The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LYNN A. RONAN, Individually and : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-1927
as Administrator of the Estate of :
Sherry L. Ronan, : (Judge Neary)
:
Plaintiff :
:
v. :
:
HAMPDEN TOWNSHIP, et al., :
:
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Lynn A. Ronan, individually and as administrator of the estate of
Sherry L. Ronan (collectively, “Ronan”), sued Hampden Township, Hampden
Township Police, Hampden Township Emergency Services, Operations Lieutenant
Nathaniel Funk, and Detective Thomas Burfeind (collectively, the “Hampden”
defendants) for Fourteenth Amendment violations, a survival action, and a
wrongful death claim arising from the death of Sherry L. Ronan (“Sherry”). Ronan
also sued Rubi Ambrocio-Gonzales and Michael Zimmerman for a survival action, a
wrongful death claim, and an amorphous Fourteenth Amendment violation for
their alleged roles in Sherry’s death. The Hampden defendants moved to dismiss
the claims against them, which the court will grant with prejudice.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
This case arises out of tragic circumstances. (See Doc. 1-2).1 Ronan believes
that, on October 23, 2021, defendant Michael Zimmerman called 911 to report a
drug overdose at a hotel in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. (See id. ¶ 3). Lieutenant
Nathaniel Funk and Officer McIntyre2 responded to the call and arrived on scene
minutes later. (See id. ¶ 4). Before proceeding into the hotel, McIntyre retrieved
Narcan and an AED from his police vehicle. (See id.) The officers entered the room
and discovered a person who they later determined to be Sherry lying on her back.
(See id.) Officer McIntyre checked the room for other individuals and Lieutenant
Funk checked on Sherry’s status. (See id.) Both McIntyre and Funk determined
that she was deceased. (See id. ¶ 5). Neither officer attempted to administer the
AED or Narcan that they had available to them. (See id.) After concluding that
Sherry was deceased, McIntyre returned the medical equipment to his vehicle and
Funk requested the aid of a detective and the coroner. (See id. ¶¶ 6-7). Ronan
alleges that Detective Thomas Burfeind, a named defendant, was “enroute” but
does not otherwise elaborate on whether, or when, Burfeind arrived on the scene or
what transpired after he arrived. (See id. ¶ 6). Two deputy coroners arrived and
pronounced Sherry deceased shortly thereafter. (See id. ¶ 10).
1 The court accepts, as it must on a motion to dismiss, that all well-pleaded
facts in Ronan’s Amended Complaint are true. See Santiago v. Warminster
Township, 629 F.3d 121, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2010).
2 Ronan does not identify Officer McIntyre’s first name or employer, nor has
Ronan named Officer McIntyre as a defendant.
Ronan initially filed this case in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
County on an unknown date, before filing an Amended Complaint on October 10,
2024, alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations, a survival action, and a wrongful
death claim against the Hampden defendants. (See id. ¶¶ 11-31, 38-45). Ronan also
alleges an amorphous Fourteenth Amendment violation against Ambrocio-Gonzales
and Zimmerman for their alleged roles in Sherry’s drug overdose in addition to the
survival action and wrongful death claims. (See id. ¶¶ 32-45).
The Hampden defendants filed a notice of removal to this court and
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss.3 (See Docs. 1, 3, 9). The motion is fully
briefed and ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374.7 (3d
Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court
may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as
3 No attorney has entered an appearance for Ambrocio-Gonzales or
Zimmerman, they have not answered or otherwise responded to the Amended
Complaint, and it is unclear whether they have been properly served.
well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based
upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts
a three-step inquiry. Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir.
2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be
separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions
may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it
must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A claim is facially plausible
when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. If the court concludes that a complaint should be dismissed, it “must permit a
curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.
III. Discussion
The Hampden defendants move to dismiss Ronan’s Amended Complaint on
numerous grounds. They argue that: (1) Ronan fails to plausibly plead a Fourteenth
Amendment claim for failure to provide medical care to Sherry; (2) Ronan fails to
plausibly plead a Monell4 claim against Hampden Township; (3) Ronan’s claims
against Hampden Township Police and Hampden Emergency Services cannot
stand because they are sub-units of Hampden Township, and thus the same entity;
(4) Ronan’s claims against Burfeind and Funk in their official capacity are
improper;5 (5) Ronan’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Burfeind fails for lack
of Burfeind’s personal involvement in Sherry’s death; (6) Ronan’s claim that Funk
was negligent is insufficient to impose liability; (7) Burfeind and Funk are entitled
to qualified immunity; and (8) further leave to amend Ronan’s complaint would be
futile. (See Doc. 9 at 4-22). Ronan’s opposition does not address most of these
arguments but does request leave to amend the complaint if the court concludes
that the Amended Complaint is insufficiently pleaded. (See Doc. 12).
A. Ronan’s claims against the Police Department and Emergency Services
are improper.
The Hampden defendants argue that that the inclusion of Hampden
Township, Hampden Township Police, and Hampden Emergency Services is
improper because they are not separate entities. It is well-established that
4 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
5 There is nothing in the Amended Complaint, however, to suggest that
Ronan is suing Funk or Burfeind in their official capacities. Accordingly, the court
will not address this argument.
administrative arms of a municipality cannot be sued in conjunction with the
municipality. See Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App’x. 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004)
(nonprecedential) (citing DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F. Supp. 2d 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Watson v. Witmer, 183 F. Supp. 3d 607, 614.3 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Therefore, Ronan’s
claims against the Hampden Township Police and Hampden Emergency Services,
administrative arms of Hampden Township, are improper. Further, any attempt at
amendment would be futile for these claims so they will be dismissed with
prejudice. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.
B. A Fourteenth Amendment claim against Burfeind and Funk cannot
survive because they had no duty to provide medical care.
The Hampden defendants present a litany of reasons why Ronan’s
Fourteenth Amendment claims against Burfeind and Funk must be dismissed. The
court need only consider one—duty.
As a general matter, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes no affirmative obligation on the state to provide aid or protection from
private harm. Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing DeShaney
v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). But this rule has
exceptions, one of which is when an individual is “injured while being apprehended
by the police.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
Ronan does not, and cannot, allege that Sherry was in police custody when
Funk (along with McIntyre) arrived on the scene, or that Sherry’s injuries were the
result of police action. According to the Amended Complaint, both Funk and
McIntyre determined Sherry was deceased at the time of arrival. (Doc. 1-2 ¶ 5).
Even if Ronan had alleged Sherry was alive at the time the Funk arrived on the
scene, Funk still would have no duty to administer aid because Sherry was not in
police custody and her injuries were not the result of Funk’s actions. See City of
Revere, 463 U.S. at 244. As to Burfeind, there are no allegations in the Amended
Complaint that Burfeind was ever present at the scene. Even if Burfeind was
present, no duty would attach to him for the same reasons. Accordingly, Ronan’s
claims against Funk and Burfeind fail as a matter of law and will be dismissed with
prejudice because further amendment would be futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.
C. The claim against Hampden Township necessarily fails, too.
While a municipality could, in theory, be liable for a substantive due process
violation when none of its employees are liable, such liability can only attach when
there was a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Brown v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training
Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 122 (1992)). Here, Ronan fails to plausibly allege that Sherry’s
constitutional rights were violated because Sherry was not in Hampden Township’s
custody and because Hampden Township bore no constitutional obligation to
administer aid for injuries that were not caused by its actions. See City of Revere,
463 U.S. at 244; Brown, 318 F.3d at 483. And so, because Ronan has not, and cannot,
allege that Hampden Township violated Sherry’s constitutional rights, this claim is
also dismissed with prejudice because further amendment would be futile. See
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.
IV. Conclusion
As Ronan has failed to allege that the Hampden defendants violated Sherry’s
constitutional rights, or that Ronan could plead facts demonstrating a constitutional
violation, the court will grant the Hampden defendants’ motion to dismiss Ronan’s
Amended Complaint with prejudice. An appropriate order shall issue.
/S/ KELI M. NEARY
Keli M. Neary
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: April 10, 2025