The opinion
Slip Op. 25-49
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
WAGNER SPRAY TECH
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES, Before: Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
Defendant, Court No. 23-00241
and
ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR
TRADE COMMITTEE,
Defendant-Intervenor.
OPINION AND ORDER
[Remanding the U.S. Department of Commerce’s final scope ruling on Wagner
Spray Tech Corporation’s finished heat sink manifold/paint sprayer product.]
Dated: April 21, 2025
Andrew Thomas Schutz, Jordan C. Kahn, Michael Scott Holton, and Ned Herman
Marshak, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt, LLP, of
Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff Wagner Spray Tech Corporation.
Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director, and Collin T. Mathias, Trial Attorney,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of
Washington, D.C., for Defendant United States. With them on the brief were
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Patricia M.
McCarthy, Director. Of counsel on the brief was Jared Michael Cynamon,
Court No. 23-00241 Page 2
Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance,
U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, D.C. Also of counsel was
Danielle V. Cossey, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement
and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, D.C.
Alan Hayden Price, Robert Edward DeFrancesco, III, Elizabeth Seungyon Lee,
Laura El-Sabaawi, and Paul A. Devamithran, Wiley Rein, LLP, of Washington,
D.C., for Defendant-Intervenor Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee.
Choe-Groves, Judge: Plaintiff Wagner Spray Tech Corporation (“Wagner”
or “Plaintiff”) is an importer of paint sprayers who filed this action challenging the
final scope ruling on part number 805-324 of Wagner’s Titan 440 line of paint
sprayers (“Wagner’s product,” or “part 805-324”) issued by the U.S. Department
of Commerce (“Commerce”). Summons, ECF No. 1; Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 8, ECF No.
10. Commerce determined that Wagner’s paint sprayer was covered by the scope
of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from
the People’s Republic of China (“China”) (collectively, “Orders”) and not eligible
for the scope exclusion for finished heat sinks under the Orders. See Final Scope
Ruling on Wagner Finished Heat Sink Manifold, A-570-967 and C-570-968 (Oct.
17, 2023) (P.R. 30)1 (“Final Scope Ruling”); see also Aluminum Extrusions from
the People’s Republic of China, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26,
2011) (antidumping duty order) (“Antidumping Duty Order”); Aluminum
Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Dep’t of
1
Citations to the administrative record reflect the public record (“P.R.”), ECF No.
32.
Court No. 23-00241 Page 3
Commerce May 26, 2011) (countervailing duty order) (“Countervailing Duty
Order”).
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Rule 56.2 motion for judgment on the agency
record, in which Plaintiff argues that Commerce erred in finding that Wagner’s
paint sprayer did not fall within the finished heat sink exclusion of the Orders on
aluminum extrusions from China. Pl.’s Mot. J. Agency R. & Pl.’s Mem. L. Supp.
Pl.’s Mot. J. Agency R. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 23. The United States
(“Defendant” or “Government”) and Defendant-Intervenor Aluminum Extrusions
Fair Trade Committee (“Defendant-Intervenor” or “AEFTC”) oppose Plaintiff’s
motion. Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. J. Agency R. (“Def.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 24; Def.-
Interv. Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee Resp. Mot. J. Agency R.
(“Def.-Interv.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 25. Plaintiff filed a reply brief. Pl.’s Reply Br.,
ECF No. 28. In lieu of oral argument, the Court issued questions to the Parties,
and the Parties submitted written responses. Letter (Jan. 8, 2025), ECF No. 35;
Paperless Order (Feb. 6, 2025), ECF No. 36. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court remands Commerce’s final scope ruling.
BACKGROUND
Commerce issued the two Orders on aluminum extrusions from China on
May 26, 2011. Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; Countervailing
Court No. 23-00241 Page 4
Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653. Both Orders had identical scope language,
which provided the following description of the subject merchandise:
The merchandise covered by this order is aluminum extrusions which
are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from
aluminum alloys having metallic elements corresponding to the alloy
series designations published by The Aluminum Association
commencing with the numbers 1, 3, and 6 (or proprietary equivalents
or other certifying body equivalents).
Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; Countervailing Duty Order, 76
Fed. Reg. at 30,653.
The Orders explicitly excluded “finished heat sinks.” Antidumping Duty
Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
Finished heat sinks are defined as follows:
Finished heat sinks are fabricated heat sinks made from aluminum
extrusions the design and production of which are organized around
meeting certain specified thermal performance requirements and
which have been fully, albeit not necessarily individually, tested to
comply with such requirements.
Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; Countervailing Duty Order, 76
Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
The exclusion of finished heat sinks from these Orders resulted from the
U.S. International Trade Commission’s (“ITC”) determination2 that finished heat
2
The ITC’s like product determination regarding finished heat sinks was upheld in
Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Comm. v. United States, 36 CIT 1370, 1372
(2012).
Court No. 23-00241 Page 5
sinks were a separate like product from other aluminum extrusions that were
causing, or presenting a threat of, material injury to the domestic industry. Certain
Aluminum Extrusions from China, USITC Pub. 4229, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-475 and
731-TA-1177, at 1 (May 2011) (“ITC Final Report”). The ITC Final Report
promulgated the definition for finished heat sinks set forth in the Orders and
further explained that finished heat sinks are distinct from most other aluminum
extrusions:
by virtue of the specific and precise tolerances to which they are
generally produced. [Finished heat sinks] are designed to remove
damaging heat from electronic equipment. The flat surface tolerance
for FHS is often 1/1000 of an inch per inch, compared to 4/1000 to
14/1000 of an inch per inch for ordinary aluminum extrusions.
Id. at 7. In terms of production, the ITC Final Report identified that “[s]pecialized
equipment, including wind tunnels, flow calibration equipment, testing equipment,
and specialized design and data collection software, are used to design [finished
heat sinks] and to produce prototypes.” Id. at 8. The ITC Final Report also
highlighted the “customized thermal resistance properties” of finished heat sinks as
a distinguishing characteristic of the merchandise. Id. at 7. Additionally, the ITC
Final Report noted that finished heat sinks “are certified to perform within thermal
resistance parameters” and are “precisely or optimally suited to cool the specific
electronic devices for which they have been designed.” Id.
Court No. 23-00241 Page 6
On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a scope ruling request seeking a
determination that its “finished heat sink manifold [wa]s not within the scope of
the Aluminum Extrusions Order because it f[ell] within the express exclusion for
‘finished heat sinks.’” Wagner Spray Tech Corporation Scope Ruling Application:
Finished Heat Sink Manifold, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders on
Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China, A-570-967/C-570-968
(“Scope Ruling Request”) at 9 (P.R. 1). In the Scope Ruling Request, Plaintiff
explained that its product is made from extruded aluminum and “meet[s]
specifications for 6061-T6 aluminum alloy.” Id. at 3. Wagner’s finished heat sink
manifold was designed “with geometric tolerancing (GD&T) for flatness of 3/1000
(.003”) for the total manifold machined surface.” Id. When measuring the shortest
distance of .003” flatness and dividing that by 2.20” of surface width, a 1/1000
inch per inch flat surface finish results. Plaintiff averred that “[t]his flat surface
[wa]s the surface that [wa]s attached to the paint sprayer motor and [wa]s part of
the key heat sink functionality.” Id.
Wagner’s finished heat sink manifold “[wa]s custom designed for use
exclusively in Wagner’s Titan 440 line of paint sprayers.” Id. at 4. Within the
paint sprayer, the finished heat sink manifold served two purposes: “controlling the
flow of liquid paint and heat dissipation to maintain acceptable temperature of the
pump and motor.” Id. at 45.
Court No. 23-00241 Page 7
In its Scope Ruling Request, Wagner asserted that its heat sink manifold met
the criteria for exclusion from the Orders: “(1) the design and production of the
product must be organized around meeting specified thermal performance
requirements” and “(2) the product must be fully, but not necessarily individually,
tested to meet those specified thermal performance requirements.” Id. at 17, 22.
First, Wagner explained that its product was “designed to satisfy the UL
(Underwriters Laboratories) 1450 temperature test requirements.” Id. at 17. Then,
Wagner detailed how “[s]everal design and production aspects of the finished heat
sink manifold achieve[d] these thermal requirements.” Id. at 1922.
Wagner explained that thermal testing occurred on an assembled paint
sprayer to “determine[] if the manifold dissipates sufficient heat to prevent
overheating and fire risk.” Id. at 22. This testing was conducted by a qualified
electronic testing laboratory. Id. Wagner asserted that its finished heat sink
manifold met the exclusion criteria because it was: (1) designed and produced
according to specified thermal requirements set forth in the UL test requirements;
and (2) tested to meet those requirements once incorporated into the paint sprayer.
Id. at 16
After receiving Wagner’s Scope Ruling Request, Commerce initiated a
scope inquiry into Wagner’s finished heat seat manifold. Initiation of Wagner
Spray Tech Corporation (Wagner) Heat Sink Manifold Scope Inquiry (Dep’t of
Court No. 23-00241 Page 8
Commerce Dec. 22, 2022) (P.R. 2). Defendant-Intervenor filed comments in
opposition to Wagner’s Scope Ruling Request. Aluminum Extrusions from the
People’s Republic of China: Comments on Wagner’s Scope Ruling Request
(“Def.-Interv.’s Comments Wagner’s Scope Ruling Request”) (P.R. 14).
Defendant-Intervenor argued that Wagner’s product was within the scope of the
Orders and that Wagner’s product was not a finished heat sink at all. Id. at 36.
Defendant-Intervenor argued that Wagner’s product was simply a “pump block[]”
made from extruded aluminum and “not every aluminum product [wa]s a heat
sink.” Id. at 5. Lastly, Defendant-Intervenor averred that even if Wagner’s
product was a heat sink, it did not meet the exclusion criteria. Id. at 6Wagner
submitted rebuttal comments in response to Defendant-Intervenor’s comments.
Wagner Rebuttal Comments: Finished Heat Sink Manifold, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders on Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic
of China, A-570-967/C-570-968 (“Wagner Rebuttal Comments Scope Ruling
Request”) (P.R. 17).
After receiving these comments, Commerce sent Wagner a supplemental
questionnaire. Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China:
Supplemental Questionnaire (“Suppl. Quest.”) (P.R. 22). In the supplemental
questionnaire, Commerce noted that “it appear[ed] that UL 1450 relate[d] to
temperature and other requirements for the finished downstream product (i.e., the
Court No. 23-00241 Page 9
paint sprayer), rather than the thermal performance requirements of the product at
issue in this scope inquiry (i.e., the heat sink manifold).” Id. at 4. Commerce
requested documentation from Wagner of specified thermal performance
requirements “of the heat sink manifold itself.” Id. Commerce also requested
explanations and documentation of how Wagner’s product was designed,
produced, and tested according to the specific thermal requirements of its heat sink
manifold. Id.
Wagner responded to Commerce’s supplemental questionnaire and affirmed
that the “thermal performance requirements of the heat sink manifold [were] tied to
the performance components that the heat sink manifold [wa]s designed for.”
Wagner Supplemental Questionnaire Response: Finished Heat Sink Manifold,
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders on Aluminum Extrusions from the
People’s Republic of China, A-570-967/C-570-968 (“Wagner’s Suppl. Quest.
Resp.”) at 1 (P.R. 27). Wagner expanded on the thermal requirements and
explained that there were three main components that its finished heat sink
manifold must dissipate heat from: the PC board, the motor, and the paint sprayer
as a whole. Id. Each component had its own thermal requirements. Id. Wagner
averred that the ITC Final Report contextualized the thermal performance
requirements of finished heat sinks as “intended to meet the specific needs of a
given piece of electronic equipment.” Id. at 2. Wagner then explained how its
Court No. 23-00241 Page 10
finished heat sink manifold was designed, produced, and tested according to the
thermal requirements of the PC board, motor, and paint sprayer. Id. at 27.
Defendant-Intervenor submitted comments responding to the information in
Wagner’s supplemental response. Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s
Republic of China: Comments on Wagner’s Supplemental Questionnaire Response
(“Def.-Interv.’s Comments Wagner Suppl. Quest. Resp.”) (P.R. 28). Defendant-
Intervenor reiterated that Wagner’s product was within the scope of the Orders and
was not a heat sink eligible for exclusion. Id. Wagner submitted rebuttal
comments. Wagner Rebuttal Comments: Wagner Heat Sink Manifold,
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders on Aluminum Extrusions from the
People’s Republic of China, A-570-967/C-570-968 (“Wagner Rebuttal Comments
Suppl. Quest.”) (P.R. 29).
Commerce issued its Final Scope Ruling on October 17, 2023, determining
that Wagner’s product did not qualify for the finished heat sink exclusion and fell
within the scope of the Orders. Final Scope Ruling at 10. In its Final Scope
Ruling, Commerce identified the five characteristics that it used to determine
whether Wagner’s product should be classified as a finished heat sink:
(1) the product must be a “fabricated heat sink made from aluminum
extrusions;” (2) specified thermal performance requirements must
exist; (3) the product’s design must have been organized around
meeting those specified thermal performance requirements; (4) the
product’s production must be organized around meeting the specified
thermal performance requirements; and (5) the product must have been
Court No. 23-00241 Page 11
fully, albeit not necessarily individually, tested to comply with the
specified thermal performance requirements.
Id. at 11 (citing Agilent Techs. v. United States (“Agilent II”), 42 CIT __, __, 335
F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1352–53 (2018)). In coming to this determination, Commerce
relied upon the scope language in the Orders, this Court’s prior opinion in Agilent
II, Wagner’s description of its product in each of its submissions, prior rulings
from Commerce, and the ITC Final Report.
First, despite confirming that Wagner’s part 805-324 served the same
function and had the same features as a fabricated heat sink as defined by the ITC,
including a flat surface tolerance of 1/1000 of an inch per inch, Commerce
determined that Wagner’s product was not a fabricated heat sink. 3 Final Scope
Ruling at 12. Commerce emphasized that part 805-324 served dual purposes:
pumping paint and dissipating heat. Id. Next, Commerce highlighted that the
owner’s manual for the paint sprayer identified part 805-324 as a “pump valve” or
“pump block.” Id. Because Wagner’s product served dual purposes and Wagner’s
manual did not refer to the product as a heat sink manifold, Commerce determined
that the product’s primary purpose was “not that of a heat sink.” Id. Commerce
3
The scope exclusion for finished heat sinks specifies that the product at issue
must be a “fabricated heat sink made from aluminum extrusions.” Thus, the
inquiry under the first factor will focus on “fabricated heat sinks” rather than
“finished heat sinks.”
Court No. 23-00241 Page 12
determined that Wagner’s product was not a fabricated heat sink made from
aluminum extrusions. Id.
Next, Commerce determined that Wagner failed to demonstrate that
specified thermal performance requirements existed for the finished heat sink
manifold. Id. at 13. Commerce acknowledged that Wagner “demonstrated that
standards for safe operating temperatures exist[ed] for the downstream product
(i.e., the paint sprayer) and for other components of the downstream product (i.e.,
the PC board and motor.” Id. Commerce noted that the ITC Report described
finished heat sinks as “precisely or optimally suited to cool the specific electronic
devices for which they [were] designed,” id. (quoting ITC Final Report at 7), but
stated that Wagner was required to show that specified thermal performance
requirements existed for the heat sink itself, separate from that of any downstream
product or component. Id.
Commerce then determined that Wagner failed to meet the third, fourth, and
fifth factors, in large part because Wagner had failed to show that it satisfied
specified thermal performance requirements for which the product was designed,
produced, and tested. Id. at 1315. In its analysis of the product’s design,
Commerce explained that because Wagner did “not demonstrate[] that specified
thermal performance requirements exist[ed], as explained above, we f[ound] that it
also has not demonstrated that part number 805-324’s design was organized around
Court No. 23-00241 Page 13
meeting those specified thermal performance requirements.” Id. at 14. Similarly,
when it analyzed the product’s production, Commerce stated that “because Wagner
has not demonstrated that specified thermal performance requirements exist, as
explained above, we f[ound] that it also has not demonstrated that part number
805-324’s production was organized around meeting those specified thermal
performance requirements.” Id. Lastly, when analyzing the product’s testing,
Commerce explained that “because Wagner has not demonstrated that specified
thermal performance requirements exist, as explained above, we find that it also
has not demonstrated that part number 805-324 has been fully tested to comply
with those specified thermal performance requirements.” Id. at 15.
Wagner commenced this action on November 17, 2023. Summons. Wagner
filed its Rule 56.2 motion on May 29, 2024, asserting that Commerce’s Final
Scope Ruling was not supported by substantial evidence on the record and was
otherwise not in accordance with law. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. The Government argues
that Commerce’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, was in
accordance with the law, and should be sustained. Def.’s Resp. at 2. AEFTC joins
in the Government’s argument. Def.-Interv.’s Resp. at 3.
In lieu of oral argument, the Court issued questions to the Parties. Letter
(Jan. 8, 2025); Paperless Order (Feb. 6, 2025). The Parties submitted responses to
Court No. 23-00241 Page 14
the Court’s questions. Pl.’s Resp. Court’s Letter (Feb. 14, 2025); Def.’s Resp.
Court’s Letter (Feb. 14, 2025).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether Commerce’s determination that Wagner’s product did not satisfy
the finished heat sink exclusion and was within the scope of the Orders was
supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law.
JURISDICTION AND LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The U.S. Court of International Trade has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grant the Court authority to
review actions contesting the final determination of an administrative authority as
to whether a particular type of merchandise falls within the scope of an
antidumping duty order or a countervailing duty order. The Court will hold
unlawful “any determination, finding, or conclusion [that] is unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” A.L.
Patterson, Inc. v. United States, 585 Fed. App’x 778, 781–82 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Court No. 23-00241 Page 15
II. Legal Framework for Scope Determination
The descriptions of merchandise covered by the scope of an antidumping or
countervailing duty order must be written in general terms, and questions may arise
as to whether a particular product is included within the scope of an order. See 19
C.F.R. § 351.225(a). When such questions arise, Commerce’s regulations direct it
to issue scope rulings that clarify whether the product is in-scope. Id. Although
there are no specific statutory provisions that govern Commerce’s interpretation of
the scope of an order, Commerce is guided by case law and agency regulations.
See Meridian Prods., LLC v. United States (“Meridian Prods.”), 851 F.3d 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2017); 19 C.F.R. § 351.225.
Commerce’s inquiry must begin with the relevant scope language. See, e.g.,
OMG, Inc. v. United States, 972 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2020). If the scope
language is unambiguous, “the plain meaning of the language governs.” Id. If the
language is ambiguous, however, Commerce interprets the scope with the aid of
the sources set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1). Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at
1382.
Commerce may consider the following interpretive sources under 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.225(k)(1) to determine whether merchandise is covered by the scope of an
order:
(A) The descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition
pertaining to the order at issue;
Court No. 23-00241 Page 16
(B) The descriptions of the merchandise contained in the initial
investigation pertaining to the order at issue;
(C) Previous or concurrent determinations of the Secretary,
including prior scope rulings, memoranda, or clarifications
pertaining to both the order at issue, as well as other orders with
same or similar language as that of the order at issue; and
(D) Determinations of the Commission pertaining to the order at
issue, including reports issued pursuant to the Commission’s
initial investigation.
19 C.F.R. § 351.255(k)(1)(i).
Secondary interpretive sources under (k)(1) include any other determinations
of the Secretary or the Commission not identified in subsection (k)(1)(i), rulings or
determinations by Customs, industry usage, dictionaries, and any other relevant
record evidence. 19 C.F.R. § 351.255(k)(1)(ii). If there is a conflict between these
secondary interpretive sources and the primary interpretive sources of this section,
the primary interpretive sources will normally govern in determining whether a
product is covered by the scope of the order at issue. Id.
If the (k)(1) sources do not dispositively answer the question, Commerce
may consider the (k)(2) factors under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2). Meridian Prods.,
851 F.3d at 1382. The (k)(2) factors include the (1) “physical characteristics
(including chemical, dimensional, and technical characteristics) of the product”;
(2) “expectations of the ultimate users”; (3) “ultimate use of the product”; (4)
Court No. 23-00241 Page 17
“channels of trade in which the product is sold”; and (5) “manner in which the
product is advertised and displayed.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2).
It is well-established that “Commerce cannot ‘interpret’ an antidumping
order so as to change the scope of th[e] order, nor can Commerce ‘interpret’ an
order in a manner contrary to its terms.” Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States,
254 F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States,
161 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). When a party challenges a scope
determination, the Court must determine whether the scope of the order “contain[s]
language that specifically includes the subject merchandise or may be reasonably
interpreted to include it.” Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States (“Duferco”), 296
F.3d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
DISCUSSION
In its Final Scope Ruling, Commerce reviewed the scope language,
Wagner’s description of its product in its submissions to Commerce, and two prior
scope determination proceedings, ECCO Heat Sinks for LED Light Bars and
Agilent Technologies’ Mass Filter Radiator. Final Scope Ruling at 1015.
Commerce limited its review to (k)(1) sources and “f[ound] it unnecessary to
consider the additional factors specified in 19 CFR 351.225(k)(2).” Id. at 10.
After examining the (k)(1) sources, Commerce determined “that Wagner’s part
Court No. 23-00241 Page 18
number 805-324 d[id] not meet the criteria for the ‘finished heat sink’ exclusion”
and that “part number 805-324 [wa]s within the scope of the Orders.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Commerce’s Final Scope Ruling was unsupported by
substantial evidence and “otherwise unreasonable.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1729. Plaintiff
asserts that its product, part number 805-324, is a finished heat sink and meets the
standard for exclusion from the Orders. Id. at 17. In particular, Plaintiff argues
that Commerce improperly interpreted “the testing, design and production
requirements of the scope exclusion.” Id. Defendant counters that Commerce’s
Final Scope Ruling should be sustained because Plaintiff failed to show that it
satisfied any of the criteria necessary to be eligible for exclusion from the Orders.
Def.’s Resp. at 1630.
The Orders allow for the exclusion of “fabricated heat sinks made from
aluminum extrusions the design and production of which are organized around
meeting certain specified thermal performance requirements and which have been
fully, albeit not necessarily individually, tested to comply with such requirements.”
Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; Countervailing Duty Order, 76
Fed. Reg. at 30,654. Although Commerce did not describe the scope exclusion
language as ambiguous in its Final Scope Ruling, given Commerce’s analysis and
reliance on (k)(1) sources, the Court presumes that Commerce viewed the
exclusion language as ambiguous.
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The Court concludes that the scope exclusion language is ambiguous. For
example, the exclusion language does not define specific criteria of a fabricated
heat sink, does not identify any set of specified thermal performance requirements,
and does not establish any design, production, or testing procedures. The scope
exclusion language only states that specified thermal performance requirements
must exist, but the exclusion does not detail any threshold requirements or
mandatory measurements. The scope exclusion language requires that the subject
merchandise must be designed, produced, and tested to meet such thermal
performance requirements, but the exclusion does not explain how the design,
production, or testing should be executed. Therefore, because the scope exclusion
language is ambiguous, Commerce may interpret the scope exclusion language
found in the Orders with the aid of the sources set forth in 19 C.F.R. §
351.225(k)(1) or (k)(2). Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1382.
The Parties agree that a five-factor test exists for a product to qualify for the
finished heat sink exclusion, based on Commerce’s prior scope rulings in the
Agilent proceedings before this Court. Pl.’s Mot at 1718; Def.’s Resp. at 1617;
see Final Scope Ruling at 11; see Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court
Remand Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China, A-570-967
(“Agilent Remand Results”) at 11 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 15, 2017).
Commerce’s Final Scope Ruling proclaimed to set forth the five requirements
Court No. 23-00241 Page 20
needed “to be considered a finished heat sink” and explained that “[a]ll five of
these elements must be present for a product to be a finished heat sink.” Final
Scope Ruling at 11 (stating that (1) the product must be a “fabricated heat sink
made from aluminum extrusions;” (2) specified thermal performance requirements
must exist; (3) the product’s design must have been organized around meeting
those specified thermal performance requirements; (4) the product’s production
must be organized around meeting the specified thermal performance
requirements; and (5) the product must have been fully, albeit not necessarily
individually, tested to comply with the specified thermal performance requirements
(citing Agilent II, 42 CIT at __, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 1352–53)).
The Court agrees in principle with the five elements identified by Commerce
for a product to meet the exclusion language of a finished heat sink because the
five elements are consistent with the scope exclusion language in the Orders. The
Court concludes, however, that Commerce’s application in this case of the five
factors for an excluded finished heat sink is inconsistent with the scope exclusion
language of the Orders and therefore Commerce’s determination is not in
accordance with law and not supported by substantial evidence.
In Agilent II, this Court did not clearly sustain Commerce’s five-factor test
for determining whether a product qualifies for the finished heat sink exclusion. In
Agilent II, this Court concluded that Commerce acted unreasonably when it
Court No. 23-00241 Page 21
excluded evidence showing that the plaintiff’s product was designed to meet
specific thermal performance requirements. 42 CIT at __, 335 F. Supp. 3d at
1354. This Court found that Commerce’s determination on this issue lacked
substantial evidence. Further, this Court found that the sources Commerce relied
upon were insufficient to justify its determination, and this Court concluded that it
was “quite unlikely that Commerce [could] confine itself to a limited 19 C.F.R. §
351.225(k)(1) analysis here and reach a supported conclusion for the question of
whether Agilent’s products are designed and produced around meeting specified
thermal requirements.” Id. at 135455. Ultimately, this Court remanded the
matter and directed Commerce to conduct an additional evaluation pursuant to 19
C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) and (k)(2) if necessary. Id. at 1355. The matter settled out
of court before this Court issued a final judgment.
As will be discussed in more detail below, Commerce’s application of this
five-factor test in its Final Scope Ruling here was not in accordance with law
because Commerce added a new requirement prohibiting a dual purpose of the
subject merchandise that the Court concludes is inconsistent with the scope
language in the Orders. See Final Scope Ruling at 1115. This was improper.
Commerce’s focus should have been on whether Wagner’s product satisfied the
exclusion language set forth in the Orders, without adding new requirements that
do not appear in the scope exclusion language. Further, because Commerce
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applied the wrong legal test, its determinations were not supported by substantial
evidence.
I. Fabricated Heat Sink Made from Aluminum Extrusions
The Orders begin by providing an exclusion for “fabricated heat sinks made
from aluminum extrusions.” Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651;
Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. In its analysis, Commerce
relied on the definition of a heat sink set forth in the ITC Final Report. Final
Scope Ruling at 1112. Therein, a heat sink is defined as “a finished good made
of extruded aluminum that cools a solid material, principally electronics and
computer equipment (servers, laptops, etc.), by transferring the heat generated in
such devices to a fluid medium, such as air or a liquid.” ITC Final Report at I-10.
The ITC Final Report stated that a finished heat sink is “designed to remove the
damaging heat from electronic equipment” and heat sinks “are different from most
other aluminum extrusions. . . by virtue of the specific and precise tolerances to
which they are generally produced.” Id. at 10. Finished heat sinks have a flat
surface tolerance of “1/1000 of an inch per inch.” Id.
Commerce acknowledged that Wagner’s product was “CNC machined from
an extruded aluminum blank ‘with dimensions held to high tolerances and stringent
quality standards.’” Final Scope Ruling at 12. Commerce quoted Wagner’s
description of its product as serving “two main purposes—controlling the flow of
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liquid paint and heat dissipation to maintain acceptable temperature of the pump
and motor.” Id. In order to do so, Wagner’s product operated with a 1/1000 flat
surface tolerance. Commerce determined that “information on the record indicates
that Wagner’s part number 805-324 has some of the same functions and features as
a fabricated heat sink, namely that it dissipates heat and has specifications for
flatness that are similar to the flat surface measurements identified by the ITC.”
Id. It appears to the Court that based on this evidence and the scope exclusion
language, Commerce should have determined that part 805-324 was “a fabricated
heat sink made from aluminum extrusions.”
However, Commerce took issue with the product’s capability to serve two
functions. Id. Commerce determined that because Wagner’s product both
dissipated heat and controlled the flow of liquid paint, the product could not be
considered a heat sink whose primary purpose was to dissipate heat. Id.
Commerce noted that the ITC Final Report emphasized that the main
distinguishing characteristic of a finished heat sink is that it is “designed to remove
the damaging heat from electronic equipment.” Id. at 1112. The scope exclusion
language does not mention or prohibit a dual purpose of the product, however, and
does not require that a product’s primary purpose be heat dissipation in order to
qualify as “a fabricated heat sink made from aluminum extrusions.” Commerce’s
interpretation is contrary to the Orders’ terms and improperly changes the scope of
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the Orders. Eckstrom Indus., Inc., 254 F.3d at 1072. Because the scope exclusion
language does not require a primary use of heat dissipation, nor does it preclude a
dual use, Commerce’s determination is not in accordance with law.
Wagner avers that its product meets “all the physical and functional
properties of a heat sink” and argues that Commerce’s determination was
“inconsistent with the plain language of the scope exclusion and the ITC Report.”
Pl.’s Mot. at 18. The Court agrees that Wagner’s product, part number 805-324,
meets the description of a fabricated heat sink as set forth in the ITC Final Report
and reiterated by Commerce in its Final Scope Ruling. First, Wagner’s product is
a finished good made of extruded aluminum that dissipates heat. Next, it transfers
heat generated within the paint sprayer in accordance with UL 1450 requirements.
More specifically, it has a flat surface tolerance of 1/1000 of an inch per inch,
which is the exact specification identified in the ITC Final Report as a
distinguishing quality of a heat sink.
It appears to the Court that Wagner’s product meets the description of a
fabricated heat sink as established by the ITC Final Report and the exclusion
language of the Orders under the correct legal standard discussed above.
Additionally, Commerce’s reliance on Wagner’s owner’s manual was
improper in this case. Commerce focused on Wagner’s Titan 440 owner’s manual
description of part 805-324 as a “pump block” or “pump valve.” Final Scope
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Ruling at 12. Commerce determined that “the identification of the part in
Wagner’s owner’s manual as a pump valve rather than a heat sink, along with
Wagner’s description of part number 805-324 as controlling the flow of paint,
suggest that part number 805-324’s primary purpose is not that of a heat sink.” Id.
Again, Commerce’s determination that a “primary purpose” of heat dissipation is
required is contrary to the scope exclusion language in the Orders, and
Commerce’s conclusion that the primary purpose of part 805-324 was not that of a
heat sink was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, Wagner’s owner manual was not before Commerce as a primary
(k)(1) source, and if considered, would be a (k)(2) source. While Commerce may
consider secondary (k)(2) sources in conducting a (k)(2) analysis (which
Commerce did not do here), if there is a conflict between secondary interpretive
sources and primary interpretive sources, the primary interpretive sources will
normally govern. 19 C.F.R. § 351.255(k)(1)(ii). Commerce should have given
more weight to “the descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition
pertaining to the order at issue.” Id. § 351.255(k)(1)(i)(A). For example, the (k)(1)
sources of the Scope Ruling Request and Wagner’s subsequent filings before
Commerce described the product as a heat sink. Scope Ruling Request at 3;
Wagner Rebuttal Comments Scope Ruling Request at 29; Wagner’s Suppl. Quest.
Resp. at 14, 67; Wagner Rebuttal Comments Suppl. Quest. at 13. Commerce
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did not properly consider this contrary (k)(1) evidence on the record that referred
to Wagner’s product as a heat sink, particularly in light of the descriptions in the
petition as a (k)(1) source compared to a contrary (k)(2) source of the owner’s
manual. Commerce did not conduct a (k)(2) analysis and therefore should not
have considered the owner’s manual in its (k)(1) analysis.
Commerce’s determination that Wagner’s product was not a fabricated heat
sink made from aluminum extrusions because it possessed a second function
capability and was identified as a “pump block” and “pump valve” in the owner’s
manual was not supported by substantial evidence on the record and otherwise not
in accordance with law.
II. Designed, Produced, and Tested Around Specified Thermal
Performance Requirements
Next, the Orders require that the “design and production” of the heat sinks
be “organized around meeting certain specified thermal performance requirements”
and be “tested to comply with such requirements.” Antidumping Duty Order, 76
Fed. Reg. at 30,651; Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
Throughout this proceeding, the Parties have disputed the proper interpretation of
“specified thermal performance requirements.” Scope Ruling Request at 17,
1922; Def.-Interv.’s Comments Wagner’s Scope Ruling Request at 613; Suppl.
Quest. at 4; Wagner’s Suppl. Quest. Resp. at 17; Def.-Interv.’s Comments
Court No. 23-00241 Page 27
Wagner Suppl. Quest. Resp.; Pl.’s Br. at 2125; Def.’s Br. at 2023; Pl.’s Reply at
58. Because the interpretation of sufficient thermal requirements affects the
analysis of the product’s design, production, and testing, the Court will address the
issue of specified thermal performance requirements first.
A. Specified Thermal Performance Requirements
Commerce relied on the ITC Final Report for guidance on its analysis of
whether Wagner’s product was designed, produced, and tested around certain
specified thermal performance requirements. Final Scope Ruling at 1215. The
ITC Final Report emphasized that the main distinguishing characteristic of a
finished heat sink is its “customized thermal resistance properties.” ITC Final
Report at 7. The ITC Final Report noted that finished heat sinks “are certified to
perform within thermal resistance parameters.” Id. Lastly, the ITC Final Report
described finished heat sinks as “precisely or optimally suited to cool the specific
electronic devices for which they have been designed.” Id.
Commerce acknowledged that Wagner’s product was designed to meet the
thermal resistance properties established in UL 1450. Final Scope Ruling at 13.
UL 1450 “is the ‘standard for safety’ for motor-operated air compressors, vacuum
pumps, and painting equipment.” Id. UL 1450 governs the temperature
restrictions for Wagner’s paint sprayer as a whole, as well as certain components,
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such as the PC board and motor. Id. Commerce discussed the individual
temperature requirements for Wagner’s paint sprayer, the PC board, and motor. Id.
Although specified thermal performance requirements existed, Commerce
determined that Wagner failed to satisfy this element because the UL 1450
temperature requirements pertained to a downstream product and the downstream
product’s components. Id. Commerce determined “that the thermal performance
of part number 805-324 being ‘tied to’ the operating temperature standards for the
downstream product is not sufficient to meet the specific requirements of the
finished heat sink scope exclusion, which requires that specified thermal
performance requirements must exist for the inquiry merchandise.” Id.
Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor contend that, to qualify for an
exclusion, a finished heat sink must have its own thermal performance
requirements, separate and independent from any thermal performance
requirements of any downstream product. Def.’s Resp. at 2123; Def.-Interv.’s
Resp. at 1.
In its Final Scope Ruling, Commerce provided no citations to support its
determination “that the thermal performance of part number 805-324 being ‘tied
to’ the operating temperature standards for the downstream product [wa]s not
sufficient to meet the specific requirements of the finished heat sink scope
exclusion, which requires that specified thermal performance requirements must
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exist for the inquiry merchandise.” Final Scope Ruling at 13. The scope exclusion
language does not mention downstream products and does not prohibit the thermal
performance requirements from being tied to a downstream product; the exclusion
language merely states that “the design and production of which are organized
around meeting certain specified thermal performance requirements.”
Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; Countervailing Duty Order, 76
Fed. Reg. at 30,654. Commerce’s determination on this issue is contrary to the
Orders’ terms and impermissibly changes the scope of the Orders. Eckstrom
Indus., Inc., 254 F.3d at 1072. The scope exclusion language merely requires that
the “design and production” of the fabricated heat sink “are organized around
meeting certain specified thermal performance requirements.” Antidumping Duty
Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
The Court’s interpretation based on the actual scope language is broader than the
interpretation proposed by Commerce.
It appears to the Court that Wagner’s painting equipment product was
designed to meet the thermal resistance properties established in UL 1450 (as
noted by Commerce, Final Scope Ruling at 13), and thus part 805-324 is a
fabricated heat sink that was designed, produced, and tested around certain
specified thermal performance requirements pursuant to the scope exclusion
language of the Orders.
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On remand, Commerce must reconsider the basis for its determination that
the thermal resistance properties of heat sinks are separate from downstream
products. Commerce must also reconsider on remand its determinations regarding
the certifications applicable to Wagner’s products. Commerce acknowledged that
Wagner’s product was designed to meet the thermal resistance properties
established in UL 1450. Final Scope Ruling at 13. Commerce should reconsider
or explain why UL 1450 is not a certification within the context of the finished
heat sink exclusion provision.
The Court observes that the ITC Final Report and Commerce’s prior scope
rulings discuss the thermal resistance properties of finished heat sinks, and the ITC
Final Report mentioned the expectation that the thermal resistance properties will
relate to downstream products. ITC Final Report at 7–8 (“The principal end-use
applications of aluminum extrusions are in the building and construction,
transportation, and engineered products sectors. [Finished heat sinks] have a
specific end use (thermal management of electronic devices), but many other
aluminum extrusions also have distinct individual end-use applications.”).
The ITC Final Report noted that while “these thermal resistance properties
are not visible, they are clearly relevant to the customers for whom [finished heat
sinks] have been designed.” Id. The ITC Final Report explained that finished heat
sinks are “precisely or optimally suited to cool the specific electronic devices for
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which they have been designed.” Id. At no point did the ITC state that the
finished heat sinks themselves must operate independently within a specified
range. The context of this requirement implies that the thermal resistance
properties are instead directly related to “the specific electronic devices for which
they have been designed.” Id. The ITC Final Report described the thermal
resistance properties of heat sinks entirely in the context of the downstream
products for which they were designed. In light of this potentially contrary
evidence, Commerce on remand must reconsider its determination.
This Court faced similar questions in Agilent II, 42 CIT at __, 335 F. Supp.
3d at 135455. In Agilent II, both parties debated at length the meaning of the
phrase “specified thermal performance requirements.” Id. at __, 335 F. Supp. 3d at
1354. Not only did the parties differ in their interpretation of how this element
may be met, but it also was unclear how the industry viewed “specified thermal
performance requirements.” Id. at __, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 1355. In Agilent II, this
Court left unanswered the question “What are specified thermal performance
requirements?” Id. This question remained unresolved as the parties in Agilent II
settled the litigation before the Court issued a final judgment. The Court does not
answer this question here either.
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The Court concludes that Commerce’s determination regarding the specified
thermal performance of finished heat sinks is not in accordance with law and not
supported by substantial evidence.
B. Designed, Produced, and Tested Around Specified Thermal
Performance Requirements
The scope exclusion language of the Orders requires that the product be
designed, produced, and tested, in accordance with the specified thermal
performance requirements. Commerce determined that Wagner failed to meet the
design, production, and testing criteria in large part because Wagner failed to show
that specified thermal performance requirements existed for the product to have
been designed, produced, and tested to satisfy. For each of these three processes,
Commerce discussed the record evidence that Wagner submitted detailing its
design, production, and testing processes. Final Scope Ruling at 1315.
Commerce discounted all this evidence based on its earlier determination that no
specified thermal performance requirements existed for Wagner’s product. Id.
In its analysis of the product’s design, Commerce explained that “because
Wagner has not demonstrated that specified thermal performance requirements
exist, as explained above, we f[ound] that it also has not demonstrated that part
number 805-324’s design was organized around meeting those specified thermal
performance requirements.” Id. at 14. Nevertheless, Commerce summarized the
steps in Wagner’s design process that related to part number 805-324’s capability
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to operate in accordance with the temperature requirements specified in UL 1450.
Id. at 1314. Commerce also noted that Wagner did not identify “the types of
specialized equipment that the ITC described as being involved in the design of
finished heat sinks, including wind tunnels, flow calibration equipment, or
specialized design and data collection software.” Id. at 14.
However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that these methods of design are
not meant to be an exclusive list. The ITC Final Report also stated that “[h]eat
sinks may be designed and tested for thermal performance, including using
sophisticated computer modeling software, wind tunnels, and other apparatus.”
ITC Final Report at 31. The ITC Final Report did not mandate that these methods
were the only design and testing methods that were sufficient.
Commerce noted that Wagner described in detail its design process and the
specialized equipment used in its supplemental questionnaire, such as a test bench
with controlled variables using calibrated test equipment such as thermocouples
and electrical diagnostic apparatus and equipment. Final Scope Ruling at 1314
(citing Wagner Suppl. Quest. Resp. at 2). Because the Court already found that
Commerce improperly determined that Wagner failed to demonstrate that specified
thermal performance requirements exist, and now finds that Wagner provided
contrary evidence demonstrating that part 805-324 was designed to meet specified
thermal requirements, the Court concludes that Commerce’s determination that
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Wagner failed to show its heat sink was not designed around specified thermal
performance requirements was unsupported by substantial evidence and not in
accordance with law.
Similarly, when Commerce analyzed the production of Wagner’s finished
heat sink, it determined that “because Wagner has not demonstrated that specified
thermal performance requirements exist, as explained above, we f[ound] that it also
has not demonstrated that part number 805-324’s production was organized around
meeting those specified thermal performance requirements.” Id. at 14. Commerce
also noted that Wagner did not identify “the types of specialized equipment that the
ITC described as being involved in the production of finished heat sinks, including
wind tunnels, flow calibration equipment, or specialized design and data collection
software.” Id.
In terms of production, the ITC Final Report referred to production of
prototypes, which is not relevant here. ITC Final Report at 8. In its response to
Commerce’s supplemental questionnaire, Wagner explained that “the key physical
characteristic of the heat sink manifold that permits it to achieve the necessary
thermal parameters is the flat surface tolerance,” which is produced through CNC
machining. Wagner’s Suppl. Quest. Resp. at 6. Because the Court already found
that Commerce improperly determined that Wagner failed to demonstrate that
specified thermal performance requirements exist, and now finds that Wagner
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provided record evidence that part 805-324 was produced to achieve specific
thermal controls, the Court concludes that Commerce’s determination that Wagner
failed to show that part 805-324 was produced in accordance with specified
thermal performance requirements was not in accordance with law and
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Lastly, when analyzing Wagner’s testing of its product, Commerce
explained that “because Wagner has not demonstrated that specified thermal
performance requirements exist, as explained above, we f[ound] that it also has not
demonstrated that part number 805-324 has been fully tested to comply with those
specified thermal performance requirements.” Final Scope Ruling at 15.
Commerce acknowledged that Wagner provided evidence of testing the thermal
properties of the downstream paint sprayer and its individual components, but
Commerce determined that Wagner failed to demonstrate that “part number 805-
324 has been tested to comply with the specified thermal performance
requirements.” Id.
In support of Commerce’s determination, the Government cites to the
Agilent proceedings and avers that the mass filter radiator product in Agilent was
tested independently from its downstream product. Def.’s Resp. at 29. Neither the
final scope ruling in the Agilent proceedings nor this Court’s opinion in Agilent I
state that the product was independently tested. In Agilent II, this Court explained
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that many questions were left open-ended. Agilent II, 42 CIT at __, 335 F. Supp.
3d at 1355. The Government’s reliance on the Agilent proceedings as a source of
support for separate, individualized testing of heat sinks is misplaced. As
discussed above, because the Court already found that Commerce improperly
determined that Wagner failed to demonstrate that specified thermal performance
requirements existed for its product, and because the Court now finds that contrary
record evidence exists showing that part 805-324 was tested to comply with such
thermal requirements, the Court concludes that Commerce’s determination that
Wagner failed to show that part 805-324 was tested to comply with specified
thermal performance requirements was not in accordance with law and was
unsupported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court holds that Commerce’s Final
Scope Ruling was not in accordance with law and was not supported by substantial
evidence. Therefore, the Court remands the Final Scope Ruling for reconsideration
pursuant to this Opinion. It is further
ORDERED that that this case shall proceed according to the following
schedule:
(1) Commerce shall file its remand determination on or before June 16, 2025;
(2) Commerce shall file the administrative record on or before June 30, 2025;
Court No. 23-00241 Page 37
(3) Comments in opposition to the remand determination shall be filed on or
before July 30, 2025;
(4) Comments in support of the remand determination shall be filed on or before
August 29, 2025; and
(5) The joint appendix shall be filed on or before August 29, 2025.
/s/ Jennifer Choe-Groves
Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
Dated: April 21, 2025
New York, New York