Glass v. Tipton Co. Sheriff's Dept.

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

ALISSA GLASS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 2:22-cv-02661-SHM-tmp

)

TIPTON COUNTY SHRIFF’S )

DEPARTMENT, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER MODIFYING THE DOCKET;

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1) WITH PREJUDICE;

DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND;

CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH;

NOTIFYING GLASS OF THE APPELLATE FILING FEE;

NOTIFYING GLASS OF THE COURT’S STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

AND CLOSING CASE

On September 26, 2022, Plaintiff Alissa Glass filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) When Glass filed the complaint, she was incarcerated at the

Women’s Therapeutic Residential Center (the “WRTC”), in Henning, Tennessee, and was

assigned Tennessee Department of Correction (the “TDOC”) prisoner identification number

00590645. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1-2 & 5; ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 15.) (See also

https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/details.jsp (TDOC Felony Offender Information website, showing that

Glass is serving an eight-year sentence for drug offenses committed in 2017 and 2020, and she is

assigned presently to the Chattanooga Probation & Parole Office, in Chattanooga, Tennessee) (last

accessed Apr. 15, 2025).) On January 12, 2023, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and assessed the three hundred and fifty dollar ($350.00) civil filing fee pursuant to the

aggressive and illegal search conducted at her place of residence [the “Search”] by Deputy Gross

and Sergeant Washam[,] [who] […] were employed by [the] Tipton County Sheriff’s Department

and operating under the direct supervision of Sheriff Chumley.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) Glass

alleges that the Search “violated not only her privacy but Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

Constitutional rights.” (Id.) Glass does not allege facts about the circumstances of the Search or

whether the Defendants seized anything during the Search. (See id.)

Glass sues: (1) the Tipton County Sheriff’s Department (the “TCSD”); (2) Tipton County

Sheriff J.T. Chumley; (3) Tipton County Deputy Tim Gross; (4) Sergeant Jimmy Washam; and (5)

the Tipton County Justice Center (the “TCJC”). (Id. at PageID 2-4.) Glass sues Sheriff Chumley,

Deputy Gross, and Sergeant Washam (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) in their official

and individual capacities. (Id.)

Glass seeks: (1) one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in compensatory damages; (2) one

million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in punitive damages; (3) fees and costs; and (4) an “order [that]

the Defendants review search protocols of the [TCSD] to ensure that this does not happen to

another private citizen.” (Id. at PageID 4.)

The Clerk shall MODIFY the docket to add Tipton County, Tennessee (the “County”) as a

Defendant.

The complaint (ECF No. 1) is before the Court.

For the reasons explained below: (1) the complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief as a matter of law; and (2) leave to amend is

DENIED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint —

granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007).

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts

the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the

allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations

are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported

by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides

guidance on this issue. Although Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it also requires factual

allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted

by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383

(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)

(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”

and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”

(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

Glass sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under §

1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution

and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting under color of

state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claim Against The TCJC

To the extent Glass alleges a claim under § 1983 against the TCJC, the complaint fails to

state a claim to relief as a matter of law. Under § 1983, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit.

Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., 238 F.3d 422 (table), No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir.

Nov. 6, 2000). Glass’s claim against the TCJC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim to relief as a matter of law.

B. Claim Against The TCSD

To the extent Glass alleges a claim under § 1983 against the TCSD, the complaint fails to

state a claim to relief as a matter of law. It is well-established in the Sixth Circuit that

a police department is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d

1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Police Department is not an entity which may be

sued”). “[S]ince Matthews, federal district courts in Tennessee have frequently and uniformly held

that police departments and sheriff’s departments are not proper parties to a § 1983 suit.” Mathes

v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 2010 WL 3341889, at *2 (M.D. Tenn., Aug. 25,

2010). Glass’s claim against the TCSD is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a

claim to relief as a matter of law.

C. Claim Against The Individual Defendants In Their Official Capacities

Glass’s official capacity claims against the Individual Defendants (see ECF No. 1 at

PageID 2-4) are treated as municipal capacity claims against their employer – i.e., the County.

2019) (in screening the pro se complaint’s official capacity claims under § 1983 against individual

defendants employed by a municipality, the Court construed the official capacity claims as against

the local government itself, although the municipality was not a named defendant); Mathias v.

Thomas, No. 1:16-cv-01091-JDT-cgc, 2019 WL 419290, at *2-3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 1,

2019) (pro se prisoner plaintiff’s official capacity claims against individual defendants employed

by the Gibson County Correctional Complex were construed as against Gibson County); see also

Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (pro se complaints are to be liberally construed).

“A municipality or other local government may be liable under [§ 1983] if the

governmental body itself subjects a person to a deprivation of [constitutional] rights or causes a

person to be subjected to such deprivation.” Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 948 (6th Cir.

2018) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), reh’g en banc denied (May 17, 2018).

“A municipality may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or

agents.” Stanfield v. City of Lima, 727 F. App’x 841, 851 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Burgess v.

Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff must

“(1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3)

show that [her] particular injur[y] [was] incurred due to execution of that policy.” Morgan v.

Fairfield Cnty., Ohio, 903 F.3d 553, 566 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802,

815 (6th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1377 (2019). See also Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Glass fails to allege a municipal policy or custom of the County that deprived her of a

constitutionally protected right. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) She has, therefore, failed to state a

claim against the County and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. That, however,

is not the only defect in Glass’s claims against the County and the Individual Defendants in their

official capacities. For the reasons explained infra in Section III.D., Glass’s official capacity

WITH PREJUDICE because they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

D. Claim Against All Defendants For Search In Violation Of The Fourth

Amendment

Glass alleges that the Search violated her “privacy” and her “Fourth Amendment

constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4 (the “Search Claim”).)1 Glass does not allege facts

supporting her contention that the Search was unconstitutional. (See id.)

It is well-settled that if a search produces evidence used to obtain a conviction, a § 1983

claim alleging the search was illegal is barred unless the conviction is overturned. “Fourth

Amendment claims arising out of searches occurring prior to [a] [p]laintiff’s [conviction] and

incarceration [are] precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, [512 U.S. at 487], on the grounds that a civil

suit holding that these searches were improper would undermine the basis of [plaintiff’s

conviction] and sentence.” Jacob v. Twp. of West Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 385, 388 (6th Cir. 2008);

see also Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396, 398–99 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that, where

an allegedly illegal search produced evidence used to obtain a conviction, the convicted plaintiff

cannot bring a § 1983 claim challenging the search until the conviction is overturned unless the

evidence was admitted under an exception to the exclusionary rule), overruled in other

part, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (recognizing that Heck bars the pursuit of a Fourth

1 Glass purports to allege two separate causes of action in the complaint: (1) violation of her right

to “privacy”; and (2) violation of her “Fourth Amendment Constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 1 at

PageID 4.) Glass misunderstands the nature of claims under the Fourth Amendment. Privacy is

an element of a claim of unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. To establish that law

enforcement violated a person’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable search,

a plaintiff must show that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. United

States v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038, 1041 (6th Cir. 2024). To establish a legitimate expectation

of privacy in the place searched, a plaintiff must show that she had: (1) a subjective expectation

of privacy in the place searched; and (2) that expectation was one society is prepared to recognize

as reasonable. Id. at 1041-42.

at the time of the arrest).

Here: (1) Glass’s eight-year sentence for an October 28, 2020 drug offense was imposed

on May 23, 2022, with a December 7, 2020 sentence effective date; and (2) her eight-year sentence

for a December 14, 2018 drug offense was imposed on March 22, 2018, with a December 14, 2017

sentence effective date. (See https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/details.jsp (TDOC Felony Offender

Information website (last accessed Apr. 15, 2025).) Under the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit

precedent outlined above, the Search Claim cannot proceed because a finding that the Search was

illegal would undermine the basis of Glass’s criminal convictions. Glass does not allege that her

convictions have been overturned. See Shamaeizadeh, 182 F.3d at 396, 398–99. The Search Claim

against all Defendants, including Glass’s allegations against the Individual Defendants in their

official and individual capacities, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim

to relief as a matter of law.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a District Court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013). Leave to amend should not

be granted where a plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency in his complaint. See Gonzalez-Gonzalez

v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“If it is crystal clear that ... amending the

complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); see also Curley v. Perry, 246

F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of

a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does

not infringe the right of access to the courts”).

in the complaint -- i.e., the Search Claim -- is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, and the

complaint therefore fails to state a claim to relief as a matter of law.

V. APPELLATE ISSUES

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), it is

CERTIFIED that any appeal in this matter by Glass would not be taken in good faith. If Glass

nevertheless chooses to file a notice of appeal, she must either: (1) pay the entire six hundred and

five dollar ($605.00) appellate filing fee or, if she is confined at that time, (2) submit a new in

forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of her inmate trust account statement for the

last six months, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b).

VI. NOTICE OF STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

The “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting in

forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court recommends that the dismissal of this case be

treated as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2021).

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:

A. The complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state

a claim to relief as a matter of law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave

to amend the complaint is DENIED.

B. The Court recommends that this dismissal be treated as a strike pursuant to §

1915(g). See Simons, 996 F.3d 350.

DENIES leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

D. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 15th day of April, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE