Z&R Cab, LLC v. Philadelphia Parking Authority

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., :

Ronald Blount, and Debra Bell, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1582 C.D. 2022

:

Philadelphia Parking Authority : Argued: March 4, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: April 22, 2025

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., Ronald Blount, and Debra Bell (collectively,

Licensees) appeal from the October 27, 2022 judgment of the Court of Common Pleas

of Philadelphia County (trial court) entered upon the jury verdict in favor of the

Philadelphia Parking Authority (Authority) and against Licensees, and from the trial

court’s July 16, 2020 order granting the Authority’s motion for partial summary

judgment. After careful review, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Licensees are two Philadelphia taxi companies, a former Philadelphia taxi

driver, and the assignee of a Philadelphia taxi dispatch company. Prior to 1990, the

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) regulated all taxicabs and limousines

in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including those in Philadelphia, subject to the

provisions of the Public Utility Code (Code).1 In 1990, the General Assembly passed

the Medallion Act, which required the PUC to regulate Philadelphia taxicabs pursuant

to distinct provisions not applicable to any other public utilities in Pennsylvania. 66

Pa.C.S. § 2414.

In 2004, the General Assembly enacted Act 94,2 transferring the

regulatory responsibility for the Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industries from the

PUC to the Authority. Act 94 also created a budget submission process for the

Authority to follow and it prescribed a formula that the Authority must use to ascertain

assessments imposed on Philadelphia taxi cabs. Pursuant to Section 5707(b) of Act 94,

the Authority, through its Taxicab and Limousine Division (TLD), established budget

and fee schedules under which it assessed regulatory fees on the various participants in

the Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industries. The Authority would submit the

budget and fee schedule to the Appropriations Committees of the Pennsylvania Senate

and House of Representatives each year. Unless the Appropriations Committees

adopted a disapproval resolution by April 15, the Authority’s budget and fee schedule

would become effective.

Taxicab and limousine industry members were required to pay these fees

in order to maintain their certificates of public convenience and/or their ability to

operate in the Philadelphia taxicab and/or limousine industries. Failure to pay the fees

also could result in the Authority’s imposition of fines and penalties on industry

members. Certain taxicab operators refused to pay regulatory assessments and fees

1

66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-3316.

2

Act of December 30, 2002, P.L. 2001, No. 230, reenacted and amended by the Act of July

16, 2004, P.L. 758, No. 94, as amended, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701-45.

2

imposed by the Authority and filed a petition in this Court’s original jurisdiction,

challenging the constitutionality of Section 5707 of Act 94.

In MCT Transportation Inc. v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 60 A.3d

899 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d, 81 A.3d 813 and 83 A.3d 85 (Pa. 2013), this Court found in

favor of the taxicab operators, concluding that Section 5707 of Act 94 was

unconstitutional because it violated the Pennsylvania Constitution by impermissibly

delegating legislative power to the Authority by granting the Authority the power to

formulate its own budget and fee schedule without restriction or guidance from the

General Assembly. We found that the Appropriations Committee’s power to

disapprove of the Authority’s budget did not suffice to pass constitutional muster under

the non-delegation doctrine. We also found that Section 5707 of Act 94 deprived the

taxicab operators of due process because it did not provide any procedure for

challenging the Authority’s fee schedule, either before or after its adoption. Id. at 916-

17. Our decision was later upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

In response to MCT Transportation, in July 2013, the General Assembly

enacted Act 643 to amend Act 94 to cure the constitutional shortcomings. Act 64

established a new process for setting the Authority’s budget and fee schedule and for

calculating the individual taxicab assessment. By enacting Act 64, the General

Assembly amended Section 5707 and added Sections 5707.1 and 5710.

Section 5707 of Act 64 now requires legislative approval of the

Authority’s proposed budgets. Regarding assessments for taxicabs, limousines, and

dispatchers, in Section 5707(c)(1)(v), the General Assembly set the taxicab assessment

for the fiscal years ending June 30, 2013, and June 30, 2014, to be $1,250.00. 53

Pa.C.S. § 5707(c)(1)(v). Section 5707.1(a) requires the Authority to serve notice of

3

Act of July 9, 2013, P.L. 455, No. 64, as amended, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5707.1, 5710.

3

assessment to each regulated party. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5707.1(a). Section 5707.1(b) permits

regulated parties to file a petition with the Authority that avers that the assessment is

excessive or otherwise invalid. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5707.1(b).

On October 22, 2013, Licensees filed a civil rights class action in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging a federal due process violation and seeking a full refund of the fees they

had paid. The District Court dismissed the case on the ground that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. Licensees appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded the case

on the ground that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction because Licensees’

claim arose under the United States Constitution and federal law. Z&R Cab, LLC v.

Philadelphia Parking Authority, 616 F. App’x 527 (3d Cir. 2015). Upon remand, the

District Court deferred to a state court.

On June 10, 2014, Licensees filed a complaint in the trial court to pursue

remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that all the putative class members are

entitled to a full refund of all fees that they paid from 2004 through 2013 (the period

when the now-declared unconstitutional Act 94 was in effect). The Authority filed a

motion for summary judgment asking the trial court to rule that the putative class

members are not entitled to a class-wide refund.

The trial court granted the motion on the ground that MCT Transportation

did not hold that the assessments and fees that Licensees paid to the Authority were

beyond the Authority’s power. The trial court further noted that MCT Transportation

held that the Authority denied Licensees the procedural due process right to challenge

assessments. The trial court ordered the Authority to provide a review procedure

regarding assessments and the fees that it charged the taxicab industry from 2004 to

4

2013 under Act 94. The trial court ruled, inter alia, that the Authority shall issue

notices of assessment to the members of the taxicab industry to whom it charged fees

in the years 2004-2013.

Licensees appealed the decision to this Court, which reversed and

remanded the case. Z&R Cab, LLC v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 187 A.3d 1025

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc). We held that the trial court lacked the authority to

impose the procedural remedy it created in its order granting the summary judgment

motion and that the order was inappropriate given the existence of genuine issues of

fact. Id. at 1037. We stated that Licensees’ available remedy should be limited in

terms of both time and amount. Regarding time, citing McKesson Corp. v. Division

of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida,

496 U.S. 18 (1990), we indicated that states may avail themselves of a variety of

procedural protections against any disruptive effects of the Authority’s fee schedule’s

invalidation, such as “enforcing relatively short statutes of limitation applicable to

refund actions.” Z&R Cab, LLC, 187 A.3d at 1037. Regarding the amount of the

refund, we made clear that basic principles of causation must govern any

consideration of money damages in the nature of a refund:

We have substantial doubt regarding Licensees’ entitlement

to the full refund they demand. In McKesson [], the U.S.

Supreme Court set forth permissible retroactive remedies for

parties burdened by unconstitutional tax statutes. The tax

statute at issue in McKesson improperly discriminated

between different groups of taxpayers in interstate

commerce. One available remedy was to refund the

difference between the tax paid and the tax that should have

been assessed had unconstitutional distinctions not been

made. Id. Stated differently, one possible remedy was a

refund “of the excess taxes paid by petitioner . . . .”

....

5

Although we will not decide this issue now, by analogy to

McKesson, and consistent with [Z&R Cab, LLC v.

Philadelphia Parking Authority, 616 F. App’x 527 (3d Cir.

2015)], Licensees could be entitled to recover only the

portion, if any, of their fees and assessments that

exceeded the amount the Authority would have assessed

had it been subject to constitutional standards, guidance,

and limits imposed by the General Assembly.

Z&R Cab, LLC, 187 A.3d at 1036-37 (emphasis added).

Following remand, on June 20, 2019, the trial court certified the class

composed of all individuals, partnerships, corporations, limited liability companies, or

other business entities which paid to the Authority fees assessed under the provisions

of 53 Pa.C.S. § 5707(b), from July 16, 2004, until July 9, 2013. The Authority filed a

motion for summary judgment, arguing that Licensees’ claims for damages for any

period prior to October 22, 2011 (two years before the action was filed), were barred

by the statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Authority argued that Licensees should not be permitted to invoke the discovery rule4

by claiming they were unaware that their injury had been caused by another party’s

action because Licensees had actual knowledge of the injury and its causal relationship

to the Authority on the day each fee and assessment was issued. In support, it presented

letters to demonstrate that Licensees knew of the injury and cause. The Authority

further argued that by enacting Act 64, the General Assembly cured the constitutional

defects found in MCT Transportation, and Act 64 was ruled constitutional by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Germantown Cab Co. v. Philadelphia Parking

Authority, 206 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2019). Therefore, Licensees’ claims for refunds during

4

The discovery rule is an exception to the general principle that once a statutory period has

expired, a complaining party is barred from bringing a lawsuit. Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15

A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011). The discovery rule provides that where a complaining party is reasonably

unaware that his or her injury has been caused by another party’s conduct, the rule tolls the running

of the statute of limitations. Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858-59 (Pa. 2005).

6

the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013, were barred by the adoption of Act 64, which

retroactively set the fees for that fiscal year and required a partial refund, without any

discretion of the Authority.

By order and opinion dated July 16, 2020, the trial court granted the

Authority’s motion for partial summary judgment, by narrowing the scope of

Licensees’ potential claim to an approximately eight-month period from October 22,

2011 (i.e., two years before the class action was filed), to July 1, 2012 (collectively, the

damages period). The trial court agreed with the Authority that the discovery rule did

not apply because Licensees knew or should have known of both injury and cause as

soon as they found increased fees were excessive (injury), and they knew that the fees

were proposed and imposed by the Authority (cause). The trial court further agreed

with the Authority that Licensees may not claim a refund for the assessments and fees

imposed by the Authority for fiscal year 2013 on due process grounds because those

fees were set by the General Assembly, and the protections of procedural due process

do not extend to legislative action. By Order dated October 19, 2020, the trial court

specified the issue which must be addressed at trial:

The following issue of material fact remains unresolved:

whether the amount of damages can be estimated from a

comparison between what [Licensees] actually paid [the

Authority] under Act 94 and what [Licensees] would have

paid [the PUC] had they enjoyed constitutional protections.

(Trial Ct. Op., July 19, 2020, at 2, n.2.) Licensees did not appeal the trial court’s

decision.

A four-day jury trial commenced on February 14, 2022. Licensees’

economic forensics expert, Chad Staller, provided evidence by way of charts and tables

of economic loss sustained by Licensees by comparing the general revenue from the

Authority to the revenue the PUC would have generated during the damages period.

7

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 223a-25a.) The Authority’s revenue or “money gained

by” the Authority, Staller explained, represented “all the fees that were paid by” or

“expended” by Licensees. Id. at 225a-26a. With respect to the PUC’s revenues, Staller

calculated the amount the PUC would have charged based upon the historical revenue

that PUC did charge from fiscal year 1997 through 2004-2005. Id. at 227a. Staller

determined the amount the PUC would have charged in 2005 and thereafter by applying

the three-percent growth rate to the averages of the PUC’s revenue before 2005. Id. at

227a-33a. He assumed, based on the allegation of the complaint, that every cent more

the Authority charged than the PUC was the product of a due process violation. Id.

at 257a. That is because Act 94 had been deemed unconstitutional on grounds of

non-delegation and due process.

On cross-examination, Staller acknowledged that his damage calculation

included the administrative surcharge paid with every parking ticket in the City of

Philadelphia and amounts that were unrelated to Section 5707 of Act 94, the specific

statutory provision MCT Transportation declared unconstitutional. Id. at 262a-68a.

Staller also testified that he did not use the Authority’s actual daily receipts to calculate

the Authority’s revenues for the eight-month damages period. Id. at 269a.

To counter Licensees’ position that the charges were the product of a

constitutional violation, the Authority provided evidence that the Medallion Act

(pursuant to which the PUC charged fees and assessments) suffered from the same

constitutional infirmities found to exist in Act 94. Christine Kirlin, the Director of

TLD, testified that the budgeting and assessment procedures under Act 94 were not

different than those used by the PUC under the Medallion Act. Id. at 392a-93a. She

explained that neither the Medallion Act nor Act 94 set standards or limitations for the

8

regulatory budget. Id. Neither required legislative approval before the budget and fee

schedule became effective. Id. Neither provided a protest procedure for operators. Id.

Kirlin also explained that, prior to the adoption of Act 94, the taxicab and

limousine industries in Philadelphia were not clean, safe, reliable, or well regulated. Id.

at 373a. In enacting Act 94, the Legislature explicitly found that the industries would

benefit from a well-regulated local focus. Id. Complying with that mandate included,

among other things, hiring more full-time inspectors, which cost more money. Id. at

387a. In addition, the Legislature validated the same level of regulation and

assessments that the Authority charged under Act 94 when it passed Act 64 in the

aftermath of MCT Transportation. Id. at 436a. Those assessments and fees under Act

64 were the same, and in many cases higher, than they were under Act 94. Id. at 438a.

At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the law and

sent the jury to deliberate with a Verdict Sheet. Licensees objected to neither. In

relevant part, the jury was tasked with answering the following:

1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the []

Authority increased its fees and fines beyond what the [PUC]

would have charged during the period of October 22, 2011

through July 1, 2012, as a result of the lack of due process

protections in Act 94?

2. Do you find that [Licensees] proved by a preponderance

of the evidence that they suffered an actual injury during the

period of October 22, 2011 through July 1, 2012, as a result

of the lack of due process protections in Act 94?

(Jury Verdict Sheet, Licensees’ Br., Ex. C.)

The jury unanimously answered “No” to both questions. The jury thus

found that Licensees failed to prove that they “suffered an actual injury . . . as a result

of the lack of due process protections in Act 94.” Id. The jury also found that the

9

Authority did not increase its fees and fines “beyond what the [PUC] would have

charged during the [damages period] as a result of the lack of due process protections

in Act 94.” Id. Licensees did not challenge the jury’s verdict before the jury was

discharged.

Licensees subsequently filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief seeking a new

trial. First, Licensees argued that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the

evidence because the only evidence of what the PUC might have charged in 2011 and

2012 was provided by their expert and that evidence showed that the Authority charged

more than what the PUC would have charged and those excess amounts necessarily

resulted from a lack of due process protections in Act 94. Second, Licensees

claimed that the trial court’s summary judgment rulings impermissibly restricted the

jury from considering whether Licensees were entitled to damages before and after the

limited damages period. They further claimed that the discovery rule was a question

that should have been submitted to the jury.

On September 26, 2022, the trial court denied Licensees’ Post-Trial

Motion. With respect to Licensees’ weight of the evidence argument, the trial court

found that the Authority, on cross-examination, had contradicted Staller’s opinions,

and, therefore, the jury’s “No” answer to Question 1 on the Verdict Sheet was not

against the weight of the evidence. Concerning Question 2 on the Verdict Sheet, the

trial court found that the jury heard ample evidence permitting it to conclude that no

portion of the fees and assessments the Authority imposed could be attributed to the

due process violations in Act 94. Regarding its summary judgment ruling, the trial

court concluded, consistent with its July 16, 2020 order, that the discovery rule did not

apply because reasonable minds would not differ in finding that Licensees knew or

should have, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of their alleged injury and

10

its cause. With respect to the damages period, the trial court concluded that Licensees

could not claim a refund for the assessments and fees the Authority imposed in fiscal

year 2013 because the protections of procedural due process do not extend to legislative

actions. This appeal followed.

II. Issues

On appeal, Licensees raise four issues:

A. Was the jury’s verdict against the weight of the evidence

where the parties agreed that the Authority increased its

fees and fines above what the PUC charged and that the

only authority for the increase was an unconstitutional

statute (Act 94)?

B. Was the trial court’s entry of summary judgment,

precluding the jury from considering the discovery rule

and restricting the trial’s focus to the period 2011 to 2012

an error of law?

C. Did the trial court’s entry of summary judgment preclude

jury consideration of whether Act 94 accorded a full and

adequate retroactive remedy and signal to the jury that the

legislature ratified the Authority’s past budgets?

D. Did the trial court’s entry of summary judgment

improperly remove from the jury’s consideration whether

a full refund would constitute a full and adequate remedy?

(Licensees’ Br. at 4-5.)

11

III. Analysis

1.

Licensees argue that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the

evidence5 because Question 1 on the Verdict Sheet could only have been answered

“Yes.” Licensees argue that there could be only one possible answer to Question 1

because the parties agreed that the Authority charged more than the PUC did under the

Medallion Act, and because there was only one statutory basis for the Authority to

charge anything at all, and that was Act 94, the statute that the Court declared

unconstitutional in MCT Transportation for, inter alia, violating due process. Thus,

according to Licensees, any increased fees and fines charged by the Authority over and

above those charged by the PUC (under the Medallion Act) necessarily resulted from

a lack of due process protections in Act 94. Licensees assert that the jury’s refusal to

recognize this was against the weight of the evidence.

We address first the Authority’s argument that Licensees waived their

weight of the evidence claim because they did not move for judgment as a matter of

law, never objected to either the jury instructions or the Verdict Sheet, and did not

object once the jury returned its verdict.

We do not agree that Licensees waived the weight of the evidence claim.

A claim challenging the weight of the evidence is not the type of claim that must be

raised before the jury is discharged. Such a claim is not premised upon trial court error

or some discrete and correctable event at trial. The challenge does not dispute the

power of the jury to render the verdict it rendered, nor does it even allege any facial

5

A trial court’s action in granting or refusing such a motion will not be reversed in the absence

of a manifest abuse of discretion or a clear error of law. Premises Commonly Known as Lot No. 26,

Section 36, of Official Survey of City of New Castle, Lawrence County v. Redevelopment Authority of

City of New Castle, 432 A.2d 321, 322 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).

12

error in the verdict of the jury. Criswell v. King, 834 A.2d 505, 515 (Pa. 2003). Rather,

it is a claim which, by definition, ripens only after the verdict, and it is properly

preserved so long as it is raised in timely post-verdict motions. Id. at 513. The

Authority cites Stapas v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 198 A.3d 1033 (Pa. 2018), in support of its

waiver argument. Stapas is not on point because it did not involve a weight of the

evidence claim. Instead, it involved a problematic verdict. There, Giant Eagle

challenged the jury’s ability to award damages for future lost wages. However, it failed

to object to the jury’s verdict awarding future lost wages before the trial court dismissed

the jury. The Supreme Court held that Giant Eagle waived its objection for post-trial

relief because a belated objection challenging the jury’s ability to render a verdict

deprived the trial court of the opportunity to efficiently correct a trial error.

Turning next to the merits, it has been Licensees’ position that they were

automatically entitled to a full refund of the difference between the charges the PUC

would have charged under the Medallion Act and what the Authority charged under

Act 94 – purely based on the fact that Act 94 was found to violate due process

protections because it did not provide a means for the taxicab and limousine

owners to protest the fees and assessments. It is their contention that the “only legal

basis for the [Authority] to charge fees and fines during the class period was [Section]

5707 [Act 94], and that statute was unconstitutional.” (Licensees’ Br. at 15.) However,

that is not the law.

The United States Supreme Court has explained that damages for a

Section 1983 claim should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right

in question. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). Indeed, an injury for a violation of

procedural due process rights “cannot be presumed to occur, and . . . plaintiffs at least

should be put to their proof on the issue, as plaintiffs are in most tort actions.” Id. at

13

262. Thus, a Section 1983 plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the

constitutional violation and the relief sought.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Halpern 2012, LLC v.

City of Center Line, Michigan, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1121 (E.D. Mich. 2019), aff’d,

806 F. App’x 390 (6th Cir. 2020), is instructive. In Halpern, a property owner

(Halpern) brought a class action under Section 1983 against the City of Center Line,

Michigan (Center Line), challenging the constitutionality of Center Line’s ordinance

requiring owners who rented their properties to register, comply with habitability

standards, and submit to inspections. The trial court granted summary judgment in

favor of Halpern, finding that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment on its face

because it permitted an administrative search without either a warrant or providing the

owner with an opportunity to obtain pre-compliance review before a neutral

decisionmaker. As explained by the trial court, the fundamental nature of this violation

was a deprivation of the opportunity to be heard: “the opportunity for pre-compliance

review must be such that a property owner has a chance to challenge a warrantless

search before being sanctioned for refusing entry to a city inspector.” Halpern, 404 F.

Supp. 3d at 1121. Although the trial court found the inspection ordinance

unconstitutional, it nonetheless rejected Halpern’s claim to recover a refund of all fees

it paid under the ordinance, including inspection fees.

To recover damages under § 1983, the plaintiff must bring

out facts that establish a causal connection between the

constitutional violation and the damages they seek . . . The

Court must therefore determine whether the absence of pre-

compliance review was both the cause in fact and proximate

cause of plaintiff’s payment of inspection and registration

fees.

14

“Cause in fact is typically assessed using the “but for” test,

which requires us to imagine whether the harm would have

occurred if the defendant had behaved other than it did[.]” .

. . In other words, here, [the p]laintiff must show that it and

the other property owners would not have paid the

registration and inspection fees “but for” the absence of

pre-compliance review. “[I]f the result would have

occurred without the conduct complained of, such

conduct cannot be a cause in fact of that particular

result.”

But here, the unavailability of a pre-inspection review

process or warrant procedure is not the cause in fact of these

fees or the “damages” which [the p]laintiff claims to have

incurred. To lawfully rent a property within the [c]ity, a

property owner must obtain a certificate of compliance and

pay registration and inspection fees. Municipalities are

entitled to impose inspections and certificates of compliance

to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens . . . .

Rental property inspections are therefore clearly mandated

by law and it is likewise permissible for [ the d]efendant to

charge minimal amounts to offset the costs associated with

these inspections . . . . Because registration and inspection

fees are lawful requirements and must be paid regardless of

the absence of pre-compliance review, its absence cannot be

the cause in fact of [the p]laintiff’s injuries. And because [the

p]laintiff cannot establish that the ordinance’s deficiencies

were the cause in fact of its injuries, it is unnecessary to

determine whether it was the proximate cause of those same

injuries.

Id. at 1121-22 (emphasis added and citations omitted).

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed:

Halpern has not shown that Center Line’s adoption or

implementation of the unconstitutional section of the prior

[ordinance] caused it to pay registration or inspection fees.

To the contrary, nothing in Halpern’s argument or in the

record suggests that if Center Line had provided an

opportunity for pre-compliance review or required a warrant

15

at the time Halpern’s property was registered as a rental and

an inspection was scheduled, Halpern would not have paid

the required fees.

Of course, causation would be established if the registration

and inspection fees were themselves unconstitutional; but

they are not. Center Line’s rental property registration and

inspection requirements are reasonable means of advancing

its governmental interests in public safety and welfare, and it

may impose reasonable fees to offset the costs of advancing

those interests.

Halpern, 806 F. Appx. at 395.

The Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the claim that since the fee

requirements fell under the same unconstitutional ordinance scheme, they were

necessarily invalid and must be refunded under McKesson:

According to Halpern, McKesson and Carpenter [v. Shaw,

280 U.S. 363 (1930)] establish that Center Line must

refund the fees Halpern paid to the city when the

unconstitutional section of the [ordinance] was in effect.

We disagree. As the district court in MS Rentals[, LLC v.

City of Detroit, 362 F. Supp. 3d 404 (E.D. Mich. 2019),]

explained in rejecting the same argument, those cases

“involved refunding payments where the underlying tax or

assessment scheme was deemed unlawful.” 362 F. Supp. 3d

at 419. As discussed above, the underlying fees in this

case were not unlawful.

Indeed, McKesson highlights the shortcomings of Halpern’s

claim for damages because, unlike the plaintiff in that case,

Halpern cannot demonstrate a difference between what it

actually paid the city and what it would have paid had the

[ordinance] been constitutional from the start. See

McKesson, 496 U.S. at 40[].

16

806 F. App’x. at 396 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Halpern Court noted that

causation might have been established if the registration fees and inspection fees were

themselves unconstitutional, but they were not. Id. at 395.

Here, Licensees’ automatic full refund theory is no different from the

theory rejected in Halpern. Licensees failed to establish that the lack of due process

(lack of means to protest the fees and fines) in Act 94 caused them to pay more fees

and fines to the Authority than were paid to the PUC under the Medallion Act. They

failed to causally connect the damages they seek to the specific underlying

constitutional violation, i.e., the procedural due process violation in Act 94 identified

in MCT Transportation. Nothing in Licensees’ argument or in the record suggests that

the fees and fines themselves were unconstitutional (e.g., they were excessive or

confiscatory or beyond the Authority’s power to impose or that Licensees were

absolutely immune from them). As the Authority’s evidence demonstrated, the

Medallion Act – the law under which the PUC regulated the Philadelphia taxicab

industry from 1991 to 2005 – suffered from the same constitutional infirmities that the

MCT Transportation Court found to exist in Act 94; namely, it required the PUC to

create a budget that included fees and assessments that went into effect without any

legislative approval or guiding standard, R.R. at 364a, and without a procedure to

challenge the PUC-imposed fees and assessments. Id. at 368a-69a. Christine Kirlin,

then-Director of the Authority’s TLD, explained:

Act 94 required us to do the exact same thing that was in the

Medallion Act to create a budget with fees and assessments

and submit it to the senate and the house committees . . . if

they didn’t act, it didn’t require legislative approval.

Id. at 393a.

17

The jury heard unrebutted testimony demonstrating that the Authority

would have lawfully imposed the same charges notwithstanding the due process flaws

in Act 94. When the Legislature enacted Act 94, it publicly announced that it intended

a more robustly regulated taxicab and limousine industry in Philadelphia, which

required greater regulatory expenses without any regard to industry members’ due

process rights. As Kirlin explained, prior to the adoption of Act 94, the taxicab and

limousine industries in Philadelphia were not clean, safe, reliable, or well regulated.

Id. at 376a. In enacting Act 94, the Legislature explicitly found that the industries

would benefit from a well-regulated local focus. Id. at 375a. Complying with that

undisputedly lawful mandate required things, such as hiring more full-time inspectors,

which cost more money, and hence higher fees. Id. at 387a.

Considering this evidence, we find it was not conscious shocking for the

jury to reject Licensees’ full refund theory that every dollar the Authority charged in

excess of the hypothetical amounts the PUC would have charged under the Medallion

Act resulted from the lack of due process protections in Act 94. Accordingly, we find

Licensees’ weight of the evidence challenge to be without merit.

2.

In their second issue, Licensees argue that the trial court erred by granting

summary judgment and precluding the jury from considering the discovery rule and

restricting the trial’s focus to the period 2011 to 2012.6 They contend that the question

of when a person should know he or she has been injured is a fact issue for the jury.

6

The standard of review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo and the scope of review

is plenary. Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (Pa. 2011). Summary judgment is

appropriate only if the record clearly demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue of any material fact

as to a necessary element of the cause of action.” Id. (quoting Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(1)). The record

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Id.

18

The trial court’s entry of summary judgment took this question away from the jury and

may have led the jury to believe that passage of the unconstitutional statute must have

occurred within two years of filing of the complaint.

Having just concluded that Licensees failed to carry their burden of proof

as to causation, we need not decide if the trial court erred in limiting the damages period

because that is now irrelevant. Nevertheless, even if we were required to decide the

issue, we would hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Licensees’ claims

for a refund of funds before October 22, 2011, were barred by the two-year statute of

limitations. The applicable statute of limitations for Licensees’ civil rights action is two

years. Lindquist v. Buckingham Township, 68 F. App’x. 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2003) (“In

Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years, and

thus the statute of limitations for a civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

is also two years.”). The statute of limitations begins to run on Licensees’ claim from

the time the cause of action accrues. S.T. Hudson Engineers, Inc. v. Camden Hotel

Development Associates, 747 A.2d 931, 934 (Pa. Super. 2000). Accrual of a cause of

action under Section 1983 occurs “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or

her constitutional rights have been violated.” Graff v. Kohlman, 28 F. App’x. 151, 153

(3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a property owner’s action for excessive property taxes

accrued on the date that the property owner received the allegedly inflated property tax

assessments, rather than at some later date); see also Gordon v. Lowell, 95 F. Supp. 2d

264, 272 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[T]he claim accrues upon knowledge of the actual injury,

not that the injury constitutes a legal wrong.”).

Applying these principles and considering undisputed evidence provided

by the Authority, the trial court found that Licensees possessed all relevant facts to file

19

a lawsuit as soon as the Authority levied the assessments and fees at issue. We discern

no error.

3.

Next, Licensees argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they could

not challenge the effect of Act 647 and claim a refund for fees and assessments the

Authority imposed in fiscal year 2013. In doing so, Licensees claim that whether Act

64 provided a full and complete remedy to the class members was a fact question for

the jury to decide. This argument fails for the simple reason that the General Assembly

explicitly corrected the constitutional defects in Act 94 as found in MCT

Transportation as applied to fiscal year 2013 by setting – through duly enacted

legislation – the assessment and fee schedule. Thus, those fees were not established by

the Authority’s unfettered discretion, and Licensees could not possibly claim that they

had any basis to protest with the Authority the amounts imposed by the General

Assembly.

“[T]he protections of procedural due process do not extend to legislative

actions.” Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 615 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (dismissing

developer’s claim that township violated its procedural due process rights by enacting

zoning amendments without affording it a hearing; “to provide every person affected

by legislation the various rights encompassed by procedural due process including

hearings, opportunity for confrontation and response, clear standards, an impartial

arbiter, and possibly judicial review would be inconsistent with the structure of our

system of government”).

Thus, Licensees had no valid claim for refunds of any amounts assessed

and paid for fiscal year 2013 because the General Assembly, not the Authority,

7

To reiterate, Act 64 became effective July 9, 2013 (soon after MCT Transportation), and

established fees for the fiscal year that ran from July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2013.

20

explicitly adopted those fees and assessments. Any attempt to claim amounts paid in

fiscal year 2013 would be an impermissible attempt to raise a due process claim for

legislative action.

4.

In its last issue, Licensees argue that the trial court’s entry of summary

judgment improperly denied them the opportunity to seek a full refund of all the fees

and fines they had paid under the requirements of Act 94. We discern no such error.

As a matter of law, Licensees were not entitled to a full refund of all the

fees and fines they had paid under Act 94. We held in MCT Transportation that Act

94 violated procedural due process rights because it did not provide an opportunity for

operators to challenge the amount of assessments or fees. We did not hold that taxicab

operators were constitutionally immune from the assessments or fees collected under

Act 94 or that it was beyond the Authority’s power to collect them, which may have

entitled Licensees to a full refund. See, e.g., McKesson (involving unconstitutional

discriminatory taxes). Therefore, the trial court did not err by barring Licensees from

arguing to the jury that they were entitled to a full refund of all the fees paid under Act

94. See also our thorough discussion of this issue in Z&R Cab, LLC, 187 A.3d at 1037

(“Licensees could be entitled to recover only the portion, if any, of their fees and

assessments that exceeded the amount the Authority would have assessed had it been

subject to constitutional standards, guidance, and limits imposed by the General

Assembly.”).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s October 27, 2022 judgment and

its July 16, 2020 order are affirmed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

21

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., :

Ronald Blount, and Debra Bell, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1582 C.D. 2022

:

Philadelphia Parking Authority :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2025, the October 27, 2022

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and its July 16,

2020 order are hereby affirmed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge