Opinion

Akinrinola v. Grimes

Court
District Court, W.D. Louisiana
Filed
Mar 21, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.9%

challenge to length of detention awaiting removal became moot when the petitioner was removed

How later courts described this case

  • challenge to length of detention awaiting removal became moot when the petitioner was removed

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

ESTHER OYINDAMOLA AKINRINOLA DOCKET NO. 6:24-cv-1030

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

HELEN GRIMES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AYO

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241 by pro se petitioner Esther Oyindamola Akinrinola on August 1, 2024. (Rec. Doc. 1).

The government filed a response to the petition on January 17, 2025. (Rec. Doc. 9).

At the time of filing, Akinrinola was incarcerated at the South Louisiana ICE

Processing Center in Basile, Louisiana. Akinrinola has since been removed or released from

custody.

This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and

recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court.

For the reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus

should be DENIED AND DISMISSED because Akinrinola’s claims are MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

Akinrinola, a native and citizen of Nigeria, filed the instant petition, through which

she sought the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing her release from the South

Louisiana ICE Processing Center in Basile, Louisiana. The government argues that

Akinrinola fails to carry her burden that there is no significant likelihood of accomplishing

her removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and is therefore unable to satisfy her burden

under either prong of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In support of the government’s

position, they represent to the Court that Akinrinola’s removal date was tentatively

scheduled for February 19, 2025. See Declaration of Assistant Field Office Director Jacques

Metoyer, Rec. Doc. 1, att. 3, p. 2, ¶ 15.

While this matter was pending, Akinrinola has either been removed from the United

States or released from custody. See Online Detainee Locator System search results,

https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results.

II. LAW & APPLICATION

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court

jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and 'Controversies.’” United States v. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445

U.S. 388, 395 (1980). A case or controversy becomes moot “when the issues presented are no

longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 396

(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).

This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of

federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate . . . The parties must

continue to have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. This

means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff :must have suffered,

or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[T]o be eligible for habeas relief [under 28 U.S.C. § 2241], a petitioner must be ‘in

custody’ and must have exhausted his available state remedies.” Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816

F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). A habeas petition “is not moot simply because a § 2241

petitioner is no longer in custody.” Salgado v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 220 F. App’x 256, 257

(5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Brown v. Resor, 407 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1969)). A

habeas petition may be moot, however, “when the court cannot grant the relief requested by

the moving party.” Id. at 257 (citing Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987));

-2-

see also Kokoski v. Fox, 2012 WL 4321717, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2012) (“A case may become

moot when an ‘intervening factual event . . . causes the [petitioner] to no longer have a present

right to be vindicated or a stake or interest in the outcome.’”) (quoting Dailey v. Vought

Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Here, Akinrinola claimed that her continued detention violated her rights pursuant

to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that

detention of an alien subject to a final order of removal is limited to a period reasonably

necessary to bring about his removal from the United States, which is presumably six

months, and that he must thereafter be released if “there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 533 U.S. at 701. Akinrinola only challenged

the lawfulness of her continued detention.

Because the Online Detainee Locator System results show that Akinrinola is no longer

detained and has either been removed from the United States or released from custody, the

Section 2241 petition is moot. See Francis v. Lynch, 622 F. App’x 455, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2015)

(challenge to length of detention awaiting removal became moot when the petitioner was

removed); Odus v. Ashcroft, 61 F. App’x 121 (5th Cir. 2003) (same). It should therefore be

dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus should be DENIED

AND DISMISSED because petitioner Esther Oyindamola Akinrinola claims are MOOT.

-3-

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) business days from service of this

report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A

party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served

with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed

legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days

following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b),

shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal

conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 21st day of March, 2025.

David J. Ayo

United States Magistrate Judge

_4-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.