The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY 1998 SESSION
KEITH WOOTEN, )
)
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9708-CC-00330
)
vs.
DONAL CAMPBELL,
) LAKE COUNTY
)
) NO. 97-7633
FILED
COMMISSIONER, T.D.O.C., ET AL., )
May 7, 1998
)
Respondent. )
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
ORDER
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus. The record reflects that in 1989 the petitioner was convicted on
two counts of armed robbery and was sentenced to thirty-five years on each count.
These sentences were run concurrent with one another, concurrent with a previous ten
year sentence for armed robbery, and consecutive to two separate four year sentences
for grand larceny. The petitioner was paroled from prison in May 1991. The Parole
Board was apparently unaware of the petitioner’s thirty-five year sentence for armed
robbery when it authorized the petitioner’s release. Upon discovery of its error, the
Parole Board issued a warrant for the petitioner’s arrest in September 1991. In
November 1991, the petitioner was also convicted on two counts of aggravated burglary
and received two concurrent three year sentences to be served consecutively to the
thirty-five year sentence for armed robbery. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court claiming, in part, that the Parole Board
improperly revoked his parole without a hearing. Finding that the petitioner’s sentences
are not void and have not expired, the trial court denied the petition.
On appeal,1 the petitioner contends that the Parole Board was without
authority to place the petitioner back in prison. The petitioner also seems to suggest
1
Although it appears the notice of appeal was filed late, we have decided to waive the timely filing
in this case. T.R.A.P. 4(a).
that his thirty-five year sentences have expired because they were ordered to run
concurrent with his previous armed robbery conviction, which was reduced from forty to
ten years after the imposition of his thirty-five year sentences. The petitioner, therefore,
claims the trial judge should have granted his petition.
The state argues that the trial court properly denied relief in this case
because it does not appear from the face of the judgment or record that the petitioner’s
sentences have expired. See Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). The
record clearly reflects that the petitioner’s thirty-five year sentences for armed robbery
have not expired. The petitioner’s argument to the contrary is without merit. Nor is
there anything before us which shows that the convicting courts were without
jurisdiction to render the judgments. Id.
The state further contends that the issue regarding the authority of the
Parole Board to arrest the petitioner is not a proper consideration for habeas corpus
relief, but rather must be challenged under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.
We agree. See Brigham v. Lack, 755 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to
appeal denied, (Tenn. 1988). See also State v. Warren, 740 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1986), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1987).
Accordingly, finding no error of law mandating reversal, it is hereby
ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20,
Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Costs of this proceeding are taxed to the
petitioner.
Enter, this the ___ day of May, 1998.
2
____________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
` ____________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
____________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
3