STATEN v. THE CITY OF PHILADLPHIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HAROLD STATEN, :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

: No. 24-1380

v. :

:

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and :

DETECTIVE JAMES J. MCNESBY, :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

In October 1986, Harold Staten was convicted of second-degree murder, arson, and

aggravated assault. Now that his conviction and life sentence have been vacated, he seeks to hold

Defendants the City of Philadelphia (“the City”) and Detective James J. McNesby (“McNesby”)

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Defendants move to dismiss Staten’s suit. For the

reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND1

In the early morning hours of October 30, 1984, a North Philadelphia rowhome inhabited

by Robert Williams, Marian DeBose, and Charles Harris caught fire. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 32, 38,

65, ECF No. 13. All three escaped by jumping from second-floor windows. Id. ¶ 21. As Harris

was being rushed to the emergency room, a firefighter saw him “hold his arms out with the skin

hanging off” and exclaim to DeBose, his girlfriend, “Look, see what you did to me!” Id. ¶ 23

(cleaned up). Though Williams and DeBose survived, Harris ultimately died due to the severe

1 The Court accepts all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true for purposes of addressing

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir.

2018).

burns he sustained on “a significant portion of his upper torso.” Id. ¶ 22.

The Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”) began an arson investigation, with McNesby

serving as “lead detective.” Id. ¶ 78. For reasons unexplained in the Amended Complaint, a

forensic investigator quickly “presumed” that the fire was caused by “‘an open flame applied to

an accelerant’” and started in the rowhome’s vestibule. Id. ¶ 28. Later testing and a separate fire

detected on the second floor, however, suggested otherwise. When the PPD’s crime laboratory

tested samples from the vestibule, those samples contained “no detectible volatile flammable

vapors.” Id. ¶ 29. Separately, though a firefighter had “also noted a separate fire in the second-

floor back bedroom” inhabited by Harris and DeBose, that fire “went uninvestigated.” Id. ¶ 32.

Despite the contradictory test results and separate second-floor fire, the PPD’s official conclusion

was that the fire was caused by “‘an open flame applied to an accelerant’” in the vestibule. Id. ¶

28.

Early on in the investigation, investigators caught wind of a “neighborhood rumor”: Harold

Staten (an exterminator) thought that Williams had stolen his pest control supplies and had

previously threatened to burn down the rowhome in retribution. Id. ¶¶ 38, 65. Investigators thus

“developed a theory”—one that dovetailed neatly with the purported cause and origin of the fire—

that Staten had acted on that threat by using his pest control supplies to start the fire. Id. ¶¶ 38-39,

65. However, when investigators interviewed Williams in October or November 1984, Williams

told them that (1) “Staten hadn’t threatened him” or “threatened to burn the house down over

missing pest control products”; and (2) he “didn’t think [] Staten started a fire.” Id. ¶¶ 64-68.

Investigators kept records of Williams’ interview but did not give those records to Staten until long

after his trial. See id.

Despite Williams denying the neighborhood rumor, investigators zeroed in on Staten.

Although Staten acknowledged that he and Williams had previously had “a dispute” over his

missing pest control supplies, he told investigators “that the dispute had been resolved.” Id. ¶¶ 40-

41. Staten also (1) gave investigators “the names of the men responsible for the theft”; (2) provided

“an alibi and [names of] witnesses to his whereabouts on the evening of the fire”; (3) explained

that “his pest control supplies were not flammable” and gave them a list of the brands he used; and

(4) agreed to a polygraph examination (the results of which revealed “‘no deception indicated’

regarding his lack of involvement in the fire”). Id. ¶¶ 41-44. Separately, unbeknownst to Staten

until 2022, a number of witnesses gave exculpatory statements that investigators either failed to

record or recorded but withheld. Id. ¶¶ 34, 57-58.

At some point during the investigation, investigators “found and interviewed a 17-year-old

girl” who lived across the street from the rowhome and claimed she was home the night of the fire.

Id. ¶ 35. When she was first interviewed, she said she had been “awakened by a resident of the

[rowhome] screaming about the fire and her broken legs” and denied seeing Staten before, during,

or after the fire. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Four months later—after McNesby and other investigators began

secretly treating her to lunch—she “abruptly changed her story” and claimed she saw Staten “at

the steps of the rowhome with a hose and can starting the fire.” Id. ¶ 46; see also id. ¶¶ 60-61

(noting that “none of these lunches were documented” or otherwise disclosed to Staten until after

he was convicted).

On or around March 20, 1986, McNesby signed and submitted an affidavit of probable

cause in support of a warrant for Staten’s arrest. Id. ¶ 31. The affidavit mentioned only that (1)

Staten believed that Williams had stolen his pest control supplies and had threatened to burn the

rowhome down in retribution; and (2) a witness had seen Staten start the fire. See id. ¶¶ 45-46,

66.2

In October 1986, Staten’s case culminated in a bench trial. Id. ¶ 50. Among those who

testified were Williams, the seventeen-year-old, and the seventeen-year-old’s boyfriend who was

with her the night of the fire. See id. ¶¶ 47-50, 65-66. Williams established Staten’s motive for

committing arson by testifying that Staten had previously threatened to burn the rowhome down

over his missing pest control supplies. See id. ¶¶ 64-66. The seventeen-year-old gave the “sole

eyewitness” account of Staten starting the fire, id. ¶ 59, testifying that she saw Staten “huddled at

the front door, using a hose to put liquid through the mail slot of the home” after which it erupted

in flames, id. ¶ 47. Her boyfriend, however, testified “that she was sleeping when they first heard

the screams for help.” Id. ¶ 49. Despite this conflicting testimony, the court convicted Staten of

second-degree murder, arson, and aggravated assault. Id. ¶ 50.

For over a year, the court delayed sentencing to hear evidence from witnesses that Staten’s

initial trial counsel failed to call at trial. Id. ¶ 51. Among these were “numerous witnesses” who

refuted the testimony of the seventeen-year-old eyewitness, including a witness who testified that

the seventeen-year-old “decided to lie” about what she saw “after investigators began treating her

to lunch.” Id. ¶¶ 52, 61; see also id. ¶ 60 (seventeen-year-old was “blacked out from a combination

of alcohol and cocaine” and had to be carried to bed by her boyfriend and her roommate the night

of the fire). After hearing all the additional testimony, the court stated “on the record” that Staten

“merit[ed] a new trial”; however, after two years of deliberation, the court entered an order denying

2 At some point before Staten was convicted, an unnamed witness told investigators that Staten had

confessed to him. See Am. Compl. ¶ 63. The Amended Complaint does not say whether this information

was included in the affidavit of probable cause and/or was introduced at trial. It does say, however, that

the unnamed witness “revealed [] he was incarcerated on the day he claimed to have had an incriminating

conversation with [] Staten” after Staten was convicted. Id.

Staten’s post-trial motions3 without any accompanying explanation, and on February 8, 1989,

sentenced Staten to life. Id. ¶¶ 54-56.

Decades later, two forensic fire investigators—one hired by Staten, the other by the

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office—began reinvestigating the case. See id. ¶¶ 70-72. Both

“concluded that the cause of the fire should have been ruled ‘undetermined.’” Id. ¶ 72 (“a

misunderstanding and application of fire science principle [had] led to unsupportable conclusions

about the origin and cause of the fire”). Armed with “proof of the false fire science,” Staten filed

a PCRA petition for relief from his conviction and sentence. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 75. On February 5, 2024,

he was finally vindicated: the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ordered a new trial and the

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office nolle prossed the charges against him. See id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 131.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 3, 2024, Staten sued the City and McNesby, alleging violations of his federal

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law stemming from his arrest, prosecution, conviction, and

thirty-seven-plus years of incarceration. More specifically, Staten brings: (1) a Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 against McNesby (Count I); (2) a Fourteenth

Amendment claim against McNesby (Count II);4 (3) a state law malicious prosecution claim

against McNesby (Count V); (4) a Monell claim against the City (Count III); and (5) a civil rights

conspiracy claim against both Defendants (Count IV). See id.

On July 24, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss Staten’s Amended Complaint in its

entirety. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 (hereinafter “Mot. to Dismiss”);

Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 42 (hereinafter “Reply”). Defendants’ arguments are threefold. First, they

3 The Amended Complaint references “post-trial motions” but does not say exactly what they were. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 55.

4 As discussed in greater detail below, Count II encompasses two claims: fabrication of evidence and

deliberate deception. See infra Sections IV.B.2-3.

argue that McNesby had probable cause and lacked malice, barring both of Staten’s malicious

prosecution claims (Counts I and V). Second, they assert that McNesby is entitled to qualified

immunity on Staten’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims (Counts I and II). Third, they

argue that Staten fails to plead his Monell and civil conspiracy claims (Counts III and IV). The

Court will address each argument in turn below.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept all factual

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine

whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”

Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To survive dismissal, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Malicious Prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and State Law (Counts

I and V)

Staten asserts Fourth Amendment and state law malicious prosecution claims against

McNesby. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127-132 (Fourth Amendment claim), 147-49 (state law claim). To

allege malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendants initiated

a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding

was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other

than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent

with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 318

F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Under Pennsylvania law, “malicious prosecution has three elements. The defendant must have

instituted proceedings against the plaintiff (1) without probable cause, (2) with malice, and (3) the

proceedings must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs

& Helpers, Loc. Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988).

Defendants argue that both of Staten’s malicious prosecution claims fail because McNesby

had probable cause and nothing in the Amended Complaint suggests he acted maliciously. See

Mot. to Dismiss 9-13. The Court will address probable cause and malice in turn.

1. Probable Cause

The “proceedings” against Staten started when he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 31. According to the Amended Complaint, McNesby wrote and swore the affidavit

of probable cause submitted in support of Staten’s arrest warrant. Id. Therefore, to establish that

the proceedings against him were initiated without probable cause, Staten must show that (1)

McNesby, “with at least a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that

create[d] a falsehood in applying for [the] warrant,” and (2) those assertions or omissions were

“material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697

(3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Omissions are made with reckless disregard for the

truth when an officer withholds facts that “[a]ny reasonable person would have known . . . a judge

would wish to know.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States

v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)). “[A]n officer must have knowledge of the

information alleged to have been recklessly omitted” and “the information must be relevant to the

existence of probable cause,” meaning “a reasonable person would know that it could affect [a

judge’s] probable cause determination[.]” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 471, 471 n.9

(3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). Assertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth

“when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of

his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.”

Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (quoting United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)).

Defendants’ position is that none of McNesby’s alleged omissions and assertions were

reckless or, if corrected, would otherwise “alter the probable cause determination.” Mot. to

Dismiss 11. The Court disagrees. According to the Amended Complaint, McNesby’s affidavit

only included the following: (1) Staten had threatened to burn Williams’ house down over a dispute

regarding pest control supplies; and (2) the 17-year-old’s eyewitness account of Staten starting the

fire. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-47 (discussing eyewitness account), 65-68 (discussing threat-related

allegations). However, when Williams was interviewed in the fall of 1984, long before McNesby

submitted the affidavit in March 1986, Williams said that “Staten hadn’t threatened him” or

“threatened to burn the house down over missing pest control products,” and furthermore, that he

“didn’t think [] Staten started a fire.” Id. ¶¶ 64-68.5 Williams’ statements negate Staten’s

purported motive and are exactly the kind of information that “[a]ny reasonable person would have

known . . . a judge would wish to know.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788. Furthermore, the eyewitness

5 Williams’ statements were recorded in a “Philadelphia Police Department Arson Investigation Memo”

(dated October 30, 1984) and “Activity Sheet” (dated November 17, 1984). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64, 66.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Staten’s favor, McNesby—as “the lead detective” on the case—

presumably reviewed these files before swearing the affidavit of probable cause for Staten’s arrest. Id. ¶

78.

account included in the affidavit was completely contrary to the seventeen-year-old’s first

interview and only came to light four months after investigators (including McNesby) began

treating her to lunch. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-46, 60-61. At the time he swore the affidavit, McNesby

knew that the seventeen-year-old’s eyewitness account was completely contrary to her initial

account and was also aware of other “serious concerns” that would have severely undermined her

credibility. Id. ¶¶ 60 (eyewitness was “blacked out from a combination of alcohol and cocaine”

the night of the fire), 62 (eyewitness “had a documented history of drug and alcohol abuse . . . and

a significant history of mental health problems, including short- and long-term memory loss[.]”).

McNesby would have therefore “had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy” of the eyewitness

account he included in the affidavit. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (internal citation omitted). A

corrected warrant affidavit—one that included Williams’ statements to police, and either excluded

or told the full story behind the seventeen-year-old’s eyewitness account—would not have

otherwise established probable cause for Staten’s arrest.6

2. Malice

An officer’s decision to “omit crucial exculpatory information from [an] affidavit of

probable cause” can equate to malice. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (a

reasonable juror could find that officer who “mischaracterized [] events and chose to omit crucial

exculpatory information from [an] affidavit of probable cause” acted with malice or for purposes

other than bringing defendant to justice); see also Kelley, 544 A.2d at 941 (“Malice may be inferred

from the absence of probable cause.”). According to the Amended Complaint, the affidavit failed

6 Defendants also contend that Staten’s confession to a civilian witness was (1) included in the affidavit and

(2) established probable cause for his arrest. See Mot. to Dismiss 5, 11. As Staten has not alleged that the

confession was included in the affidavit, the Court may not consider Defendants’ argument at this phase of

the case. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all factual

allegations as true [and] construe [them] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . .”).

to mention (1) any of the credibility issues associated with the seventeen-year-old’s version of

events; and (2) “numerous” exculpatory eyewitness accounts. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 62, 119(b)

(discussing credibility issues); id. ¶ 34 (exculpatory eyewitness accounts). Accepting these

allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Staten’s favor, McNesby chose to omit

this information from the affidavit to bolster an otherwise tenuous case against Staten. Cf.

Harvard, 973 F.3d at 204.

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, Staten has sufficiently pleaded that McNesby lacked

probable cause and acted with malice. The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Counts I and V.

B. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 “permits suits against state government officials who deprive individuals of

‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Mack v. Yost, 63

F.4th 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Though “the statute on its face admits

of no immunities,” the Supreme Court has held that most government employees, including police

officers, enjoy qualified immunity from § 1983 suits. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986).

Even when they violate the Constitution or a federal statute, police officers “are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

When presented with a qualified immunity defense, a court must ask two questions: (1)

whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether

the right was “clearly established” at the time of the official’s conduct. Dennis v. City of

Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 287 (3d Cir. 2021).7 A court may address these questions in either

order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). “The burden of establishing qualified

immunity falls to the official claiming it as a defense.” Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163,

176 (3d Cir. 2011). Because the case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court will

construe the Amended Complaint liberally and take its factual allegations as true when performing

this analysis. See Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022).

In this case, Defendants contend that McNesby is entitled to qualified immunity on each

of Staten’s constitutional claims (Counts I and II).8 The Court will address each claim in turn.

1. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim (Count I)

Defendants argue that McNesby is entitled to qualified immunity on Staten’s Fourth

Amendment malicious prosecution claim because he had probable cause. See Mot. to Dismiss 16-

17. Defendants are correct that probable cause would entitle McNesby to qualified immunity.

7 The “clearly established” standard seeks to “shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability

when they perform their duties reasonably” while still “hold[ing] [them] accountable when they exercise

power irresponsibly . . . .” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “A right is clearly established

if it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). This means that

there is either “a closely analogous case that establishes that the Defendant’s conduct was unconstitutional”

or “that the Defendant’s conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials

would know without guidance from a court.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting

Est. of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 780 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 232

(3d Cir. 2023) (a right can be clearly established “even without a precise factual correspondence between

the case at issue and a previous case.”).

8 Defendants contend that McNesby is entitled to qualified immunity on Staten’s § 1983 malicious

prosecution claim to the extent it relies on the Fourteenth Amendment because “there is no clearly

established procedural due process right against malicious prosecution[.]” See Mot. to Dismiss 14-15.

However, Staten expressly pleads his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim only under the Fourth

Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127-132 (Count I, “Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth

Amendment). He also explains that his Fourteenth Amendment “claims are . . . like those described in”

Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279 (3d Cir. 2021)—a case that dealt with claims for fabrication

of evidence and deliberate deception but not malicious prosecution. Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 5, ECF No.

36 (hereinafter “Resp.”). Accordingly, because it appears that the only “constitutional peg” Staten hangs

his malicious prosecution claim on is the Fourth Amendment, the Court need not address Defendants’

argument on this point. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994).

Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2016). However, as discussed above, Staten has

adequately pleaded that McNesby lacked it. The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Count I on qualified immunity grounds.

2. Fourteenth Amendment - Fabrication of Evidence (Count II)

Staten alleges that McNesby knowingly fabricated evidence in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶ 133. Defendants contend that McNesby is entitled to qualified

immunity on this claim because the right underlying it—the right not to be convicted on perjured

testimony—has only ever been recognized in cases involving prosecutors and thus “simply does

not apply” to McNesby. Reply 12-13. Stated otherwise, Defendants argue that Staten fails to state

a violation of a clearly established right because McNesby was not a prosecutor. See id. at 11-12.

Defendants’ narrow construction of the right is untenable. By 1986—the year McNesby

swore and submitted the affidavit of probable cause and Staten proceeded to trial—any reasonable

state actor would have had ample fair and clear warning that fabricating inculpatory evidence

against a defendant violates due process. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2014);

Dennis, 19 F.4th at 289. By that time, there was decades-old Supreme Court precedent forbidding

prosecutors from “knowingly using perjured testimony to secure a conviction”—precedent that the

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly deemed “closely analogous” to an

investigator’s fabrication of evidence to “bring about [a] prosecution or to help secure [a]

conviction.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 296 (discussing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) and

Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967)); Dennis, 19 F.4th at 289 (“Halsey established that sufficiently

particularized precedent placed these detectives on notice that fabricating evidence to convict a

criminal defendant is unconstitutional, regardless of whether that evidence is inserted into a

confession to ‘bring about’ his prosecution or to help secure his conviction.”); see also Mervilus

v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185, 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (noting that “the due process protection against

criminal investigators’ fabrication of inculpatory evidence against a defendant . . . ha[s] long been

recognized by the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal,” collecting cases). But even without this

precedent, it has always been “an axiomatic principle of our justice system that those charged with

upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals

for crimes they did not commit.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 296 (cleaned up). To put it plainly: the

“obviousness of this violation would [have been] difficult to escape” long before the investigation

began in this case. Id.

Having determined that the right at issue was clearly established, the Court now addresses

whether Staten has pleaded a violation of that right. “If a defendant has been convicted at a trial

at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under

section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment.” Mervilus, 73 F.4th at 193. To succeed on his

claim against McNesby, Staten must establish “there is a reasonable likelihood” that he would not

have been convicted without the use of the allegedly fabricated evidence. Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294;

see also Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 372 (3d Cir. 2016) (plaintiff must draw “a

meaningful connection” between fabricated evidence and due process violation). Staten must also

provide “persuasive evidence” that McNesby “formulated or submitted false evidence willfully,

knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for its truth.” Mervilus, 73 F.4th at 194-95.

At this early stage of the case, Staten has made the requisite showings. According to the

Amended Complaint, McNesby and other investigators secretly coerced a seventeen-year-old into

saying she saw Staten start the fire after she initially claimed she never saw him. See Am. Compl.

¶¶ 60-62, 117-18, 119(b). As discussed in greater detail above, McNesby had ample reasons to

doubt that the seventeen-year-old’s new account was true. And because she gave the only

eyewitness account at trial, there is a reasonable likelihood that Staten would not have been

convicted without her false account. The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss

the fabrication of evidence claim.

3. Fourteenth Amendment - Deliberate Deception (Count II)

Staten also alleges that McNesby deliberately concealed, suppressed, and withheld relevant

and material evidence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶ 134.

Defendants argue that Staten’s “deliberate deception claim is merely a Brady claim by another

name” and contend that the right underlying it—to have exculpatory or impeachment evidence

disclosed—was not clearly established by the time Staten was convicted in 1986. Reply 9; Mot.

to Dismiss 15.

As a threshold matter, allowing Defendants to “recharacterize” Staten’s claim to their

liking “would run afoul of the longstanding principle that . . . a defendant cannot create a cause of

action from the fact pattern on behalf of the plaintiff.” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 291. To the contrary:

“[i]t is the party suing, not the party sued, who enjoys the right to frame the claims asserted in a

complaint.” Id. (quoting Haley v. City of Bos., 657 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2011)). But beyond that,

Defendants’ position misconstrues Staten’s claim and the underlying right it implicates.

“A Brady claim, in essence, is a claim by a defendant that his due process rights were

violated by the failure to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence to the defense.” Dennis,

19 F.4th at 291. A deliberate deception claim “go[es] beyond the failure to disclose evidence and

arises when imprisonment results from the knowing use of false testimony or other fabricated

evidence or from concealing evidence to create false testimony to secure a conviction.” Id.

(emphasis in original) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). And unlike a Brady

claim, a deliberate deception claim is rooted in “the right not to be framed by the use of perjured

witness testimony at trial”—which, as discussed above, was clearly established long before the

events in question. Id. at 290 (citing Mooney, 294 U.S. at 103).

The allegations here go beyond a mere failure to disclose. To be sure, the Amended

Complaint certainly alleges that certain pieces of exculpatory and impeachment evidence were

withheld for 36 years following Staten’s trial. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57 (“numerous statements

exculpating [] Staten were withheld . . . until 2022”). However, it also alleges that McNesby and

other investigators repeatedly treated a seventeen-year-old to lunch in an effort to coerce her into

providing what would be the “sole eyewitness” account of Staten’s alleged misconduct at trial.

See id. ¶¶ 60-62, 117-18, 119(b). None of these lunches were documented and only came to light

at a post-trial hearing through a third-party witness. Id. ¶ 61. These allegations plausibly suggest

that McNesby not only fabricated the seventeen-year-old’s account, but also concealed evidence

that would have revealed it was fabricated, in an effort to secure Staten’s conviction. Dennis, 19

F.4th at 291-92. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the deliberate

deception claim.

C. Monell Claim (Count III)

Staten also brings a Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia, alleging both “policy or

custom” and “failure to train, discipline, or supervise” theories of municipal liability. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 138-43; see also Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (outlining two theories of

Monell liability). Defendants contend that Staten did not plead enough facts to support his claim

under either theory. See Mot. to Dismiss 18-24.

To succeed under a “policy or custom” theory, a plaintiff must point to “an official

proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal

policy on the relevant subject,” or a practice “so well-settled and permanent as to virtually

constitute law.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105-06; see also Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 794

(3d Cir. 1989) (“Custom may be established by proof of knowledge and acquiescence.”). In a case

involving an alleged custom, a plaintiff need not identify a decisionmaker by name; rather, the

custom can be “ascribable to municipal decisionmakers.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990). Even still, a plaintiff “must demonstrate a plausible nexus or affirmative link

between the municipality’s custom and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To succeed on a “failure to train, discipline, or supervise” theory, a plaintiff must show that

the failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come

into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). This means that “(1)

municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation

involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an

employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106.

Alleging facts about “the City’s inadequate disciplinary systems and how the City was aware of

repeated constitutional violations but deliberately failed to act” is sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. Swainson v. City of Philadelphia, 2023 WL 144283, *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2023); Alicea

v. City of Philadelphia, 2022 WL 17477143, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2022).

Given that “Monell liability is generally not amenable to resolution at the pleading stage,

as it requires a plaintiff to plead facts outside or her knowledge,” the Court concludes that Staten

has adequately alleged a Monell claim under both theories. 3909 Realty LLC v. City of

Philadelphia, 2021 WL 2342929, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2021). First, Staten sufficiently pleads

that the City had a custom of acquiescing to pervasive unconstitutional misconduct by the PPD.

Am. Compl. ¶ 79. More specifically, Staten alleges the City knew but did not stop the PPD from

coercing and inducing false witness statements, fabricating inculpatory evidence, concealing

exculpatory evidence, and omitting or deleting exculpatory evidence from charging documents

and investigative files. See id. ¶¶ 79-85. These are the same practices that led to Staten’s

constitutional injuries. To show the City had the requisite knowledge of this pervasive misconduct,

Staten cites newspaper articles, a consent decree, and a number of other cases detailing this

misconduct from the late 1970s through the present day. See id. ¶¶ 85-102, 104-11; see also

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)

motions to dismiss, “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources

courts ordinarily examine . . . in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by

reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”); Est. of Roman v. City of

Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 796-98 (3d Cir. 2019) (considering consent decree, newspaper article, and

press release “referenced” in complaint in assessing sufficiency of allegations regarding municipal

custom).9 Second, Staten describes the City’s deficient disciplinary system—a system that failed

to adequately investigate allegations of misconduct, timely resolve complaints, or deter repeat

offenders within the PPD—with adequate specificity. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 111(b), (d), (f), 112. Staten

also alleges that at the time he was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, the PPD employed an

“unsound” definition of probable cause and included that definition in training materials and

directives that were authorized by the PPD’s Police Chief. Id.¶ 119(a); see also id. ¶ 113-16. At

the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level” under either theory of municipal liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court will

9 Defendants claim that “many of the incidents” Staten cites “are not sufficiently similar in kind to the

allegations of police misconduct he raises in his suit.” Mot. to Dismiss 20. The Court agrees that “the facts

of some of the cited cases are clearly distinguishable” from Staten’s experience; nonetheless, “the breadth

of misconduct which they represent is highly relevant to the existence of the City’s custom of acquiescence

in PPD’s allegedly unconstitutional actions.” Alicea, 2022 WL 17477143, at *5(denying motion to dismiss

municipal liability claim).

therefore deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss Staten’s municipal liability claim.

D. Civil Rights Conspiracy Claim (Count IV)

Staten also asserts a § 1983 conspiracy claim against McNesby “and other City []

employees.” Am. Compl. ¶ 144. “To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

prove that persons acting under color of state law reached an understanding to deprive him of his

constitutional rights.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 207 (quoting Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904

F.3d 280, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2018)).

Defendants move to dismiss Staten’s conspiracy claim because he fails to identify any state

actors—besides McNesby—who conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Mot. to

Dismiss 24-26. However, as Staten notes in briefing, he cannot name the other actors without

discovery. Resp. 12. Given that “caution is advised in any pre-trial disposition of conspiracy

allegations in civil rights actions,” the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Staten’s §

1983 conspiracy claim. Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184-85

(3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted); see also Jones v. Burlington Twp., 2017 WL 6372232,

at *9 n.18 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2017) (declining to dismiss conspiracy claim)

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without

prejudice to raise McNesby’s entitlement to qualified immunity at a later stage in the proceedings,

if applicable.