The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
AUGUST SESSION, 1998 November 4, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk
C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9709-CR-00438
)
Appellee, )
)
) WILSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. J.O. BOND
WILLIAM D. STOCKWELL, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Direct Appeal - First Degree M urder)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
B. F. LOWERY JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Public Square, Lowery Bldg. Attorney General and Reporter
Lebanon, TN.. 37087
TIMOTHY F. BEHAN
Assistant Attorney General
425 5th Avenu e North
Nashville, TN. 37243
TOM P. THOMPSON, JR.
District Attorney General
ROBERT HIBBETT
Assistant District Attorney
111 Cherry Street
Lebanon, TN. 37087
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
On Decem ber 19, 1 996, a W ilson Co unty jury found Appella nt, William D.
Stock well, guilty of first degree murder in the death of his newborn son. The trial
court immediately imp osed a sen tence of life im prison men t. Appe llant ap peals
from his conviction, raising three issues:
1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first
degree m urder;
2) whether the trial court erred in failing to make a conclusive determination
of the voluntariness and admiss ibility of Appellan t’s alleged c onfess ion prior to
the submission of the statement to the jury; and
3) whether the trial court erred in allowin g the Sta te to introdu ce into
evidence the involun tary statem ent of Appellant as well as the testimony of
Detective David K enned y at the trial con cerning the taking of the state ment.
After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
FACTS
On Thursday, May 11, 1995, Appellant received a call from his girlfriend,
Lisa Murphy, at approximately 6:45 in the morning. Ms. Murphy, who Appellant
knew to be pregnant with his child, called to say that her water had broken.
Appellant went to Ms. Murphy’s house and picked up Ms. Murphy and her
younger sister. T he co uple transported Ms. Murphy’s sister to school. Appellant
then took Ms. Murphy to a farm that his parents owned on Sherrilltown Road. He
left her the re in an old decrepit travel trailer, and returned home so that no one
would notice that Ms. Murphy did not go to school. He returned to the farm,
repor tedly around 9:00 am, to find Ms. Murphy in labor. The couple delivered the
baby in the floor of the trailer.
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Accord ing to Ms. Murph y, the baby was born alive, tho ugh A ppella nt told
her the cord was around the infa nt’s neck during delivery. Ms. Mu rphy tied o ff the
child’s cord with thread and cut the cord with scissors she had with her. She
reported that the child cried as it was delivered and w as a purplish-red dish color.
She further testified that Appellant took the child from her, wrap ped it in a jac ket,
and took it to his truck, where there was a heater. He came back to the trailer and
helped her to the truck where she sat and held the infant. She testified that the
infant cried and slept, breathing normally. The couple discussed what to do with
the child; they co nsidere d taking it so mew here an d leaving it, but de cided it would
event ually be traced back to them. Ms. Murphy reported that Appellant several
times mentioned the possibility of burying the child. The two discussed their
dilemma for 15 to 20 minutes, and then Appellant got out of the truck, took a
shove l, and we nt into the barn. When Appellant returned from the barn, he took
the baby fr om M s. Mur phy an d carrie d it into the barn. Ms. Murphy testified that
the baby cried as Appellant carried it. Appellant returned in a few minutes without
the baby, telling Ms. Murphy that the baby had died.
The couple spent the rest of the day together, acting as if nothing out of the
ordinary had occurred. T hey went shopping and then had dinner with Ms.
Murph y’s family.
According to Appellant, the baby was born with the cord around its neck.
In a statement made at the time of his arrest, he stated that he thought that
perhaps the child moved a little. He said that it seeme d that the baby w as alive
when Ms. M urphy cut the cord, b ut it was blue in color. He testified at trial that he
attempted to revive the infant by placing his finger in the baby’s mouth and trying
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to clear its throat. He stated that both he and Ms. Murphy determined that the
baby was dead, and that they jointly decided that the baby should be buried.
Appe llant adm itted to digg ing a gra ve and b urying the baby.
When Ms. Mu rphy return ed to sch ool the M onday fo llowing the birth, a
teacher noticed th at she w as no lon ger preg nant. The teacher asked a friend of
Ms. Murphy’s, Judy Williams, if Ms. Murphy had delivered the baby. Ms. Williams
responded that the baby had died after being born with the cord around it’s neck.
The teacher went to the school principal who called law enforcement. The
detective assigned to the case wired Ms. Williams in order to tape a conversation
between her and Ms. Murphy regarding what had occurred. The taped
conversation was o nly par tially aud ible, bu t Ms. W illiams reported that Ms.
Murphy told her that the baby boy wa s buried in a barn in Cherry Valley. O fficers
determined that Appellant’s parents owned the property described and obtained
permis sion to se arch the property. T he officers located th e buried infant.
An autopsy performed by the County Medical Examiner revealed that the
child was full term and properly developed. The child’s esophagus, trachea, and
stomach containe d liquefied brown ish gre y dirt. Th e child ’s lung s floate d very w ell
in water, which the medical examiner testified indicated that the chid had been
born alive. The bronchi of the child’s lungs were blocked with a brown mate rial,
and the alveoli contained “brown amorphous aspirated material,” which was
consistent with the mate rial in the child’s s toma ch. Th e me dical examiner
determined that the ca use of de ath was “mech anical airw ay obstru ction due to
inhalation and ingestion of dirt.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation lab
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determined that the soil recovered from the infant was consistent with soil from
the child’s grave.
Detective Kennedy observed the autopsy of the baby, after which he
returned to the Sheriff’s office and re-read the statements by Ms. Murphy and
Appe llant. Upon reading them, he decided to again qu estion A ppellant a s to
whether the baby had been alive. At app roximately 1:00 in the morning, D etective
Kennedy awoke Appellant and led him to an interrogation room for further
questioning. Appella nt signed a rights wa iver. Detec tive Kenn edy testified that
Appellant then told him he wished to change his statement to reflect that the baby
was alive at the time he buried it. Detective Kennedy stated that he wrote out the
statement for Appellant, but Appellant refused to sign the stateme nt. Detective
Kennedy testified that he told Appellant that he, Detective Kenne dy, would testify
as to wh at Appe llant had to ld him ev en if App ellant did n ot sign the statem ent.
Appellan t’s version of that night’s eve nts differed from tha t of Detective
Kennedy significantly. He testified that Detective Kennedy asked him if he wanted
to change any part of his statement and that he responded that he did not. He
said that Detective Kennedy wrote a statement and read it back to him , again
asking if he wanted to change his statement. Appellant testified that he
uneq uivoca lly told the de tective th at he d id not w ish to ch ange his statements and
that he asked for an attorney. Appellant further testified that Detective Kennedy
told him that he, Detective Kennedy, was studying to be an attorney and that in
his opinio n Appe llant shou ld sign the statem ent.
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I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appe llant initially contends that the State failed to present evidence
sufficient to support the jury’s conviction of murder in the first degree, alleging
spec ifically that the S tate failed to prove the elements of premeditation and
deliberation. When an ap pellan t challe nges the su fficienc y of the e videnc e, this
Court is oblige d to rev iew tha t challe nge a ccord ing to c ertain w ell-settle d
principles. A verdict of guilty by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the
testimony of the Sta te’s witnes ses an d resolve s all conflicts in the te stimo ny in
favor of the Sta te. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994); State v.
Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Although an accused is originally
cloaked with a presum ption of innocen ce, a jury verdict removes this presumption
and replaces it with one of guilt. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.
1982). Hence, on app eal, the bu rden of p roof rests w ith Appe llant to dem onstrate
the insufficienc y of the con victing evide nce. Id. On appeal, “the [S]tate is entitled
to the stro nges t legitim ate view of the e videnc e as w ell as all reasonable and
legitimate inference s that ma y be draw n therefro m.” Id. (citing State v. Cabbage,
571 S.W .2d 832 , 835 (T enn. 1978)) . W here th e suffic iency o f the evid ence is
contested on appeal, the relevant question for the reviewing court is whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the
offense beyond a reason able do ubt. Harris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 ; Jackson v.
Virgin ia, 443 U .S. 307, 3 19, 99 S .Ct. 2781 , 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (19 79). In
conducting our evaluation of the convicting evidence, this Court is precluded from
reweighing or recons idering the evidenc e. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383
(Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 6); State v. Mathews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990). More over, th is Court may not substitute its own inferences “for those
drawn by the trier of fa ct from circ umsta ntial eviden ce.”Id. at 779. Finally, the
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Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 13(e) provides, “finding s of gu ilt
in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings by th e trier of fact beyond a
reasonab le doubt.” See also State v. Mathews, 805 S.W.2d at 780.
In State v. Brown, 836 S.W .2d 530 (Tenn .1992) and State v. West, 844
S.W.2d 144 (Tenn.1992), our Supreme Court discussed the then existing
eleme nts of first degree murder. In Brown, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the Tennessee courts have often blurred the distinction between the
eleme nts of premeditation and deliberation. The Court relied upon the following
historical definitions:
"Premeditation" is the process s imply of thinking
about a proposed killing before engaging in the homicidal
condu ct; and "deliberatio n" is the proce ss of ca refully
weighing such ma tters as the wisdom of going ahead with
the proposed killing, the manner in which the killing will be
accomplished, and the consequences which may be
visited upon the killer if and when apprehended.
"Deliberation" is present if the thinking, i.e., the
"preme ditation," is being done in such a cool mental state,
under such circumstances, and for such a period of time
as to perm it a "careful weighing" of the proposed decision.
Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 540-41 (quoting C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law
§ 140 (14th ed.1979) (emphasis in original)); see also State v. Gentry, 881
S.W .2d 1 (Tenn . Crim. App.1 993).
Premeditation as define d by the S uprem e Cou rt requires evidenc e of a
"previo usly formed design or intent to kill," and deliberation requires "some period
of reflection, during which the mind is free from the influence of excitement or
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passion ." West, 844 S.W.2d at 147. More over, to insure that the elem ents w ould
be considered separately, in Brown the Court decided to aba ndon the co mm only
given instruction that prem editation c ould be "formed in an insta nt." Brown, 836
S.W.2d at 543. In State v. Gentry, while holding that the jury may infer
premeditation and delibe ration from the circumstances surrounding the killing, the
Supreme Court, outlined the proof from which a jury might rationally infer the
elements o f first degree murd er:
(1) facts about how and w hat the defen dant d id prior to the
actual killing which show he was engage d in activity
directed toward the killing, that is, planning activity;
(2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and
conduct with the victim from which motive may be inferred;
and
(3) facts about the nature of the killing from which it may
be inferred that the manner of killing was so particular and
exacting that the defen dant m ust ha ve inten tionally killed
accord ing to a pre conce ived des ign.
State v. Gentry, 881 S.W .2d 1, 4-5 (Ten n. Crim. App . 1993) (quoting 2 W.
LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.7 (198 6)); see also State v.
Hall, 1997 W L 769174 ,118-119 (T enn. 1997 ).
In the matter sub judice, proof w as pre sente d that A ppella nt wan ted rid of
the baby “someway, anyway.” Further proof showed that Appellant refus ed to
take Ms. Mu rphy to a h ospital, bu t rather too k her to a re mote location to give
birth so that no one would find out about the child. Because premeditation and
deliberation are elements are mens rea eleme nts, elem ents which pertain to the
mental state o f the pe rpetra tor, the o nly way a jury ca n find s uch e leme nts is
usua lly through circumstantial evidence, through examining Appellant’s actions
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for evidence of what was in his mind as he acted. The evidence showed that the
Appellant left Ms. Murphy at the abandoned trailer for over an hour during which
her labor started. The child was born alive and Appellant took a shovel and dug
a shallow grave before taking the baby from its mother. All of this evidence
suppo rts the finding of preme ditation an d delibera tion. This is sue is with out me rit.
II. Determination of Voluntariness and Admissibility of Statement
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to determine
pretrial whether Ap pellant’s stateme nt to Detective Ke nnedy wa s voluntary.
Detective Kennedy and Appellant both testified at a pretrial hearing regarding
Appe llant’s motion to suppress the statement. The trial court overruled
Appe llant’s motio n and allowed the State to presen t the statemen t to the jury
through the testimony of Detective Kennedy. The trial court ruled that Appe llant’s
contention that he never m ade the statem ent was a fact q uestion for the jury
rather than a question of volu ntariness for the trial court to determine. We agree.
Appellant has not contested the rights waiver which he signed. Neither has he
indicated that he was mistreated or threatened into making a statement. He
mere ly contests the authe nticity of the sta temen t. The qu estion of w hether
Appellant actually made the statement at all is a relevant fact question to be
resolved by the trier of fact, the jury.
III. Introduction of Statement
Appe llant further alleg es that the trial court erre d in allowin g the Sta te to
present the contested statement to the jury through the testimony of Detective
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Kenned y. W e disagree. Appellant’s argument seems to be based on the lack of
verification of the stateme nt allegedly ma de by App ellant to Detective Kenned y.
Appellant was allowed to cross-examine Detective Kennedy at length regarding
the authenticity of the document, the conditions under which it was authored, and
whether the detective was truthful in his version of the events. Questions
concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given to the
evidence, and w ell as factual issues raised by the evide nce are resolved by the
trier of fact and not this Cou rt. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835(Tenn.
1978). T he jury ha s spoke n. This iss ue is witho ut merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
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DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOHN K. BYERS, SENIOR JUDGE
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