David James Hanson, Magistrate.

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–2030

Submitted March 27, 2025—Filed April 18, 2025

In the matter of Honorable David James Hanson, judicial magistrate of the

First Judicial District.

On application of the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications.

The commission on judicial qualifications filed an application to discipline

a judicial officer. Application Granted; Judicial Officer Removed.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for complainant.

David James Hanson (argued), Fayette, pro se.

2

Oxley, Justice.

Over twenty years ago, we said that “[t]he strength of our judicial system

is due in large part to its independence and neutrality. These twin qualities help

remove outside influences from judicial decision-making, and promote public

respect and confidence in our system of justice.” In re Inquiry Concerning Patrick

McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). Some today might

question that underlying premise—that there is in fact public respect and

confidence in the judiciary. In an age where judges are under seemingly endless

scrutiny and attack, it is ever more critical that judges ensure that their words

and actions are above reproach.

This is a judicial disciplinary action against Judicial Magistrate David J.

Hanson (Magistrate Hanson) for the First Judicial District of Iowa related to

statements he made in two separate cases that purport to demonstrate bias,

prejudice, and a lack of impartiality. In one case, Magistrate Hanson denied an

arrest warrant in a lengthy written order that reflected his own disparaging views

about young male victims of sexual assault. In the other, Magistrate Hanson

made statements in open court using a derogatory racial slur and reflecting

stereotypes about a criminal defendant. The Iowa Commission on Judicial

Qualifications (Commission) filed an application for imposition of discipline

against Magistrate Hanson. The Commission found that Magistrate Hanson

violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that he be

suspended for ninety days without pay and ordered to participate in mandatory

anger management and bias training.

Even more concerning than the clearly inappropriate statements

Magistrate Hanson made in his written order and from the bench is his response

to the Commission’s application for disciplinary action. His complete lack of self-

3

awareness and contrition reflects an unwillingness (or inability) to change his

behavior and further undermines public respect and confidence in the judiciary.

Accordingly, we grant the Commission’s application. But we conclude that the

appropriate discipline is to remove Magistrate Hanson from his position as a

judicial officer.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

Magistrate Hanson graduated from Drake University Law School in 1987.

He was appointed to the bench in January 2022 to serve a four-year term in

Fayette County, located in Iowa’s first judicial district. At the time, he had

practiced law in Iowa for over thirty-six years. In Iowa, magistrates function as

“part-time” judicial officers serving the county they reside in or a neighboring

county. Magistrates are often the first (and sometimes only) judicial officer that

members of the public encounter when the magistrate presides over “simple

misdemeanors . . . , including traffic and ordinance violations, . . . preliminary

hearings, search warrant proceedings, county and municipal infractions, and

small claims,” or when they “hear complaints or preliminary informations, issue

warrants, order arrests, make commitments, [or] take bail.” Iowa Code

§ 602.6405(1) (2024).

The fact that magistrates serve as part-time judicial officers does not

excuse them from complying with the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, with some

limited exceptions not applicable here. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct,

Application I(B) (“A judge, within the meaning of the Iowa Code of Judicial

Conduct, is anyone who is authorized to perform judicial functions, including an

officer such as a magistrate . . . .”); In re Inquiry Concerning Sevcik, 877 N.W.2d

707, 711 (Iowa 2016) (“The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct applies to both judges

and part-time magistrates, with some exceptions. . . . The exceptions carve out

4

conduct relating to the judicial restrictions governing the practice of law, select

extrajudicial activities, and public statements concerning pending and

impending cases when not serving as a judge. Otherwise, the same canons of

conduct applicable to Iowa judges apply to magistrates.” (citations omitted)).

A. The First Complaint. In August 2022, approximately six months after

Magistrate Hanson’s appointment to the bench, the Commission received a

complaint about him from the chief judge of the first judicial district based on

the contents of a written order that he had recently entered denying a request

for an arrest warrant. The administrative judge for Fayette County informed the

chief judge of the contents of the written order, and the chief judge referred the

matter to the Commission. The requested arrest warrant related to a criminal

complaint involving allegations made by a fifteen-year-old boy as the victim of a

sexual assault by a seventeen-year-old girl. A police officer with the West Union

Police Department filed an affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, describing

in detail the events giving rise to the charges as relayed to him by the alleged

victim, identified in the affidavit as “John Doe.”

Magistrate Hanson entered a six-page, single-spaced order denying the

request for an arrest warrant on the basis that he did not find John Doe credible

and therefore the warrant application lacked probable cause. In explaining the

reasons for discrediting John Doe’s allegations, Magistrate Hanson: (1) described

John Doe’s claim that he was unable to push away the female offender as

“absurd” given a male’s “innate physical advantage,” noting that the female

offender was identified as five feet eleven inches tall and weighed 290 pounds,

which he suspected “most likely represents female obesity rather than muscular

weight” such that John Doe’s will was not likely “overridden by force”;

(2) explained that “[a]ny self-respecting young male” would have simply removed

5

himself from any sexual touching that was truly unwelcomed, describing

Magistrate Hanson’s own response when he received an “unwelcome[d] sexual

touch” as a teenager; (3) described John Doe’s actions as “contrary to nature”

because the “normal, hormone-ridden teenage boy’s reaction to being undressed

by a teenage girl” is, “Alright! I’m gonna GET some!”; and (4) claimed as fact what

“[c]ommon human experience suggests: if a man imbibes a truly substantial

quantity of alcohol, to the point that he cannot rationally consent to engage in

sex[ual] relations, that man’s physical ability to perform sexually also goes away

until he sobers.” The order then went into graphic detail about the physiology of

the male sex organ—which we choose not to repeat—explaining why “[c]ommon

human experience” undermined John Doe’s story.

From this discussion, Magistrate Hanson declared that “John Doe knew

exactly what Defendant was doing to him, welcomed the advance, and both freely

consented and actively participated in the sex acts,” only to “later regret[] his free

will choice.” He concluded the order with:

In summation[,] Confidential informant John Doe’s

allegations of his curious passivity in warding off or purporting to

refuse offers of sexual favors, alleged memory blackout, and weeks-

later convenient memory recovery, all strike this Court as highly

unnatural. And therefore unlikely to be true. The Court concludes

that John Doe lacks credibility sufficient to support a criminal

charge against Defendant—particularly for a charge that as applied

is a forcible felony.

B. The Second Complaint. Less than a year later, in July 2023, and while

the first complaint was still pending, the Commission received another complaint

against Magistrate Hanson. This complaint was also filed by the chief judge of

the first judicial district based on an email she received from a law school student

working as a prosecuting intern for the summer with the Fayette County

Attorney’s office. The intern raised issues of bias, discrimination, and derogatory

6

remarks made by Magistrate Hanson in open court during a proceeding in which

the intern was representing the state in prosecuting simple misdemeanor

charges. As described by the intern:

During magistrate court on July 18, 2023, Judge Hanson was

reviewing a case where the defendant was of Hispanic ethnicity.

Judge Hanson noted that the charges were for no license and no

insurance, and asked me, “Is this guy a wetback? An illegal?” He

also asked if I was sure this was the defendant’s real name and

commented that the defendant probably stole someone’s ID card or

identity.

We choose to only repeat the above-quoted racially derogatory slur in full once

throughout the opinion. Those remarks in open court made the intern feel

“extremely uncomfortable” and “extremely concerned about [Magistrate]

Hanson’s bias affecting defendants’ right to an impartial jurist.”

C. The Commission’s Investigation and Charges. After receiving the

second complaint, the Commission notified Magistrate Hanson that it was

beginning a preliminary investigation regarding both complaints. On May 22,

2024, the Commission issued a notice of charges and hearing thereon informing

Magistrate Hanson of the specific charges against him, his right to file an answer,

defend, and participate at the hearing in person and by counsel, and setting a

three-and-a-half-hour hearing on the matter for October 29.

The notice informed Magistrate Hanson that the conduct referred to in the

charges violated canons 1 and 2 and rules 51:1.2 (promoting confidence in the

judiciary) and 51:2.3 (bias, prejudice, and harassment) of the Iowa Code of

Judicial Conduct. With respect to the first complaint, the Commission alleged

that Magistrate Hanson’s order was “unfitting of a judicial officer because it

expressed bias, included unnecessary and inappropriate commentary about

parties, relied on extrajudicial resources of questionable substance, applied an

incorrect legal standard, and included information suggesting a conflict of

7

interest.” With respect to the second complaint, the Commission alleged that

Magistrate Hanson “made racially disparaging remarks concerning a litigant who

was to appear before him in a pending case,” raising “issues of bias and

discrimination.” The Commission concluded that its receipt of the second

complaint showed that Magistrate Hanson “repeatedly failed to meet the

requirements of both Rule 51:1:2 and Rule 51:2.3(A) & (B).”

Magistrate Hanson did not file an answer. The October 29 hearing was

canceled after Magistrate Hanson stated at a prehearing conference on October

24 that he did not intend to challenge the complaints or the charges against him,

so a hearing was not needed. Magistrate Hanson, who appeared at the

conference without counsel, declined an offer to adjourn the call to obtain

representation.

A subsequent hearing was held on November 14 to make a record of

Magistrate Hanson’s decision to forego a hearing on the charges. When asked to

confirm his prior statement that he did not intend to contest the facts alleged

against him, Magistrate Hanson responded:

There were two issues. The more -- I assume the more significant

was my ruling in anger over what I thought was a specious request

for an arrest warrant, and I own up to that. If I make a decision and

somebody don’t like it, well, I’m sorry.

As far as the other one, I don’t recall the circumstances, and

people can say whatever they want to say. . . . [W]hatever’s said I

have no way of identifying, so I’m not going to even argue the point.

There’s no point to it.

The assistant attorney general clarified that Magistrate Hanson was entitled to a

hearing where the State would be required to present witnesses to support the

charges. Magistrate Hanson responded:

Well, there’s no point in dragging everybody into a day’s worth of

work over what looks like about four minutes worth of testimony.

I’m not going to put the Commission to that. The Commission can

8

make whatever decision it wants to make, and I will roll with the

punch and take whatever you give me.

The Commission chair then clarified that the Commission makes a

recommendation to the Iowa Supreme Court, which makes the final

adjudication. Magistrate Hanson responded, “Well, I guess if they want to shoot

me, they can. Okay. I will accept whatever you think is right.”

D. The Commission’s Application for Discipline. The Commission filed

its application to the supreme court to discipline Magistrate Hanson on

December 18. The Commission concluded that the record established by a

convincing preponderance of the evidence that Magistrate Hanson’s conduct, as

asserted in the two complaints, violated rule 51:1.2 (promoting confidence in the

judiciary) and rule 51:2.3(A) and (B) (bias, prejudice, and harassment), brought

the judiciary into disrepute, and that those violations were substantial violations

of the canons of judicial ethics. See Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b) (providing that

on application of the Commission, the supreme court may “[d]iscipline or remove

the judicial officer for . . . conduct which brings judicial office into disrepute, or

substantial violation of the canons of judicial ethics”).

With respect to rule 51:1.2, the Commission concluded that “Magistrate

Hanson’s conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that he

engaged in conduct reflecting adversely on his impartiality, temperament, and

fitness to serve as a judge.” Because both incidents involved a public judicial

forum—a written judicial order and statements in open court—the Commission

believed the incidents “eroded public confidence more substantially than if his

conduct had been purely personal.”

With respect to rule 51:2.3, the Commission noted that the content of

Magistrate Hanson’s written order and the statements he made in open court

satisfied many of the examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice identified

9

in the comments to rule 51:2.3. The Commission concluded that “[b]y

manifesting bias or prejudice in the two proceedings at issue, Magistrate Hanson

impaired the fairness of the proceedings and brought the judiciary into

disrepute.”

Without the benefit of any briefing from Magistrate Hanson, the

Commission recommended that Magistrate Hanson be suspended for ninety

days without pay and ordered to participate in mandatory anger management

and bias training. The Commission relied on the facts that Magistrate Hanson’s

misconduct occurred in his official capacity, showed a pattern of alarming bias

and prejudice, and diminished public confidence in the integrity and impartiality

that a judicial officer is expected to exhibit. Noting “[n]o effort to change or modify

his conduct,” the Commission concluded that Magistrate Hanson’s “lack of

willingness to address the situation, or to express remorse, is concerning.”

E. Proceedings in the Iowa Supreme Court. Our constitution places the

final responsibility for disciplining judges with our court. Iowa Const. art. V,

§ 19; see also Iowa Code § 602.2101. But the discipline process begins with the

Commission, a seven-member body made up of a district court judge; two

practicing attorneys who are not from the same political party; and four electors

who are not attorneys, no more than two of whom are from the same political

party, and who are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the state senate.

Iowa Code § 602.2102(1). Complaints about judges are directed first to the

Commission, which, after investigation, may dismiss the charges, dispose of the

charges informally, or make application for discipline to the supreme court.

Id. § 602.2104(1). And before the Commission can send the complaint to the

supreme court for discipline, the judge is provided due process through notice

of the charges and a hearing. Id. § 602.2104(2). The attorney general prosecutes

10

the charges on behalf of the state and the judge “may defend and has the right

to participate in person and by counsel, to cross-examine, to be confronted by

the witnesses, and to present evidence in accordance with the rules of civil

procedure.” Id. The judge may request the Commission to issue subpoenas on

the judge’s behalf for use at the hearing. Id. § 602.2104(3)(b). We lay out this

process to make clear that charges made against a judicial officer provide due

process for the judge at the hearing stage and are carefully reviewed and

seriously considered before they reach our docket.

The Commission’s application to discipline Magistrate Hanson was set for

nonoral submission to our court on March 26, 2025. The State filed its brief on

January 30, and Magistrate Hanson filed his responsive brief on February 28.

On March 3, the State filed a request to set the matter for oral submission, noting

that “upon review of the responsive brief, the State believes the Court and

Magistrate Hanson might benefit from a hearing.” We granted the State’s request

and heard argument on the matter on March 27.

II. Analysis.

“It is our duty to discipline judicial officers for conduct violating the canons

of judicial ethics.” In re Inquiry Concerning Sevcik, 877 N.W.2d at 711; see also

Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b) (“Upon application by the commission, the supreme

court may . . . [d]iscipline or remove the judicial officer for . . . conduct which

brings judicial office into disrepute, or substantial violation of the canons of

judicial ethics.”). We review the Commission’s recommendation to discipline a

judicial officer de novo. In re Dean, 855 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa 2014). Ethical

violations supporting the discipline of a judge “must be established by a

convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “We give respectful consideration

11

to the Commission’s findings and recommended sanctions, but [we] are not

bound by them.” In re Krull, 860 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 2015).

A. Violations of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. Magistrate Hanson

has never disputed the underlying facts giving rise to the two complaints or that

his conduct violated judicial ethics. And in his brief to our court, he does “not

resist anything the Commission and this Court says” and does “not complain

that the Commission is wrong.” Rather, Magistrate Hanson attempts to explain

his reasoning and make excuses for his conduct. Nonetheless, “it is our duty to

review the findings of the Commission de novo and evaluate the facts to

determine if a violation occurred.” In re Dean, 855 N.W.2d at 189.

The Commission charged Magistrate Hanson with violating cannons 1 and

2 of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically rules 51:1.2 and 51:2.3(A)

and (B).1 We address each alleged rule violation in turn.

1. Promoting confidence in the judiciary. “A judge shall act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:1.2; see also id. Canon 1 (“A

judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of

the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”).

This rule requires judicial officers “to preserve the crown jewels of the judiciary—

independence, integrity, and impartiality—and directs judges to uphold the

fundamental qualities of judging by avoiding impropriety.” In re Krull, 860

N.W.2d at 45 (quoting In re Block, 816 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2012)). The Code

defines “impartiality” to mean the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or

1“The Canons state overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must observe.

Although a judge may be disciplined only for violating a rule, the Canons provide important

guidance in interpreting the rules.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Scope [2].

12

against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an

open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.” Iowa Code of

Judicial Conduct, Terminology. And “ ‘[i]ntegrity’ means probity, fairness,

honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character.” Id. “The test for appearance

of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a

perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that

reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness

to serve as a judge.” Id. r. 51:1.2 cmt. [5].

“Judges set the tone for a courtroom.” In re Russo, 231 A.3d 563, 570

(N.J. 2020). As such, they are held to a higher standard than the average citizen,

to a higher standard than an attorney—particularly when they are acting in their

judicial role. See In re Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 45 (“Judges are held to a higher

standard of conduct than attorneys because of the importance of maintaining an

impartial judiciary.”); In re Inquiry Concerning Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271, 277

(Iowa 2001) (“[Canon 1] imposes a duty upon a judge that rises above the normal

responsibilities he has as an attorney.”). When judges put on the black robe and

take the bench, their actions not only reflect on themselves but the entire judicial

system. See In re Inquiry Concerning Eads, 362 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Iowa 1985) (en

banc) (“The canons of conduct recognize that public confidence in the judiciary

is eroded by irresponsible or improper judicial conduct.”).

A judge’s conduct—both his actions and his words—must reflect to the

outside observer that he is presiding over proceedings in the fair and impartial

manner demanded by the basic requirements of due process. See State v.

Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Iowa 1976) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a

basic requirement of constitutional due process. It follows a presiding judge

should not only be fair and impartial, he must conduct himself in the trial to

13

constantly manifest those qualities.” (citation omitted)). Thus, when a magistrate

takes the bench or issues an order, he is not concerned only with being fair and

impartial—he must also appear fair and impartial to the outside observer to

protect the integrity, i.e., the reputation, of the entire judiciary. See In re Inquiry

Concerning McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16 (“The focus of sanctions in judicial

disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the individual judge, but to restore and

maintain the dignity, honor, and impartiality of the judicial office, and to protect

the public from further excesses.”); In re Inquiry Concerning Eads, 362 N.W.2d at

551 (“The overriding purpose of the judicial disciplinary system is to provide a

means for maintaining the integrity of the judicial branch of government.”); see

also In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99, 100 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam) (Kaus, J.,

concurring) (“ ‘[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and

undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ The administration of justice is prejudiced by

the public perception of racial bias, whether or not it is translated into the court’s

judgments and orders.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting The

King v. Sussex Justs. [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (Lord Hewart CJ))). Particularly in

criminal cases, “[t]he inherent imbalance of power between a judge and a

defendant mandates that defendants be treated with utmost professional

courtesy,” and statements from the bench that could be perceived as derogatory

toward or about the defendant “contribute to the erosion of the public perception

of the Judiciary.” In re Lamdin, 948 A.2d 54, 66 (Md. 2008). The same holds true

for statements made about victims of alleged crimes.

We have no trouble concluding that Magistrate Hanson violated rule

51:1.2 with respect to both complaints. As to the written order denying the

request for an arrest warrant, our concern is not so much that Magistrate

Hanson applied an improperly heightened standard when he treated the

14

purported victim (John Doe) who reported an alleged sexual assault as a

confidential informant whose veracity must be tested before their reported

allegations can support an arrest warrant.2 As the State candidly stated at oral

argument, the Commission did not seek to discipline Magistrate Hanson for

incompetence. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.5(A) (“A judge shall

perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently.”). Judges

are allowed to make mistakes. Correcting errors and addressing abuses of

judicial discretion are what appeals are for.

Rather, the problem with the order is that Magistrate Hanson’s written

explanation reflects a decision premised on stereotyped views and personal

experiences, not on the facts presented in the arrest warrant application,

revealing a lack of impartiality and undermining his integrity as a judicial officer.

See, e.g., United States v. Collier, 932 F.3d 1067, 1079 (8th Cir. 2019) (“An

opinion [by a judge] that derives from an ‘extrajudicial source’ or reflects

favoritism or antagonism to such a high degree that makes ‘fair judgment

impossible’ could support a bias challenge.” (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510

U.S. 540, 555 (1994))); In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d

2Magistrate Hanson characterized John Doe as a “confidential informant” in the written

order based on his erroneous conclusion that he needed to treat the arrest warrant application

similar to a search warrant application that relied on an unnamed police confidential informant

since his identity was not revealed. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978) (imposing

additional requirements for information provided by “an informant’s tip” included in an officer’s

search warrant application).

John Doe was not a confidential informant. He was the alleged victim of a sexual assault

who made a report with the West Union Police Department. “This court has adopted the position

that information imparted by a citizen informant,” which includes “a victim of a crime,” “is

generally reliable.” State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1990); see also State v.

Rapenske, 998 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023) (“When it is a citizen calling in the tip, the

test for reliability is relaxed, as there is a ‘rebuttable presumption that “information imparted by

a citizen informant is generally reliable.” ’ And, when the citizen tipster is known rather than

anonymous, the case for reliability of the information is even stronger because the tipster could

be held accountable if the information provided turns out to be false.” (quoting State v. Walshire,

634 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 2001))).

15

603, 608 (Wis. 1989) (per curiam) (“Judge Gorenstein repeatedly allowed his

personal perceptions to interfere with his responsibilities as a judge. For

example, he ascribed character traits to people appearing before him based on

statistical and other information he had obtained from newspapers and other

sources, thus denying those litigants the treatment as individuals they were

entitled to receive from the court.”). Specifically, his justification for denying the

arrest warrant was based on his own stereotyped beliefs about how a teenage

male sexual assault victim would, or should, react when assaulted by a teenage

girl. He buttressed his stereotyped views with his own personal experience when

he was apparently inappropriately touched as a teenager.

Magistrate Hanson also included inappropriate commentary in the written

order about his views on how a “normal, hormone-ridden teenage boy” would

react and the physiology of how a male’s sex organ works, and unfounded

assumptions about the alleged female offender based on her height and weight.

These demeaning and sophomoric justifications have no place in a judicial order.

See In re Russo, 231 A.3d at 570 (“Especially when it comes to sensitive matters

like domestic violence and sexual assault, that tone [set by the judge] must be

dignified, solemn, and respectful, not demeaning or sophomoric.”). Magistrate

Hanson fails to appreciate the effect his words have on the individuals before

him seeking justice from our courts—here, the alleged victim of sexual abuse.

See In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1993) (en banc) (“The authority

exercised by a judge is so great as to easily break ordinary people who are

rendered comparatively helpless in their relationship with a court. Such

authority should not be entrusted to those who, either deliberately or through

thoughtlessness, offend the ordinary sensibilities of citizens. . . . Nowhere is it

16

more true than in the words chosen by a judge in a decision or decree that

becomes a permanent public record.”).

Equally troubling is the fact that Magistrate Hanson admitted during the

Commission hearing to “ruling in anger” when he denied the arrest warrant

application a few days after it was filed. We recognize that judicial officers are

imperfect; we do not expect infallibility. Judges, like the parties before them,

deserve a measure of grace. But this was not a situation where a judicial officer

lost his temper in the heat of a moment. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56 (“Not

establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience,

dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what

imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges,

sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even

a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom

administration—remain immune.”). Rather, Magistrate Hanson admittedly sat

on the written order for a few days. Yet, even with that time for reflection, he

failed to recognize the improper reliance on stereotyped information based on his

own experiences and perceptions or the inappropriate language contained in the

order. In sum, Magistrate Hanson’s 2022 written order reflects a failure to

“promote[] public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of

the judiciary,” as required by Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 51:1.2.

The 2023 statement in open court to a law student prosecuting intern,

referring to a Hispanic criminal defendant as a “w******” and commenting that

the criminal defendant probably stole someone’s identity, further reflects

adversely on Magistrate Hanson’s impartiality and undermines his integrity as a

judicial officer. Racially derogatory remarks and stereotyped assumptions made

in open court—particularly about a criminal defendant—reflect the mindset of

17

the judge and create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge will act

based on that improper mindset. See In re Kellam, 503 A.2d 1308, 1311

(Me. 1986) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial accountability does not require all judges to

be of precisely the same temperament or to have the same personal qualities and

attitudes. A judge’s style and personality does not by itself suggest misconduct.

These canons, however, leave little room for judicial independence in the matter

of courtroom manners. Regardless of personal style, a judge is required to show

patience and dignity and to use common courtesy in daily interaction with

members of [the] public. . . . Courtroom courtesy is a duty owed to the public

and is evaluated . . . from the perspective of the ordinary, reasonable person.”

(citations omitted)).

It should go without saying that the term “w******” is a racially derogatory,

highly offensive slur that does not belong in a courtroom—and especially not

from the mouth of a judge. See, e.g., Wetback, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wetback [https://perma.cc/2R26-

LVHH] (labeling the term as “offensive” and defining it as “used as an insulting

and contemptuous term for a Mexican who enters the U.S. illegally”). We cannot

overemphasize how inappropriate it was for Magistrate Hanson to use the slur—

in open court—in reference to a Hispanic criminal defendant. See In re Goodfarb,

880 P.2d 620, 623 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (“The use of [racially inflammatory]

language during the course of judicial proceedings is so debilitating to the

administration of justice that we think the public, and the public’s perception of

justice, will be better served by suspending Judge Goodfarb for the balance of

his remaining term.”); In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam)

(“[A judge’s] racially charged assessment of the case,” referring to a murder victim

as “some old n[*****] b[****]” in a private conversation with the prosecutor, “not

18

only devalued the victim’s life but also cast doubt on the integrity and

impartiality of the judiciary and, by itself, puts into question [the judge’s] fitness

to hold judicial office”).

Except we must say the obvious—that the term is derogatory—because

Magistrate Hanson continues to defend his use of it. He does not dispute that he

said the word in open court: “I assume I did, without thinking about it.” Rather

than recognize the term as the racial epithet that it is, he labels it as “someone’s

taboo” that he “[a]pparently . . . transgressed.” He cites to a 1969 opinion from

our court, State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768, 775 (Iowa 1969) (describing a

federal case involving wire interceptions by a federal communications agent and

repeating what the agent overheard in that case, which included the term), to

justify his use of the term in 2023 as slang, similar to “pickpocket” used in Ette

v. Linn–Mar Comm. Sch. Dist., 656 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Iowa 2002), or “man of the

road” or “sneak thief” as used 129 years ago in Kidd v. Ward, 59 N.W. 279, 280

(Iowa 1894).

As with the complaint about the written order, we find that Magistrate

Hanson’s response to the second complaint to be as—if not more—troubling than

the underlying act itself. Whether or not Magistrate Hanson recognizes his use

of the slur as offensive, he most definitely violated Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct

Rule 51:1.2’s directive to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public

confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.” See

In re Inquiry Concerning Stigler, 607 N.W.2d 699, 708 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)

(“Even if Judge Stigler believed that he could be impartial (and we accept his

statement that he did so believe), this impartiality could nonetheless be

reasonably questioned by an impartial observer.”); see also Gonzalez v. Comm’n

on Jud. Performance, 657 P.2d 372, 382 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam)

19

(“[S]uch facially blatant ethnic slurs as those Judge Gonzalez uttered from the

bench are apt to offend minority members not familiar with petitioner’s views

and may be construed by the public at large as highly demeaning to minorities.”);

In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam) (“Racial epithets,

indefensible when uttered by a private citizen, are especially offensive when

spoken by a judge. Whether or not he meant [‘n***** in the woodpile’] as a racial

slur, [the judge’s] use of the term ‘n[*****]’ in any context is indefensible. That he

used the term in open court with black defendants before him and in obvious

reference to a particular black person makes his conduct especially egregious.”).

What courts recognized forty years ago should be even more obvious today.

The Commission established by a convincing preponderance of the

evidence that Magistrate Hanson violated rule 51:1.2.

2. Bias, prejudice, and harassment. Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct Rule

51:2.3 (A) and (B) provides:

(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including

administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.

(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by

words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice or engage in

harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice or

harassment based upon race, sex, gender, . . . national origin, [or]

ethnicity . . . .

This rule is found in canon 2: “A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office

impartially, competently, and diligently.” Id. Canon 2. The comments to rule

51:2.3 provide:

[1] A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding

impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into

disrepute.

[2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include

but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames;

negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes;

20

threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections

between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; insensitive

statements about crimes against women; and irrelevant references

to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body

language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding,

jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice. A

judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as

prejudiced or biased.

Id. r. 51:2.3 cmts. [1]–[2].

Again, we have no trouble concluding that Magistrate Hanson’s 2022

written order and his 2023 statements in open court brought the judiciary into

disrepute and violated rule 51:2.3. Magistrate Hanson’s written order and the

comments he made from the bench called into question his impartiality and

integrity in violation of rule 51:1.2 precisely because they demonstrated biases

and prejudices, which are the aim of rule 51:2.3. We agree with the Commission

that his written and verbal statements included many of the examples from

comment [2]. He used a “slur” when he asked the prosecuting intern if the

defendant was a “w******” and he “suggest[ed] [a] connection[] between race,

ethnicity, or nationality and crime” when he questioned whether the defendant

had provided his real name, suggesting he had stolen someone’s identity. Id. r.

51:2.3 cmt. [2]. His written order denying the arrest warrant relied on “negative

stereotyping” about a teenage boy claiming to be the victim of a sexual assault

by a teenage girl and made “irrelevant references to personal characteristics”

about the defendant in surmising she was obese rather than muscular in

concluding the fifteen-year-old alleged victim could have pushed her away if he

really wanted to. Id.

The Commission established by a convincing preponderance of the

evidence that Magistrate Hanson violated rule 51:2.3.

21

B. Sanctions. Determining the appropriate sanction for a judicial officer

who engages in judicial misconduct is more about “restor[ing] and maintain[ing]

the dignity, honor, and impartiality of the judicial office,” “protect[ing] the

public,” and deterring other judges from similar misconduct than it is about

punishing the wayward judge. In re Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 46 (quoting In re

Inquiring Concerning McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16). We have identified a

nonexhaustive list of factors to consider in reaching an appropriate sanction:

1. whether the misconduct is isolated or a pattern of

misconduct;

2. the nature, extent, and frequency of the acts of misconduct;

3. whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the

courtroom;

4. whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official

capacity or in his or her private life;

5. whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized the

misconduct;

6. whether the judge has made an effort to change or modify

his or her conduct;

7. the length of service on the bench;

8. whether there have been any prior complaints;

9. the effect of the misconduct upon the integrity of and

respect for the judiciary; and

10. the extent to which the judge exploited the judicial office

to satisfy personal interests.

Id. (quoting In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365–66).

Most of these factors serve as aggravating factors when applied to

Magistrate Hanson’s judicial misconduct. The Commission received the first

complaint against Magistrate Hanson within six months of his appointment to

the bench. When the Commission received the second complaint less than a year

22

later, it determined that Magistrate Hanson’s conduct was not isolated, instead

representing a pattern of misconduct. Both complaints involved Magistrate

Hanson’s official duties, one in open court and one in a written order. Magistrate

Hanson does not recognize the extent of his misconduct, and he has made no

real effort to modify his behavior. It has been nearly a year since he was first

notified of the investigation by the Commission, and he is still only willing to

participate in anger management or bias training if we direct him to do so.

Not only did Magistrate Hanson not consider his conduct and statements

inappropriate when they were made, but he defended them throughout the

Commission’s investigation, even up to the time of oral argument before our

court. He has not shown regret for his choice of words. He has not shown genuine

remorse for the effect his statements likely had on the litigants. He has shown

no aptitude for self-improvement. Indeed, he suggested in his brief that the

Commission simply provide him with a list of “bad words” so that he can avoid

them in conversation.

Most concerning, though, is Magistrate Hanson’s lack of self-awareness

and his apparent inability for self-reflection as revealed in his responsive brief

filed with our court. See In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d at 426 (imposing greater

sanction for judge’s “inappropriate and unnecessary characterizations of

persons appearing before him” where “by his answer and explanation at the

hearing, he has failed to appreciate or understand that his conduct was offensive

or violated the canons”); see also In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d at 621 (noting that

“[t]he Commission . . . found Judge Goodfarb’s failure to recognize the full extent

of the harm caused to the public’s perception of the judiciary to be aggravating”

while finding as mitigating that the judge “had begun counseling to deal with his

intemperate use of language”); In re Fiffie, 395 So. 3d 738, 750 (La. 2024) (“In

23

mitigation we recognize Judge Fiffie’s relative inexperience as a judge and his

stated desire to do what he believes is right. However, his persistent refusal to

acknowledge his errors, to take unqualified responsibility for them, and to listen

to the advice and counsel of others is troubling.”); cf. In re Inquiry Concerning

Sevcik, 877 N.W.2d at 711 (noting the Commission’s reliance on Magistrate

Sevcik’s “candidness” and “his admission” of inappropriate behavior in its

recommended sanction); In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 364 (“Judge Block testified

at the Commission hearing. He was contrite and honest, accepted responsibility

for his actions, and acknowledged his conduct gave the judiciary a ‘black eye.’ ”);

In re Inquiry Concerning McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 17 (“Judge McCormick was

profusely apologetic, and recognized the harm he caused.”). In his brief to our

court, Magistrate Hanson defended his order denying the arrest warrant request

by asserting that he “smelled lies” in the alleged victim’s allegations. Magistrate

Hanson is absolutely correct that he has an obligation not to rubber-stamp any

warrant application presented to him. Rather, he is expected to exercise his

judicial discretion, which often includes assessing an affiant’s credibility. But

what he cannot seem to comprehend is that our rules requiring impartiality and

integrity demand that he exercise his judicial discretion based only on the facts

before him, not his own personal code of honor and personal biases.

In his brief, Magistrate Hanson explained his view of sexual assault

allegations:

All judges should know, and fear, false accusations of sexual

crimes alleged long after the supposed events. I witnessed the

televised atrocities visited upon U.S. Supreme [Court] Justice

nominees . . . by women, whom effective cross examinations showed

to be, telling falsehoods. I will never abet such “high tech lynchings.”

(Emphasis added.)

24

Magistrate Hanson’s statements in 2022 and 2023 and this year before

our court are not those of an independent, impartial arbiter carefully considering

whether the allegations provided in the affidavit before him supplied probable

cause to support an arrest warrant. Instead, they reflect the biases of someone

with preconceived and inflexible notions about alleged sexual assault victims.

See Tyler J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with Noncorroboration Instructions, 53

Tulsa L. Rev. 1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter Buller] (“The English legal system was

infected with what we now call ‘rape myths’—misogynist falsehoods about sexual

assault—that eventually made their way across the Atlantic.”); cf. State v.

Sievers, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 938109, at *10 (Iowa Mar. 28, 2025)

(Waterman, J., dissenting) (discussing application of Iowa’s “outcry statute” that

allows hearsay testimony about a child sexual abuse victim’s “initial disclosure”

of the abuse to another person and explaining that “[t]he legislature enacted

section 622.31B to . . . dispel the inference that the delay in reporting the crime

to authorities casts doubt on whether it happened”). As now-Judge Buller noted

in his law review article, although many of the formal legal barriers to

prosecuting sexual assault crimes, “including the corroboration requirement,”

have been eliminated, “the implicit effects of institutionalized sexism and anti-

victim bias persist in the hearts and minds of jurors.” Buller, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. at

2. Magistrate Hanson’s statements in these proceedings reflect that those biases

persist with him as well.

We find a recent judicial disciplinary proceeding from New Jersey

instructive. The New Jersey Supreme Court removed a judge from office based

on four acts of misconduct, the most serious of which involved an unrepresented

litigant who obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the father of

her five-year-old daughter after he allegedly forced her to have sex against her

25

will. In re Russo, 231 A.3d at 567–68. At the hearing on the final restraining

order (FRO), the judge took over questioning the complaining witness during the

defendant’s cross-examination, asking her several very pointed and “coarse

questions” about her efforts to stop the alleged assault. Id. at 568–69. The judge

ultimately dismissed the TRO and declined to enter an FRO based on his

conclusion that the petitioner was not credible in light of her responses to his

questions. Id. at 569. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the judge’s

explanation to the judicial qualifications panel that “he was trying to help a

‘demoralized’ witness on cross-examination” was not only contrary to the record

but that the questioning was also irrelevant to the issue of whether a sexual

assault occurred. Id. at 568–69. In explaining its decision to remove the judge

from office, the court reflected:

It is inconceivable that [the judge] could sit in judgment in

domestic violence or sexual assault matters in the future. No

reasonable victim could have confidence in a court system were he

to preside over those kinds of cases again. Nor could any objective,

informed member of the public.

Id. at 574–75.

We find the same to be the case here. Magistrate Hanson has an obligation

as a judicial officer to address each case before him with impartiality and based

only on the facts before him. If a judicial officer concludes that the information

provided in a warrant application is insufficient to establish probable cause or is

not credible, he should absolutely deny the application unless the affiant

provides more information. But Magistrate Hanson’s insistence that his role is

to ferret out false accusations of sexual assault by requiring corroboration is not

only contrary to the law, see, e.g., State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa

2022) (noting that it has been the law in Iowa since 1974 that a conviction for

rape can be supported solely by the victim’s testimony, without a need for

26

corroboration), it is also contrary to his oath as a judge to set aside any

preconceived biases, see Iowa Code § 63.6 (“All judges of courts of record shall

qualify before taking office following appointment by taking and subscribing an

oath to the effect . . . that, without fear, favor, affection, or hope of reward, they

will, to the best of their knowledge and ability, administer justice according to

the law, equally to the rich and the poor.”). And his refusal to take any

accountability for that fact makes him unable to preside over any proceeding

involving a sexual assault.

Magistrate Hanson’s inability to recognize the derogatory effect of his

choice of words also raises serious concerns about his ability to impartially

preside over a case involving minorities, particularly those charged as a criminal

defendant. That he believes this matter can be put behind him if we provide a

list of “bad words” he should avoid reveals how deep his lack of understanding

goes.

Finally, we note that Magistrate Hanson has an obligation to govern not

only his own conduct, but also the conduct of his staff and the lawyers in the

proceedings before him. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.3(B) (“A judge

shall not . . . by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice or engage in

harassment . . . and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject

to the judge’s direction and control to do so.”), (C) (“A judge shall require lawyers

in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice or

engaging in harassment . . . .”). If Magistrate Hanson cannot recognize bias or

prejudice in his own conduct, we cannot trust him to recognize it in those he is

tasked with policing.

Upon careful consideration, we conclude that Magistrate Hanson “is

simply and unalterably unsuited to be a judge, and no attempts at behavior

27

modification are going to change that significantly. [H]e simply should not be a

judge.” In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Iowa 2000)

(en banc); see also In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d at 623 (suspending judge for the

remainder of his term despite the commission’s recommendation for a three-

month suspension based on two counts of misconduct for using racially

inflammatory language in connection with a hearing in one criminal case and

profane language in another); In re Ademiluyi, 321 A.3d 142, 201 (Md. 2024)

(concluding that removal was required “[g]iven the wide-ranging and pervasive

nature of [the judge’s] misconduct, her inability to comply with the fundamental

requirement that she perform the duties of office fairly and impartially, and her

lack of remorse for blatant and egregious violations of the [Maryland Code of

Judicial Conduct]”); In re Russo, 231 A.3d at 575 (removing judge from office

because “[t]he series of ethical failures that [the judge] committed are not errors

of law, innocent missteps, or isolated words taken out of context,” but “are

flagrant and serious acts of misconduct”); In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d at 123

(removing judge from office based on pattern of misconduct, including engaging

in racial epithets and ethnic slurs and intemperate behavior); In re Disciplinary

Proc. Against Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d at 608–09 (suspending judge for two years

based on lack of necessary judicial temperament evidenced by a pattern of

expressing insensitivity and disrespect toward litigants, witnesses, and other

courts in the judicial system).

III. Disposition.

We order the respondent, David J. Hanson, removed from office effective

ten days from the filing of this opinion unless the respondent has, in the

meantime, resigned his position. In the event he has resigned in that time, the

28

Iowa State Court Administrator must certify that fact to this court, and a

supplemental order will be filed accordingly.

Application Granted; Judicial Officer Removed.