The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
TA’VORREOUS KEON FLEMING CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-168-P
VERSUS JUDGE HICKS
VICTOR LLANITO, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the standing order of this court, this matter was referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for review, report and recommendation.
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Before the court is a civil rights complaint filed in forma pauperis by pro se plaintiff
Ta’Vorreous Keon Fleming (“Plaintiff”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This complaint
was received and filed in this court on February 10, 2025. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the
Bossier Maximum Security Center in Plain Dealing, Louisiana when he filed this
complaint. He names Bondsman Victor Llanito, Fugitive Agent John Doe, and Assistant
Jane Doe as defendants.
Plaintiff states that on June 30, 2022, he had his legal notice and demand notarized.
He then took his legal notice and demand to Victor Llanito at the SBC Bail Bonds office.
He claims later that day, his fiancée’s grandmother and his mother-in-law called his fiancée
to tell her that Llanito called them and said negative things to them because of the
paperwork he had served him.
Plaintiff claims he then call Llanito and got into a heated argument with him. He
told Llanito that his business was with him, and he should only speak to him. He claims
Llanito cursed him and hung up on him. He claims Llanito then called his fiancée and told
her to tell him that if he called him again, he would make them pay. Plaintiff called Llanito
and Llanito told him to come to his office to resign the bond documents. He told Llanito
that he would come when his fiancée got home.
Plaintiff claims Llanito then showed up at his house with a fugitive agent to help
arrest him. He claims the fugitive agent came to his backyard where he was with his fiancée
and children. The fugitive agent called Llanito to the backyard. Llanito told him that he
had to arrest him and take him to jail. He claims Llanito did not state the reason for
arresting him and told him that he did not need a warrant to arrest him. Plaintiff told Llanito
that there was no reason to arrest him because he had not breached their contract and was
not arrested while on bond.
Plaintiff claims he was holding his three-week-old son when Llanito attacked him
by rushing him, pushing him into the wall, and choking him. He claims that when his
fiancée grabbed their son, Llanito attempted to slam him on the ground, tried to trip him,
and kicked him in the legs. He claims Llanito then elbowed him in his back in an attempt
to get his hands behind his back. He claims that at that moment, the fugitive agent rushed
over to assist Llanito. He claims the fugitive agent grabbed his right arm while Llanito
held his left arm. He claims Llanito then tasered him three times across the left side of his
chest. He claims Llanito also tasered his back and the left side of his body. He claims
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Llanito held the taser on his back until his left arm went numb. He claims Llanito then
handcuffed him. He claims Llanito and the fugitive agent dragged him to the car, placed
him in the backseat, and put the seatbelt around him. He claims Llanito made offensive
remarks about his fiancée and her mother.
Plaintiff claims Llanito made a U-turn and returned to his house. He claims Llanito
jumped out of the car and grabbed papers that were on the ground. They then drove off
again. He claims Llanito pointed his firearm at him the entire time they were driving to his
office.
Plaintiff claims that when they arrived at the office, Llanito sat him in a chair. He
claims the fugitive agent and two female assistants who worked for SBC Bail Bonds were
at the office. He claims that before they could leave to go to the Bossier Maximum Security
Center, his sister and her fiancée entered the office. Llanito then escorted him out of the
office. Plaintiff claims the Shreveport Police were called by his sister and were waiting for
them at the front door of the building. Llanito told the officers that he was surrendering
Plaintiff to the Bossier Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff told the officers that Llanito falsely
arrested him. He claims the officers told him that Llanito, as his bondsman, had the right
to arrest him and left.
Plaintiff claims Llanito told him that he was arresting him because he did not like
the paperwork he had given him. Llanito placed him in his car and put the seatbelt on him.
Plaintiff claims that while driving to the Bossier Maximum Security Facility, Llanito made
numerous racial remarks toward him, his fiancée, and his mother in law. He told Llanito
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that his arrest was illegal. He claims Llanito then filmed him and posted him on his
snapchat feed.
Plaintiff claims that when they arrived at the Bossier Maximum Security Facility,
Llanito explained to the booking deputy that he was surrendering him off his bond because
he had failed to check in with him and failed to pay him. Plaintiff claims he was only out
on bond for one and a half months. He claims he checked in with Llanito by phone every
Monday. He also claims that he paid Llanito once during this time.
Plaintiff asked Llanito for a refund of his premium and the three car titles he gave
him. He claims Llanito told him that he could not have a refund. He claims Llanito paid
the money for surrendering him back to the Sheriff’s custody, completed the paperwork,
and left the facility. He claims Llanito never told him or gave him notice that he was due
a refund of the premium paid to SBC Bail Bonds and its surety.
Plaintiff claims he never received a court hearing to establish if the surrender was
legal. He claims probable cause was not shown to determine if the surrender was legal.
Plaintiff was rebooked at the Bossier Maximum Security Center. He called his
fiancée, and she informed him that Llanito told her that he would not be returned any
money and that he still owed him approximately $16,000.00.
Plaintiff attempted to bond out again, but no bondsman agency would bond him out
because of the surrender by SBC Bail Bonds. He complains that he was forced to fight his
case from jail. He also complains that he missed his daughter’s birthday and seeing his
son grow as an infant.
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Plaintiff claims he was forced to take a sentence of ten years because he could not
properly fight his case while in jail. He pleaded guilty to a 2016 charge of convicted felon
in possession of a firearm. He claims he was forced to serve two years of his sentence from
2022 to 2024 in prison.
After Plaintiff was released from incarceration, his fiancée informed him that
Llanito and SBC Bail Bonds were threatening her and forcing her to pay $400.00 every
month since Llanito surrendered off his bond. He claims Llanito threatened to confiscate
the three cars if his fiancée did not pay him the $400.00. He claims Llanito was arrested
in 2024 for a similar crime of extortion.
Plaintiff claims Llanito used excessive force against him when he arrested him and
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. He claims Llanito caused him pain,
suffering, physical injury, and emotional distress. Plaintiff claims Llanito breached the
implied contract with him by lying about the reason he surrendered him to the Sheriff’s
custody and illegally arresting him when he had not breached the contract or been arrested
for a new charge. He claims Llanito violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and caused him suffering and emotional distress. Plaintiff claims Llanito
threatened him with physical violence for exercising his right to present legal
documentation to a state employee. He claims Llanito retaliated against him in violation
of his rights under the First Amendment.
Plaintiff claims Fugitive Agent John Doe witnessed Llanito’s illegal action, failed
to correct the misconduct, and encouraged the continuation of the misconduct. He claims
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Fugitive Agent John Doe violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and caused him
pain, suffering, physical injury, and emotional distress.
Plaintiff claims Assistant Jane Doe witnessed Llanito’s illegal action, failed to
correct the misconduct, and encouraged the continuation of the misconduct. He claims
Assistant Jane Doe violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and caused him pain,
suffering, physical injury, and emotional distress.
Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory,
nominal, and punitive damages, a complete refund of the premium paid to SBC Bail Bonds
and its surety, restitution of all money paid to Llanito and SBC Bail Bonds, cost of this
suit, and any additional relief the court deems just, proper, and equitable.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Prescription
Plaintiff complains that on June 30, 2022, Victor Llanito and Fugitive Agent John
Doe arrested him. He claims Llanito did not tell him the reason for his arrest, but did tell
him that he did not need a warrant to arrest him. He complains that excessive force was
used against him during the arrest. He complains that Llanito breached their implied
contract. Plaintiff claims Fugitive Agent John Doe and Assistant Jane Doe witnessed
Llanito’s illegal action, failed to correct the misconduct, and encouraged the continuation
of the misconduct.
In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Court articulated the guidelines to be
used in determining what prescriptive period should apply to Section 1983 claims. The
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Court determined "§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions" and the
forum state's statute of limitations applicable to such claims should be used. Id. at 280. In
Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals phrased
the test as: "The state statute governing the general tort remedy for personal injuries should
apply to 1983 actions . . ." Gates, 771 F.2d at 919.
The Louisiana Civil Code provides a general prescriptive statute that governs tort
actions. The article subjects delictual actions to a liberative prescription of one year. See
La. C.C. art. 3492.1 The Fifth Circuit qualified this prescriptive period, however, when it
held that "a section 1983 action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for the action."
Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1417 (5th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff claims his civil rights were violated by Defendants on June 30, 2022. Thus,
prescription began to run as to these claims on June 30, 2022. The above entitled and
numbered complaint was not signed by Plaintiff until January 22, 2025, and it was not filed
by the Clerk of Court until February 10, 2025. Plaintiff’s claims are therefore prescribed.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint should be dismissed as frivolous.
1 La. C.C. art. 3492 was repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024. Section 3 of Acts 2024 provides “The
provisions of the Act shall be given prospective application only and shall apply to delictual actions after the effective
date of this Act.” Thus, La. C.C. art. 3492 is still applicable as to this complaint.
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State Actors
Plaintiff names Bondsman Victor Llanito, Fugitive Agent John Doe, and Assistant
Jane Doe as defendants. Section 1983 prescribes redress for conduct by any person who,
under color of state law, acts to deprive another person of any right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A
plaintiff in a civil rights suit must show that the conduct of which he is complaining was
committed by a person acting under color of state law. Plaintiff has not alleged any action
that would give rise to defendants Bondsman Victor Llanito, Fugitive Agent John Doe, and
Assistant Jane Doe being state actors for purposes of Section 1983.
In certain circumstances, bail bondsmen act under color of state law and are subject
to suit under Section 1983. See Landry v. A–Able Bonding Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204–05 (5th
Cir.1996) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)). For a bail bondsman
to act under color of state law, he must be licensed by the state to make arrests, and he must
make the arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant and with the assistance of law enforcement
officers. See Johnson V. Cowthorn, CIV.A. 14-3038-P, 2015 WL 6441434, at 1 (W.D. La.
Oct. 21, 2015) (citing Landry v. A–Able Bonding Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204–05 (5th Cir.1996).
Plaintiff does not allege that Llanito possessed an arrest warrant for him at the time that he
was arrested and surrendered to the Bossier Maximum Facility. In fact, Plaintiff claims
Llanito told him that he did not need a warrant to arrest him. Furthermore, Plaintiff does
not allege that Llanito attempted to enlist the assistance of local law enforcement officials
to seize him. Based on the facts of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Defendants are not state actors
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under § 1983 because they did not act under color of state law when they seized him and
allegedly breached the terms of their contract. See Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75
F.3d 200, 204–05 (5th Cir.1996).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint should be dismissed as frivolous.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff filed this proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"), if this court finds
Plaintiff's complaint to be frivolous, it may dismiss the complaint as such at any time,
before or after service of process, and before or after answers have been filed. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Spears v.
McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). District courts are vested with extremely
broad discretion in making a determination of whether an IFP proceeding is frivolous and
may dismiss a claim as frivolous if the IFP complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact. See Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995); Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114
(5th Cir. 1993); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989).
Accordingly;
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's civil rights complaint be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous.
OBJECTIONS
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties
aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an
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extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another
party’s objection within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel
are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge
at the time of filing.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and
recommendations set forth above, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking, on appeal, the
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions that were accepted by the district court and
that were not objected to by the aforementioned party. See Douglas v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in chambers, in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this 21st
day of March, 2025.
rAd;
Mark □□ Hornsby
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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