Keenan v. Pav

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MAUREEN KEENAN,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

21-CV-6928 (JS)(JMW)

-against-

MARK PAV, CHRISTOPHER LAROCCO,

REBECCA MARCUS, MAUREEN MARCUS,

and COUNTY OF SUFFOLK,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Joshua B. Pepper, Esq.

Law Office of Joshua Pepper, PLLC

30 Wall Street, 8th Floor

New York, New York 10005

For Defendants Mark Stacy A. Skorupa, Esq.

Pav, Christopher Suffolk County Department of Law

LaRocco, and County H. Lee Dennison Building

of Suffolk: 100 Veterans Memorial Highway

Hauppauge, New York 11788

For Defendants Christopher P. Ring, Esq.

Rebecca Marcus and Law Office of Christopher P. Ring

Maureen Marcus: 737 Smithtown Bypass

Smithtown, New York 11787

David Antwork, Esq.

1757 Merrick Avenue, Suite 205

Merrick, New York 11566

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Presently before the Court is the Suffolk County

Defendants’1 Motion for Reconsideration (hereafter, the

“Reconsideration Motion”) (ECF No. 62), requesting the Court:

(1) update the docket sheet to “reflect that the complaint against”

Defendant Suffolk County is dismissed; (2) reconsider its decision

to grant summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor as to Count Three;

and (3) reconsider its decision declining to opine as to whether

Defendants’ Pav and LaRocco are entitled to qualified immunity.

For the following reasons, the Reconsideration Motion is GRANTED;

however, upon reconsideration, the Court adheres to its original

decision.

I. Standard of Review

The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration

is “strict.” Callari v. Blackman Plumbing Supply, Inc., 153 F.

Supp. 3d 590, 592 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Shrader v. CSX Transp.,

Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). Indeed, “to succeed on a

motion for reconsideration, the movant must show an intervening

change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or

the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”

Id. (citing Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956

1 The Court incorporates herein the defined terms utilized in the

March 31, 2025 Memorandum and Order on Summary Judgment (hereafter

“Summary Judgment Order”) (Mem. and Order, ECF No. 61), familiarity

with which is presumed.

F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992)) (quotation marks omitted). A motion

for reconsideration may not be used as a vehicle to relitigate

issues already decided by the Court. Id. Notwithstanding this

strict standard, the Court, in an abundance of caution, reconsiders

and clarifies its Summary Judgment Order as follows.

II. Analysis2

A. Request to Reconsider the Court’s Determination as to

Count Three

Suffolk County Defendants assert the Court “mistakenly”

granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff as to Count Three.

Upon reconsideration of the Court’s ruling and Suffolk County

Defendants’ argument, the Court concludes such argument is without

merit and adheres to its original ruling granting summary judgment

in favor of Plaintiff as to this Count. Suffolk County Defendants

allege the Court misstated that Plaintiff was arrested “in” her

home as opposed to “at” her home; however, such distinguishment is

inconsequential under the law. The law is clear, “the area

‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’—what [the

2 The Court notes Defendant Suffolk County’s request for an updated

docket sheet is not properly brought via a motion for

reconsideration. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in light of the

fact that all counts against Defendant Suffolk County i.e., Counts

Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, have been either dismissed by

the Court or withdrawn by Plaintiff (see generally, Mem. and

Order), Defendant Suffolk County, identified on the docket sheet

as “County of Suffolk”, is hereby dismissed from this case. The

Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket sheet to so

reflect.

Supreme Court] call[s] the curtilage—[i]s ‘part of the home itself

for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1,

6 (2013) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180

(1984)). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff were standing in the

doorway of her home or just outside of her home at the time of her

arrest, such arrest would still have violated Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, and would

warrant a finding, as a matter of law, in favor of Plaintiff as to

Count Three. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76, 85

(2d Cir. 2016) (“We therefore hold that irrespective of the

location or conduct of the arresting officers, law enforcement may

not cause a suspect to open the door of the home to effect a

warrantless arrest of a suspect in his home in the absence of

exigent circumstances”).

Therefore, upon reconsideration, the Court adheres to

its original ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff

as to Count Three.

B. Request to Reconsider the Court’s Determination as to

Defendants’ Qualified Immunity Defense

Despite Suffolk County Defendants’ contentions

otherwise, there remains a dispute of fact as to whether Defendant

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

[T]he Second Circuit has held that courts

should [only] cloak defendants with qualified

immunity at this [summary judgment stage of

litigation] . . . “if the court finds that the

asserted rights were not clearly established,

or if the evidence is such that, even when it

is viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and with all permissible inferences

drawn in [plaintiff’s] favor, no rational jury

could conclude that it was objectively

reasonable for the defendants to believe they

were acting in a fashion that did not violate

a clearly established right.”

Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 739 F. Supp. 2d 205, 264

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations and alterations omitted). Moreover, as

Suffolk County Defendants point out, even where a right is “clearly

established,” an officer is entitled to qualified immunity “if

‘officers of reasonable competence could disagree’ on the legality

of the action at issue in its particular factual context.” Walczyk

v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 154 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

Suffolk County Defendants argue the Court’s statement

that “reasonably competent officers could disagree about whether

there was probable cause to arrest [Plaintiff]” (see Mem. and Order

at 24), which was made in the context of its finding that there is

a genuine dispute of material fact concerning Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment § 1983 claims and parallel state law claim, renders a

finding that Officers Pav and LaRocco are entitled to qualified

immunity. The Court disagrees. To the extent the Court’s Summary

Judgement Order was ambiguous, the Court clarifies: it did not

intend to find, as a matter of law, that reasonable officers could

disagree about whether there was probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff; rather, given the enumerated disputed facts discussed

in the Summary Judgment Order, the Court was finding that a jury

could potentially make such a determination. Put simply: in light

of the material facts in dispute, which, in its preceding sentence,

the Court had enumerated, this issue of whether reasonable officers

could disagree about whether there was probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff is for a jury to decide, not the Court. See generally,

53rd St., LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 8 F.4th 74, 77 (2d Cir.

2021) (“A genuine dispute as to a material fact ‘exists and summary

judgment is therefore improper where the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could decide in the non-movant's favor.’”). Given

the Court’s intention (which it believed to be apparent) and

reiterating the Court’s view that there is an issue of fact as to

the applicability of the qualified immunity defense (see Mem. and

Order at 25 fn.10), upon reconsideration, the Court adheres to its

original ruling and declines to grant summary judgment in favor of

Officers Pav and LaRocco based upon the claimed defense of

qualified immunity.

C. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED, the Reconsideration

Motion is GRANTED; however, upon reconsideration, the Court

adheres to its original rulings.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

I. The Clerk of Court shall update the docket sheet to reflect

the dismissal of Defendant Suffolk County (identified on the

docket sheet as “County of Suffolk”);

II. The parties shall submit a Joint Pre-trial Order in accordance

with the Court’s Individual Rules no later than 60 days from

the date of this Order; and

III. In light of the parties’ representation that they are engaged

in settlement discussions, by no later than April 22, 2025,

the parties shall submit a joint letter to the Court

indicating whether they wish to proceed with a settlement

conference before Magistrate Judge Wicks and/or mediation.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: April 15, 2025

Central Islip, New York