Taylor v. Bay Area Hospital

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

JUSTIN TAYLOR, Case No. 6:22-cv-00868-MTK

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

BAY AREA HOSPITAL; DR. BRETT

DAVIS, Personally; McKENZIE GAUNTZ,

RN, Personally; REBECCA HOFFMAN,

RNC, Personally,

Defendants.

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Justin Taylor (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that medical practitioners violated his constitutional rights by restraining him, and

non-consensually injecting him with an antipsychotic medication, conducting a blood draw, and

inserting a catheter into his penis to obtain a urine sample. Before the Court is a Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Bay Area Hospital (“BAH”) and its two nurses,

Rebecca Hoffman (“RNC Hoffman”) and McKenzie Gauntz (“RN Gauntz”) (ECF No. 52); and

an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Dr. Brett Davis (“Dr. Davis”)

(ECF No. 63).1 For the reasons explained below, the Motions for Summary Judgment are

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On July 6, 2020, Plaintiff Justin Taylor (“Plaintiff”) was taken into custody by Reedsport

Police after assaulting a gas station employee, harassing customers at the gas station, and being

combative and delirious with police. Declaration of Carolyn Pearson (Pearson Decl.), Ex. 1 at

BAH 0073, ECF No. 53-1. Plaintiff was brought to BAH by Reedsport Police on a mental health

hold. BAH’s Answer to SAC at ¶ 1, ECF No. 40; Pearson Decl., Ex. 1 at BAH 0073. BAH, is a

public body within the meaning of Or. Rev. Stat. (“ORS”) § 30.260 to ORS 30.300. BAH’s

Answer to SAC at ¶ 6.

When he arrived at BAH, Plaintiff refused to get out of the police car and required five

people to get him out of the car and into a wheelchair. Pearson Decl., Ex. 1 at BAH 0073.

Thereafter, Plaintiff was combative with staff, including kicking, swinging and attempting to

grab staff. Id. In response to Plaintiff’s conduct, emergency department physician Dr. Davis

ordered Plaintiff to be placed in upper and lower body restraints. Id. at BAH 0095–96. Dr. Davis

worked as an independent contractor with BAH but was not an employee of BAH at the times

relevant to this lawsuit. Davis’ Answer to SAC at ¶ 7, ECF No. 41.

During his initial evaluation, Plaintiff, a white man, repeatedly exclaimed that he was a

black woman of varying heights, who had been raped. Pearson Decl., Ex. 1 at BAH 0080. Dr.

Davis began a medical evaluation to determine whether plaintiff was psychotic, delusional,

suffering from a methamphetamine psychosis, or functional. Id. Dr. Davis ordered a urine drug

test, blood serum alcohol test, as well as a comprehensive metabolic panel and complete blood

1 Dr. Davis initially filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 54) which is DENIED as

MOOT because it is superseded by his Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63).

count screening. Id. at BAH 0095-95. Dr. Davis also ordered the administration of the

antipsychotic medication Olanzapine. Id.

BAH employees RNC Hoffman and RN Gauntz obtained the samples ordered by Dr.

Davis. BAH’s Answer to SAC at ¶ 6. The medical staff repeatedly gave Plaintiff the opportunity

to have his upper and lower body restraints removed, if he agreed to cooperate. Pearson Decl.,

Ex. 1 at BAH 0073-74. Plaintiff was combative and refused to cooperate. Id. Per Dr. Davis’

order, and without Plaintiff’s written or verbal consent, RNC Hoffman injected Plaintiff with

Olanzapine. Berman Decl., Ex. 1 (Hoffman Resp. to Pl.’s RFA) at 3, ECF No. 64-1. Plaintiff

refused to submit to a blood draw or to voluntarily produce a urine sample. Pearson Decl., Ex. 1

at BAH 0073. RN Gauntz advised Plaintiff that if he did not voluntarily produce a urine sample

then she would insert a catheter into his penis to obtain the sample for urinary analysis. Id. Over

Plaintiff’s objections, RN Gauntz inserted a catheter to obtain a urine sample; she also obtained a

blood sample. Id. at BAH 0073-74.

In deposition, Dr. Davis testified that obtaining and testing these samples was necessary

to determine the cause of Plaintiff’s “very bad condition.” Armosino Decl., Ex. 1 (Davis Dep.) at

67:6-12, ECF No. 73-1. During discovery, Plaintiff requested Dr. Davis to admit that Plaintiff

did not present with symptoms that might require an emergency catheterization and intervention

to potentially save Plaintiff’s life. Berman Decl. (Second), Ex. 1 (Davis’ Resp. to Pl.’s RFA) at

2, ECF No. 68-1. Dr. Davis responded that Plaintiff’s “presentation was complicated and not

classically explicable, requiring additional testing to ensure that he did not have a life threatening

illness.” Id.

When the results from the urinary analysis and blood tests came back unremarkable,

Plaintiff was “medically cleared” which allowed someone in the psychiatric department to

evaluate Plaintiff and “determine whether he needed to be brought into the hospital involuntarily

to a psychiatric bed or released[.]” Davis Dep. at 67:11-16. There is no evidence that BAH gave

Plaintiff’s test results to the police.

Ultimately, after no emergency medical condition or psychosis were found, Plaintiff was

discharged into police custody. Pearson Decl., Ex.1 at BAH 0077, BAH 0101). When his

restraints were removed, Plaintiff became combative and attacked a BAH security guard. Id. at

BAH 0074. Police officers took Plaintiff to the ground and placed him in handcuffs. Id. At the

time of his discharge, a Coos Bay police officer reported that Plaintiff was believed to be a

mentally ill person who was still a danger to himself or others and in need of immediate care,

custody or treatment. BAH 0101.

Plaintiff attests, “I was never threatening or violent with ER staff.” Taylor Decl. ¶ 2, ECF

No. 66. Plaintiff also attests that RN Gauntz’s administration of the catheter “was forceful, crude,

not gentle, and it felt as though it was done to maximize pain and discomfort.” Taylor Decl., ¶ 4,

ECF No. 66.

STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file, if any, show “that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party determines the

authenticity of the dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings

and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. Special rules of construction

apply when evaluating a summary judgment motion: (1) all reasonable doubts as to the existence

of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved against the moving party; and (2) all

inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Service, Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. However, “[a] conclusory,

self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create

a genuine issue of material fact.”. F.T.C. v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171

(9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Apr. 11, 1997).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts three claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) for unreasonable

search and seizure in violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights based upon the

involuntary restraints, medication administration, and urine and blood draws; (2) for excessive

and unreasonable force in violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights also based upon the

involuntary restraints, medication administration and urine and blood draws; and (3) for violation

of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights due to unreasonable conduct that shocks the

conscience. Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ECF No. 38. Plaintiff’s claims are brought against

RNC Hoffman, RN Gauntz, and Dr. Davis in their personal capacities and against BAH as a

public body, pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

I. Section 1983 Claims Against Individual Defendants

When prosecuting a civil rights claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) a

person acting under color of law (2) deprived the plaintiff of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011). Liability under § 1983 arises upon a showing

of personal participation by each defendant. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

A. RNC Hoffman and RN Gauntz

The parties do not dispute BAH is a public body and that its employees, RNC Hoffman

and RN Gauntz, are considered government officials entitled to assert the affirmative defense of

qualified immunity. Plaintiff argues that RNC Hoffman and RN Gauntz are not protected by

qualified immunity because disputes of fact prevent summary judgment on the merits of

Plaintiff’s claims and that under these circumstances, every reasonable officer would have

known that their conduct was contrary to Plaintiff’s clearly established rights.

Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). The purpose of qualified immunity is to “strike a balance

between the competing ‘need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when

they perform their duties reasonably.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231)). Qualified immunity “applies regardless of whether the

government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed

questions of law and fact.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

“Determining whether officials are owed qualified immunity involves two inquiries: (1)

whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show

the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right was clearly

established in light of the specific context of the case.” Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 821 (9th

Cir. 2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). District courts have discretion to

address either inquiry first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227. Regardless of whether the constitutional

violation occurred, the officer should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not clearly

established or the officer could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful.

Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991).

To determine whether a government official’s conduct violates clearly established law,

the Supreme Court has emphasized that the asserted right “must be sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v.

Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation

in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,” which means it is

dictated by “controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive

authority[.]’ ” It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent.

The precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret

it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. Otherwise, the rule is

not one that “every reasonable official” would know.

D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62 (2018) (citations omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of

making a showing that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Court addresses the clearly established law inquiry of the qualified immunity

analysis at the outset. Plaintiff argues that under Ellis v. City of San Diego, Cal., 176 F.3d 1183

(9th Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh’g (June 23, 1999), every reasonable government

official would have understood that RNC Hoffman and RN Gauntz’s conduct violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

In Ellis, the plaintiff alleged:

that he was arrested in his home without a warrant, that the officers used excessive

force in effectuating his arrest and that, in conjunction with ambulance and hospital

personnel, they violated his rights by restraining him, sedating him into

unconsciousness, taking blood from his arms, and inserting a catheter into his penis

to extract a urine sample against his will and over his objections. He further

allege[d] that the defendants had no cause or justification for their actions and that

they engaged in some of them “simply because he was on parole.”

Id. at 1186 (emphasis added). After conducting the allegedly involuntary medical procedures, the

plaintiff was “returned to the patrol car, where he was given his Miranda rights and told that he

was charged with numerous offenses including being under the influence of a controlled

substance.” at 1187.

Regarding the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Ninth Circuit found

that it was clearly established in 1995 that under these circumstances:

blood and urine tests are searches subject to the constraints of the Fourth

Amendment, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16

L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and that warrantless compulsory blood tests are unreasonable

unless supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id. at 768–770,

86 S.Ct. 1826. It was furthermore clearly established at that time that even if the

search meets these criteria, it is still unreasonable if the degree of force employed

to carry it out is excessive.

Ellis, 176 F.3d at 1191–92. The Ninth Circuit explained that the defendant was not entitled to

qualified immunity because—at the motion to dismiss stage—the court was bound to accept as

true the plaintiff’s “allegations regarding the absence of any basis for the body search and his

contentions regarding the use of excessive force[.] . . . We do not consider whether [the

defendant] might be able to successfully assert qualified immunity later in the proceedings; at

this point, however, there is nothing in the record to support [the defendant’s] claim [of qualified

immunity].” Id. at 1192. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to grant the

motion to dismiss with prejudice and remanded. Id.

Here, Plaintiff offers no evidence disputing the fact that Dr. Davis ordered the medical

procedures for the express purpose of determining the cause of Plaintiff’s perceived medical

condition. Ellis clearly establishes that compulsory medical procedures performed without a

medical justification or with an unreasonable degree of force implicate a person’s Fourth

Amendment rights. Id. Unlike in Ellis, the tests were not conducted for law enforcement

purposes and there is no evidence that the results were provided to the police. Plaintiff offers no

evidence that any of the medical procedures ordered by Dr. Davis and performed by the nurses

were unnecessary or improper under the circumstances. Plaintiff’s affidavit briefly describing his

perception of RN Gauntz’s conduct while she inserted the catheter is insufficient to show that

under the circumstances every reasonable officer would know they were using excessive force.

F.T.C. v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Apr.

11, 1997) (“A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting

evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.”).

Plaintiff fails to show that under these specific circumstances, every reasonable officer

would know that restraining Plaintiff and conducting involuntary procedures for medical

purposes violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourteenth Amendment was not at

issue in Ellis, and Plaintiff therefore fails to show that the asserted violation of that right was

clearly established. RNC Hoffman and RN Gauntz are entitled to qualified immunity and

summary judgment is granted in their favor.

B. Dr. Davis

Dr. Davis first argues that, as an apparent agent of BAH, he is entitled to qualified

immunity. Plaintiff responds that Dr. Davis is not entitled to qualified immunity because

“apparent agents” of the state are not state employees, and “[a]t all times relevant to plaintiffs’

[sic] claims Dr. Davis was working within the course and scope of his employment as an

independent contractor at Bay Area Hospital.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Davis’ Am. Mot. for Summ. J.

at 5, ECF No. 71. Dr. Davis replies that Plaintiff fails to prove that Dr. Davis was acting under

color of state law.

Private actors, as opposed to government officials, are generally not entitled to qualified

immunity. Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008); Jensen v. Lane

Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir. 2000) (private employee doctor who was asked by the

government to decide whether to civilly commit a person suspected of a mental illness was

subject to suit under § 1983 per state action test but was not entitled to qualified immunity). Dr.

Davis admits that he worked with BAH as a private independent contractor and was not

employed by a public agency at the relevant time. Davis’ Answer to SAC at ¶ 7 ECF No. 41.

Following Plaintiff’s response in opposition to Dr. Davis’ Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment, the parties do not dispute that Dr. Davis is not a government official. Dr. Davis is

therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Resolving this issue, however, presents another; was Dr. Davis acting under color of state

law when he treated Plaintiff?

“Acting under color of state law is ‘a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action.’”

Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 46 (1988)).

Private actors are only subject to liability under § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the alleged

injury was caused by “state action.” Jensen, 222 F.3d at 574. The Ninth Circuit has “recognized

at least four different general tests that may aid us in identifying state action: ‘(1) public

function; (2) joint action; (3) governmental compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental

nexus.’” Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003)). “At bottom, the inquiry is always

whether the defendant has ‘exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible

only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Rawson, 975 F.3d at 748

(quoting West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quotation marks omitted)).

Whether a defendant was acting under color of state law is a legal question. Pasadena

Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021). “Courts must engage in

‘sifting facts and weighing circumstances’ to answer what is ‘necessarily a fact-bound inquiry.’”

Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lugar

v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).

To proceed on his § 1983 claims against Dr. Davis, Plaintiff must show that Dr. Davis

was acting under color of law. Jensen, 222 F.3d at 574 (“in order to prevail under § 1983, a

plaintiff must show” that the defendant acted under color of state law). Although courts have

found that private doctors in arguably similar circumstances were acting under color of state law,

determination of whether Dr. Davis’ conduct may be fairly attributed to the state cannot rely on

generalizations. Rawson, 975 F.3d at 751 (state action test “necessarily” involves “a close, fact-

intensive analysis”). Dr. Davis denies that he was acting under color of state law and argues that

none of the four so-called “general tests” show that his conduct can be fairly attributed to the

state. Plaintiff offers no evidence, or even a legal argument, showing that Dr. Davis was acting

under color of state law. He fails to meet the “jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action” against

Dr. Davis. West, 487 U.S. at 46.

II. Monell Liability

Plaintiff brings several claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

436 U.S. 658 (1978) against BAH. Section 1983 permits a cause of action for constitutional

violations by persons. In certain circumstances, a municipality may be held liable as a “person”

under § 1983. Id. at 690–91. Unlike a claim for negligence, however, “a municipality cannot be

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be

held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. Liability only attaches where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through the “execution of a government’s

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible

under § 1983.” Id. at 694.

There are three methods by which a plaintiff may establish municipal liability under

Monell. First, a local government may be liable where the “execution of a government’s policy

or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflict[s] the injury.” Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776,

802 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)). Second, a local government can fail to

train employees in a manner that amounts to “deliberate indifference” to a constitutional right,

such that “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to

result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the [government entity]

can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at

802 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). Third, a local

government may be held liable if “the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an

official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a subordinate’s

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 802–03 (quoting

Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013)).

Here, the parties do not dispute that BAH is a public body subject to suit under § 1983

per Monell. However, Plaintiff offers no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that

any of the defendants had final policy-making authority; that someone else at BAH with final

policy-making authority engaged in conduct that ratified or directly violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights; or that there was a long-standing pattern, practice, or ratification of

unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff’s argument in support of his claims against BAH boils down

to an assertion of respondeat superior, which cannot serve as a basis of liability under § 1983.

III. State Law Claims

Plaintiff argues that Defendants conceded by failing to move for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s state law claims. On December 27, 2022, Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing

that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s state law claims. ECF Nos. 31, 32. In response, on

January 13, 2023, Plaintiff voluntarily filed his SAC, asserting no state law claims. Under Local

Rule 15-1(a)(3), “[a]n amended or supplemental pleading may not incorporate by reference any

part of the prior pleading.” The Ninth Circuit considers “any claims voluntarily dismissed . . .

waived if not repled.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). The SAC is

the operative complaint and contains no state law claims to concede.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Defendants BAH, RNC Hoffman, and RN Gauntz’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) and Defendant Dr. Davis’ Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 63) are GRANTED.

DATED this 11th day of April 2025.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai

MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him)

United States District Judge