Fontaine v. CGI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MATIYA J. FONTAINE,

Plaintiff,

-against-

MEMORANDUM AND

CGI; LINEAGE PROPERTIES; EMPIRE STATE ORDER

MANAGEMNT CO.; LA CABANA APARTMENTS;

22-CV-3857 (LDH)(RML)

EPHRAIM FRUCHTHANDLER; MATIS TYBERG;

LUIS PEREZ; DJ,

Defendants.

LaSHANN DeARCY HALL, United States District Judge:

On January 30, 2023, Plaintiff Matiya J. Fontaine filed the instant pro se action and alleged

violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (the “FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981

(“Section 1981”) and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”).

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is granted. For the reasons discussed

below, Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order to submit an amended

complaint.

BACKGROUND1

The Court assumes the truth of the factual allegations in the Complaint for purposes of this

Memorandum and Order. Plaintiff’s complaint is far from clear. Plaintiff asserts that she is a

disabled, black, single woman who resides in Brooklyn, New York and was refused an

“opportunity to participate in denied renovations” to her apartment and an “ADA upgrade to a

larger unit.” (Compl. at 7, ECF No. 1.) She further alleges that Defendants retaliated against her

1 The following facts taken from the complaint (ECF No. 1) are assumed to be true for the purpose of this

memorandum and order.

and threatened her with termination from the housing assistance program in which she participates.

(Id.) Plaintiff seeks to have her apartment upgraded and monetary damages.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Therefore, the complaint must at a minimum “disclose sufficient

information to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining

about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531,

541 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d

Cir. 2019). And, although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this

tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful that a plaintiff’s pleadings

should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976));

see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts

“remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). That said, the Court must dismiss

sua sponte a pro se action if the court determines that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636,

639 (2d Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

Each of Plaintiff’s stated causes of action fall short of the pleading standard required to

state a case for which relief may be granted.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her based on her disability and race

and retaliated against her in violation of the FHA. The FHA prohibits, among other things,

discrimination based on race in the setting the availability, terms, and conditions of residential real

estate transactions. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). To state a claim for housing discrimination under the

FHA, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege “(1) [s]he is a member of the protected class; (2) that

defendant took adverse actions against [her]; and (3) that the adverse action took place under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Mazzocchi v. Windsor Owners Corp.,

11–CV–7913 (LBS), 2012 WL 3288240, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (citation omitted). And

to state a plausible retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege that additional facts that (1) she is a

member of a protected class (2) in the exercise or enjoyment of her FHA rights, and (3) as a result

of her actions, she suffered coercion, intimidation, threats, interference or retaliation. See

Wentworth v. Hedson, 493 F.Supp.2d 559, 565 (E.D.N.Y.2007).

Here, Plaintiff simply has not alleged any facts to support FHA liability under either theory.

For instance, she has not alleged what disability or condition she lives with. Nor does Plaintiff

explain what reason she was given for the alleged denial of an upgrade to her apartment. Without

more, the Court may not infer merely from Plaintiff’s racial identity and the fact that she was

denied a renovation request, that Defendant discriminated against her based upon her identity.

And, with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, she does not provide any details supporting an

inference that she was subjected to retaliatory conduct or that she exercised her FHA rights.

Plaintiff's FHA claim therefore fails on either theory. See Nguedi v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New

York, 813 F. App’x 616, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (pro se litigant’s reliance on “conclusory

allegations” and “unsubstantiated speculation” are not sufficient).

Plaintiff also asserts claims under § 1981 and Title VII, but these claims suffer from the

same problem. Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all

laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42

U.S.C. § 1981(a). Title VI provides that no person shall be subject to exclusion from participation

in, denial of benefits of, or discrimination in any program receiving federal financial activity based

upon race. 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. In order to state a claim under either of these

statutes, “the plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant discriminated against [her] on the

basis of race, that that discrimination was intentional, and that the discrimination was a substantial

or motivating factor for the defendant's actions.” Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir.

2001) (citations and quotations omitted). And, “the standard for liability under these statutes is

more exacting than the standard required to sustain an FHA claim, which the Court has already

determined Plaintiff has failed to meet.” Jackson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 15-CV-5062

(PKC) (ST), 2019 WL 1376840, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2019).

As with her FHA claim, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1981 and Title VII fall short of the

pleading standard. Plaintiff alleges only that she is a disabled, black, single woman and was refused

an “opportunity to participate in denied renovations” to her apartment and an “ADA upgrade to a

larger unit.” (Compl. at 7.) Because these allegations “consist[ ] of nothing more than conclusory

allegations that [Plaintiff] was mistreated as a result of h[er] race,” Brown v. Greene, No. 11-CV-

4917 (BMC), 2012 WL 911560, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2012), her claims are dismissed. See

Bentley, Jr. v. Mobil Gas Station, 599 F. App’x 395, 396 (2d Cir. 2015) (“a plaintiff's naked

allegation that the defendant acted based on the plaintiff's race and color is too conclusory to

survive a motion to dismiss.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice and she is granted leave

to amend her complaint to expound upon her allegations.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is granted 30 days’ leave from the date of this Order to submit an amended

complaint. Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint, she must provide a short and plain

statement of the relevant facts supporting her claim under the FHA, Title VI, and Section 1981,

against each Defendant named in the amended complaint. Plaintiff is also directed to provide the

addresses for any named Defendants.2 Plaintiff's amended complaint should: (a) state the names

and titles of all Defendants; (b) describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support Plaintiff's

case, including what each Defendant did or failed to do; (c) give the dates and times of each

relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date and time of each relevant event; (d) give the

location where each relevant event occurred; (e) describe how each Defendant's acts or omissions

violated Plaintiff's rights and describe the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and (f) clearly state what relief

Plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as monetary damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the

original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the

amended complaint. The Amended Complaint must be labeled as an Amended Complaint and

include the docket number. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days of this

Order, or fail to address the deficiencies identified herein, judgment may enter.

2 Plaintiff’s failure to provide an address for each Defendant named in the Amended Complaint will mean that the

Court will not be able to direct service of process for those Defendants.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, Plaintiff is granted 30 days’ leave to

amend the complaint to allege facts, if possible, to support a basis for her claim. No summons

shall issue at this time, and all further proceedings shall be stayed for thirty (30) days.

Plaintiff may wish to consult the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance

Project at (212) 382-4729 for free, limited-scope legal assistance.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3) that any appeal from this order

would not be taken in good faith, and therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York /s/ LDH

April 15, 2025 LaSHANN DeARCY HALL

United States District Judge