Williams v. Smith

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

EDDIE WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

) Civ. No. 2:25-cv-02104-SHM-tmp

v.

)

)

ELIZABETH SMITH, ET AL.,

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DISMISSING CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT WITH

PREJUDICE, DENYING MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL, DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER, CERTIFYING THAT APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN

GOOD FAITH, DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS ON APPEAL, NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF COURT’S

STRIKE RECOMMENDATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), AND

CLOSING CASE

Plaintiff Eddie Williams, booking number 24116623, an inmate at the Shelby County Jail

in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with an incorporated

motion for the appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 1.) Williams filed two motions for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 2 & 8.) The Court granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(the “PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 15.)

Williams filed an amended motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 6) and a

motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 7). Williams filed an amended complaint.

(ECF No. 13.) The Court CONSOLIDATES the original complaint and the amended complaint

for the purpose of screening Williams’ claims under the PLRA.

For the reasons that follow, Williams’ consolidated complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. Williams’ motions for the appointment of counsel and for a temporary restraining

order are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Williams alleges that on November 27, 2024, Shameika Sims, a parole officer, issued an

arrest warrant based on Williams’ alleged violation of the conditions of his parole. (ECF No. 13

at PageID 51.) Williams has attached a Parole Violation Report--Notice of Charges from the

Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“Notice of Charges”) to his complaint. (ECF No. 13-1

at PageID 56.) The Notice of Charges alleges that Williams violated the condition of his parole

requiring Williams to “obey the laws of the United States or any state,” by committing the crimes

of assault, aggravated assault, and stalking. (Id.) The Notice of Charges alleges that Williams’

criminal conduct violated the condition prohibiting Williams from “engag[ing] in assaultive,

abusive, threatening or intimidating behavior.” (Id.)

The Notice of Charges alleges that on March 22, 2024, Elizabeth Smith called the police

and stated that Williams had been “following her and harassing her.” (Id.) The Notice of Charges

alleges that Williams “work[ed] maintenance” at Smith’s apartment complex. (Id.) The Notice of

Charges alleges that on March 22, 2024, Smith was “walking through the complex” when Williams

“came out of his unit, chased [Smith] down and struck her several times on her left shoulder with

his fist, leaving it bruised and sore.” (Id.)

The Notice of Charges alleges that Smith called the police again on April 1, 2024. (Id.)

The Notice of Charges alleges that Smith was walking through the apartment complex when

Williams “came out of nowhere” and began swinging a metal pipe at Smith. (Id.) The Notice of

Charges alleges that Williams hit Smith on the wrist with the pipe and “fled the scene.” (Id.) The

Notice of Charges alleges that Smith suffered a broken wrist from the attack. (Id.) The Notice of

Charges alleges that Smith gave a police statement on April 4, 2024, and “positively identified

Eddie Williams in a six photo lineup” as the person who assaulted Smith. (Id.)

Williams alleges that Smith “made false police reports.” (ECF No. 13 at PageID 52.)

Williams alleges that Smith’s police reports were “dismiss[ed] by the Criminal Court for Shelby

County.” (Id.) Williams alleges that he presented evidence to a parole officer, showing that

Williams had not violated the conditions of his parole. (Id.) Williams alleges that he presented,

among other documents, an “order of dismissal by courts” and an “order of expungement of the

records.” (Id.)

Williams alleges that he was not given sufficient notice of his revocation hearing. (Id. at

PageID 53.) Williams alleges that his revocation hearing did not comply with the rules governing

parole proceedings in Tennessee. (Id.) Williams alleges that he was not informed of his rights to

“present witnesses and documentary evidence” on his behalf. (Id. at PageID 54.) Williams alleges

that he was sentenced to a year of imprisonment based solely on Smith’s false allegations. (Id. at

PageID 55.) Williams alleges that his revocation proceedings and incarceration violated his rights

under the 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.)

Williams sues as Defendants: (1) Officer Sims, (2) Smith, and (3) the Tennessee Board of

Probation and Parole. (Id. at PageID 1.) Williams seeks “immediate release from prison” and a

temporary restraining order against Defendants. (Id. at PageID 7.) Williams asks the Court to

issue a “criminal charge” against Smith for perjury. (Id.) Williams seeks $10,000 in monetary

damages and $20,000 in punitive damages against each Defendant. (Id. at PageID 8.)

II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

(2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Applying those standards, the

Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines

whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d

380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that

conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a

complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). It also requires factual allegations to

make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 555 n.3

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989); see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal

of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court

cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v.

Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

B. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983

Williams sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the

“Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS

Williams alleges that the revocation proceedings and his resulting incarceration violated

his constitutional rights under the 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments.1 (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.)

The Court need not analyze Williams’ constitutional claims about his parole revocation

and incarceration because they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held

that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,

or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

The Shelby County Jail’s Inmate Database shows that Williams is presently confined at the Shelby

County Jail, and his status is listed as “sentenced.” (See https://imljail.shelbycountytn.gov/IML

1 Williams seeks “immediate release from prison.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) For a state

prisoner who challenges “the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he

seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 500 (1973).

(Booking No. 24116623) (last accessed Apr. 15, 2025).) Williams’ claims call into question the

validity of the revocation of his parole, which has not been reversed, expunged, declared void, or

otherwise called into question. Williams’ claimed constitutional violations are not cognizable

under § 1983 and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013)). Leave to amend should

not be granted where a plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency in his complaint. See Gonzalez-

Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“If it is crystal clear that . . . amending

the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); see also Curley v. Perry,

246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal

of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and

does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).

The Court DENIES leave to amend. Williams cannot cure the deficiencies in the

consolidated complaint because all of his claims are barred by Heck.

V. APPELLATE ISSUES

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), it is

CERTIFIED that any appeal in this matter by Williams would not be taken in good faith. If

Williams nevertheless chooses to file a notice of appeal, he must either: (1) pay the entire $605

appellate filing fee or, if he is confined at that time, (2) submit a new in forma pauperis affidavit

and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust account statement for the last six months, in

compliance with § 1915(a)-(b).

VI. NOTICE OF STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

The “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting

in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated

or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court recommends that the dismissal of this case be

treated as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2021).

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:

A. Williams’ § 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to allege

facts stating a claim on which relief can be granted. See §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) &

1915A(b)(1)-(2). Williams’ § 1983 claims are barred by Heck.

B. Leave to amend is DENIED. The Court recommends that this dismissal be treated

as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g). See Simons, 996 F.3d 350.

C. The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and DENIES

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

D. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety.

E. Because the Court has dismissed Williams’ case in its entirety, Williams’ motions

for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 6) and for a temporary restraining order

(ECF No. 7) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 16th day of April, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE