The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JACOB B., )
Plaintiff,
v. 1:22CV678
LELAND DUDEK,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jacob B. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Section 1631(c)(3) of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review
of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims for Supplemental
Security Income and Child Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Act. The
patties have filed cross-motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified
to the Court for review.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his application for Supplemental Security Income on May 14, 2019,
alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2004. (Tr. at 33.)! His application was denied
initially (Ir. at 120-36), and that decision was upheld upon reconsideration (Tr. at 137-52).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de novo before an Administrative
Transcript citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #10].
Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Ir. at 167-70.) On November 9, 2020, Plaintiff, represented by an
attorney, appeared at the subsequent hearing, at which Plaintiff and his mother both testified.
(Tr. at 33, 58-90.) Several weeks after the hearing, on December 2, 2020, the AL] requested
written interrogatories from an impartial medical expert, which were later entered as additional
exhibits in the administrative record. (Tr. at 33, 492-512.) The ALJ also held a supplemental
telephone heating on October 7, 2021, at which Plaintiff and his attorney again appeared, and
at which an impartial vocational expert appeared and testified. (Tr. at 33, 91-119.)
On November 12, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. at 53), and on June 13, 2022, the Appeals Council
denied review, thereby making the AL]’s conclusion the Commissionet’s final decision for
purposes of judicial review (I'r. at 21-26). Plaintiff filed the action now before the Court on
August 18, 2022, one day after the deadline for filing a civil action expired, and Plaintiffs
counsel requested that the Appeals Council grant an extension of time, which the Council later
granted. (I'r. at 1.) Therefore, the civil action was deemed timely filed.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissionet’s denial of
social security benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the
scope of review of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144
(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts are not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d
396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the
ALJ if they ate supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
cortect legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”’ Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of more than a mere
scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270
F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If there is
evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is
substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the
[AL}].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the
responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. “The issue before
[the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the
AL)’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was
reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996).
In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that tn administrative proceedings,
“la| claimant for disability benefits beats the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris,
658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). For claimants ages 18 and older,? “[t]he Commissioner uses
a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a) (4); 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the Commissioner asks, in sequence,
whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe
impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the requirements of a listed
impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other
work in the national economy.” Id.
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence
forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step
determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant 1s ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carties his or her burden at the first two steps, and if
the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, “the clatmant
is disabled.” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two,
but falters at step three, ie., “[i]f a clatmant’s impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or
exceed a listed impairment,” then “the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional
? Plaintiff's disability applications, as filed with the Social Security Administration, involve periods of time both
before and after Plaintiff attained the age of 18. Therefore, the AL] evaluated Plaintiffs claims using two
different standards in accordance with the regulations. However, in the case now before the Court, Plaintiff
only challenges the ALJ’s treatment of his adult disability claim. Specifically, as discussed below, Plaintiff only
challenges the AL]’s “failing to explain why the effects of [PlaintifPs] episodes of low blood glucose would not
cause him to be away from the work station or to need [] additional work breaks.” (Pl. Br. at 15.) The Court
therefore considers here only the relevant standatds for adult disability determinations.
capacity (RFC’).” Id. at 179.3 Step four then requites the ALJ to assess whether, based on
that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify
as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior
work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that
a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite the clatmant’s
impairments.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide
“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the clatmant’s RFC]
and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust
to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carty its
“evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available
in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.
Ill. DISCUSSION
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in “substantial gainful
activity” since his May 14, 2019 application date. (Tr. at 38.) He therefore met the first step
of the sequential evaluation process. The ALJ next determined at step two that Plaintiff
suffered from the following severe impairments prior to age 18:
Diabetes mellitus; visual disturbance; speech and language disturbance; and
learning disability
3 “REC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d
at 562 (noting that administrative regulations requite RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks
omitted)). The RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations
(mental, sensory, or skin impaitments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after
[the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (¢.g., pain).”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
(Tr. at 39), and had “not developed any new impairment or impairments since attaining age
18” (Ir. at 48).4 At step three, the AL] determined that none of these impairments, singly or
in combination, met ot medically equaled a listed impairment. (Tr. at 48-50.) Therefore, the
ALJ assessed Plaintiffs RFC and determined that he could perform sedentary work with the
following, additional limitations:
[He can] perform sedentaty work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) and can lift
and catty up to 10 pounds. He can also sit for up to six hours as well as stand
and walk for up to two hours. On a frequent basis, he can reach, handle, finger,
and feel bilaterally. Further, he can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and use tamps and stairs. However, he can have no exposure to common
workplace hazards—including unprotected heights, dangerous machinery,
laddets, ropes, or scaffolds. Additionally, he can have no exposure to extreme
heat ot cold. He is further limited by monocular vision—that is he has the
complete loss of functional vision in one eye but continues to have full
functional vision in the other eye at 20/20 visual acuity.
(Tr. at 50.)° The ALJ found at step four of the analysis that Plaintiff had no past relevant
work. (Tr. at 51.) However, the ALJ determined at step five that, given Plaintiffs age,
education, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert as to these factors, he could
4 As noted above, Plaintiffs disability applications involved periods of time both before and after Plaintiff
attained the age of 18. The AL] concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish disability prior to age 18 because he
“did not have an impairment or combination of impaitments that met or equaled a listing” for child disability
under 20 CFR § 416.924. (Tr. at 48.) Plaintiff does not challenge that determination in this case. The AL] also
evaluated Plaintiffs impairments under the applicable regulations for adult disabilities, since the application
included claims for the period after Plaintiff turned 18, and that is the determination Plaintiff challenges in the
ptesent case, as set forth above.
5 The AL] concluded that Plaintiff did not have any medically determinable mental health impairment, and
Plaintiff does not challenge that determination in this case. (Ir. at 49.) Plaintiff was designated with a learning
disability in early elementary school, but was re-evaluated in 2016 and was determined to have low average to
average intellectual functioning and academic achievement, with no need for special services. The ALJ noted
that Plaintiff obtained a driver’s license and GED, and at the hearing, Plaintiffs representative asserted that
Plaintiff did not have a severe medically determinable mental impairment. (Tr. at 39, 44, 46, 47, 49.) The ALJ
nevertheless considered this history and also considered the impact of Plaintiff's diabetes-related symptoms on
his ability to concentrate, persist, maintain pace, interact with others, or adapt. (Tr. at 49.)
perform other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. at 51-52.)
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. at 53.)
Plaintiff now brings a single claim, arguing that the AL] “fail[ed] to explain why the
effects of [Plaintiffs] episodes of low blood glucose would not cause him to be away from the
work station or... need additional work breaks.” (PL’s Br. [Doc. #15] at 3.) In making this
challenge, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to comply with the “narrative discussion
requitements” set out in Social Security Ruling 96-8p. (PI.’s Br. at 6.) See Social Security
Ruling 96-8p: Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles I] and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional
Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 WL 374184 (1996) (‘SSR 96-8p”). First, in terms of
symptoms, SSR 96-8p requires that “[t]he RFC assessment must include a discussion of why
reported symptom-telated functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be
accepted as consistent with medical and other evidence.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7.
Second, the Ruling more generally requires that, when assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ
“must... explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case
record were considered and resolved.” Id.
In the present case, the AL) specifically found that the record does not support a
finding that “the severity of [Plaintiffs] diabetes would result [in] the need for additional
breaks, beyond normal breaks, [or] time off task or away from the work station.” (Tr. at 51.)°
Plaintiff argues that this finding conflicts with the ALJ’s earlier determination that Plaintiffs
6 The vocational expert at Plaintiff's supplemental hearing testified that the types of occupations identified at
step five of the sequential analysis typically involve three breaks per workday, including morning and afternoon
breaks “that would consist of ten to 15 minutes in duration, and a lunch break that would typically have a
duration of 30 minutes to an hour.” (Tt. at 116.) Plaintiff contends that episodes of low blood sugat would
require unscheduled breaks in addition to these three breaks.
“reported symptoms during periods of uncontrolled blood sugars ‘could reasonably impact
his ability to concentrate, persist, maintain pace, interact with others, or adapt during active
symptoms.” (PI.’s Br. at 5-6) (quoting Tr. at 49). In pertinent part, Plainuff “reported
symptoms of fatigue and feeling ‘shaky’ when his blood sugar dropped, and testified that
periods of low blood sugar happen “at least two to three times a day.” (I'r. at 42, 49, 73.)
Plaintiff further testified that, during these episodes of low blood sugar (hypoglycemia), it takes
“20 to 40 minutes” for his blood glucose to go back up, and that he sits and waits during this
time for his energy to return, unable to “really do much” else. (Tr. at 42, 67, 72-75, 109.)
The ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiffs subjective symptoms forms the crux of Plaintiffs
challenge. Under the applicable guidance, the ALJ’s decision must “contain specific reasons
for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the
evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess
how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Social Security Ruling 16-3p: ‘Titles
I] and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10 (Oct. 25,
2017) (“SSR 16-3p”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. In Arakas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 983
F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit clarified the procedure an AL] must follow when
assessing a claimant’s statements:
When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, AL]s must use the two-step
framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029
(Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must determine whether objective medical
evidence presents a “medically determinable impairment” that could reasonably
be expected to produce the clatmant’s alleged symptoms. 20 CF.R. §
404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3.
Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the AL] must assess
the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they
affect the claimant’s ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. At this step,
objective evidence is mot required to find the claimant disabled. SSR 16-3p, 2016
WL 1119029, at *4-5. SSR 16-3p recognizes that “[s]ymptoms cannot always
be measured objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” Id. at *4. Thus, the ALJ must consider the entite case record and
may “not disregard an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence
does not substantiate” them. Id. at *5.
983 F.3d at 95. Thus, the second part of the test requites the ALJ to consider all available
evidence, including Plaintiff's statements about his pain, in order to evaluate “the intensity and
persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it affects [his] ability to work.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. This approach facilitates the AL]’s ultimate goal, which is to accurately
determine the extent to which Plaintiff's pain or other symptoms limit his ability to perform
basic work activities. Relevant evidence for this inquity includes Plaintiffs “medical history,
medical signs, and laboratory findings,” id., as well as the following factors set out in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.929(c)(3) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3):
(i) [Plaintiffs] daily activities;
(it) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [Plaintiff's] pain or other
symptoms;
(tii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;
(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication [Plaintiff]
take[s] or [has] taken to alleviate [his] pain or other symptoms;
(v) Treatment, other than medication, [Plaintiff] recetve[s] or [has] received for
relief of [his] pain or other symptoms;
(vi) Any measures [Plaintiff] use[s] or [has] used to relieve [his] pain or other
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on [his] back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every
hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and
(vii) Other factors concerning [Plaintiff's] functional limitations and restrictions
due to pain or other symptoms.
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs reported symptoms, including periods of fatigue
and shakiness due to poorly controlled blood glucose levels, “could reasonably impact’ his
ability to work. (Ir. at 49.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs “statements concerning
the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent
with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Ir. at 46, 51.) The ALJ
specifically noted that Plaintiff had reported symptoms of fatigue and being “shaky” when his
blood pressure was uncontrolled, “which could reasonably impact his ability to concentrate,
persist, maintain pace, interact with others, or adapt during active symptoms”, but the AL]
also specifically found that these symptoms resulted in only “mild limitation in understanding,
remembering, and applying information; with regard to concentration, persistence, ot
maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself.” (Tr. at 49.) As support for this
determination, the ALJ noted that, despite Plaintiffs variable blood glucose control, “in his
activities of daily living, [Plaintiff] retained the ability to drive independently, recetve and
forward glucose readings to his mother from his personal cellphone, and intermittently
exercised [sic] and cut the grass.” (Ir. at 49; see also Tr. at 46.) The AL] further noted that
the “evidence does not document any hospitalizations or treatment for higher level cate prior
to the age of eighteen,” and that after he turned 18, in the year preceding Plaintiffs October
2021 hearing, Plaintiff testified that his blood sugars sometimes went low but he “had not had
any emergency room visits, urgent cate, or hospitalizations for issues related to his diabetes,”
not had he made “any major changes to his diet or lifestyle.” (Tr. at 46, 49.) He “maintained
positive relationships with family and peers,” “successfully completed his general equivalency
diploma”, and “continued to drive” and play video games and watch television. (I't. at 49.)
10
Similarly, in his earlier discussion, the AL] specifically noted that Plaintiff testified that “he
had also experienced difficulty with concentration when his blood sugar level was low” but he
was still able to “successfully complete his general equivalency diploma.” (Tr. at 42.) The AL]
also noted that according to Plaintiffs mother, many of the issues with low blood sugat arose
in hot environments, ot when Plaintiff was active in the sun. (Tr. at 43.)
Plaintiff nevertheless contends that his testimony regarding the need for irregular
and/or extended breaks “is consistent with his reports to his treating physician in October
2019, January 2020, September 2020, and January 2021 that he experienced episodes of
hypoglycemia.” (PL’s Br. at 5) (citing Tr. at 477, 484, 523, 517). However, the AL] considered
Plaintiff's treatment records at length. The AL] began with a June 2018 treatment record that
noted Plaintiffs diabetes was under “poor control” based on an elevated Alc level, but
Plaintiff nevertheless “reported normal energy and denied persistent hypoglycemia [low blood
sugat] ot exertcise intolerance” and Plaintiff was “very active.” (Tr. at 39, 415-16.) That
medical record notes that Plaintiff reported only “0-1 episodes of low blood sugars a week”,
with no episodes of “severe hypoglycemia requiring intervention with glucagon.” (Tr. at 415.)
The ALJ noted the next visit in September 2018, with patterns of high blood sugar in the late
evenings and overnight. (Ir. at 40, 422.) That record similarly reflects only a “few episodes
of low blood sugats a week,” and that Plaintiff “denies persistent hypoglycemia” and had not
had any “severe hypoglycemia requiting intervention with glucagon.” (Tr. at 422-23.) Plaintiff
was “physically active outdoors and working with his father.” (Ir. at 423.)
The ALJ acknowledged subsequent records in January 2019 and April 2019, still with
elevated Alc levels, but the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “denied any instances of hypoglycemia.”
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at 40.) Those records reflect that in January 2019, Plaintiff “denie[d] any episodes of
hypoglycemia” (Ir. at 429), and in April 2019, Plaintiff “denie[d] any episodes of
hypoglycemia” and his data from his glucose monitoring device showed “fait conttol .. .
without hypoglycemia risk” (Tr. at 438). The AL] further noted the next visit in July 2019,
during which Plaintiff reported he had been doing “fairly well”, reported that he had been
“helping his dad working outside,” and denied any severe hypoglycemia requiring intervention
with glucagon. (Ir. at 40, 454.) That record similarly reflects that Plaintiff “dente[d] any
episodes of hypoglycemia” and the data from his monitoring device again showed “fair control
... without hypoglycemia risk.” (Tr. at 454.) The ALJ also noted that during the next visit in
October 2019, Plaintiff reported ““frequent’ episodes of hypoglycemia” but no episodes of
sevete hypoglycemia requiring intervention with glucagon. (Tr. at 41,477.) That record also
reflects that the data from his monitoring devices showed “fair control . . . without
hypoglycemia risk”, and the provider directed Plaintiff and his parents not to use the insulin
pump so often and to use the suggested boluses. (Tr. at 41, 476, 479.)’
The ALJ further described the next visit in January 2020 and noted that while Plaintiff
reported “significant lows” when entering data in the pump, “review of his glucose monitor
revealed fait control with . .. minimal hypoglycemia risk.” (Tr. at 41, 483.) Plaintiff reported
“several episodes of hypoglycemia” over the past 3 months, but there were no incidents of
sevete hypoglycemia requiring intervention with glucagon. (Tr. at 483, 484.) The pump was
7 These records and the records from the prior six months note concern that Plaintiff was “frequently stacking
insulin” (Tr. at 440), and that “[h]is parents endorse numerous bolus modifications due to his current settings
resulting in ‘lows,’ however this is often when he is not actually <70 mg/dl. We discussed the likelihood that
be prematurely correcting for potential lows, and thus keeping his glucose mote elevated than necessary” (Tr.
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adjusted and Plaintiff was again cautioned against dose modifications and multiple doses. (T'.
at 41, 486.) During the remainder of 2020 and into 2021, Plaintiff continued management of
his diabetes. (Ir. at 42.) Medical records are similar, with a visit in September 2020 reflecting
no episodes of severe hypoglycemia requiring intervention with glucagon, data from his
monitoring device showing “fair control .. . with minimal hypoglycemia risk,” and a report of
only “occasional episodes of hypoglycemia” over the past nine months. (Tr. at 522-23.) The
ALJ noted that at the next visit in January 2021, Plaintiff reported that he worked with his
father at a lumber yard several days per week, and his pump had been adjusted to avoid related
lows, with good results. (Tr. at 42,517.) That treatment record similarly reflects no instances
of severe hypoglycemia requiring intervention with glucagon, with only occasional episodes of
hypoglycemia since the last visit. (I'r. at 517.) Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs present assertions,
the medical record, reviewed at length by the ALJ, does not support his claim of multiple
instances of hypoglycemia per day, and instead reflects only occasional instances of
hypoglycemia overt a period of months, even while Plaintiff was working, exercising, and doing
yatd work, and no instances of severe hypoglycemia, and only minimal risk of hypoglycemia
based on the data from his monitoring device.
The ALJ also relied on the opinion evidence from Dr. Meyers, the medical expert
selected by the AL] to provide further information regarding the impact of Plaintiffs
impairments on his functioning. Dr. Meyers stated in his responses to the medical
interrogatories that “the onset of [Plaintiffs] diabetes was at a very young age,” and that “[i]t
is well known that in these cases, the diabetes is ‘brittle’ and more difficult to control.” (Tr. at
512.) However, neither Dr. Meyers nor any other medical practitioner further opined that
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Plaintiff required additional breaks or time off task to account for diabetes complications. Dr.
Meyets specifically found no limitation in Plaintiffs ability to acquire and use information, no
limitation in his ability to attend and complete tasks, no limitation in interacting and relating
with others, and no limitation in caring for himself. (I'r. at 48, 510-11.)
In assessing the RFC, the AL] acknowledged that objective treatment records indicated
vatiable control of Plaintiffs diabetes with periods of “poor” management despite the use of
an insulin pump and glucose monitoring. (Tr. at 51.) He therefore found Plaintiff limited to
sedentary work, standing and walking no more than 2 hours per day, with further manipulative,
postural, and environmental limitations, including no exposure to extreme heat and no
exposute to workplace hazards. (Tr. at 50, 51.) The ALJ also determined that the severity of
Plaintiffs diabetes did not result in the need for additional breaks beyond normal breaks, time-
off task or away from the work station, or absenteeism. (Tr. at 51.) In assessing the
impairments, the ALJ relied on the record, which he discussed at length as noted above
regarding Plaintiffs reports to his doctors, the data from Plaintiffs glucose monitoring device,
and the assessment of the doctors, and the ALJ also specifically pointed to the lack of any
hospitalization or urgent care or emergency visits, the lack of any changes to Plaintiffs diet or
lifestyle, the opinion of Dr. Meyers, and Plaintiffs activities of daily living. (Tr. at 49-50.) The
Court finds that, by discussing and relying on all the above evidence, the ALJ provided “a
logical explanation of how [he] weighed the record evidence and arrived at [his] RFC findings.”
Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019). In doing so, the ALJ met the “narrative
discussion requirements” set out in SSR 96-8p by explaining how the evidence was resolved,
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and finding that Plaintiffs symptoms, including the symptoms related to hypoglycemia, were
not as frequent, intense, persistent, or limiting as Plaintiff alleged.
To the extent that Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to reconsider that conclusion and
te-weigh the evidence presented, it is not the function of this Court to re-weigh the evidence
ot reconsider the AL]’s determinations if they ate supported by substantial evidence. As noted
above, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant
is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472
(internal brackets and quotation omitted). Thus, the issue before the Court is not whether a
different fact-finder could have drawn a different conclusion, or even “whether [Plaintiff] is
disabled,” but rather, “whether the AL]’s finding that [plaintiff] is not disabled is supported
by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a cortect application of the relevant law.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. Here, the ALJ reviewed the evidence and explained his conclusion in a
lengthy, detailed decision. That determination is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Plaintiffs Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner should therefore be
denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision finding no
disability is AFFIRMED, that Plaintiffs Dispositive Brief [Doc. #15] is DENIED, that
Defendant’s Dispositive Brief [Doc. #17] is GRANTED, and that this action is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
This, the 10 day of April, 2025.
Last 7
nited States Magistrate Judge
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