The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
VALDEZ LAMONT JORDAN, )
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
) Case No. 23-cv-2654-RJD
vs.
)
)
DEANNA BROOKHART, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on various motions filed by the parties. For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 45) is DENIED without
prejudice. Defendants’ Second Motion for Extension of Time to Opt Out of Mandatory Mediation
(Doc. 46) is DENIED as moot. Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery Deadline
and Dispositive Motions (Doc. 47), Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery
Deadline and Dispositive Motions (Doc. 48), and Defendants’ Motion to Opt Out of Mandatory
Mediation (Doc. 49) are GRANTED.
Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery Deadline and Dispositive Motions
(Doc. 47) & Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery Deadline and Dispositive
Motions (48)
Defendants filed a motion seeking a 60-day extension for discovery, up to and including
May 2, 2025, and a 90-day extension for dispositive motions, up to and including June 3, 2025.
(Doc. 47). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his own motion for extension of the discovery and dispositive
motions deadlines, conceding to Defendants’ requests. (Doc. 48). Accordingly, the parties’
motions are GRANTED. The Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 34) is AMENDED as follows:
Discovery is due by May 2, 2025; Dispositive motions are due by 6/3/2025. All other dates and
deadlines remain in place.
Defendants’ Second Motion for Extension of Time to Opt Out of Mandatory Mediation (Doc.
46) & Motion to Opt Out of Mandatory Mediation (Doc. 49).
On January 17, 2025, the Court entered an Order referring this case to mandatory mediation
and advising the parties that any motion to opt out of mandatory mediation was due by January
31, 2025. (Doc. 38). Thereafter, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for extension of that
deadline up to February 20, 2025. (Doc. 44). Defendants then filed a second motion for extension
up to March 13, 2025. (Doc. 46). On that date, and while the ruling on their motion was pending,
Defendants filed a motion to opt out of mandatory mediation. (Doc. 49). They represent that
additional discovery and/or arguments on summary judgment are first warranted prior to any
settlement negotiations with Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ motion to opt out
of mandatory mediation.
Under the Mandatory Mediation Plan, motions to opt out shall be granted only for “good
cause” shown, which does not include “inconvenience, travel costs, attorney fees, or other costs.”
Mandatory Mediation Plan, § 2.2 B. In light of Defendants’ representation that additional
discovery and arguments relating to a motion for summary judgment are needed prior to engaging
in settlement negotiations, the Court is satisfied that good cause exists to opt out of mandatory
mediation at this time. Accordingly, Defendants’ Second Motion for Extension of Time to Opt
Out of Mandatory Mediation (Doc. 46) is DENIED as moot, and their Motion to Opt Out of
Mandatory Mediation (Doc. 49) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 45)
While there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel for a civil litigant, under
Section 1915(e), a district court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see also Stroe v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 256
F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2001); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995). When presented
with a request to appoint counsel, a court must make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent
plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or effectively been precluded from doing so,
and (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it
himself. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff has attached to his motion several letters to law firms seeking representation
in this case. (Doc. 45, pp. 10-14). Accordingly, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of making
reasonable attempts to obtain counsel on his own. As to the second prong of the test, however, the
Court finds that the difficulty of this case does not exceed Plaintiff’s ability to litigate it himself.
Plaintiff proceeds with a First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claim against Defendants
Vaughn, Brown, Brookhart, and Kohn for denying him access to a vegetarian kosher diet while at
the Lawrence Correctional Center, as well as with a claim for injunctive relief against the IDOC
Director under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et
seq. (“RLUIPA”). “In the prison context, a regulation that impinges on an inmate’s constitutional
rights, such as one imposing a substantial burden on free exercise, may be justified if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, protection under RLUIPA
is broader in that “the government may not impose a ‘substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person residing in or confined to an institution’ unless the burden is the ‘least restrictive
means’ of serving a ‘compelling governmental interest.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1).
Plaintiff’s claims relating to the imposed burden in the exercise of his religion are not
factually complex. See Whitfield v. Lawrence Corr. Ctr., No. CIV. 06-968-GPM, 2008 WL
563441, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2008). Plaintiff will mostly have to show what his religion
requires him to do, how Defendants inhibited his ability to do so, and why. Id. Plaintiff should
have personal knowledge of those facts or be able to get such information from Defendants through
discovery. While Plaintiff’s claims may present some complex legal issues, at this time, and while
discovery is still ongoing, the Court believes that Plaintiff is well capable of proceeding on his
own. Plaintiff’s motions and pleadings thus far are clear, coherent, and very well structured and
organized. (See Doc. 1, 39, 45, & 48). Plaintiff clearly states the facts and artfully analyzes
relevant authority in support of his arguments. Id. Plaintiff’s filings thus far are significantly more
articulate and eloquent compared to those of most unrepresented plaintiffs. Further, as Plaintiff
stated in his Complaint, he has at least some litigation experience, since he has two more cases
pending in this district as well as cases pending in state and appellate courts. (Doc. 1, p. 3).
Plaintiff states in his motion that he has limited access to the law library (once a week for
about two hours when there is an upcoming deadline, but only twice a month without an upcoming
deadline). These circumstances are not unique to Plaintiff and do not warrant recruitment of
counsel. Should Plaintiff need additional time at any stage of this litigation, he may file a motion
with the Court, as he has already done in the past. Plaintiff also claims that there are no materials
in the prison law library to assist him with the stages following discovery, and the prison law clerks
are also not able to help him with trial preparation. However, at this time, discovery has not yet
been completed, and Plaintiff will need to overcome any dispositive motions before heading to
trial. Plaintiff asserts that he has no access to a jailhouse lawyer to assist with evidence gathering,
preparing, and responding to motions, but his pleadings thus far show he does not need such
assistance. Further, Plaintiff does not state in his motions that he used the assistance of a jailhouse
lawyer in preparation of his prior filings in this case.
Plaintiff next alleges that he has been transferred from Lawrence to Pinckneyville
Correctional Center, and he thus does not have access to necessary witnesses. He states that he
has identified over 30 witnesses. However, Plaintiff has not specifically explained what
information he needs to obtain from those witnesses that he is unable to provide on his own or to
secure from Defendants. Further, any witnesses from Plaintiff’s old facility are not essential to
establish Plaintiff’s claim under the RLUIPA for injunctive relief in his current facility.
Plaintiff further states that he needs the Court to appoint counsel to assist him with filing a
preliminary injunction for him and others similarly situated and to prove a prison-wide RLUIPA
violation. However, any request for a class action certification must be made “[a]t an early
practicable time,” and Plaintiff has not done so even though this case has been pending for over
one and a half years. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Plaintiff further avers that he has not yet received
Defendants’ responses to his discovery requests, which he served on Defendants on December 16,
2024, but Defendants clarified that they responded on February 10, 2025. (Doc. 49). If a
discovery dispute arises in the future, Plaintiff may file a motion with the Court to resolve it.
The Seventh Circuit has been clear that “courts must be careful stewards of [the] limited
resource” of volunteer lawyers. Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hosp., 962 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir.
2020) (quoting Dupree v. Hardy, 859 F.3d 458, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2017)). At this juncture, the
Court is satisfied that Plaintiff is competent to litigate this case himself. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 45) is DENIED without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 45) is
DENIED without prejudice. Defendants’ Second Motion for Extension of Time to Opt Out of
Mandatory Mediation (Doc. 46) is DENIED as moot. Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time
for Discovery Deadline and Dispositive Motions (Doc. 47), Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of
Time for Discovery Deadline and Dispositive Motions (Doc. 48), and Defendants’ Motion to Opt
Out of Mandatory Mediation (Doc. 49) are GRANTED. The Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 34)
is AMENDED as follows: Discovery is due by May 2, 2025; Dispositive motions are due by
6/3/2025; All other dates and deadlines remain in place.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 4/10/2025
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge