Tayvin Galanakis v. City of Newton, Iowa

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 24-1275

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Tayvin Galanakis

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

City of Newton, Iowa

Defendant - Appellant

Rob Burdess

Defendant

Nathan Winters; Christopher Wing, individually and in their official capacities

with the Newton Police Department

Defendants - Appellants

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

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Submitted: November 20, 2024

Filed: April 17, 2025

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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Tayvin Galanakis sued Officers Nathan Winters and Christopher Wing under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law, alleging they arrested him without probable cause.

Galanakis also brought federal and state claims against the City of Newton, Iowa

(City). The district court 1 denied summary judgment in part, determining that the

officers were not entitled to qualified immunity or state statutory immunity, and the

City was subject to vicarious liability on a surviving state-law claim. The officers

appeal, and having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and dismiss

in part.

I.

In reviewing a district court’s denial of qualified immunity, “we accept as true

the facts that the district court found were adequately supported, as well as the facts

that the district court likely assumed, to the extent they are not ‘blatantly contradicted

by the record.’” Burnikel v. Fong, 886 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Thompson v. Murray, 800 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2015)). Where possible, we also

look to video evidence plainly depicting the incident, see Meehan v. Thompson, 763

F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007)),

and “we view the record and make inferences in [Galanakis’s] favor,” Dunn v. Does

1-22, 116 F.4th 737, 745 (8th Cir. 2024).

On August 28, 2022, a little after midnight, Winters and Wing saw Galanakis

driving with his high beams on and initiated a traffic stop. Otherwise, there is no

suggestion that Galanakis was driving erratically. Winters walked up to the driver’s-

side window, and Wing approached the passenger window. Galanakis was chewing

gum, and there were multiple air fresheners hanging from the car’s rearview mirror.

Winters asked Galanakis a series of questions, which Galanakis answered while

1

The Honorable Stephen H. Locher, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

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rummaging through the glove compartment in search of his registration and

insurance documents. One question was whether Galanakis had been drinking, and

Galanakis answered no. Galanakis had some difficulty finding the right documents,

but ultimately provided what Winters requested.

Winters asked Galanakis to accompany him to his patrol vehicle, where

Winters looked up Galanakis’s information. During their conversation, Winters

again asked Galanakis how much he had had to drink. Galanakis repeated “none,”

and he asked to take a breathalyzer test. Instead, Winters asked Galanakis to perform

a set of field sobriety tests, and they both exited the patrol car. Over the course of

more than ten minutes, Winters had Galanakis: follow Winters’s finger as he moved

it back and forth in front of Galanakis’s face; perform a walk-and-turn test; perform

a one-leg stand test; tilt his head back and follow Winters’s finger with his eyes; tilt

his head back, close his eyes, and try to estimate when thirty seconds had passed;

and perform a finger-to-nose test, in which Galanakis closed his eyes and touched

the tip of his nose with whichever finger (right or left) Winters instructed.

Throughout, Wing stood by watching. On the walk-and-turn test, Galanakis took too

many steps and failed to follow Winters’s instructions to count out loud and turn a

certain way; Galanakis also did not count out loud during the one-leg stand test in

the way Winters had instructed. Otherwise, he performed the tests without issue.2

Galanakis again asked to take a breathalyzer test. Winters obliged, and the test

revealed that Galanakis had a blood alcohol content of 0.00. Winters then read

Galanakis his Miranda 3 rights and immediately asked him when he had last smoked

marijuana. After eight to ten seconds of silence, Galanakis said, “I do not remember

2

Winters argues that Galanakis manifested other physical signs of impairment

during the sobriety tests, but the district court concluded that the video evidence

either contradicted or arguably contradicted Winters’s account. We lack jurisdiction

to resolve these factual disputes. See Estate of Nash v. Folsom, 92 F.4th 746, 755

(8th Cir. 2024).

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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that.” Galanakis insisted that he had not smoked that night. He explained that, as a

member of the William Penn University football team, he was drug-tested every

week; if he smoked, he would get kicked off the team. Winters asked whether

Galanakis would come to the station and submit to a drug influence evaluation.

Galanakis agreed at first, but after Winters arranged for the evaluation, Galanakis

told Winters he wanted to go home instead. At that point, Winters arrested Galanakis

for driving while intoxicated. A drug evaluation conducted at the police station

concluded that Galanakis was not under the influence of any illicit substances, and

he was released.

Galanakis sued Winters and Wing in Iowa state court, bringing a state-law

false arrest claim, a claim under the Iowa Constitution, and a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for arrest without probable cause; he also brought a state-law respondeat

superior claim against the City, as well as Monell 4 and state-law negligent

supervision claims against the City and its police chief. The defendants removed the

action, and later moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the officers were

entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim and state statutory immunity on

the false arrest claim. The defendants also sought summary judgment on the claims

against the City. The district court denied summary judgment with respect to the

§ 1983 and false arrest claims against Winters and Wing, as well as the respondeat

superior claim against the City predicated on Galanakis’s false arrest claim.

Defendants appeal, arguing that qualified immunity and state statutory immunity

protected the officers—and, as to the false arrest claim, the City—from suit.

II.

This court has “limited jurisdiction to review” a district court’s denial of

qualified immunity. Dunn, 116 F.4th at 745 (citing Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d

969, 975 (8th Cir. 2017)). We answer only “the legal question whether the particular

facts support the . . . claim that [defendants] violated clearly established law.”

4

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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Quraishi v. St. Charles County, 986 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Z.J. ex rel.

Jones v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 931 F.3d 672, 680 (8th Cir. 2019)). In

doing so, “we are ‘constrained by the version of the facts that the district court

assumed or likely assumed in reaching its decision.’” Johnson v. McCarver, 942

F.3d 405, 409 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Thompson, 800 F.3d at 983).

Our review is similarly limited when reviewing denials of official immunity

under state law. Thompson v. Dill, 930 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2019). However,

we only “have jurisdiction over pendent claims if they are ‘inextricably intertwined’

with [the] qualified immunity claim” raised on interlocutory appeal, as is the case

when “resolution of the qualified immunity claim ‘necessarily resolves the pendent

claim[s] as well.’” Muir v. Decatur County, 917 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 866 (8th Cir. 2010)).

A.

Winters and Wing 5 first challenge the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity on Galanakis’s Fourth Amendment claim. “An official is not entitled to

qualified immunity if (1) the plaintiff demonstrates the violation of a constitutional

right, and (2) that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the official’s alleged

wrongdoing.” Kuessner v. Wooten, 987 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). For a right to be clearly established,

its “contours . . . must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would [have

understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” Quraishi, 986 F.3d at 835

(alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

5

Typically, “qualified immunity requires an individualized analysis of each

officer’s alleged conduct.” Bulfin v. Rainwater, 104 F.4th 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Bloodworth v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 89 F.4th 614, 624 (8th

Cir. 2023)). However, the district court found that Winters and Wing moved for

qualified immunity solely on the grounds that they had arguable probable cause to

arrest Galanakis, and Wing had developed neither facts nor argument to support an

individualized determination of his liability. Defendants do not challenge that

finding on appeal.

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“The Fourth Amendment includes the right to be free from arrest without

probable cause.” Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 1999). To

determine whether probable cause exists, courts look to “the events leading up to the

arrest” and “‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an

objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56–57 (2018) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540

U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). The subjective intent of the officer is “irrelevant to the

existence of probable cause.” United States v. Demilia, 771 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004)).

“[E]ven if an officer arrests an individual without actual probable cause—in

violation of the Constitution—he has not violated that individual’s ‘clearly

established’ rights for qualified immunity purposes if he nevertheless had arguable

probable cause to make the arrest.” Brown v. City of St. Louis, 40 F.4th 895, 901

(8th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). “Arguable probable cause exists when ‘an

officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing [the arrest] is based in probable cause

if the mistake is “objectively reasonable.”’” Nieters v. Holtan, 83 F.4th 1099, 1106

(8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1009 (8th Cir.

2017)). In turn, we look to “the totality of the circumstances to determine if arguable

probable cause existed,” id. at 1107, asking whether “a reasonable officer” could

reasonably but mistakenly “conclude . . . that there was a ‘substantial chance of

criminal activity,’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61, 65 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 243 n.13 (1983)).

On appeal, Winters and Wing argue they are entitled to qualified immunity

because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Galanakis for driving while under

the influence of marijuana. 6 Iowa’s Operating While Intoxicated offense (OWI)

prohibits driving “[w]hile under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug

6

Much of the stop appeared oriented toward the possibility that Galanakis was

intoxicated by alcohol. However, defendants concede that Galanakis’s performance

on the breathalyzer test “eliminated alcohol as the source of intoxication.”

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or a combination of such substances.” Iowa Code § 321J.2(1). Officers lack arguable

probable cause to arrest for such intoxication offenses when a suspect is “not visibly

intoxicated” and “neither his speech nor his actions” suggest intoxication. Lambert,

187 F.3d at 935. Consistent with this, Iowa courts7 have credited the following

indicia of intoxication, in varying combinations, to support probable cause for OWI

arrests: the odor of alcohol or marijuana on the driver; slurred speech; erratic driving;

bloodshot or watery eyes; an unstable gait; and refusing to take a breathalyzer, do

field sobriety tests, or otherwise cooperate with police. See State v. Morgan, 877

N.W.2d 133, 137 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (“[C]ommon indicia of intoxication include

an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and an uncooperative

attitude.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also State v. Warren, 955

N.W.2d 848, 866 (Iowa 2021) (odor, bloodshot or watery eyes); State v. McIver,

858 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2015) (erratic driving); State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d

388, 391–92 (Iowa 1986) (odor, unstable gait, failed “dexterity tests”).

When assessing arguable probable cause, we are tasked with looking at “the

whole picture.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 60 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.

411, 417 (1981)); see also Nieters, 83 F.4th at 1107 (“[W]e may not disregard

exculpatory evidence when considering the totality of the circumstances to

determine if arguable probable cause existed.”). We avoid a “divide-and-conquer

approach” to the facts and instead weigh “all of the surrounding circumstances” in

assessing whether the officers’ belief that probable cause existed was reasonable.

Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61–62 (citations omitted). Doing so here, and accepting the facts

found by the district court, no officer could reasonably conclude that there was a

7

Here, we look to Iowa law for guideposts as to what officers may credit

toward arresting someone for Iowa Code § 321J.2(1). See Kuessner, 987 F.3d at 756

(looking to state cases to delineate signs of intoxication amounting to arguable

probable cause); Evans v. Cabot Sch. Dist., 114 F.4th 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2024) (doing

the same for state disorderly conduct offense); see also Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (“To

be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in

then-existing precedent. The rule must be settled law, which means it is dictated by

controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”

(quotations omitted)).

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substantial chance that Galanakis was under the influence of marijuana. Galanakis

evinced almost no indicia of intoxication: no erratic driving; no odor of marijuana;

no watery or bloodshot eyes; no staggering or physical instability; no refusal to take

sobriety tests—rather, he twice asked to take a breathalyzer test. And he denied

drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana that day or night. Moreover, Galanakis’s

movements and behavior captured on Winters’s body camera footage suggest the

opposite of intoxication. As the district court found, and as the footage shows,

“Galanakis was moving confidently and directing subtle and not-so-subtle verbal

jabs at Winters in a manner that would have been difficult for an impaired person.”

Defendants point to a sampling of Galanakis’s actions and statements during

the entire course of the stop and argue that these support a reasonable inference that

there was a “substantial chance” he was intoxicated. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61

(quotation omitted). They cite the following undisputed facts: driving with high

beams on; air fresheners in the car and gum chewing; Galanakis’s initial trouble

finding his documentation; Galanakis’s failure to fully follow Winters’s instructions

on two of the five field sobriety tests; four arguably inconsistent statements or

misstatements; and the eight-to-ten-second pause before Galanakis answered that he

could not remember when he last smoked marijuana.

Weighed against the totality of the circumstances—namely, video of a lengthy

stop in which Galanakis registers almost no outward indication of intoxication—no

objectively reasonable officer could conclude that these isolated actions amounted

to arguable probable cause to arrest Galanakis. Galanakis’s traffic violation, the air

fresheners, and his brief difficulty finding documentation while simultaneously

answering Winters’s questions are minimally suggestive of impairment. Cf. State v.

Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 205–06 (Iowa 2004) (“[I]f failure to follow a perfect vector

down the highway or keeping one’s eyes on the road [was] sufficient [reason] to

suspect a person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would

be subject each day to an invasion of [its] privacy.” (alterations in original) (quoting

United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1993))); Saunders v. Comm’r of

Pub. Safety, 226 N.W.2d 19, 21–22 (Iowa 1975) (in upholding license revocation,

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acknowledging driver’s “difficulty in producing his driver’s license” was one factor

among several—including driver’s admission to having had three or four beers, “the

smell of alcohol on his breath,” erratic driving, and unsteady walking—to support

“reasonable grounds” he had driven under the influence). That Galanakis did not

completely follow Winters’s instructions on two of the sobriety tests—taking too

many steps, and not turning or counting out loud in the ways instructed—also lends

weak support for the inference that Galanakis was intoxicated. Cf. State v. Wenzel,

987 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (noting that “marijuana diminishes a

person’s temporal and spatial judgment, but the Standard Field Sobriety Test does

not measure those effects” (quoting State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa

2017)).

The officers also rely on purportedly inconsistent statements 8 Galanakis made

during the stop to support arguable probable cause for arrest. But the district court

did not find that Galanakis had made inconsistent statements, and to the contrary, it

found that Galanakis’s answers to Winters’s questions were detailed and coherent.

The officers do not contend that this conclusion is “blatantly contradicted” by the

8

For example, Galanakis said he had a taillight out and immediately corrected

to “one of the bulbs up front.” And when Winters accused Galanakis of having red

eyes, Galanakis said, “I got contacts”; later, when Winters asked whether he was

presently wearing contacts, Galanakis said that he had taken them out earlier that

night at his friend’s house because he was allergic to his friend’s dog, which made

his eyes “dried up and watery.” The district court did not find Galanakis’s statements

to be inconsistent. Additionally, whether Galanakis’s eyes were actually red is

disputed and beyond the scope of our review. See Folsom, 92 F.4th at 755.

Also beyond our review is Galanakis’s statement that he was drug tested each

Friday as a member of William Penn University’s football team, a statement the

evidence later showed was incorrect. This statement is only relevant if Winters was

aware that it was not true before he arrested Galanakis, and the district court found

there was no contemporaneous evidence that Winters knew Galanakis’s statement to

be false. See Lambert, 187 F.3d at 935 n.6 (“The relevant inquiry is whether the

arresting officers had probable cause to arrest [the defendant] at the time of the arrest,

not whether the officers’ decision to arrest [the defendant] can be justified by

information learned after the arrest.”).

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record, Burnikel, 886 F.3d at 709 (quotation omitted), and, when considering the

video evidence in full, we agree that it is not.

Finally, defendants note that Galanakis “oddly” paused before answering

Winters’s question of when he had last smoked marijuana. It is true that evasive

behavior during a stop can be relevant to an officer’s assessment of probable cause.

See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (noting that officers may take

evasiveness into account). But here, defendants do not explain how or why a

reasonable officer would find Galanakis’s pause to be odd or evasive. They also

ignore vital context: Galanakis’s pause came immediately after Winters had

Mirandized him. The significance a reasonable officer could attribute to a

defendant’s silence right after being told that anything he says can and will be used

against him in a court of law is attenuated at best. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,

618 (1976) (concluding it was “fundamentally unfair” to use defendant’s post-

Miranda silence as evidence of guilt); see also Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57 (noting

probable cause inquiry is a circumstance-dependent, “fluid concept” (quoting Gates,

462 U.S. at 232)).

By the time Galanakis was arrested, no objectively reasonable officer could

have concluded that there was a substantial chance Galanakis had driven while under

the influence of marijuana. The video shows that Galanakis was not visibly

intoxicated, and “neither his speech nor his actions” suggested he was impaired.

Lambert, 187 F.3d at 935; see also id. at 933–35 (affirming denial of qualified

immunity where officers, called to the scene for an attempted burglary, arrested

suspect for public intoxication who was not visibly intoxicated and “was engaged in

friendly conversation” with the supposed victim). The facts to which the officers

point reflect at most a “divide-and-conquer approach”—a subset of Galanakis’s

actions that would not suggest a substantial chance of marijuana intoxication to any

reasonable officer when observed in the context of the stop as a whole. Because, on

the facts that we must assume for purposes of this appeal, “the officers subjected

[Galanakis] to [a] warrantless arrest[] unsupported by arguable probable cause . . .

they violated [his] clearly established rights.” Dunn, 116 F.4th at 751; see also

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Webster v. Westlake, 41 F.4th 1004, 1013 (8th Cir. 2022) (finding officers’

warrantless arrest violated plaintiff’s clearly established right “[b]ecause the

detectives did not have arguable probable cause to arrest [her]”). We affirm the

district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Galanakis’s Fourth Amendment

claim.

B.

The defendants also appeal the district court’s denial of summary judgment

on Galanakis’s state-law claims. We may exercise limited pendent jurisdiction over

“claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with interlocutory appeals concerning the

defense of qualified immunity,” permitted they are “‘coterminous with, or subsumed

in’ our qualified immunity analysis.” Clinton v. Garrett, 49 F.4th 1132, 1139 (8th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 78 F.3d 1264, 1269–70 (8th Cir.

1996)).

Independent of federal qualified immunity, Iowa officers enjoy statutory

immunity where “[t]he right . . . secured by law was not clearly established at the

time of the alleged deprivation, or at the time of the alleged deprivation the state of

the law was not sufficiently clear that every reasonable employee would have

understood that the conduct alleged constituted a violation of law.” Iowa Code

§ 670.4A(1)(a). The parties appear to agree that Iowa law follows the same two-step

approach applicable to federal qualified immunity. However, on appeal, the

defendants suggest that Iowa’s false arrest law presents a different liability standard

than the Fourth Amendment. See Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa

1983) (noting that in civil false arrest cases, “[i]f the officer acts in good faith and

with reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the person arrested

committed it, his actions are justified and liability does not attach”). Without

clarification that “resolution of [Galanakis’s] qualified immunity claim ‘necessarily

resolves the pendant claim[s] as well,’” we decline to exercise jurisdiction and

dismiss the interlocutory appeal as to the state-law claims. Muir, 917 F.3d at 1053

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(quoting Shannon, 616 F.3d at 866); see also Clinton, 49 F.4th at 1139 (citing

differing state liability standard in denying pendent jurisdiction).

III.

We affirm the judgment of the district court as to Galanakis’s Fourth

Amendment claim, and otherwise dismiss defendants’ appeal.

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