BELDING v. RUSSO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH

MICHAEL BELDING, )

)

) 2:23-CV-02148-MJH

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

DAVID RUSSO, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL

)

AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES;

)

ZACHARY SAMS, SUED IN HIS

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; AND GREEN

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,

Defendants,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff, Michael Belding, filed suit against Defendants, David

Russo, former District Attorney for Greene County, Pennsylvania; Zachary Sams, former Chief

Detective for Greene County; and Green County, itself. (ECF No. 1). On February 26, 2024,

Defendant, Greene County, moved to dismiss Counts Eight and Nine of the Complaint. (ECF

No. 12). On August 2, 2024, this Court granted Defendant Greene County’s Motion to Dismiss.

(ECF No. 29). On August 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a ten count Amended Complaint, alleging

violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 32). On August 30,

2024, Defendant Greene County filed its Motion to Dismiss all claims and counts against it,

(ECF No. 33), and an accompanying brief. (ECF No. 34). On September 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed

his Brief in Opposition to Defendant Greene County’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 38). Greene

County did not file a Reply. All issues have been briefed and are ripe for decision. For the

reasons below, Greene County’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

I. Statement of Facts

In 2019, Plaintiff, Michael Belding, was elected to the Greene County Board of

Commissioners (“the Board”). (ECF No. 32, at ¶ 25). On January 6, 2020, David Russo was

sworn in as the District Attorney for Greene County. (Id. ¶ 28). Mr. Belding alleges that, from

the beginning of his tenure, Mr. Russo conflicted with county elected officials and employees,

refused to pursue Board-requested investigations, and maintained an unprofessional relationship

with Greene County’s Victim Witness Coordinator (“VWC”). (Id. ¶¶ 30-43).

In late October 2021, the VWC resigned her County position. (Id. ¶ 43). Following her

resignation, the Board transferred oversight and management of the VWC position from the

District Attorney’s Office to the County Commissioners’ Office. (Id. ¶ 45). The Board voted to

appoint a member of their staff, Sarah Smith, to oversee the VWC program. (Id. ¶ 51). When

asked why control of the VWC was being transferred, Mr. Belding told the press that the

“transition was necessary because the District Attorney’s Office had been unable to keep [the]

important position adequately staffed.” (Id. ¶ 54). Mr. Russo opposed Ms. Smith’s appointment.

Mr. Russo sent the Board various cease-and-desist letters, which were published by the media.

Mr. Belding also alleges that, on January 26, 2022, Mr. Russo informed reporters that he was

launching a criminal investigation into the alleged “illegal hiring” of Ms. Smith. (Id. ¶¶ 52-57).

Mr. Belding alleges that Mr. Russo instructed Zachary Sams, his Chief Detective, to investigate

Mr. Belding and the Board for the hiring of Ms. Smith. (Id. ¶¶ 58-60). Mr. Belding alleges that

this investigation was conducted in retaliation for the public statements Mr. Belding made about

the VWC position. (Id. ¶ 60).

In the Fall of 2022, Mr. Russo announced his intention to form a special weapons and tactics

(“SWAT”) unit under the Greene County District Attorney’s Office. (Id. ¶ 72). On September 2,

2022, the Board requested that Mr. Russo explain the operation, organizational structure, and

procedures of the new SWAT unit. (Id. ¶ 73). Mr. Russo did not respond to such requests. (Id. ¶

74). The Board sent two more letters to Mr. Russo, attempting to obtain a response and more

information from Mr. Russo about the SWAT unit. Mr. Russo allegedly did not answer any of

the Board’s requests. (Id. ¶¶ 77-81). On January 3, 2023, an editorial opinion, criticizing Mr.

Russo’s implementation and creation of the SWAT unit, was authored by Mr. Belding and

published in the Observer Reporter, a newspaper in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶¶ 81-83). Mr.

Belding claims that his editorial opinion statements were made as a citizen on a matter of public

concern. (Id. ¶ 82).

Mr. Belding alleges that, two days after the Observer Reporter publication, Mr. Russo made

statements to the press that two individuals were being charged with forging court orders, and

that one of the accused individuals was a former employee of Mr. Belding. (Id. ¶¶ 85-86). Mr.

Belding alleges that Mr. Russo continued commenting to the press, stating that six other

individuals employed by Mr. Belding had been arrested for crimes. (Id. ¶ 87). Mr. Belding

claims that none of the individuals identified by Mr. Russo ever worked for Mr. Belding. (Id. ¶

89). In fact, under Greene County’s organizational structure, no one works for a specific

Commissioner, only the County itself. (Id.). Mr. Belding further alleges that Mr. Russo made

these media statements in retaliation for Mr. Belding’s published Observer Reporter editorial

opinion. (Id. ¶ 90-91).

In 2022, Greene County’s Office of the Controller audited the Greene County District

Attorney’s §§ 5801 and 5803(a) Forfeiture Accounts. (Id. ¶ 99). Mr. Belding alleges that the

results of the audit revealed that Mr. Russo had improperly utilized funds to buy gear for his

SWAT unit, and that, at least twice, Mr. Russo had violated the Asset Forfeiture Statute related

to handling and accounting for asset forfeitures. (Id. ¶¶ 100-101). On September 30, 2022, the

Office of the Controller reported their findings to the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney

General. (Id. ¶ 101). On January 17, 2023, the chairman of the Greene County Republican

committee filed a right-to-know request for the audit, which resulted in the release of several

pages from the audit. (Id. ¶ 103). On February 18, 2023, Mr. Belding posted portions of the audit

on his personal Facebook page. (Id. ¶ 104). On March 2, 2023, Detective Sams sent a

“Preservation Request” to the Green County Information Technology Director, instructing them

to preserve certain emails and other electronic communications. The request indicated that such

preservation related to the release of confidential information. (Id. ¶ 105).

Mr. Belding claims that Greene County officials considered the preservation demand to be an

investigation into the release of the County’s audit of the Office of the District Attorney, and that

Mr. Russo directed Detective Sams to begin said investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 107-108). On March 7,

2023, County Solicitor, Eugene Grimm, filed an action for declaratory judgment related to the

investigation against County officials, asserting the investigation was politically motivated and a

conflict of interest. (Id. ¶ 110). Mr. Belding signed the Verification for the Declaratory Judgment

Action. Id. ¶ 111. On March 11, 2023, Mr. Russo issued a written statement to the media stating:

To say I am furious beyond measure with Mike Belding and his cronies’

fabricated allegations would be an understatement. . . . Belding has surreptitiously

and libelously used sensitive government documents in order to attempt to slander

my name. . . . Belding and his cronies can be sure that this will be answered

aggressively and swiftly and lawsuits will be filed against Belding regarding his

action and behavior.

(Id. ¶ 112).

On March 15, 2023, Greene County’s Office of Registration and Elections conducted a

casting-of-lots to determine the order for listing candidates on the election ballot for the county

election. (Id. ¶ 113). This casting-of-lots was not properly advertised in two newspapers, as

required by 25 Pa. Stat. § 2875, which resulted in a challenge to the original casting-of-lots. (Id.

¶ 114). A recasting of the lots was rescheduled for March 23, 2023. (Id. ¶ 116). Mr. Russo, who

was seeking reelection to the Office of District Attorney, objected to the recasting of the lots; and

he, along with some other candidates, refused to recast their lots. (Id. ¶¶ 119-120). The Green

County Elections Manager informed the candidates that anyone who refused to cast a lot would

be positioned last on the primary ballot. (Id. ¶ 121). Mr. Russo and several others, who still

refused to recast their ballots, were positioned at the bottom of the ballot. (Id. ¶ 112). Mr.

Belding alleges that he was not involved with the decision to place those, who refused to recast

their lots, at the bottom of the ballot. (Id. ¶ 123).

On April 4, 2023, Detective Sams filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable

cause against Mr. Belding related to the recasting of lots, accusing Mr. Belding in four criminal

counts. (Id. ¶ 124). Mr. Belding alleges that Mr. Russo “directed, advised, and assisted

[Detective] Sams on the investigation and coordinated with [Detective] Sams to file charges

against Mr. Belding.” (Id. ¶ 126). Mr. Belding alleges that Mr. Russo was the actual author of the

affidavit in support of the criminal complaint and that Mr. Sams just signed off on what was

written. (Id. ¶ 129). Since Mr. Russo was a candidate in the election that was being challenged,

the charges were referred to the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office. (Id. ¶ 142). On May 2,

2023, the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office withdrew all four of the charges against Mr.

Belding, “finding that the criminal complaint was not supported by probable cause.” (Id. ¶ 144).

Mr. Belding alleges that Greene County policymakers were aware of Mr. Russo and Mr.

Sams’ unconstitutional conduct against Mr. Belding and others but did not take any precautions

against the behavior. (Id. ¶¶ 156-157). Mr. Belding alleges that “16 Pa. Stat. § 1405(b) sets forth

a mechanism for initiating the removal of a district attorney for willful and gross negligence in

the execution of the duties of the office, which includes engaging in unconstitutional behavior;

however, Greene County’s policymakers did not pursue this precautionary measure until after

the unconstitutional conduct and attendant harm described herein had occurred. (Id. ¶ 158). Mr.

Belding further alleges that Green County policy makers did not initiate any policies, practices,

or intervening conduct to stop Mr. Russo and Sams’ conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 159-163).

II. Relevant Legal Standard

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,

the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

The Supreme Court clarified that this plausibility standard should not be conflated with a

higher probability standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A

pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must

only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of the necessary element[s].’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.

2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Assocs., Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4,

2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016).

Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d

902, 906 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether

the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to

establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). The

purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline[] litigation by dispensing with needless

discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).

In a civil rights case, when the court grants a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a

claim, the court must offer the plaintiff leave to amend, even if it was not requested by the

plaintiff, “unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 246; Fletcher-

Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).

III. Discussion

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

In Counts Eight and Nine of his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Belding claims that

Greene County and the Greene County District Attorney’s Office violated his rights under the

First Amendment by taking retaliatory actions in response to Mr. Belding’s public speech. (ECF

No. 32, at ¶¶ 273-312). Mr. Belding alleges that Mr. Russo “(1) used the media to threaten legal

action against and make false and disparaging statements about Mr. Belding; and (2) initiated

and participated in pretextual criminal investigations against Mr. Belding.”1 (ECF No. 38, at 16).

Mr. Belding alleges that such retaliatory actions taken by Mr. Russo were a policy and custom of

Greene County. (ECF No. 32, at ¶¶ 273-312).

Greene County argues that Mr. Belding’s speech was not constitutionally protected. (ECF

No. 34, at 5-7). Greene County further argues that Mr. Belding has not pled facts to establish that

the County disregarded a known or obvious consequence of its actions such that its actions or

lack thereof amount to deliberate indifference to Mr. Belding’s constitutional rights. (Id.).

Greene County further contends that Mr. Belding fails to establish that Mr. Russo’s non-

prosecutorial actions established a policy or custom attributable to the County to impose Monell

liability, and that Mr. Russo was not acting as a final policy maker of the County when he took

the non-prosecutorial actions. (Id.).

Mr. Belding maintains that Greene County’s argument, that Mr. Belding’s speech was not

constitutionally protected, is precluded, because the present allegations regarding Mr. Belding’s

statements are unchanged and Greene County did not make the argument when it filed the first

Motion to Dismiss in this case. (ECF No. 38, at 10-11). Mr. Belding argues that he has pled facts

sufficient to establish that Mr. Russo was acting as a final policy maker when he took the alleged

non-prosecutorial retaliatory acts. (ECF No. 38, at 13). Mr. Belding further argues that he has

sufficiently alleged that Mr. Russo’s actions created a policy of retaliation, for which Greene

County’s acquiescence, constituted a custom of retaliation. (Id. at 15-21).

1 In this Court’s August 2, 2024 Memorandum Opinion, this Court determined that these alleged actions

taken by Mr. Russo were the only actions not protected by prosecutorial immunity.

In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court established

circumstances for when a municipality can be held liable under § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983

claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) an underlying constitutional

violation; (2) a policy or custom attributable to the municipality; and (3) that the constitutional

violation was caused by the municipality’s policy or custom. Burgos v. City of Phila. 270 F.

Supp. 3d 788, 796 (2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). A

“policy” is made, “when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal

policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Est. of Roman

v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019). A “custom” is present when “a given

course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and

permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990)). “Custom stems from policymakers’ ‘acquiescence in a longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local government entity.’”

Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 685, F. App’x 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Jett v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). Further, even a single act or event can subject an

entity to Monell liability. In Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), the Supreme Court

held that

It is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by

municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. No one has ever

doubted, for instance, that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single

decision by its properly constituted legislative body — whether or not that body

had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future — because

even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official

government policy.

475 U.S. at 480. For a single act to subject an entity to Monell liability, the plaintiff must

establish that the official, whose decision or conduct is in question, had final policy making

authority for the governmental entity regarding the specific manner at hand. Id.

To prove that an individual acted with final policy-making authority, a plaintiff must

show that (1) as a matter of state law, the official is responsible for making policy in the areas of

municipal action in question, McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997), and (2)

the official’s authority to make policy in that area is unreviewable. City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988). Municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative

enactment or delegated by an official who possesses such authority. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.

Whether an official possesses such authority is dictated by state law. Id. Municipal liability under

§ 1983 attaches when “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among

various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with

respect to the subject matter in question.” Id. When discussing the application of absolute

immunity to district attorneys, the Third Circuit recognized that, under Pennsylvania Law,

district attorneys are the “‘chief law enforcement officer[s] for the county in which [they were]

elected.’” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 349.

As an initial matter, the Court will address Greene County’s argument that Mr. Belding’s

speech was not constitutionally protected. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2)

“a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule

raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). Such limitations exist even when a complaint has been amended. See

Gary v. Hladik Onorato & Federman, LLP, 509 F. Supp. 3d 368, 374. (W.D. Pa. 2020). Here,

Greene County’s argument, that Mr. Belding’s speech was not protected speech, relates to

allegations that were made in Mr. Belding’s original complaint and those are unchanged in his

Amended Complaint. See (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 54, 81-83, 95-97, 103-04, 111); See also (ECF No.

32, at ¶¶ 54, 81-83, 95-97, 103-04, 111). Greene County had the opportunity to argue that Mr.

Belding’s speech was not protected in its original Motion to Dismiss, but failed to do so. Since

Mr. Belding’s allegations, regarding his speech, remain unchanged in his Amended Complaint,

Greene County’s argument that such speech is unprotected, will not be considered at this stage.

However, even if Greene County’s argument were to be considered, at this stage, the Amended

Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support that Mr. Belding’s speech in question could be

considered protected speech.

As for Greene County’s argument, that Mr. Belding cannot establish Monell liability for

Mr. Russo’s non-prosecutorial actions, such argument falls short. Mr. Belding has alleged

sufficient facts, at this stage, to establish that it is plausible that, because Mr. Russo allegedly

engaged in a custom or policy that violated Mr. Belding’s First Amendment rights, Greene

County may be liable to Mr. Belding. Greene County argues that Monell liability applies only to

truly administrative actions made by a district attorney, such as the training and supervision of

employees under a district attorney’s discretion. (ECF No. 34, at 12). The law does not support

such a restrictive interpretation. The Third Circuit, in Carter, determined that, when a district

attorney performs actions outside of his prosecutorial function, he acts as a final policy maker of

the county where he was elected. 181 F.3d at 352-353. While the Third Circuit was speaking

about the application of prosecutorial immunity, in its decision, the court’s discussion is

informative as to the question of when a district attorney may be considered to be a policy maker

of the County. There are functions attendant to the district attorney’s position that are more than

administrative, but less than prosecutorial, which do not qualify for absolute immunity, and the

district attorney is thus acting as a policy maker for the county. These functions involve

prosecutorial discretion and include investigations and comments to the public. See Fogle v.

Sokol, 957 F. 3s 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020)(“when prosecutors function as investigators, rather than

advocates, they enjoy no right to absolute immunity”); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.

259, 277-278 (1993) (holding that district attorneys’ media comments are not afforded

prosecutorial immunity); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 346 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that media

comments made by a prosecutor are an administrative function of a prosecutor). Accordingly,

Mr. Belding’s allegations support that Mr. Russo’s initiation of and participation in Mr Sams’

investigations of Mr. Belding and Mr. Russo’s media comments about Mr. Belding were made in

his capacity as a policy maker for Greene County. Thus, taking Mr. Belding’s allegations as true,

as the Court must at this stage, Mr. Belding has alleged facts sufficient to establish that Greene

County may be held liable under Monell. As such, Greene County’s Motion to Dismiss Mr.

Belding’s First Amendment retaliation claims, at Counts Eight and Nine of the Amended

Complaint, will be denied.

B. Selective Enforcement Claim

At Count Ten of the Amended Complaint, Mr. Belding brings a selective enforcement claim

against Greene County and the District Attorney’s Office. (ECF No. 32, at ¶¶ 313-337). Greene

County argues that, because this Court determined that Mr. Russo’s prosecution of Mr. Belding

is protected by prosecutorial immunity, Greene County cannot be subject to Monell liability

based upon that prosecution. (ECF No. 34, at 13). Mr. Belding argues that Count Ten is a claim

for selective enforcement by Mr. Sams; and, as such, it is subject to a different standard from

selective prosecution. (ECF No. 38, at 21-23). Mr. Belding further argues that he has alleged

sufficient facts to establish that Greene County acquiesced in Mr. Russo and Mr. Sams’ selective

enforcement of the laws against Mr. Belding, such that Monell liability applies. (Id.).

Selective prosecution and selective enforcement are distinct claims that concern discrete

actors and conduct. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he

enforcement/prosecution distinction is a legitimate one.”). Claims of selective prosecution

concern the prosecutorial actions of a prosecutor, which implicates doctrines such as

prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 214, 219. Selective enforcement, on the other hand, concerns the

actions of law enforcement officials, who “enjoy no such categorical protection.” Id. Selective

enforcement occurs when an individual or individuals are treated differently from other similarly

situated individuals, based upon an unjustifiable standard, such as to punish them for exercising

constitutional rights. See Simmermon v. Gabbianelli, 932 F. Supp. 2d 626, 631 (D.N.J. 2013);

See also Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Public officials engage

in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when

they seek to enforce the law . . . in order to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.”

Here, Greene County fails to provide any argument regarding Mr. Belding’s selective

enforcement claim. Greene County’s argument focuses on selective prosecution in relation to

Mr. Russo’s actions. (ECF No. 34, at 13). However, Mr. Belding alleges that Mr. Sams, under

the instruction of Mr. Russo, pursued criminal charges against Mr. Belding, because Mr. Belding

spoke out against Mr. Russo and that such charges were not pursued against similarly situated

individuals. (ECF No. 32, at ¶¶ 317-323). Mr. Belding also alleges that Mr. Sams selectively

enforced laws against other critics of Mr. Russo, and that Greene County was aware of such

selective enforcement and acquiesced such actions. (Id. ¶¶ 324-329). Mr. Belding further argues

that Greene County took no actions against the alleged selective enforcement against him. (Id. ¶¶

332-35). For the reasons discussed above, Mr. Belding sufficiently pled facts to satisfy the

pleading request to show that Mr. Russo is a policy maker for Greene County. Since Mr. Belding

alleges that Mr. Russo directed Mr. Sams to selectively enforce the law against him, Greene

County may be liable under Monei//. Taking Mr. Belding’s allegations as true, as the Court must

at this stage of the proceedings, Mr. Belding has pled sufficient facts to allege a selective

enforcement claim against Greene County. As such, Greene County’s Motion to Dismiss Mr.

Belding’s selective enforcement claim against it, at Count Ten of the Amended Complaint, will

be denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, Greene County’s Motion to Dismiss Mr. Belding’s First Amendment

retaliation claims, at Counts Eight and Nine of the Amended Complaint, will be denied. Greene

County’s Motion to Dismiss Mr. Belding’s selective enforcement claims, at Count Ten of the

Amended Complaint, will also be denied.

DATE: April 15, 2025 Meth. Alora

Marilyn J. Horan

United States District Judge

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