of
the suffering.3
B. Appropriate Compensation for Petitioner’s Pain and Suffering
In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. The record reflects that at all
times Petitioner was a competent adult with no impairments that would impact her
awareness of her injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and duration of
3 I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May
14, 2013) (quoting McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed.
Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
2
Petitioner’s injury.
I have reviewed the record as a whole to include the medical records, declarations,
affidavits, and all other filed evidence, plus the parties’ briefs and other pleadings. I
consider prior awards for pain and suffering in both SPU and non-SPU SIRVA cases and
rely upon my experience adjudicating these cases. However, I base my determination on
the circumstances of this case.
The record establishes that as of October 13, 2017, Petitioner was 37 years old,
healthy, and raising three children (approximately 10, 6, and 4 years old) with her
husband. Ex. 5 at 50 – 51; Ex. 1 at ¶ 51. She was employed as a pharmacist and received
the at-issue vaccination in her left arm, while at work. Ex. 2 at 1.
Overall, Petitioner’s SIRVA was moderately severe. It was not documented at two
dermatology appointments on November 6 and December 1, 2017. Ex. 13 at 10 – 17. But
I previously concluded that those were “not an obvious context” for reporting a shoulder
injury. Chukwudum, 2023 WL 8112957 at *6. And a later dermatology appointment
referenced shoulder pain, but omitted any exam or assessment thereof – confirming that
the provider was focused on her separate and unrelated area of specialty. Id. Thus, the
dermatology encounters do not particularly impact the damages determination.
Petitioner’s shoulder injury was documented 49 days post-vaccination, on
December 1, 2017, through a complaint to her employer. Ex. 15 at 42. The employer
advised that it would manage the medical evaluation of the injury – and the resulting
costs. Id. The employer arranged an appointment with a physician’s assistant (“PA”)
which took place four days later and resulted in prescriptions for ibuprofen and
metaxalone, but the maintenance of Petitioner’s regular duties as a pharmacist. Id. at 43
– 44, 48 – 52. Those medications and four physical therapy (“PT”) sessions later in
December 2017 (see generally Ex. 4) were not associated with improvement, however.
By January 2018, Petitioner’s shoulder injury had worsened, prompting initial
evaluation with an orthopedist (affiliated with her employer); a shift to “light” work duties,
with no overhead lifting and weightbearing restrictions; several additional oral pain
medications, including a Medrol steroid dose pack; and a steroid injection. See generally
Ex. 15 at 16 – 19; Ex. 6 at 36 - 40. In February 2018, she started occupational therapy
(“OT”), Ex. 7 at 9 – 10, and MRIs of the shoulder suggested supraspinatus tearing;
subacromial impingement; biceps tendinitis; supraspinatus tendinopathy; and
degenerative changes of the superior labrum. Ex. 8 at 3; Ex. 6 at 49 – 50.
3
In spring 2018, Petitioner consulted a second and a third orthopedist (not affiliated
with her employer) who each endorsed surgical intervention. Ex. 8 at 1 – 2; Ex. 9 at 16 –
17. In contrast, her original orthopedist (affiliated with her employer) hoped that
Petitioner’s injury would heal with conservative treatment, including administration of a
second steroid injection on April 2, 2018. See generally Ex. 6 at 30 – 37.
On April 9, 2018, during her ninth (9th) OT session, Petitioner reported that her
shoulder was feeling better since the injection. Ex. 7 at 33. On April 18, 2018, during her
11th OT session and reevaluation, she reported that the injection was wearing off and her
pain was becoming more significant, and the therapist concurred that her shoulder
remained “severely impaired.” Id. at 49 – 50. After two more OT sessions in April 2018,
Petitioner did not return and was administratively discharged. Id. at 44 – 46, 51 – 53. S
In May 2018, Petitioner attended fourteen (14) chiropractic sessions. Ex. 14 at 5 –
11. She also started seeing a pain management specialist (also affiliated with her
employer). Ex. 5 at 21 – 24, 43 – 55. Upon starting an interdisciplinary pain rehabilitation
program (featuring mobilization, strengthening, and behavior modification) on June 11,
2018, Petitioner’s pain ranged from 0 – 10/10. Id. at 26. She had “Decreased AROM in
her L shoulder: flexion 100-A [active], 115-P [passive]; abduction 40-A, 50-P; extension
10; IR 45; ER 10 (pain with all ranges and compensatory movements.” Id. After twenty
(20) full days in this program, in mid-July 2018, she displayed improvements and was
cleared to return to work without restrictions. Id. at 6. After six more “after-care” sessions,
by July 31, 2018, her pain had decreased to 2 – 6/10. Id. at 26. She had: “Increased
AROM in her shoulder: flexion 140-A, 150-P; abduction 110-A, 120-P; extension 45; IR
45; ER 40 (pain at end range and compensatory movements with abduction, IR, and IR.”
Id. Petitioner was instructed to continue a home exercise program, and was referred back
to her orthopedist for reevaluation. Id. at 27.
In September 2018, the orthopedist assessed Petitioner’s shoulder as having
“improved,” but still featuring “persistent” pain and impingement. Ex. 6 at 26. The treater
discussed the option of a surgical “decompression and cuff debridement [which] would
reduce, but not get rid of the pain entirely.” Id.
By November 2018, Petitioner’s continued home exercises and another Medrol
dose pack had not cured her shoulder pain, which had persisted for over a year and still
interfered with her quality of life and sleep. Id. at 21. She opted for surgery, with an
expected recovery time of four months, and expected improvement of her condition by
“75 – 80%.” Ex. 6 at 21 – 22.
4
In January 2019, the orthopedist performed arthroscopic surgery – specifically,
glenohumeral debridement and subacromial decompression. Ex. 17 at 53 – 54. She
subsequently attended 12 post-operative PT sessions in January – March 2019, see
generally Ex. 18, which were punctuated by her orthopedist’s administration of another
steroid injection “to help quiet the inflammation to facilitate the therapy,” and
recommendation to “add a little rotator cuff strengthening.” Ex. 6 at 11. Through home
exercises, she achieved “full” ROM and “minima[l] tender[ness]” by April 2019; was
released from weightbearing restrictions in May 2019; and was assessed to be at
maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) as of June 20, 2019. Id. at 3, 5, 7. In
recommending ongoing “conditioning” exercises, the orthopedist wrote: “[T]he
maintenance of good strength and minimization of load with good body mechanics is
critical, and although she is young, and maybe even especially because she is young,
she needs to be attentive to this forever.” Id. at 5.
In February 2022, after a 32-month gap in evaluation or treatment of her left
shoulder,4 Petitioner returned to her orthopedist, who recorded: “She has had a little bit
of pain from time to time, but over the last couple of months it has been more sore. She
has not had any interval management. She has tried some anti-inflammatories with a
partial response.” Ex. 19 at 2. A physical examination found “good motion,” but positive
Hawkins and Neer’s tests. Id. The orthopedist assessed that Petitioner was dealing with
“some recurrent inflammation.” Id. Petitioner received prescriptions for Medrol and
Meloxicam, and agreed to “keeping activities light, hopefully nothing more than 5 pounds.”
Id. She declined a steroid injection or additional formal therapy, and she did not follow up
with the orthopedist. Id. There are no further treatment records, or other information
particularly helpful to assessing Petitioner’s ongoing condition.5
The above evidence establishes that after her October 2017 vaccination, Petitioner
suffered a moderately severe SIRVA for approximately 20 months. After an initial 49-day
treatment delay (with two intervening medical encounters for unrelated issues), her injury
was documented consistently, and it featured varying pain ratings; moderately restricted
ROM; consultations with three different orthopedists; two MRIs; various oral pain
medications; three steroid injections; 16 PT sessions; 11 OT sessions; 14 chiropractic
4 Excluding an October 2019 primary care annual exam record, which states in the Review of Systems “L
shoulder pain (improving).” Ex. 16 at 14. But this record misspells the orthopedist’s name, indicates that a
physical exam found full range of motion and full strength in the upper extremities, and did include any
relevant assessment or treatment. Id. at 14 – 15. Accordingly, the record has little probative value in
understanding Petitioner’s shoulder’s condition after June 2019.
5 Petitioner’s only affidavit was prepared in July 2020. Ex. 1. Her husband also submitted an affidavit
(primarily to bolster her onset showing), which only briefly attests that Petitioner’s pain and suffering
“continu[ed]” up to May 2023. Ex. 25.
5
sessions; an intensive pain management program; and arthroscopic surgery. The injury
also disrupted her work as pharmacist, and care of her three children. However, the
evidence also establishes that Petitioner’s shoulder had substantially recovered by 20
months post-vaccination, at which point she had full ROM and strength and was able to
return to her full work duties.
I recognize the orthopedist’s opinion that Petitioner’s shoulder might not be fully
healed after surgery, and that she should work to maintain her strength and stability – but
there is insufficient evidence of Petitioner adhering to such an exercise program or
suffering any cognizable residual effects beyond mid-2019, as evidenced by the dearth
of further medical records. Accordingly, the pain and suffering award will not include a
future component despite Petitioner’s urging, see Damages Brief at 3, 13 (requesting
$30,000.00 for future pain and suffering); Response at 18 (opposing any future award).
There is simply insufficient objective evidence of an ongoing/permanent deficit.
For her past pain and suffering, Petitioner requests an award of $140,000.00, and
Respondent counters with $97,500.00. Respondent’s approach is not appropriate, for
several reasons. First, he states: “The Court has awarded $91,000.00 - $110,000.00 in
cases involving severe [SIRVAs], usually requiring surgeries, but pain is not always
immediately reported.” Response at 13 (emphasis added). But he did not cite, nor did I
independently identify, any cases at the low end of that spectrum. Instead, the lowest
SIRVA surgery cases featured past pain and suffering awards of $95,000.00 each. And
such low awards were for specific reasons not replicated here – such as a five-month
initial treatment delay followed by another three-month gap in Shelton, 2021 WL 2550093,
at *7, and the “periods of little to no pain – as evidenced by some gaps in treatment” in
Shields, 2024 WL 5261893, at *11 (citing favorably to Hunt, 2022 WL 2826662, at *8 –
9).6 Ms. Chukwudum’s documented injury and treatment thereof was much more
consistent, thus warranting a higher award.
More interesting is Respondent’s acknowledgment of Davidson, which involved a
treatment delay of six weeks (compared to seven weeks and two intervening encounters
in this case). Response at 14.7 This case had a shorter treatment course (20 months,
compared to 30 months in Davidson) but it involved higher pain ratings and restrictions
of motion, additional imaging and specialist evaluations, more continuous treatment (with
6 Shelton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-279V, 2021 WL 2550093 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 21,
2021) (awarding $97,500.00 for past pain and suffering); Shields v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-
1970V, 2024 WL 5261893 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 26, 2024) ($95,000.00); Hunt v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 19-1003V, 2022 WL 2826662 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 16, 2022) ($95,000.00).
7 Davidson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1617V, 2024 WL 1152539 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb.
8, 2024) ($110,000.00).
6
less relief from steroid injections, and Petitioner attempting various therapies and an
intensive pain management program), and more post-operative PT sessions. Davidson,
2024 WL 11152539, at *4; see also Brief at 6 citing Reed, 2019 WL 1222925, at *15
(noting treatment by a pain management specialist).8
Also instructive is Petitioner’s citation to Nute, Brief at 9 – 10,9 in which an injured
party experienced several cortisone injections, 19 PT sessions, arthroscopic surgery
featuring subacromial decompression and debridement, as well as impaired functioning
with hands-on job tasks (nursing in Nute, pharmacology in this case). Nute featured a
somewhat shorter initial treatment delay of 37 days, but a much shorter treatment course
of eleven months, compared to the 20 months here. 2019 WL 6125008, at *11 – 12. And
Respondent has not explained why a degenerative labral tear dictates a lower award for
Petitioner’s SIRVA. Response at 14; but see, e.g., Ex. 6 at 24, 28, 32; Ex. 17 at 53
(orthopedist’s characterization of only “minimal” fraying and tendinosis). Like in Nute, her
surgical intervention primarily comprised of glenohumeral debridement and subacromial
decompression.
And again, this case involves very consistent documentation and treatment efforts
for the injury (even in the face of Petitioner’s employer placing roadblocks in the way of
surgical intervention). For the above reasons, plus some recognition of her work
disruptions (as discussed further below), I find Ms. Chukwudum is entitled to a past pain
and suffering award of $130,000.00.
II. Past Lost Earnings
The Vaccine Act provides for recovery of “actual and anticipated loss of earnings”
for a vaccinee whose “earning capacity is or has been impaired by reason of such
person's vaccine-related injury.” Section 15(a)(3)(A). But any such award must avoid
duplicating for any payment that has been made or can be reasonably expected to be
made, “under any State compensation program, under an insurance policy, or under any
Federal, or State health benefits program (other than under Title XIX of the Social Security
Act”). Section 15(g).
A lost earnings award must also reflect tax deductions that would have occurred.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983) (citing Norfolk & Western R.
Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980); see e.g., L.J. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.
8 Reed v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1670V, 2019 WL 1222925 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 1,
2019) ($160,000.00).
9 Nute v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-140V, 2019 WL 6125008 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 6,
2019).
7
17-959V, 2023 WL 2137946, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 20, 2023) (in which the
parties stipulated that the appropriate offsets for taxes reduced a past lost earnings award
from $9,223.80 to $5,681.50).
Lost earnings calculations must be performed ‘in accordance with generally
recognized principles and projections,” Section 15(a)(3)(A), and “in a cautious manner.”
Brown v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 00-182V, 2005 WL 2659073, at *6 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. Sept. 21, 2005). Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims recently cautioned that
“the determination of compensation for lost earnings ‘in accordance with generally
recognized actuarial principles and projections’ [will] likely require expert opinion
evidence.’” Dillenbeck v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 147 Fed. Cl. 131, 139 (2020).
Here, Ms. Chukwudum requests $11,568.16 in past lost wages. Brief at 12. The
evidence reflects that her SIRVA did not result in unemployment, but somewhat impaired
her ability to work as a pharmacist. Ex. 1 at ¶ 8 (explaining that her job required “frequen[t]
standing, moving, and bending for prolonged period of time”); Ex. 15 at 33 (reflecting a
December 2017 shift to “light duty”); Ex. 21 at 6 (July 2018 return to full work duty); Ex. 6
at 5, 7 (indicating additional work restrictions following the January 2019 surgery).
Petitioner typically worked 80 hours in each two-week pay period, at a rate of
$48.50 per hour (sometimes with overtime, at a higher hourly rate). Ex. 21 at 30 – 40 (pay
stubs from June – December 2017). But she reduced her hours, coinciding with periods
of acute pain and treatment for her SIRVA. See, e.g., Ex. 21 at 24 and Ex. 24 at 1
(reflecting a February 18 – March 3, 2018, pay period with 20.25 hours missed); accord
Ex. 6 at 36, 38; Ex. 7 at 9 – 10; Ex. 8 at 1 – 3 (orthopedics and therapy records from that
period). Additionally, she was excused from work, and paid at a “SafetyNet” reduced
hourly rate of $41.23 per hour for twelve weeks of post-surgical recovery. Ex. 21 at 7 –
12; Ex. 24 at 1 – 2 (January - March 2019 pay periods); accord Ex. Ex. 6 at 3 – 11; 17 at
53 – 54; Ex. 18 (corresponding medical records). Importantly, there is no apparent
alternative explanation for Petitioner’s reduced earnings throughout this period.
Thus, Petitioner had made some showing of lost earnings – but at the same time,
Respondent reasonably questions whether all necessary offsets have been applied.
Response at 17. Petitioner only replies that she has “carefully documented, calculated,
and checked [the lost earnings claim] or any potential offsets.” Reply at 6. But it is unclear
whether her workers’ compensation coverage was state-supported or entirely privately
funded. See, e.g., Ex. 23 at 4 (“Texas Workers’ Compensation Work Status Report”). And
she only calculated “wages missed,” Ex. 24 at 1 – 2, without any likely tax deductions.
For those reasons, Petitioner’s lost earnings claim is inadequately developed and will be
denied. However, in the interests of accomplishing “rough justice” and closing out this
8
case (which has been pending for nearly five years), the above past pain and suffering
award includes recognition of her work disruptions, and has been adjusted upwards
accordingly.
III. Past Unreimbursed Expenses
A petitioner may recover “actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the
date of judgment award such expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury
for which petitioner seeks compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person
who suffered such injury, and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care,
rehabilitation ... determined to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(B). But I have
previously declined to award the costs of home cleaning, recognized as a “typical” home
maintenance cost, when an individual “has not adequately demonstrated that he [or she]
can no longer do any typical tasks associated with cleaning except that it may take longer
to complete, or that the circumstances justify a special allowance for this sum.” Grant v.
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1262V, 2024 WL 940275, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Feb. 9, 2024) (denying home cleaning costs, despite awarding lawn service costs
that “more directly implicate[d] the limitations” placed on an individual dealing with
residual effects of Guillain-Barré syndrome, as endorsed by the Respondent’s expert).
Ms. Chukwudum’s damages briefing claims ongoing “struggles with essential
cleaning because of the inability for anything higher than chest level and cannot carry or
hold moderately heavy objects (similar to her work accommodations preventing the
same).” She requests reimbursement for home cleaning costs of $60.00 per week for 309
weeks (dating from her January 2019 surgery to her December 2024 opening brief) for a
total of $18,540.00. Brief at 13. She did not submit any documentation of actually incurring
those costs, as required under Section 15(a)(1)(B)(ii). I also agree with Respondent that
there is not evidence of an ongoing injury that would uniquely justify ongoing
housecleaning costs. Response at 18 (citing Ex. 6 at 14), compare Grant, 2024 WL
940275, at *7. Accordingly, those requested costs are denied.
Conclusion
For all the reasons discussed above and based on consideration of the entire
record, Petitioner is entitled to damages in the form of $141,097.11 (representing
$130,000.00 for past pain and suffering, and $11,097.11 for past unreimbursed
medical expenses10) to be paid through an ACH deposit to petitioner’s
10 The parties stipulated to the past unreimbursable medical expenses. Brief at 13; Response at 2; see also
Ex. 22 (supporting documentation).
9
counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. This amount represents
compensation for all damages that would be available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this
Decision.11
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Brian H. Corcoran
Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
11 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice
renouncing the right to seek review.
10