finding the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the defendant to submit a joint discovery plan because a potentially immune defendant should not be subject to litigation “beyond the point at which immunity is asserted”
How later courts described this case
- finding the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the defendant to submit a joint discovery plan because a potentially immune defendant should not be subject to litigation “beyond the point at which immunity is asserted”
- “The defense of sovereign or qualified immunity protects government officials not only from having to stand trial, but from having to bear the burdens attendant to litigation, including pretrial discovery.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ANDREW BRYANT SHEETS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:24-cv-958-JES-KCD
v.
CHARLOTTE COUNTY, TONY
PRIBBLE, SUPERVISOR OF
SECURITY; IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY;
LINDA ARMSTRONG,
SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS; IN
THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY;
JULIE SEARGENT, IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY;
ROBERT CESTARO, IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY;
WEISER SECURITY, IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY; and
MATTHEW ROEPSTORFF, IN
THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY;
Defendants.
/
ORDER
Plaintiff Andrew Bryant Sheets sues a host of defendants under the First
Amendment. (See Doc. 35.) His claims stem from an incident where he
“attempt[ed] to record … the closing of [voting] polls at” the Charlotte County
library but was trespassed. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.)
Several individual Defendants (Pribble, Cestaro, Flores) have moved to
dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 53.) They now ask
the Court to stay discovery while their motion awaits disposition. (Doc. 101.)1
Sheets responded in opposition. (Doc. 102.) For the reasons below, the motion
is granted in part and denied in part.
“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a court may, for good
cause, issue a protective order staying discovery pending resolution of a
dispositive motion.” Caicedo v. DeSantis, No. 6:23-CV-2303-JSS-RMN, 2024
WL 1579675, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2024).2 But staying discovery is the
exception, not the rule. See Middle District Discovery Handbook (2021) at 5.
The pendency of a dispositive motion “will not justify a unilateral motion to
stay discovery pending [its] resolution.” Id.
Rather, “a stay should be granted only where the motion to dismiss
appears, upon preliminary review, to be clearly meritorious and truly case
dispositive.” Garvin v. Effingham Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. CV423-337, 2024 WL
2092990, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 7, 2024). This is because “[d]elays in discovery
1 This document is not paginated, so the Court refers to the page numbers generated by
CM/ECF.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have
been omitted in this and later citations.
can create case management problems which impede the Court’s responsibility
to expedite discovery and cause unnecessary litigation expenses and
problems.” Caicedo, 2024 WL 1579675, at *1.
Also relevant here, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that claims of
immunity often call for protection from discovery because subjecting officials
to traditional discovery for acts where they are immune would undercut the
protection immunity was meant to afford. See Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing,
LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The defense of sovereign or
qualified immunity protects government officials not only from having to stand
trial, but from having to bear the burdens attendant to litigation, including
pretrial discovery.”); Overcash v. Shelnutt, 753 F. App’x 741, 746 (11th Cir.
2018) (“The very purpose of the immunity defenses raised by the judicial and
officer defendants is to protect them from having to bear the burdens attendant
to litigation.”); Howe v. City of Enter., 861 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2017)
(finding the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the defendant to
submit a joint discovery plan because a potentially immune defendant should
not be subject to litigation “beyond the point at which immunity is asserted”).
Because the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss raises serious
questions about the viability of the complaint that must be resolved before they
are burdened with discovery and other pretrial obligations, a stay is
appropriate. (Doc. 53.) If the individual Defendants are indeed entitled to
qualified immunity, their motion to dismiss will dispose of Sheets’ entire case
against them and moot any discovery.
Sheets’ arguments about the need for discovery do not sway the Court to
break step with the Eleventh Circuit. Further, Sheets has already responded
to the motions to dismiss without discovery. (Doc. 68.) And lastly, when ruling
on a motion to dismiss, the Court considers only the complaint and any other
judicially noticed facts. Discovery is simply unnecessary for the Court to decide
the issues now before it.
Charlotte County has also joined the motion to stay discovery. But the
County is not entitled to qualified immunity and its tangential protections. All
things considered, the Court will not stop discovery for the County because it
remains a viable defendant without immunity. See Ratliff v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga.,
62 F.3d 338, 340 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995).
Charlotte County alternatively seeks to limit discovery under Federal
Rule 26(b)(2)(C). (Doc. 101 at 9-14.) It notes that Sheets has already served
over 200 discovery requests, many of which are improper. (Id. at 10-11, 14.)
The Court “on motion or on its own” must limit discovery when: “(i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain
the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is
outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). “In
short, a district court may limit discovery when the burden of compliance
outweighs its likely benefit or relevance.” Pinehaven Plantation Properties,
LLC v. Mountcastle Fam. LLC, No. 1:12-CV-62 WLS, 2013 WL 6734117, at *1
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2013).
The request to limit discovery is also denied. The County has not
addressed the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) factors, nor does it provide the Court with
enough information to understand what limitation it wants (i.e., a specific
number of admissions or requests for production). The County may move to
quash or limit specific discovery requests to address concerns about the
breadth of discovery.
Two final issues. First, there is no excuse for Sheets’ vulgar language
towards opposing counsel in his written communications. (See Docs. 101-9,
101-10.) This will stop, or the Court will consider sanctions. Second,
Defendants accuse Sheets of using AI to generate discovery responses. (Doc.
101-10.) Though the use of AI platforms is not itself problematic, Sheets must
ensure that he vets any factual and legal references generated by AI.
For these reasons, it is ORDERED:
1. Defendants Charlotte County, Anthony Pribble, Robert Cestaro, and
Hector Flores’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 101) is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART.
2. Discovery and the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
as to Defendants Pribble, Cestaro, and Flores are stayed pending a
decision on whether this case will be dismissed. (Doc. 53.) Discovery
is not stayed as to Charlotte County.
3. Charlotte County’s alternative request to limit discovery is denied
without prejudice.
ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 9, 2025.
Z en Lo Le
* Kale C. Dudek
United States Magistrate Judge