United States v. Hall

Case: 24-10515 Document: 73-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/15/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-10515 FILED

____________ April 15, 2025

Lyle W. Cayce

United States of America, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Richard Hall,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:18-CR-623-1

______________________________

Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Jones and Stewart, Circuit Judges.

Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:

Richard Hall wanted in on the lucrative market for compounded

drugs. Federal insurers paid well. He and his partners built a pharmacy, hired

marketers, and found doctors to write prescriptions. The money flowed. But

so did the fraud. The government charged Hall with paying illegal kickbacks

to secure prescriptions, laundering the proceeds, and defrauding federal

healthcare programs under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”).

A grand jury indicted him. A jury convicted him. The district court

sentenced him to 52 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay more

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than $59 million in restitution. Hall now appeals. For the reasons that follow,

we AFFIRM.

I.

Richard Hall reconnected with an old classmate, Dustin Rall, at a 2012

golf tournament. Their conversation turned to compounding pharmacies.

Rall needed a licensed facility to mix prescription drugs. Hall’s father, Lewis

Hall, was a pharmacist struggling to sell his business. To them, the solution

seemed clear: repurpose the pharmacy for compounding.

By 2013, Hall, Rall, Lewis, and Scott Schuster formed Rxpress. Each

played a role—Hall handled compliance, his father oversaw pharmacy

operations, Rall managed finances, and Schuster led marketing. The business

model relied on existing physician networks. Schuster expanded outreach,

recruiting marketers to promote the pharmacy’s compounded drugs. The

four each identified high-reimbursement formulations, secured

prescriptions, and billed both private and federal insurers.

A year later, the group restructured. They launched a second

pharmacy, Xpress Compounding, after consulting legal counsel. The plan

was strategic. Rxpress would handle private insurance claims, allowing

physician investment, while Xpress would process prescriptions covered by

federal programs like Medicare and TriCare. This structure also allowed

marketers to receive commission-based pay. If the drugs were federally

reimbursed, these payments likely violated the AKS. So to avoid liability,

Hall and his partners claimed they converted Xpress marketers from

independent contractors to W-2 employees.

The distinction was more form than substance. Marketers for both

pharmacies continued to induce physicians to write prescriptions and still

received commissions tied to prescription value—in effect, kickbacks. To

secure physician cooperation, the marketers offered incentives:

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directorships, consulting agreements, luxury trips, and fine dining. Between

2014 and 2016, Xpress received over $59 million in federal healthcare

reimbursements.

In 2018, a grand jury indicted Hall and seven co-conspirators. Charges

included conspiracy to defraud the United States and to receive health care

kickbacks under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1) and multiple counts of paying and

receiving illegal kickbacks under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2) (Counts

2–5). A superseding indictment added charges of money laundering

conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 7) and substantive money

laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count 9). The case proceeded to trial on

Counts 1 through 5 and Count 7.

The jury found Hall guilty on Counts 2 through 5 and 7. The district

court sentenced him to 52 months in prison, three years of supervised release

and imposed restitution in the amount of $59,879,871. Hall filed a Motion

for Release Pending Appeal. But the district court and this court denied his

request. He subsequently appealed.

II.

The AKS’s provision at issue, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2),

“criminalizes the payment of any funds or benefits designed to encourage an

individual to refer another party to a [Federal health care program provider]

for services to be paid by the [Federal healthcare] program.” United States v.

Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). Section 1320a-7b(b)(2) provides

that:

Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any

remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)

directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind

to any person to induce such person—

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(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or

arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which

payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal

health care program, or

(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend

purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service,

or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part

under a Federal health care program,

shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall

be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not

more than 10 years, or both.

Under the AKS’s safe-harbor provision, however, the statute’s criminal

prohibition does not apply to “any amount paid by an employer to an

employee (who has a bona fide employment relationship with such employer)

for employment in the provision of covered items or services.” Id.

§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B).

III.

Hall presses four arguments on appeal: (A) the district court erred in

its jury instructions by placing the burden of persuasion on Hall to establish

the safe-harbor defense under the AKS; (B) the district court erred in its jury

instructions by defining “employee” related to the safe-harbor defense and

rejecting Hall’s proposed instruction; (C) the district court erred by refusing

to include Hall’s jury instruction on the recipients of the alleged kickbacks;

and (D) the district court erred in imposing restitution. We address each in

turn.

A.

We begin with whether the district court erred in instructing the jury

that Hall bore the burden of persuasion to establish the bona fide employee

safe-harbor defense under the AKS. Hall calls this a matter of first impression

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for this court. On that much, we agree. But he goes further, arguing that while

he accepted the burden of production, the court wrongly placed on him the

burden of persuasion, requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

He believes that warrants reversal. We disagree.

We generally review jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Hamilton, 46 F.4th 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2022). A jury instruction is not

an abuse of discretion if it “is a correct statement of the law” and “clearly

instructs jurors as to the principles of law applicable to the factual issues

confronting them.” Id. (quoting United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 377

(5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotes omitted)). But a district court abuses its

discretion when it “appli[es] an erroneous view of the law.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2019)). We also review

the district court’s statutory interpretation de novo. See United States v.

Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013).

“Hornbook criminal law distinguishes between offense elements and

affirmative defenses.” United States v. Ortiz, 927 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir.

2019) (citing Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses:

A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 291 n.164

(1982)). 1 By definition, an affirmative defense is “[a] defendant’s assertion

of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s

claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true . . . . The defendant

bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense.” Defense, Black’s

Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The Supreme Court has long held that

when Congress forbids an act in one provision and sets out exceptions in

another, the law places no duty on the government to disprove the exception;

_____________________

1

See also Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in

the Criminal Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2245, 2248 n.10 (1992) (distinguishing an

affirmative defense from a missing element defense).

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that burden falls to the defendant. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 13

(2006) (citing McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922)). Put

another way, “it is incumbent on one who relies on such an exception to set

it up and establish it.” McKelvey, 260 U.S. at 357. This is “the general rule of

law, which has always prevailed, and become consecrated almost as a maxim

in the interpretation of statutes.” United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141, 165

(1841); see also United States v. Haggerty, 997 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2021)

(“It is a ‘well-established rule of criminal statutory construction that an

exception set forth in a distinct clause or provision should be construed as an

affirmative defense and not as an essential element of the crime.’” (quoting

United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 370–71 (5th Cir. 1999)).

It is an immutable principle of criminal procedure that “[t]he

[g]overnment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to

constitute the crime.” Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013)

(internal citations omitted); see also ALI, Model Penal Code § 1.12(1) (2023)

(“No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such

offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (cleaned up)); Id.

§ 1.13(9)(iii)(c) (noting that an element of an offense means, inter alia, “such

a result of conduct as negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct”).

But the government need not prove “the nonexistence of all affirmative

defenses.” Smith, 568 U.S. at 110. Only when an “affirmative defense”

negates an element of the offense does the burden remain with the

government. Id. (quoting Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237 (1987) (Powell,

J., dissenting)). A defense does not shift the burden to the government when

it “excuses conduct that would otherwise be punishable but does not

controvert any element of the offense.” Id. (quoting Dixon, 548 U.S. at 6.)

(cleaned up).

In dicta in an unpublished, nonprecedential opinion, we have

described the safe-harbor defense in the AKS as one “which the defendant

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must prove.” United States v. Turner, 561 F. App’x 312, 319–320 (5th Cir.

2014) (unpublished). Our sister circuits agree. 2 So do our pattern jury

instructions. See 5th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.109B

(2019 ed.) (“These safe harbor provisions are affirmative defenses for which

the defendant bears the burden of proof.” (citing United States v. Robinson,

505 F. App’x 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished))). Having established

this point, we turn to whether the defense negates the AKS’s remuneration

element.

When the meaning of a statute is unambiguous, “our inquiry begins

with the statutory text, and ends there as well.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t

of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018) (quoting BedRoc Ltd., L.L.C. v. United

States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)). The text of the AKS leaves no doubt that

“any remuneration[,]” given or received in exchange for referrals, is

prohibited. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). The safe-harbor provision does not

rewrite that rule; it carves out a narrow exception. And Congress did not

place the safe-harbor provision within the statute’s main proscription.

Instead, it set it apart in a separate clause, § 1320a-7b(b)(3), reinforcing that

it is “incumbent on one who relies on such an exception to set it up and

establish it.” McKelvey, 260 U.S. at 357. Further, an excuse does not undo a

rule; it presupposes one. The safe-harbor provision acknowledges that

_____________________

2

See United States v. George, 900 F.3d 405, 413 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that once

the government proves an AKS violation, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish

the safe-harbor by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234,

1271 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the jury reasonably rejected the safe-harbor affirmative

defense); United States v. Ekwebelem, 669 F. App’x 868, 868 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)

(affirming that the safe-harbor provision is an affirmative defense and rejecting the need for

the government to negate all enumerated safe-harbors); United States v. Norton, 17 F.

App’x 98, 102 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (holding that failure to present sufficient

evidence of an affirmative defense relieves the court of any duty to instruct the jury on it

(citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414–15 (1980) and United States v. Sarno, 24

F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994))).

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remuneration occurs but provides an exception where the payment is made

within a legitimate employer-employee relationship. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-

7b(b)(3)(B). This is the hallmark of an affirmative defense. It does not contest

the government’s proof of the elements. See Smith, 568 U.S. at 110.

Explained differently, “[o]nce the government establishes the

elements of a violation of the [AKS], the burden shifts to a defendant to

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that her conduct fell within

the safe harbor provision of the statute.” United States v. George, 900 F.3d

405, 413 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 873 (7th

Cir. 2007) and United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234, 1269–71 (11th Cir.

2013)); see also McKelvey, 260 U.S. at 357. To read the statute otherwise

would circumvent this “general rule of law which has always prevailed . . . .”

See Dickson, 40 U.S. at 165. Because the AKS’s safe harbor has all the

earmarks of an affirmative defense, the district court did not err in placing

the burden of persuasion on Hall to establish it. See Haggerty, 997 F.3d at 299.

We turn to the caselaw that Hall cites, which he believes supports his

argument. He cites Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022), United States

v. Haggerty, 997 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d

941 (11th Cir. 2001), to argue that the government must disprove the AKS’s

safe-harbor defense beyond a reasonable doubt. None of which offer refuge

to his argument. Ruan held that the Controlled Substances Act’s “knowingly

or intentionally” mens rea applied to the statutory authorization exception

because that exception directly shaped the scope of criminal liability under

21 U.S.C. § 841(a). See 597 U.S. at 457. The AKS’s safe-harbor provision

does no such thing; it excuses conduct that otherwise meets the statute’s

elements. Haggerty addressed 18 U.S.C. § 1152’s intra-Indian carve-out,

which defined the jurisdictional reach of a purely jurisdictional statute. See

997 F.3d at 299–302. Jurisdictional elements govern a court’s power to hear

a case, not the substantive elements of a crime. The AKS safe-harbor

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provision has no such jurisdictional role. Finally, Kloess involved an

obstruction statute where the defense of lawful, bona fide legal representation

directly negated the “knowingly” mens rea element. See 251 F.3d at 948. The

AKS’s safe-harbor provision neither negates the remuneration element nor

alters the required intent; it merely excepts otherwise unlawful payments if

they satisfy narrow statutory criteria. None of these cases, therefore, support

shifting the burden of persuasion to the government.

For all these reasons, we hold that the district court properly

instructed the jury that Hall carried the burden of persuasion for the bona

fide employee safe-harbor defense under the AKS.

B.

We next address whether the district court erred in its jury

instructions defining “employee” under the safe-harbor defense and

rejecting Hall’s proposed instructions. Hall argues it did. Those instructions

were as follows:

[sic] For Counts 2 through 5, the government must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt, in addition to the elements I have

described in my previous instructions, that the payment or

offer to pay remuneration was not made by an employer to an

employee who had a bona fide employment relationship with

the employer, for employment in the provision of any item or

service for which payment may be made in whole or in part by

TRICARE or FECA.

An employer-employee relationship generally exists where the

company for which services are performed—here, Xpress

Compounding—has the right to control and direct the person

who performs the services, not only as to the result to be

accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means

by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is

subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to

what shall be done but how it shall be done. In this connection,

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it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control

the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient

if it has the right to do so. The right to discharge is also an

important factor indicating that the company possessing that

right is an employer.

We explain below why Hall’s argument is misguided.

As stated, statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. See Garcia-

Gonzalez, 714 F.3d at 312. A district court’s refusal to give a requested jury

instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cervantes,

107 F.4th 459, 469 (5th Cir. 2024). An abuse of discretion occurs when a

requested instruction (1) is substantively correct, (2) is not substantially

covered in the charge given to the jury, and (3) concerns a key issue in the

trial such that its omission seriously impairs the defense. See id. Still, trial

judges have broad discretion in crafting jury instructions. See United States v.

Marchetti, 96 F.4th 818, 829 (5th Cir. 2024). A district court does not err

when it gives a charge that tracks this circuit’s pattern jury instructions and

correctly states the law. See United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 507

(5th Cir. 2012).

The district court’s jury charge here was not a verbatim copy of this

circuit’s pattern jury instructions, but it substantially followed them. It

included the relevant substantive elements and the explanatory notes citing

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). See 5th Cir. Pattern

Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.109B (2019 ed.) (“For a list of factors

to consider when deciding whether the bona fide employee safe harbor

provision applies, see id. (citing [Darden], 112 S. Ct. [at] 1347–48.”)).

In Darden, the Supreme Court “adopt[ed] a common-law test for

determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under ERISA.” 503 U.S. at 323.

The test consists of a non-exhaustive array of factors, which includes

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the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by

which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors

relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the

instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the

duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the

hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the

hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over

when and how long to work; the method of payment; the

hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the

work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether

the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee

benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.

Id. at 323–24 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,

751–52 (1989)). Because this test, however, “contains ‘no shorthand formula

or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents

of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being

decisive.’” Id. at 324 (quoting NLRB. v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,

258 (1968)).

Given this, Darden forecloses Hall’s argument. Specifically, he argues

that the district court should have instructed the jury that the “right to

control is decisive.” But Darden taught that while an employer’s right to

control the manner and means of work is important, it is only one factor

among many in determining the employer-employee relationship. See 503

U.S. at 324. No single factor is dispositive. See id. Because of this, the district

court’s jury instructions were not an abuse of discretion. We hold that the

charge substantially aligned with our pattern jury instructions and correctly

stated the law. See Richardson, 676 F.3d at 507.

C.

We consider whether the district court abused its discretion in

declining Hall’s proposed jury instruction on the recipients of the alleged

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kickbacks. Hall contends the jury should have been instructed to decide

whether “the recipient of the remuneration was in a position” to make

referrals or purchases of healthcare goods or services, or whether the

recipient “unduly influenced or acted on behalf of a person in such a

position.” He leans on this court’s decision in Marchetti, 96 F.4th at 818, and

its discussion of Miles, 360 F.3d at 472. Neither case carries his argument.

In Marchetti, we framed “[t]he central question” as whether the

defendant’s payments were intended to induce referrals or merely to

compensate advertisers. 96 F.4th at 826. There, we noted that “the identity

of the payee, while not essential, speaks to the intent of the payer.” Id. But

the true inquiry, we emphasized, is whether the payer “intended improperly

to influence those who make healthcare decisions on behalf of patients.” Id.

at 827 (quoting Miles, 360 F.3d at 481) (cleaned up).

Hall seizes on this language but overlooks the context. The passage he

cites concerns evidentiary sufficiency, not jury instructions. When Marchetti

did turn to jury instructions, it rejected a similar claim. Id. at 829–33. The

defendant there argued that the jury should have been told that percentage-

based compensation is not per se unlawful. Id. at 831 We disagreed, holding

that the district court’s instructions were “quite clear that the payments have

to be made in order to induce an unlawful referral.” Id. The instructions

given here were materially identical. See Final Jury Instructions at 20–21,

United States v. Marchetti, No. 5:19-cr-25 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2021) (No.

595).

The district court here, like the one in Marchetti, hewed to the

language of the AKS and our jury pattern instructions. It laid out each

element and instructed the jury to decide whether the payments were made

“to induce” referrals. That is the dividing line between lawful and unlawful

conduct. See Marchetti, 96 F.4th at 826 (“Did [the defendant] intend to

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induce referrals, which is illegal, or did [the defendant] intend to compensate

advertisers, which is permissible.” (cleaned up)). Given that the district

court’s instruction fully covered the substance of Hall’s request and

mirrored the instruction upheld in Marchetti, nothing more was required. See

United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding there

was no error when the given “instructions substantially covered Defendants’

requested instructions”). Because of these reasons, we hold that the district

court did not err by declining Hall’s proposed jury instructions.

D.

We now address whether the district court erred in imposing

restitution. Hall thinks so. He argues that the district court’s reliance on

“relevant conduct” rather than convicted counts to determine restitution

violated the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). He also asserts

that the court’s basis for restitution was unclear, and if it was tied to his AKS

convictions, his liability should be limited to the benefit he personally

received—$70,406.16—rather than the government’s total loss. A

restitution award based on the money laundering conviction, in Hall’s view,

would be improper because it was not the but-for cause of any federal loss.

Again, we disagree.

We review the legality of a restitution order de novo and its amount for

abuse of discretion. See United States v. King, 93 F.4th 845, 850 (5th Cir.

2024). Because Hall challenges only the legal basis of restitution, our review

here is de novo.

The MVRA mandates restitution for defendants convicted of “an

offense against property.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii). The

MVRA defines a “victim” of such an offense as

a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the

commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered

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including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element

a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any

person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in

the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.

Id. § 3663A(a)(2). Under this definition, members of a conspiracy may be

held jointly and severally liable for all foreseeable losses within the

conspiracy’s scope, even if a specific loss cannot be attributed to a single

conspirator. See King, 93 F.4th at 854; United States v. Swenson, 25 F.4th 309,

322 (5th Cir. 2022) (observing that “where a fraudulent scheme is an element

of the conviction, the court may award restitution for actions pursuant to that

scheme” (internal quotations omitted)). 3 The MVRA also permits

restitution to be imposed on any defendant for the full amount of the victim’s

losses or apportioned based on each defendant’s contribution. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(h).

Conduct that generates illegal proceeds is conduct in furtherance of a

conspiracy to commit money laundering. See United States v. Shah, 95 F.4th

328, 360 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Conspiracy to commit money laundering does not

require that the defendant know exactly what unlawful activity generated the

proceeds . . . . The defendant merely must know that the transaction

_____________________

3

See also United States v. Ochoa, 58 F.4th 556 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 178

(2023) (“[U]nder the MVRA, members of a conspiracy may be ‘held jointly and severally

liable for all foreseeable losses within the scope of their conspiracy regardless of whether a

specific loss is attributable to a particular conspirator.’”) (quoting United States v. Moeser,

758 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2014))); United States v. Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219, 228 (2d Cir.

2021) (holding that restitution under the MVRA extends to “the reasonably foreseeable

actions of [a] defendant’s co-conspirators,” including “the common plan of the

conspiracy” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Riley, 335 F.3d 919, 932 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“A conspirator is vicariously liable for reasonably foreseeable substantive

crimes committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (citation omitted)).

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involved profits of unlawful activity.” (cleaned up)). 4 The jury convicted

Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. The superseding indictment

charged that the conspiracy’s purpose was to “engage and attempt to engage

. . . in monetary transactions in criminally derived property of a value greater

than $10,000,” with those funds stemming from “conspiring to defraud the

United States by paying and receiving health care kickbacks . . . and paying

and receiving illegal health care kickbacks . . . .” The indictment further

alleged that Hall and his co-conspirators used the proceeds to “enrich

themselves and others through the purchase of luxury vehicles and chartered

vessels, among other property.” Trial evidence confirmed that the kickback

scheme’s proceeds funded this spending. At sentencing, the district court

expressly found that Hall’s money laundering conspiracy conviction directly

and proximately caused the government’s loss. Because Hall’s conduct was

both part of and essential to the scheme, the district court properly based its

restitution order on the government’s total loss. We hold that the district

court did not err in imposing restitution. See King, 93 F.4th at 854.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Hall’s convictions and the

district court’s restitution order.

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4

See also United States v. Woodmore, 127 F.4th 193, 220 (10th Cir. 2025)

(“[C]onviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering . . . does not require proof of

an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy . . . . Instead, all that is required is agreeing to

obtain illegal proceeds and to launder those proceeds.” (cleaned up)); United States v.

Abbas, 100 F.4th 267 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 319 (2024) (concluding that the

defendant’s emails were “overt acts that furthered the [money laundering] conspiracy

because the steps a conspirator takes to produce the proceeds subsequently laundered

furthers a money-laundering conspiracy.” (citing United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 727

(4th Cir. 2012))).

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