Roberts v. Fleury

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CHRISTOPHER A. ROBERTS,

Plaintiff, 6:22-cv-918

(ECC/TWD)

v.

R. FLEURY, et al.,

Defendants.

Christopher A. Roberts, Pro Se Plaintiff

Daniel Cartwright, Esq., for County Defendants

Charles C. Spagnoli, Esq., for District Defendants

Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Christopher A. Roberts brings this action against Defendants R. Fleury, M.

Aldoori, Robert Maciol, Anthony J. Picente, Jr., Ronald Wheelock, Daniel Gilmore, Jim Dever,

Ron Critelli, Dawn Miller, Anthony Nicotera, Todd Nelson, Oneida County, and Sauquoit Valley

Central School District, alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as various state law

claims. Plaintiff’s claims arise from his objection to face-mask policies implemented by the

Defendants during the COVID-19 pandemic (Mask Mandates), and Plaintiff’s inability to attend

and be heard at a public school board meeting due to his refusal to comply with the Mask

Mandates. On March 22, 2024, U.S. District Judge Glenn T. Suddaby dismissed Plaintiff’s

original Complaint, without prejudice as to certain claims. Dkt. No. 55. Plaintiff filed an Amended

Complaint on April 19, 2024, Dkt. No. 56, and Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended

Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (f), Dkt. Nos. 65, 70. Plaintiff opposes the

Defendants’ motions. Dkt. Nos. 67, 76. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions are

granted in part, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed.

II. FACTS

The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with Judge Suddaby’s March 22, 2024

decision, which recites the factual background of this case. Dkt. No. 55 at 3-5.1 To the extent the

Amended Complaint adds any relevant factual allegations, the Court will address these additional

facts in the course of discussing the parties’ arguments below.2

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d

129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Although

a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels,

conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual

allegations ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Lawtone-Bowles

v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-4240, 2017 WL 4250513, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint

and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See EEOC v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247,

253 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.

2007)). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court’s review is ordinarily limited to “the facts

as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as

1 Citations to page numbers refer to pagination generated by the ECF system, unless otherwise

noted.

2 However, Plaintiff represents that the “essential factual allegations” contained in the original

Complaint are “the same” as those contained in the Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 63.

exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” See McCarthy v. Dun &

Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his submissions “must be construed liberally and

interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). “Nonetheless, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pro

se plaintiff must support his claims with ‘specific and detailed factual allegations, not stated in

wholly conclusory terms.’” Wightman-Cervantes v. ACLU, No. 06-cv-4708, 2007 WL 1805483,

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2007) (quoting Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85–86 (2d Cir.

2000)).

Defendants also seek to strike the Amended Complaint, or portions thereof, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Dkt. Nos. 65 at 1; 65-7 at 5-7; 70-1 at 12. Rule 8 requires that a complaint

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court has the power to strike portions of or outright dismiss a complaint

that “does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861

F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)). “However, violations of Rule 8 are found

only in extreme circumstances.” A.S. v. City Sch. Dist. of Albany, 585 F. Supp. 3d 246, 266, n.7

(N.D.N.Y. 2022) (collecting cases). Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(f) “is usually reserved for those

cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its

true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42 (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The District Defendants’ Motion

1. Claims Conceded and/or Abandoned

In his opposition to the District Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff explicitly concedes the

dismissal of certain claims for relief asserted in his Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 67 at 2.

Specifically, Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of the following claims: (1) Count One alleging

“Subjected to Investigational Countermeasure Use” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Count Two

alleging violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (3) Count Four alleging violations of the PREP Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

and (4) Count Six alleging breach of contract. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not oppose the

District Defendants’ argument that Count Three of the Amended Complaint, alleging violations of

the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is subject to dismissal

because it is inapplicable to the Mask Mandates, which did not implicate a fundamental right. See

Dkt. No. 65-7 at 16. Thus, as to these claims for relief, the District Defendants’ unopposed and

facially meritorious arguments are granted. Dkt. No. 68 at 3. See also Ross v. Port Chester Hous.

Auth., No. 17-cv-4770, 2019 WL 4738941, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) (dismissing as

abandoned claims that pro se plaintiff failed to address or oppose in response to defendants’ motion

to dismiss); Johnson v. Lew, No. 1:13-cv-1072 (GTS/CFH), 2015 WL 4496363, at *5 & n. 6

(N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3).

Accordingly, only the following claims remain against the District Defendants: (1) Count

Five alleging substantive due process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Count Seven

alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) Count Eight alleging common-law

negligence; (4) Count Nine alleging common-law conspiracy, and (5) Count Ten alleging fraud by

omission or non-disclosure.

2. Substantive Due Process

The District Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint “does not identify any

fundamental right infringed by the Mask Mandates, and it supplies no new factual allegation

showing that the Mask Mandates were not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Dkt.

No. 65-7 at 17-18. Thus, the District Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim

must be dismissed for the same reasons set forth by Judge Suddaby in his March 22, 2024 decision:

the Mask Mandates did not violate any fundamental right of Plaintiff and pass rational basis

review. Id. at 17. In response, Plaintiff argues that the Mask Mandates infringed on his

“fundamental right to redress his local school board.” Dkt. No. 67 at 2. Plaintiff further argues

the absence of any “evidence of the alleged [COVID-19] virus[.]” Id. at 2-3.

“To determine whether a government regulation infringes a substantive due process right,”

courts must first “determine whether the asserted right is fundamental.” Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th

19, 30 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 143 S. Ct. 1020 (2023) (quoting Leebaert v.

Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2003)). “Rights are fundamental when they are implicit

in the concept of ordered liberty, or deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Leebaert,

332 F.3d at 140 (quoting Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1996)).

When the right infringed is fundamental, courts apply strict scrutiny, and “the governmental

regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th

at 30 (quoting Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460). When a “claimed right is not fundamental,” courts

apply rational basis review, and the “governmental regulation need only be reasonably related to

a legitimate state objective.” Id. (quoting Immediato, 73 F.3d at 461).

As Judge Suddaby correctly noted upon review of Plaintiff’s original Complaint, “federal

courts that have been asked to rule on the constitutionality of mask mandates have uniformly found

that such mandates do not implicate fundamental rights and are thus subject to rational basis

review.” See Roberts v. Fleury, No. 6:22-cv-0918 (GTS/TWD), 2024 WL 1242231, at *9

(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024) (citing Doe v. Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist. (FSUFSD), 568

F. Supp. 3d 270, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (collecting cases)). “Under the rational basis standard, a

law is constitutionally flawed only if it was not ‘rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’”

Roberts v. Fleury, 2024 WL 1242231, at *9 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473

U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). The application of rational basis review “is not a license for courts to judge

the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319

(1993) (citation omitted). Laws subject to rational basis review are “accorded a strong presumption

of validity.” Id. “The party challenging a law subject to rational basis review has the burden to

‘negat[e] every conceivable basis which might support it.’” Roberts, 2024 WL 1242231, at *9

(quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 319) (citation omitted)).

Here, as Judge Suddaby further noted, the Defendants’ application of the Mask Mandates

“clearly survive rational basis review, because they were ‘rationally related to [the] legitimate state

interest’ of controlling the spread of COVID-19 virus.” Roberts v. Fleury, 2024 WL 1242231, at

*9 (citing FSUFSD, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 275-76 (“[Federal courts] have uniformly found that public

mask mandates do not implicate fundamental rights, and that such mandates easily clear rational

basis review.”);3 and Mongielo v. Hochul, No. 22-cv-116, 2023 WL 2307887, at *14-17

3 Approximately one month after Judge Suddaby issued his March 22, 2024 decision, the Second

Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s substantive due process claim in

FSUFSD, concluding that (1) no fundamental rights were at stake, and (2) the defendant school

district’s application of the mask mandates survived rational basis review “because it was

reasonably related to a legitimate state objective ensuring the health and safety of all students,

(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2023) (holding that school mask mandate survived rational basis review)).

Plaintiff has not raised any additional allegations in his Amended Complaint that would alter this

analysis. The Court therefore concludes that the substantive due process claim alleged in the

Amended Complaint must be dismissed as against the District Defendants.

3. Qualified Immunity

In addition to seeking dismissal on the merits of Plaintiff’s remaining constitutional claims,

the individual District Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 65-

7 at 24-26. Plaintiff argues that the individual District Defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity because they violated clearly established law and acted outside the scope of their

authority. Dkt. No. 67 at 3.

The legal standard for establishing qualified immunity at the pleading stage was set forth

in detail by Judge Suddaby in his March 22, 2024 decision, and will not be restated here. Dkt. No.

55 at 25-26. Considering that there has been no substantial change in the factual allegations, nor

any intervening changes in the law, the Court finds that the individual District Defendants are

alternatively entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims based on the doctrine of

qualified immunity, for the reasons previously set forth by Judge Suddaby. Id. at 26-27

(concluding that Plaintiff had “failed to plausibly allege ‘the violation of a constitutional right—

let alone that the unlawfulness of the defendants’ conduct was clearly established at the time.’”

(quoting Mongiello v. City of New York, 2023 WL 2307887, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2023)

(cleaned up)); id. at 32 (concluding that the individual District Defendants would be entitled to

qualified immunity for the same reasons as the individual County Defendants).

teachers, and visitors on school grounds by curbing the spread of COVID-19. It is well settled that

public health is a legitimate state interest.” Doe v. Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist., 100

F.4th 86, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 570 (2024).

B. The County Defendants’ Motion

1. Arguments Incorporated by Reference and Claims Abandoned

In seeking dismissal of the Amended Complaint, the County Defendants join in and

incorporate by reference the arguments made by the District Defendants in their motion to dismiss.

Dkt. No. 70-1 at 12. In opposition to the County Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff limits his argument

to the viability of his substantive due process claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment –

arguing that the Mask Mandates implicated a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny analysis.

Dkt. No. 76. Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss on any other

basis conforms with his concession of various claims in his response to the District Defendants’

motion to dismiss. In consideration of these factors, the County Defendants’ unopposed and

facially meritorious arguments are granted as to the dismissal of Counts One (“Subjected to

Investigational Countermeasure Use” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Two (violation of the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Three (violation

of the “Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); and Four (violations

of the PREP Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

2. Substantive Due Process

For the same reasons that Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim alleged in his Amended

Complaint must be dismissed against the District Defendants, it must also be dismissed against the

County Defendants. Specifically, the Mask Mandates do not implicate a fundamental right and

survive rational basis review because they were rationally related to the legitimate state interest of

controlling the spread of COVID-19. Count Five is therefore dismissed as against the County

Defendants.

3. Qualified Immunity

For the same reasons that the individual District Defendants would be entitled to qualified

immunity, so would the individual County Defendants. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional

claims as against the individual County Defendants is therefore alternatively warranted on this

basis.

C. State Law Claims

The only remaining claims alleged in the Amended Complaint are Plaintiff’s state law

claims. Defendants request that, absent any viable federal claim, the Court decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Dkt. Nos. 65-7 at 14; 70-1 at 11-12.

Plaintiff’s only opposition to the arguments seeking dismissal of his state law claims is that the

District Defendants “acted outside of the scope of their authority by enforcing a mask mandate[,]”

and that Plaintiff’s claims “are not precluded by Education Law § 3813.” Dkt. No. 67 at 3.

Where a district court dismisses all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court

may, in its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “It is well settled that where, as here, the federal claims are

eliminated in the early stages of litigation, courts should generally decline to exercise pendent

jurisdiction over remaining state law claims.” Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of N.Y.,

464 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Kolari v. New York-Presb. Hosp.,

455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“‘[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims.””) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 350,

n.7 (1988)) (additional citation omitted). A district court should “balance[] the traditional ‘values

of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity,” in deciding whether to exercise

jurisdiction.” Kolari v. New York-Presb. Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-

Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350).

Here, discovery is not complete, and there is nothing to suggest that the Court should depart

from the usual practice. As a result, after carefully balancing the traditional values, the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Specifically, the following claims are dismissed

without prejudice to refiling in state court: (1) Claim Six alleging breach of contract, (2) Claim

Seven alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) Claim Eight alleging common-law

negligence; (4) Claim Nine alleging common-law conspiracy; and (5) Claim Ten alleging fraud

by omission or non-disclosure.

D. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)

Because the Court has granted the Defendants’ motions seeking dismissal pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), it need not analyze whether dismissal or striking pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(f) is appropriate.

V. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, it is

ORDERED that the District Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 65, is GRANTED

in part, and it is further

ORDERED that the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 70, is GRANTED

in part, and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to

refiling in state court, and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 56, is otherwise DISMISSED

with prejudice,‘ and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close

this action.

Dated: April 16, 2025

Elizabeth C. Coombe

U.S. District Judge

* Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend his pleading. Moreover, the Court has already afforded

Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. In these circumstances, the Court finds that justice does not

require permitting Plaintiff to amend again. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). For these reasons, the

Court dismisses Plaintiff's constitutional claims with prejudice.

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