GIRARDEAU v. NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL & TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ARNETTA GIRARDEAU, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24-cv-388

)

NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL )

AND TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Arnetta Girardeau (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint on May 8,

2024, asserting claims for relief against North Carolina

Agricultural & Technical State University (“Defendant” or “the

University”) stemming from her termination on August 23, 2022.

(See generally Compl. (Doc. 1).) Before this court is

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 10). For the reasons stated

herein, Defendant’s motion will be granted in part and denied in

part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of

the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ray v. Roane,

948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The facts,

taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.

Plaintiff was hired to serve as an associate general

counsel at the University in January 2022. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶

13.) During her time of employment, Plaintiff “suffered from a

series of physical impairments including mobility issues related

to knee pain, optic strain that limits her capacity to read

small fonts, migraines, gastrointestinal issues, and signs of

early hearing loss.” (Id. ¶ 17.) She “has also been diagnosed

with clinical depression and anxiety.” (Id.)

Initially, Plaintiff was “permitted to work remotely three

days a week and onsite two days.” (Id. ¶ 16.) In addition,

Plaintiff “sought and obtained a number of health-based

accommodations during her first six months of employment.”1 (Id.

¶ 18.) “These accommodations were not documented” by the

University and “were granted without any formal

memorialization.” (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) “[I]n discussing her

accommodations with [Sheena] Cobrand,” the University’s Deputy

General Counsel and Plaintiff’s “direct supervisor,” Plaintiff

“did not initially link any of her requests to mental health

1 These accommodations included “permission to convert

documents to 18-point font, the installation of ergonomic office

furniture, built-in break time, and the latitude for occasional

extension on work assignments.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 18.)

related diagnoses because she had heard disparaging and mocking

comments from senior members of the legal department . . . about

persons who suffer from mental health related impairments.” (Id.

¶¶ 15, 21.)

In early August 2022, the University announced that “it

intended to direct much of its senior level staff to return to

full time in-office work since the Covid-19 pandemic had

abated.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Concerned that “reverting to a full time

in-office routine would make it substantially more difficult to

manage her medical limitations,” Plaintiff initiated “her first

formal application for accommodations” on August 3, 2022. (Id.

¶¶ 23–24.) Plaintiff submitted this application to Cobrand and

Linda Mangum, the University’s Director of Employee Relations.

(Id. ¶ 24.)

In her application, Plaintiff applied for three new

accommodations: “[A]pproval for a four-day remote work schedule,

a second laptop, [and] the assignment of a staff member to

assist with note taking during meetings.” (Id. ¶ 25.) She also

“sought to formalize” the accommodations that she had already

been receiving. (Id.) Plaintiff’s application identified

“several specific conditions” such as “extreme knee joint pain,

gastrointestinal illnesses, anxiety, eye strain, hand and wrist

issues, and a ringing in the ears sensation that is a sign of

early hearing loss.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Several days after submitting

the application, on August 8, she disclosed in a meeting with

Cobrand and Melissa Holloway, the University’s General Counsel,

“that she suffered from what she described as an ‘invisible

disability.’” (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28.)

On or around August 10, 2022, Plaintiff “suffered a panic

attack” at a school event; the attack was “witnessed by several

of her colleagues in the university’s legal department.” (Id. ¶

27.) That evening, Plaintiff emailed Holloway requesting “full-

time remote status on a short-term basis until Labor Day.” (Id.

¶ 28.) “Holloway denied the request the next day with no follow-

up inquiry or request for medical documentation.” (Id.)

On August 12 and August 15, 2022, Plaintiff “was verbally

admonished” by Holloway and Cobrand for two work-related

incidents. (Id. ¶ 29.) In the first, Plaintiff “had difficulty

recalling the details of negotiations with a company about a

potential promotional contract with the university.” (Id.) In

the second, Plaintiff “had similar problems remembering whether

she had completed a document review several days earlier.” (Id.)

Plaintiff acknowledges that at the time of these incidents, she

“might have been having problems with immediate recall,

concentration, or visualization of her own notes” and contends

that these issues “aligned with her request for a note-taking

assistant.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff further contends that Holloway

and Cobrand “chose to dismiss [her] issues with retaining

information as signs of poor performance,” and did not use the

opportunity to inquire about Plaintiff’s “health impairments.”

(Id.)

On August 18, 2022, Defendant notified Plaintiff that her

August 3rd application for accommodations had been denied. (Id.

¶ 31.) The University provided “no analysis” and “little in the

way of explanation” for this decision. (Id.) The next day,

August 19, Plaintiff was issued a “written warning that her job

performance had been unsatisfactory.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Four days

later, on August 23, Holloway notified Plaintiff “that she was

being terminated.” (Id. ¶ 33.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a complaint on May 8, 2024, asserting three

claims for relief. First, Plaintiff asserts an ADA disability

discrimination claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), alleging

that Defendant terminated her because of her disability. (Compl.

(Doc. 1) ¶¶ 37–43.) Second, Plaintiff asserts an ADA retaliation

claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), alleging that Defendant

retaliated against her for engaging in the protected activity of

requesting reasonable accommodations. (Id. ¶¶ 44–48.) Third,

Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for “wrongful termination in

violation of public policy.” (Id. ¶¶ 49–53.)

On July 1, 2024, Defendant filed the operative Motion to

Dismiss, (Doc. 10), and a memorandum in support of its motion,

(see Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s

Mem.”) (Doc. 11)). In its memorandum, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s state law claim for “wrongful termination in

violation of public policy” is barred by sovereign immunity.

(Id. at 5–8.) Plaintiff filed a response brief conceding that

her state law claim should be dismissed. (Pl.’s Mem. Br. in

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss by Def. (“Pl.’s Resp.”) (Doc. 14) at 2,

12–13.) Accordingly, this court will dismiss Plaintiff’s third

claim for relief - wrongful termination in violation of public

policy.

Regarding the ADA claims, Defendant argues that Plaintiff

has not plausibly alleged the elements of either claim and the

claims should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).2

(Def.’s Mem. (Doc. 11) at 8–17.) Additionally, Defendant argues

that even if the claims advance, Plaintiff “cannot recover

punitive damages against [the University], a state entity.” (Id.

at 18–19; see also Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 43, 48, 53 (seeking

punitive damages).) In her response brief, Plaintiff opposes

Defendant’s 12(b)(6) arguments, (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 14) at 5-12),

but concedes that “the portions of the complaint demanding

punitive damages are due to be dismissed for the reasons

Defendant asserts in its pleading,” (id. at 2 n.1). Accordingly,

this court will dismiss the portions of Plaintiff’s complaint

seeking punitive damages.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA disability

discrimination claim (Claim I) and ADA retaliation claim (Claim

II) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) remain for resolution.

2 Defendant also argues that the ADA-retaliation claim

should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not “request any

recoverable relief,” as she “only requests legal damages in her

cause of action.” (Def.’s Mem. (Doc. 11) at 17–18.) As Defendant

notes in its briefing, ADA-retaliation plaintiffs are only

“entitled to equitable remedies,” not to “legal damages.” See

Israelitt v. Enter. Servs. LLC, 78 F.4th 647, 658–60 (4th Cir.

2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1392 (2024). However, the Fourth

Circuit recently clarified that “[b]ack pay and front pay are

equitable remedies.” See Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc., 95 F.4th

778, 793 (4th Cir. 2024). Here, Plaintiff seeks, among other

things, back pay for her “lost wages.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 48.)

Thus, it appears that Plaintiff has pleaded recoverable relief,

but this court defers definitive resolution of this issue

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(i).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is

plausible on its face if the plaintiff pleads “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable” and demonstrates “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court accepts the

complaint’s factual allegations as true. See id. Further, this

court “draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” See M.P. by & through Pinckney v. Meta Platforms

Inc., 127 F.4th 516, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2025). This court does

not, however, accept legal conclusions as true, and

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claim I: Disability Discrimination

“The ADA prohibits wrongful discharge as a form of

disability discrimination. To state a claim for wrongful

discharge, the plaintiff must allege that (1) [s]he was a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) [s]he was

discharged; (3) [s]he was fulfilling [her] employer's legitimate

expectations at the time of discharge; and (4) the circumstances

of [her] discharge raise a reasonable inference of unlawful

discrimination.” Kelly v. Town of Abingdon, Va., 90 F.4th 158,

169 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Defendant does not challenge that Plaintiff has plausibly

alleged the second element, that she “was discharged.” (See

generally Def.’s Mem. (Doc. 11).) Nor does Defendant challenge

the portion of the first element requiring Plaintiff to

plausibly allege that she suffered from an ADA-recognized

disability. (See generally id.) However, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged another component of the

first element: that she was a “qualified individual” for her

employment. (See id. at 11–14; Def.’s Reply (Doc. 16) at 3–6.)

Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not plausibly

alleged that that she was meeting Defendant’s legitimate

expectations, (see Def.’s Mem. (Doc. 11) at 14–15).

Because this court finds that Plaintiff failed to plausibly

allege that she was “fulfilling [the University’s] legitimate

expectations at the time of discharge,” see Kelly, 90 F.4th at

169, it need not address Defendant’s other argument.

i. Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that

that she was meeting Defendant’s legitimate

expectations

“To satisfy the third element, a plaintiff need not show

that she was a perfect or model employee. Rather, a plaintiff

must show only that she was qualified for the job and that she

was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations.” Cowgill v.

First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 380 (4th Cir. 2022)

(cleaned up).

Plaintiff does not allege that she was meeting the

University’s legitimate expectations, nor does she allege facts

which would allow this court to reach such a conclusion by

reasonable inference. On the contrary, Plaintiff alleges she was

the subject of two performance-related work incidents occurring

on August 12 and 15, 2022, respectively, for which she was

“verbally admonished” by her supervisors. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶

29.) Plaintiff “acknowledge[s] that she had difficulty recalling

the details of negotiations with a company about a potential

promotional contract with the university” on the first occasion,

and that she “had similar problems remembering whether she had

completed a document review several days earlier” on the second.

(Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that on August 19, she “was issued

a written warning that her job performance had been

unsatisfactory.” (Id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff does not allege any counter-facts tending to show

that she actually was meeting her employer’s expectations in

spite of the “verbal admonish[ments]” and “written warning,”

such as, for example, praise from her peers or supervisors,

positive performance reviews, bonuses, raises, or other “recent

signals suggest[ing] that the employer viewed her performance

positively.” See Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 380 (citing Haynes v.

Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2019)).

In her brief responding to Defendant’s motion to dismiss,

Plaintiff cites to Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579 (4th Cir.

2024), a case where the Fourth Circuit held that a district

court “erred in ruling that [the plaintiff] pleaded herself out

of court by acknowledging [the defendant’s] proffered reasons”

for an adverse employment action. Id. at 599. However, Barbour

centers on a plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim and

specifically the issue of causality, where, at the 12(b)(6)

stage, the plaintiff needed only to allege facts to “support a

plausible inference that the employer did not hire the plaintiff

because of her protected activity.” Id. at 590. In the ADA

disability discrimination context, the Fourth Circuit expressly

requires that a plaintiff allege “[s]he was fulfilling [her]

employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of discharge”

(Kelly element three) in addition to alleging facts which

provide for the “reasonable inference” that discrimination was a

“but-for” cause of the discharge (Kelly element four). See

Kelly, 90 F.4th at 169.

Therefore, even if Plaintiff has alleged facts which

provide for the reasonable inference of discrimination – a

question this court will not reach in this memorandum opinion –

she has not plausibly alleged that she was fulfilling the

University’s legitimate expectations at the time of her

discharge, a necessary requirement for asserting an ADA

disability discrimination claim, see id., and thus her claim

must fail. Cf. West v. City of Charlottesville, No. 3:24-CV-

00027, 2025 WL 256998, at *9–10 (W.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2025) (slip

copy) (dismissing a plaintiff’s ADA wrongful discharge claim for

failing to plausibly allege he was meeting his employer’s

legitimate expectations).

Accordingly, this court will dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA

disability discrimination claim.

B. Claim II: Retaliation

The ADA provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate

against any individual because such individual has opposed any

act or practice made unlawful by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. §

12203(a). Under this provision, an employee may not be

terminated for engaging in ADA-protected activity such as

requesting a reasonable accommodation for her disability. See

Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2021).3 To survive

12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff bringing an ADA retaliation claim

must allege: “(1) that [she] engaged in protected conduct, (2)

that [she] suffered an adverse action, and (3) that a causal

link exists between the protected conduct and the adverse

action.” A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350

(4th Cir. 2011).

Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s pleading of the

first two elements but argues that Plaintiff has failed to

plausibly allege “that a causal link exists” between her request

for accommodation and her discharge. (See Def.’s Mem. (Doc. 11)

at 15–17.)

3 Although the retaliation claim in Smith arose under the

Rehabilitation Act and not the ADA, “[b]oth statutes ‘require a

plaintiff to demonstrate the same elements to establish

liability.’” Smith, 12 F.4th at 410 n.4 (quoting Halpern v. Wake

Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012)).

i. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a causal

link

A plaintiff demonstrates a causal link when she plausibly

alleges that her engagement in an ADA-protected activity was a

“but-for” cause of her termination. See Miller v. Md. Dep't of

Nat. Res., 813 Fed. App'x 869, 877 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing

Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235 (4th

Cir. 2016)). Even at summary judgment, establishing a causal

link between a protected activity and discharge “is not an

onerous burden” and requires “very little evidence.” See Smith,

12 F.4th at 417 (citations omitted).

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges she “initiated her

first formal application for accommodations” to Mangum, the

University’s Director of Employee Relations, and Cobrand,

Plaintiff’s direct supervisor, on August 3, 2022, (see Compl.

(Doc. 1) ¶ 24), made a follow-up request for short-term remote

status by email to Holloway, the University’s General Counsel,

on August 10, (id. ¶¶ 27–28), and was discharged on August 23,

(id. ¶ 33). Holloway notified Plaintiff of her discharge. (Id.)

It is reasonable to infer from these alleged facts that the

same supervisors who were made aware of Plaintiff’s request for

ADA accommodations were the ones involved in the decision to

terminate her. This inference, combined with the temporal

proximity between Plaintiff’s request and her termination, is

enough to plausibly allege a causal link. Cf. Smith, 12 F.4th at

420 (holding that plaintiff established a causal link at summary

judgment where the evidence showed that the “decision-maker” was

aware of the protected activity and took adverse action in close

temporal proximity); see also Kelly, 90 F.4th at 170 (“In

retaliation cases, temporal proximity suggests a correlation

between an employee’s protected action and his employer's

adverse reaction.” (citing Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293,

300 (4th Cir. 2022))).

Defendant argues in its briefing that Plaintiff’s two

“performance related issues” on August 12 and 15 “defeat any

suggestion that [Plaintiff’s] request for accommodations was the

but-for cause of her discontinuation and shows that [the

University] had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason to dismiss

[her].” (Def.’s Mem. (Doc. 11) at 17.) However, for two reasons,

Defendant’s argument does not warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s

claim at this stage. First, there can be multiple “but-for”

causes of an employee’s termination, see Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236

n.5, so even if Plaintiff’s alleged performance issues played a

role in her termination, this fact does not foreclose the

possibility that her request for accommodations was also a “but-

for” cause. Second, Defendant’s argument that the University

possessed a “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason” to terminate

Plaintiff, and that this should defeat Plaintiff’s claim for

retaliation, seeks to improperly impose on Plaintiff a

requirement to plead rebuttals to the second step of the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework at the 12(b)(6)

stage. (See Def.’s Mem. (Doc. 11) at 16.) While Defendant’s

argument forecasts evidentiary issues for Plaintiff that may

arise at summary judgment, at this stage, Plaintiff has stated a

plausible claim for relief.

As such, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA

retaliation claim will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief for ADA

retaliation (Claim II). (See supra Section III.B.) However,

Plaintiff may seek only equitable remedies as to this claim. (See

supra n.2.)

Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief

for ADA disability discrimination (Claim I). (See supra Section

III.A.) Additionally, Plaintiff concedes that her claim for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (Claim III),

should be dismissed. (See supra Section I.B.) Finally, Plaintiff

concedes that she is not entitled to seek punitive damages for

any claim. (Id.)

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 10),

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s first claim for relief, Disability

Discrimination in Violation of the ADA, and Plaintiff’s third

claim for relief, Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public

Policy. Claim I and Claim III are DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is

DENIED as to Plaintiff’s second claim for relief, Retaliation in

Violation of the ADA. Claim II, along with Plaintiff’s request

for equitable remedy, shall proceed.

This the 11th day of April, 2025.

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Whi tien

United States District Judge

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