Brown-Windle v. Wilson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ADAM C. BROWN-WINDLE, #R71785 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-00427-SPM

)

OFC. WILSON, )

LT. JOHNSON, )

SGT. BIRD, and )

BARWICK (Warden), )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Adam C. Brown-Windle, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. He claims

defendants failed to protect him from attacks and threats by other inmates. (Doc. 1). He seeks

monetary damages and injunctive relief; he also filed a Motion for Emergency Temporary

Restraining Order. (Docs. 1, 2).

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): On March 18, 2025,

other inmates housed on Plaintiff’s wing learned about his cellmate’s criminal conviction and

threatened Plaintiff and the cellmate1 with physical harm (Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff and his cellmate

barricaded the cell with blankets. Plaintiff told an unnamed officer about the threats and was told

to wait until the day shift. Plaintiff’s cellmate contacted his father by text, asking him to contact

the Intelligence Unit. The cellmate’s father called the next morning and spoke to Defendant

Wilson, who said he would speak to the cellmate.

Later that day, other inmates threw a “feces bomb” into Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff and his

cellmate reported the incident to Defendant Sgt. Bird. However, she merely walked away, saying

“that’s what you get for writing grievances.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff and his cellmate had to clean

up the feces without gloves or proper cleaning materials. Throughout the day, other inmates issued

threats to stab Plaintiff and his cellmate (Doc. 1, p. 4).

The following day, another feces bomb was thrown into the cell. Plaintiff and his cellmate

requested Defendant Lt. Johnson to move them to protective custody (“PC”). Johnson replied that

he was not doing PC paperwork and suggested Plaintiff could refuse housing, take the ticket, and

go to segregation. Plaintiff declined this option. He believed he would be safer staying in his cell

because the gang members who threatened him had warned him that he wouldn’t be safe in

segregation either.

As of March 25, 2025 (the date Plaintiff submitted his Complaint), Plaintiff had not left his

cell for a week, skipping recreation, chow, and showers for fear of attack (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff’s

cellmate’s father contacted the warden and other officials, but nothing has been done to move him

to safety (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5).

1 Plaintiff’s cellmate, Thomas M. Smith, filed a nearly identical Complaint in Smith v. Wilson, Case No. 25-cv-428-

SMY (S.D. Ill. filed March 28, 2025).

Discussion

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner may not file a lawsuit

about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Booth v. Churner, 531 U.S. 956 (2001). The purpose behind the

exhaustion requirement is to give corrections officials the opportunity to address complaints

internally before a federal suit is initiated. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721-722 (7th Cir.

2011). “[I]f a prison has an internal administrative grievance system through which a prisoner can

seek to correct a problem, then the prisoner must utilize that administrative system before filing a

claim under Section 1983.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion

must be fully completed before the prisoner files suit; a case filed while a grievance appeal is still

ongoing is premature and must be dismissed without prejudice. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979,

984 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).

The IDOC grievance procedure provides that an inmate initiates a grievance with his

counselor and may then submit his grievance to a prison grievance officer within 60 days after the

incident. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). If the matter is not resolved, the prisoner must seek

review by the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) at his facility and must appeal an adverse

outcome to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) within 30 days.

While exhaustion of prison administrative remedies “is an affirmative defense with the

burden of proof on the defendants,” Maddox, 655 F.3d at 720, a district court may dismiss a

prisoner complaint sua sponte for failure to exhaust if the failure is obvious from the complaint.

See Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002).

In Plaintiff’s case, he asserts that he was first threatened by other inmates on March 18,

2025. When the defendants took no protective action, Plaintiff filed this suit on March 25, 2025,

exactly one week later (Doc. 1, p. 5). This timeline indicates that Plaintiff could not have

exhausted the prison grievance procedure before filing this action. Notably, the Complaint does

not assert that Plaintiff even initiated the grievance process before he sued.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why this case should not be

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff SHALL FILE his written

response within 30 days of the date of this Order (on or before May 19, 2025). Plaintiff’s failure

to respond to this Order will result in dismissal of this case without prejudice.

The Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2)

Plaintiff asserts that he is “under threat of fatal violence” and his requests for help have

been ignored by Pinckneyville staff (Doc. 2, p. 1). He states he has “exhausted all other remedies”

including using his cellmate’s father to contact outside agencies. Id. Plaintiff had allegedly been

approved at the facility level to transfer to Big Muddy River Correctional Center (“BMRCC”) until

officials realized he was not eligible to request transfer until May 20, 2025 (Doc. 2, p. 2). Plaintiff

asserts he is depending on his current cellmate, who has been approved for transfer to BMRCC, to

help him with this lawsuit. As relief, Plaintiff requests an order for defendants to immediately

transfer him and his cellmate Thomas M. Smith to BMRCC and to house them as cellmates there.2

A TRO is an order issued without notice to the party to be enjoined that may last no more

than 14 days. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2). A TRO may issue without notice only if (A) specific facts

in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or

damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the

movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff, as a nonlawyer proceeding pro se, cannot represent another individual or seek relief

for that person. See Howard v. Pollard, 814 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2015) (pro se prisoner cannot represent a class of

inmates).

not be required. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1).

Without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of Plaintiff’s claims for relief, the

Court concludes that a TRO should not issue in this matter at this time. Not only does it appear

that Plaintiff filed this action prematurely, his allegations also do not set forth specific facts

demonstrating the likelihood of immediate and irreparable harm before Defendants can be heard.

The Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 18, 2025

s/Stephen P. McGlynn _____

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

United States District Judge