The opinion
Filed 4/11/25 P. v. Quinonez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331555
(Super. Ct. No. 2022002605)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
ERIC STEVEN QUINONEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Eric Steven Quinonez appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of felony theft from an elder (Pen. Code, § 368,
subd. (d)(1)), misdemeanor elder abuse (id., subd. (c)), and
misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed a split sentence
of three years: one year in county jail, followed by two years of
mandatory supervision. Eric1 contends: (1) the judgment should
be reversed because the court admitted improper opinion
1 Because the defendant and victim in this case share a last
name, we refer to them by first name. No disrespect is intended.
testimony, and (2) the minute order from sentencing and abstract
of judgment must be corrected. We order correction of the
challenged minute order and abstract of judgment, and otherwise
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying crimes
In early 2022, Ellen Quinonez was staying with her son
Eric at a Ventura motel. She was 78 years old at the time. On
February 1, Ellen went to the bank to withdraw money to pay for
the motel room. When she got back, she took a nap. The money
she had withdrawn was with her in the room.
Around 7 p.m. Ellen called 911. She told the dispatcher
that Eric had taken her money and her rental car. She also said
that Eric had been abusing her “for the last two weeks.”
Ventura Police Officer Monica Phinney responded to Ellen’s
911 call an hour later. Ellen appeared upset, confused, and
“stressed out” when Phinney arrived at the motel.2 She told the
officer that she saw Eric rifling through her purse when she woke
from her nap. She tried to grab him but he “pushed” her and
“took off” in her rental car with nearly $1,700 of her money.
Phinney did not notice any injuries to Ellen, but Ellen said she
was experiencing wrist pain.
Eric returned to the motel while Phinney was speaking
with Ellen. At some point the officer retrieved $1,214 from Eric’s
pocket. Eric said that Ellen had given him all that money “except
for like $45.” Ellen later asked for the money back, but Eric
wanted to hold onto it until he could speak with police.
2 Ellen told Phinney she had drunk a glass of wine prior to
her arrival, but the officer suspected that Ellen had consumed
more than that.
2
Eric told Phinney that he did not spend any of Ellen’s
money. He also said he did not push her. After he was arrested
he told another officer that the money in his pocket belonged to
Ellen.3
Trial
At trial Ellen testified that she had told Eric that he could
take money whenever he needed. She denied that Eric had taken
money from her motel room and denied that he pushed her. She
said she would sometimes “say anything” and that she didn’t
always mean what she said. She “dr[a]nk chardonnay to sleep.”
After Ellen’s testimony prosecutors moved to admit expert
witness testimony on domestic violence and elder abuse. They
proffered district attorney investigator Yumira Kirk as their
witness on these topics.
At an Evidence Code4 section 402 hearing, Kirk said she
worked as a civilian for the Los Angeles Police Department for
four years, then spent 10 years as a police officer in Santa
Barbara. Some of the cases she investigated involved domestic
violence or elder abuse. Her six months in the police academy
included training on domestic violence, as did her nine months of
field training. She later took courses on the subject. She had
testified in five jury trials and more than 40 preliminary hearings
that involved domestic violence.
Eric objected to Kirk’s qualifications as an expert witness.
The trial court conceded that Kirk’s “credentials fall far short of
3 When Eric arrived at jail, a bag containing a crystalline
substance fell out of his shorts. He admitted that the substance
was methamphetamine.
4 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
3
what [it was] used to seeing,” but concluded that “the bar for
admissibility is low” and permitted her to testify. Any concerns
about Kirk’s credentials went to the weight of her testimony, not
its admissibility.
When trial resumed, Kirk testified that a theme she noticed
in domestic violence cases was that complaining witnesses often
“want to recant their statements or change their statements in a
way that they could have it not look as bad, [and] minimize what
occurred.” Sometimes victims of elder abuse did the same thing;
Kirk saw “patterns” of victims doing so when she worked in
Santa Barbara. Factors that contributed to this minimization
included the “cycle of violence” that occurs in domestic abuse, the
roles of power and control, the significance of isolation in elder
abuse cases, the use of victim blaming, and the significance of
cognitive decline in many elders.
Kirk additionally testified that she had been trained in
“evaluating whether someone’s statement is truthful.” When
evaluating whether a 911 caller was truthful, for example, she
considered the caller’s “tone of voice, [their] sense of urgency,
[and] the amount of speed in which they speak.” She said
“[n]obody ever just calls 911, you know, just because. If that does
happen, it’s extremely rare. Most people who call are in need of
help immediately.”
“[E]ach situation will call for something different. It
just depends on the situation, and it also depends a
lot on the person. People have various different ticks.
Whether that means—what I mean by ticks is truth
telling. So some people will tell the truth, sometimes
they will tug their ear when they say a truth, or
sometimes they’ll do the opposite where they might,
you know, if they’re lying, they might lie and then
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look down. So these are all just some indicators, but
ultimately those are just indicators.
“I have to take the totality of everything that goes
into if they’re telling the truth, whether the
statement is making sense, is there evidence to
corroborate that? Was there a 911 call or a witness
or a neighbor? All these things go into play if
someone is telling the truth.”
Kirk concluded that a person’s motivations to lie are relevant to
evaluating their truthfulness. “[D]ependency” can be too,
because if a victim is dependent on their abuser “they don’t want
to lose that sustainability.” She downplayed the effect of alcohol
on truthfulness, however: “Just because [a person is] under the
influence of alcohol doesn’t mean they’re not telling the truth.”
Eric testified in his own defense. He said that he paid for
the motel room with his credit card when he and Ellen checked
in. He did not stay in the room full time but went there “several
days a week.” His mother was “very unusual to live with” and
repeatedly came home with large sums of cash. On February 1,
2022, he discovered that Ellen had withdrawn all the money from
her checking account. Upon making this discovery he called
“Sergeant Kelly” from the Ventura Police Department to express
concern about what his mother had done. He had also called the
manager of Ellen’s bank.
Eric said that he was on his way to the bank to put Ellen’s
money back into her account when she called 911. He agreed
that he got to the bank “a little bit too late,” and admitted that
the bank was closed by the time that 911 call took place.
Eric said that there was a “fake FBI guy” at the motel when
he returned from the bank, “sweet talking” Ellen into helping
5
him get a room. Eric threw the man out of Ellen’s room and got
into a “big fistfight” with him a few blocks away. When Eric
returned to the motel he “put the money on top of the bed” and
asked Phinney to detain the man he had been fighting. Phinney
ordered him to put the money back in his pocket, and he did. He
did not push Ellen that day, and had never done so.
On rebuttal, Sergeant Craig Kelly testified that he did not
know Eric and did not receive a call or a voicemail from him in
February 2022. He had never provided Eric with his personal
cell phone number.
Sentencing
After a jury convicted Eric of theft from an elder, elder
abuse, and possession of methamphetamine, the trial court
sentenced him to one year in county jail and two years of
mandatory supervision. The court made no mention of imposing
fines or fees related to domestic violence during sentencing, and
made no finding that Eric has a history of drug abuse.
The minute order from sentencing states that Eric must
pay $500 to the State Domestic Violence Fund and $300 to
Ventura County women’s shelters. The order also states that
Eric “has a history of drug abuse” and “recommends that [he]
participate in a counseling or educational program.” The abstract
of judgment states that Eric is to participate in such a program
and that he must pay $500 to the domestic violence fund.
DISCUSSION
Kirk’s testimony
Eric contends the trial court should not have permitted
Kirk to testify as an expert on domestic violence and elder abuse
because she lacked the requisite qualifications. We disagree.
A witness is qualified to proffer expert testimony if they
6
have “special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
sufficient to qualify [them] as an expert on the subject to which
[their] testimony relates.” (§ 720, subd. (a).) “Whether a
[witness] qualifies as an expert in a particular case depends on
the facts of that case and the witness’[s] qualifications.” (People
v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 39 (Sergill).) A trial court
has “considerable latitude in determining” whether a witness has
the requisite qualifications, and we will uphold that
determination “unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown.”
(People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 357.) A manifest abuse of
discretion is shown only if “ ‘ “ ‘the evidence shows that [the]
witness clearly lacks qualification as an expert.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Dowl (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1079, 1089, italics omitted.)
Eric has not shown a manifest abuse of discretion here. At
the section 402 hearing Kirk explained that she had training on
domestic violence at the police academy, in the field, and through
subsequent coursework. Many of the cases she investigated as a
police officer involved domestic violence or elder abuse. She had
testified about domestic violence in five jury trials and more than
40 nonjury proceedings. Such experience does not show a clear
lack of the requisite qualifications.
Eric further contends Kirk’s testimony about the “themes”
she observed in domestic violence cases was inadmissible
character evidence, and that her testimony on the methods she
uses to determine a person’s “truthfulness” invaded the province
of the jury. But Eric did not object to Kirk’s testimony during the
proceedings below. His contentions are forfeited. (People v.
Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333; see § 353, subd. (a).)
Anticipating as much, Eric maintains counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to Kirk’s testimony.
7
Establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires
Eric to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and
that he suffered prejudice as a result. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692; People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th
181, 198 (Mickel).) To demonstrate deficient performance Eric
must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. (Mickel, at p. 198.) To demonstrate
prejudice Eric must show a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s deficient performance the outcome of trial would have
been different. (Ibid.) His ineffective assistance claim fails upon
a defective showing of either component. (People v. Holt (1997)
15 Cal.4th 619, 703 (Holt).)
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are difficult to prove
on direct appeal. (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.) “The
record on appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as
[they] did.” (Ibid.) “Under those circumstances, a reviewing
court has no basis on which to determine whether counsel had a
legitimate reason for making a particular decision, or whether
counsel’s actions or failure to take certain actions were
objectively unreasonable.” (Ibid.) Moreover, appellate courts
presume that counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of
reasonableness, and we afford great deference to counsel’s
tactical decisions. (Ibid.) For this reason, we will reverse a
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
only if there is affirmative evidence that counsel had no rational
purpose for their acts or omissions. (Ibid.) Deciding whether to
object to testimony is inherently tactical, thus a failure to object
will rarely establish an ineffective-assistance claim. (People v.
Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 25.)
On this record we cannot conclude that Eric has carried his
8
burden of showing that counsel performed deficiently. Perhaps
counsel deemed Kirk’s testimony on Ellen’s minimization of Eric’s
actions admissible, and thus chose not to make an unmeritorious
objection. (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906-908
[expert testimony on recantation and minimization may be
admissible]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [counsel not
required to make unmeritorious objections].) Or perhaps counsel
did not want to highlight Ellen’s testimony by objecting. (People
v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567 (Wharton) [counsel not
required to highlight adverse testimony].) Such tactical decisions
fall within the broad range of reasonableness.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the lack of
objection to Kirk’s description of the methods she uses to
determine whether a person is being truthful—though we note
that had counsel objected to this line of testimony the objection
likely would have had merit. (See, e.g., People v. Lapenias (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 162, 179-180 [expert should not vouch for alleged
victim’s honesty]; Sergill, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 39 [“the
veracity of those who report crimes to the police is [not] a matter
sufficiently beyond common experience to require the testimony
of an expert”].) But counsel may have wanted to avoid focusing
the jury’s attention to Kirk’s testimony on this topic. (Wharton,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 567; see also People v. Catlin (2001) 26
Cal.4th 81, 165 [decision whether to object “highly tactical” and
depends on whether objection “would serve only to highlight the
undesirable testimony”].) Or “[c]ounsel may have figured
counterargument held more rhetorical promise than a mere
objection.” (People v. Ramirez (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 305, 311.)
Or perhaps jurors “looked bored, and the stimulus of an objection
may have awakened [their] interest[s] in a counterproductive
9
way.” (Ibid.) Or given the evidence of Ellen’s alcohol use, counsel
could have concluded that objecting to Kirk’s testimony would
have “had no meaningful impact.” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8
Cal.5th 694, 712.) On this record, we simply cannot conclude
that counsel performed deficiently. Because Eric has not set
forth affirmative evidence that counsel had no tactical purpose
for his actions, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
(Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 703-704.)
The abstract of judgment and minute order from sentencing
Eric contends, and the Attorney General concedes, fines
and findings not included in the trial court’s oral pronouncement
of judgment should be stricken from the sentencing minute order
and abstract of judgment. We agree.
“In a criminal case . . . the oral pronouncement of
sentence . . . constitutes the judgment.” (People v. Scott (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324, italics omitted.) If there is a
discrepancy between the pronouncement of judgment and a
minute order or abstract of judgment, the pronouncement
controls. (People v. Morales (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1587, 1594.)
Because the requirements that Eric pay $500 to the domestic
violence fund and $300 to local women’s shelters were not
included in the pronouncement of judgment here, they must be
stricken from the August 7, 2023, minute order. The finding that
Eric has a history of drug abuse and recommendation that he
participate in a counseling or education program must be
stricken from that minute order for the same reason. The
requirement that Eric participate in such a program must also be
stricken from the abstract of judgment, as must the requirement
that he pay $500 to the domestic violence fund.
We also note that the abstract of judgment erroneously
10
states that Eric was convicted by plea. The amended abstract
should reflect that Eric was convicted by jury.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected August 7,
2023, minute order and a corrected abstract of judgment, and
forward a certified copy of the latter to the probation department.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
11
David R. Worley, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Alex Coolman and Kathy Moreno, under appointments by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and David F. Glassman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.