The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROCKET CITY SHOWGIRLS, ]
LLC, et al., ]
]
Plaintiffs, ]
]
v. ] Case No.: 2:24-cv-1664-ACA
]
ALABAMA ALCOHOLIC ]
BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD ]
et al., ]
]
Defendants. ]
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Rocket City Showgirls, LLC and The Cheetah Club, LLC
(collectively, “the Clubs”) filed this lawsuit against Defendants Alabama Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board, the Madison County, Alabama Commission, and various
individual defendants. (Doc. 1). All defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that
the Clubs have twice filed impermissible shotgun pleadings under Weiland v. Palm
Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2015), among other
reasons. (See docs. 9–10). In response, the Clubs moved for leave to file a second
amended complaint. (Doc. 15).
Because the Clubs’ motion for leave to file their second amended complaint
is futile, the court WILL DENY the motion. (Id.). The court WILL GRANT IN
PART and WILL DENY AS MOOT IN PART Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
(Docs. 9–10). Because the court agrees that the Clubs have repeatedly filed shotgun
pleadings of the third type, the court WILL GRANT Defendants’ motions as to
Counts One and Two—to the extent those counts assert federal claims—and WILL
DISMISS those claims WITH PREJUDICE. Because the court resolves the only
claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the court WILL DECLINE to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and WILL
DISMISS those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the court WILL DENY AS MOOT Defendants’
motions to dismiss the state law claims. (Docs. 9–10).
I. BACKGROUND
The court determined the Clubs’ initial complaint was a shotgun pleading and
sua sponte ordered them to replead it in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Doc. 5). The court noted that the complaint was a shotgun complaint of
the third type under Weiland because one count (“Count One”) asserted
constitutional claims under the Alabama Constitution and the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution “without separating each claim
into a different count and incorporating the factual allegations” therein. (Doc. 5 at 3)
(citing doc. 1 at 37; id. ¶¶ 127–31). The complaint was also a shotgun pleading of
the fourth type because it asserted claims against multiple defendants without
specifying the defendants against whom the claims were asserted. (Doc. 5 at 3).
The Clubs then filed their first amended complaint, which contains 131
“general allegations” and alleges four counts. (Doc. 6). Counts One and Two
incorporate all 131 general allegations and purport to assert First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims under the U.S. Constitution through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as well as violations of the right to free expression, substantive due process,
and procedural due process under the Alabama Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 132–41). Counts
Three and Four assert state law claims. (Id. ¶¶ 142–50). All four counts incorporate
¶ 131 (id. ¶¶ 132, 137, 142, 147), which alleges violations of the First Amendment,
the right to free expression under the Alabama Constitution, equal protection, state
police power, the nondelegation doctrine, due process, and Art. X, § 6 of the
Alabama Constitution (doc. 6 ¶ 131).
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the action with prejudice on the ground that the
Clubs failed to fix the pleading deficiencies characteristic of the third type of shotgun
pleadings.1 (Doc. 9 at 4–6; doc. 10 at 1; see also doc. 11). In response to the motions
to dismiss (docs. 9–10), the Clubs ask the court for leave to file their second amended
complaint and attach a proposed second amended complaint that “attempt[s] to
1 Defendants also move to dismiss the action on other grounds, including that the first
amended complaint represents other types of shotgun pleadings under Weiland, and that the Clubs
lack standing to sue the Madison County Commission and the individual commissioners. (See
generally docs. 9, 11). Because the court finds that the federal claims are due to be dismissed with
prejudice as representing the third type of shotgun pleading, the court will not consider
Defendants’ other arguments.
address Defendants’ issues” (doc. 15 at 2; see also doc. 15-1). The Clubs do not
dispute that their first amended complaint is a shotgun complaint, nor do they explain
how the proposed second amended complaint cures the deficiencies identified by the
court or Defendants. (See generally doc. 15). In their reply briefs, Defendants
contend that the Clubs’ proposed second amended complaint “again falls into the
third category of shotgun complaints . . . by grouping” together claims arising from
the Alabama Constitution and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution into single counts. (Doc. 17 at 4; see also doc. 16 at 5–7).
As the court previously explained (see doc. 5 at 2–3), Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” And Rule 10(b) requires a party
to “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . . If doing so would promote clarity,
each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a
separate count or defense.” Pleadings “that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b),
or both, are . . . referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320.
Shotgun pleadings fall into “four rough types or categories.” Id. at 1321. Relevant
to this case, the third type of shotgun pleading is one that does “not separate[e] into
a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
“When a litigant files a shotgun pleading, is represented by counsel, and fails
to request leave to amend, a district court must sua sponte give him one chance to
replead before dismissing his case with prejudice on non-merits shotgun pleading
grounds.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018). The
court’s repleading order must “explain how the offending party violates the shotgun
pleading rule so that the party may properly avoid future shotgun pleadings.” Id.
After giving the counseled party one opportunity to amend, the district court may
“dismiss with prejudice if the party has neither filed a compliant pleading nor asked
for leave to amend.” Id.
It is within this court’s authority to dismiss the first amended complaint’s first
and second counts with prejudice. See id. The Clubs are counseled, and the court sua
sponte ordered them to replead, citing the fact that “Count One asserts constitutional
claims under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under the
Alabama Constitution, without separating each claim into a different count” or
“incorporating the [relevant] factual allegations” therein. (Doc. 5 at 3) (citing doc. 1
¶¶ 127–31; Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323). Instead of separating Count One into
separate claims for the six different causes of action asserted, the Clubs’ first
amended complaint asserts the exact same Count One, with the same problematic
allegations as in the initial complaint. (Compare doc. 6 ¶¶ 132–36, with doc. 1
¶¶ 127–31). Even more problematic, the Clubs’ first amended complaint added a
second shotgun count (“Count Two”), asserting the same six causes of action against
a different group of defendants. (Doc. 6 ¶¶ 137–41). And to make matters worse,
Counts One and Two in the Clubs’ first amended complaint incorporate ¶ 131 (id.
¶¶ 132, 137), which itself contains at least four claims independent of those asserted
in Counts One and Two (compare id. ¶¶ 134–35, 139–40, with id. ¶ 131).
It is true that in Vibe Micro, the plaintiff “did not ask the district court for
leave to amend,” so “the district court was not required to . . . give him any additional
chances to” amend, 878 F.3d at 1296, whereas here, the Clubs seek leave to amend
a second time (see doc. 15). However, the Clubs’ motion for leave to amend is futile
because their proposed second amended complaint repeats the exact same
deficiencies described above that were in the Clubs’ initial and first amended
complaints. (Compare doc. 15-1 ¶¶ 133–42, with doc. 6 ¶¶ 127–41, with doc. 1
¶¶ 127–31). That is, despite this court’s clear instructions (see doc. 5 at 3), and
Defendants’ briefs describing the deficiencies (see doc. 9 at 4–6; doc. 11 at 7–8), the
Clubs seek to file a third complaint (their second amended complaint) that still
embodies the third type of shotgun complaint discussed in Weiland, 792 F.3d at
1320–23.
To permit the Clubs to file their third shotgun pleading would “waste scarce
judicial resources,” and the Clubs have already exhausted their “one chance to
remedy” the initial complaint. Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295. Accordingly, the court
WILL DENY the Clubs’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (doc.
15), and WILL GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss Counts One and Two
(docs. 9–10). The court WILL DISMISS Counts One and Two WITH
PREJUDICE, to the extent those counts assert federal claims. And because the
court resolves the only claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the court WILL
DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims
and WILL DISMISS those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the court WILL DENY AS MOOT Defendants’
motions to dismiss the state law claims. (Docs. 9–10).
III. CONCLUSION
Because the Clubs’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is
futile, the court WILL DENY the motion. (Doc. 15). The court WILL GRANT IN
PART and WILL FIND AS MOOT IN PART Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
(Docs. 9–10). The court WILL GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss Counts
One and Two—to the extent those claims assert federal claims—and WILL
DISMISS those claims WITH PREJUDICE. Because the court resolves the only
claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the court WILL DECLINE to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and WILL
DISMISS those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Therefore, the court WILL DENY AS MOOT Defendants’ motions
to dismiss to the extent they request dismissal of the state law claims with prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED this April 14, 2025.
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE