The opinion
Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 200
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-23-464
Opinion Delivered April 9, 2025
MORRIS KOONTZ
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
TWELFTH DIVISION
V.
[NO. 60CV-21-5262]
DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, HONORABLE CARA CONNORS,
ARKANSAS DIVISION OF JUDGE
CORRECTION; DALE REED, DEPUTY
AFFIRMED
DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DIVISION OF
CORRECTION; WILLIAM
STRAUGHN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
ARKANSAS DIVISION OF
CORRECTION; RANDY WATSON,
WARDEN, ARKANSAS DIVISION OF
CORRECTION; JEREMY ANDREWS,
DEPUTY WARDEN, ARKANSAS
DIVISION OF CORRECTION;
GAYLON LAY, WARDEN, ARKANSAS
DIVISION OF CORRECTION; JAMES
DYCUS, DEPUTY WARDEN,
ARKANSAS DIVISION OF
CORRECTION; AND ANTHONY
JACKSON, DEPUTY WARDEN,
ARKANSAS DIVISION OF
CORRECTION
APPELLEES
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge
Pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
123-105 (Repl. 2016), Morris Koontz filed a pro se civil-rights complaint in the Pulaski
County Circuit Court against the following employees of the Arkansas Division of
Correction (ADC) in their official and individual capacities: Dexter Payne, director; Dale
Reed, deputy director; William Straughn, deputy director; Randy Watson, warden; Jeremy
Andrews, deputy warden; Gaylon Lay, warden; James Dycus, deputy warden; and Anthony
Jackson, deputy warden. In his complaint, Koontz alleged that appellees violated his
constitutional rights in connection with ADC’s restrictive-housing-review process and state
statutory law authorizing confiscation of inmates’ federal COVID-19 stimulus financial aid
and requested declaratory relief along with money damages, penalties, and fees. The circuit
court granted appellees’ motion and dismissed Koontz’s complaint. On appeal, Koontz
argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint. We affirm.
I. Standard of Review
The standard of review for the granting of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit
court abused its discretion. Muntaqim v. Kelley, 2022 Ark. App. 76, at 2, 641 S.W.3d 35, 40.
An abuse of discretion occurs when the court has acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or
without due consideration. Id. In reviewing the circuit court’s decision on a motion to
dismiss under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged in the
operative complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed
the complaint. Id. In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all
reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to
be liberally construed. Id. However, under our fact-pleading requirement, a complaint must
state facts, not mere conclusions, to entitle the pleader to relief. Id.
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II. Background
Koontz is an inmate incarcerated at the East Arkansas Regional Max Unit of the
ADC. On September 10, 2021, he filed a pro se civil-rights complaint asserting constitutional
violations relating to ADC’s restrictive-housing-review process and state law governing the
confiscation of state inmates’ federal COVID-19 stimulus funds—namely, Act 1110 of 2021
(codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 12-29-120 (Supp. 2023)). Appellees sought dismissal of the
complaint on several bases, including (1) sovereign immunity; (2) statutory immunity; (3)
failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6); and (4) a permanent injunction entered by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas enjoining ADC from using or disbursing inmates’ federal
stimulus funds in any manner other than “to pay off an inmate’s court fines, fees, costs, or
restitution pursuant to Act 1110” and requiring ADC to reimburse inmates any funds
remaining that had not been used for these limited purposes.1 Additionally, they submitted
1
Following the passage of Act 1110 of 2021, numerous Arkansas state inmates filed
lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas challenging
the Act on various constitutional and statutory grounds. The federal court consolidated the
cases and designated three as “appropriate and representative test cases[.]” See Hayes v. Graves,
No. 4:21-CV-00347-LPR, 2022 WL 822881, (E.D. Ark. Mar. 16, 2022); Lamar v. Hutchinson,
No. 4:21-CV-00529-LPR (E.D. Ark.); Holloway v. Ark. Gen. Assembly, No. 4:21-CV-00495-LPR
(E.D. Ark.). The plaintiffs in those cases argued, inter alia, that enforcement of Act 1110
violates the Takings Clause, procedural due process, and substantive due process. On
September 3, 2021, the federal court entered a preliminary injunction significantly limiting
the circumstances in which state prison officials could take and redirect the stimulus funds
sent to prisoners. On March 16, 2022, the court entered a final order and judgment,
including a permanent injunction, in the test cases and ordered the administrative
termination of all the other cases, finding that its final order and judgment “likely address[ed]
or moot[ed] most of the other cases.”
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documentary proof showing that (1) on May 28, 2021, ADC deposited federal stimulus
funds issued to Koontz (a total of $1,400) into an “Act 1110 Stimulus Funds Account”; (2)
on August 19, 2021, ADC sent $790 of Koontz’s federal stimulus funds to Hempstead
County to pay off Koontz’s pending fines, fees, and court costs; and (3) on March 18, 2022,
ADC deposited the balance of Koontz’s federal stimulus funds ($610) into Koontz’s inmate
account. Following a hearing, the circuit court dismissed Koontz’s Act 1110 claims without
prejudice. Koontz filed an amended complaint, but he did not request any specific type of
relief. The circuit court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss “based upon sovereign
immunity as Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is unclear as to the relief being sought” and
allowed Koontz three weeks to file an amended complaint.
On November 14, 2022, Koontz filed a second amended complaint—the operative
complaint in this case. In the complaint, he claimed that both Act 1110 of 2021 and Act
715 of 1981, commonly known as the State Prison Inmate Care and Custody
Reimbursement Act (codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-29-501 to -507, formerly Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 46-1701), are unconstitutional. He asserted that Act 1110, unlike Act 715, “allows
the state to take money without any process” and alleged that “Defendants took [his] stimulus
check without his consent and this check is his property.” He asserted that Act 715
“enhances the punishment on a person convicted of a crime . . . by allowing the state to take
money from a prisoner for his care and custody but the state provides no means for a prisoner
to pay for this care and custody.” He also claimed that he was denied due process in
connection with ADC’s restrictive-housing-review process. He asserted that the conditions
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of his confinement in restrictive housing for an “aggregate of 10 ½ years” impose an atypical
and significant hardship on him, creating a liberty interest protected by due process, and he
alleged that appellees denied him the process he was due by providing “sham” reviews of his
restrictive-housing assignment.
From a review of the operative complaint, Koontz’s civil-rights action is based on the
following alleged facts. Koontz was placed in punitive isolation at the Tucker Max Unit after
receiving a disciplinary sanction “for assault on staff” in June 2012. He was subsequently
transferred to the Varner Supermax Unit and told that he had to complete an eighteen-
month behavior-modification program before he could be released back into the general
prison population. He completed the eighteen-month program in January 2014 and was
assigned to administrative segregation until he was transferred to the East Arkansas Regional
Max Unit in March 2016.
In December 2016 or January 2017, he was told by Deputy Director Dale Reed,
Deputy Warden James Dycus, and Unit Warden Jeremy Andrews that he would be required
to complete a step-down program before he could be released into the general prison
population from restrictive housing. In October 2017, the step-down program at the East
Arkansas Regional Max Unit “was suspended and everyone assigned placed on lockdown.”
Koontz was then transferred to the Ester Unit in Pine Bluff and placed in the general prison
population. After a classification hearing at the Ester Unit, “Unit Warden Moses Jackson
immediately had [him] transferred back” to the East Arkansas Regional Max Unit and “put
back on lockdown without any disciplinary sanction.”
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Koontz alleged in the complaint that he has been assigned to either administrative
segregation or restrictive housing for an aggregate of over ten years, and “[a]ll classification
reviews have been sham proceedings because [his] status is already predetermined before he
is seen.” He “was told at Classification Committee hearings and via unit mail that the Unit
Classification Committee had no authority to release [him]” into the general prison
population; and “release could only come thru director or ADC management team.”
According to Koontz, he “only saw the director once a year and ADC management team
never,” and at his housing review hearings, “he is only told to remain and no reason given.”
Koontz further alleged that since the filing of the complaint, appellees “have continuously
implemented” the following punishments: (1) restriction to only two showers a week and six
recreation/yard calls and ten shaves/haircuts since October 1, 2021; (2) imposition of
twenty-four-hour restrictions on out-of-cell time for weeks at a time since January 1, 2022;
and (3) not replacing his cup, shoes, and spoon on a consistent basis.
On December 15, 2022, appellees moved to dismiss and strike Koontz’s second
amended complaint pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). After a March 29,
2023 hearing, the circuit court granted appellees’ motion and entered an order dismissing
Koontz’s claims as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s claims related to Act 1110 of 2021 are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The constitutionality and applicability of Act 1110 have been
determined by litigation in the federal courts of Arkansas. And consistent with
this Court’s rulings on Plaintiff’s Complaint and First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief as to Act 1110 in his Second Amended
Complaint.
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2. Plaintiff’s claims related to Act 715 of 1981 are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. Act 715 has been upheld as constitutional by the Arkansas
Supreme Court. And Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief as to Act 715 in
his Second Amended Complaint.
3. Plaintiff’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. At the hearing, Plaintiff couched some of
his allegations in terms of an administrative appeal. But the Second Amended
Complaint does not refer to the Administrative Procedure Act by name or
description. Nor does the Second Amended Complaint identify an
adjudication that Plaintiff, as an inmate in the custody of the Arkansas
Division of Correction, could have appealed. Plaintiff has therefore not stated
a claim for relief as to the Administrative Procedure Act in his Second
Amended Complaint.
4. Plaintiff’s remaining claims, which demand damages, penalties, and
costs, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because defendants are state
officials or employees, sovereign immunity bars such claims against
Defendants in their official capacities. And the Second Amended Complaint
makes generalized, conclusory allegations against Defendants in their personal
capacities. This fails to state a claim for relief sufficient to overcome statutory
immunity under Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-305.
III. Sovereign and Statutory Immunity
Sovereign immunity for the State of Arkansas arises from an express declaration in
article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. Muntaqim, 2022 Ark. App. 76, at 6, 641
S.W.3d at 42. A suit against the State is barred by the sovereign-immunity doctrine if a
judgment for the plaintiff will operate to control the action of the State or subject the State
to liability. Id. Because sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit, jurisdiction
must be determined entirely from the pleadings. Id. at 2, 641 S.W.3d at 40. When the
pleadings show that the action is one against the State, the circuit court acquires no
jurisdiction. Swanigan v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 2014 Ark. 196, at 2. In determining whether
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sovereign immunity applies, the decisive question is whether a judgment for the plaintiff will
operate to control the action of the State or subject the State to liability. Fegans v. Norris, 351
Ark. 200, 206, 89 S.W.3d 919, 924 (2002) (per curiam). If so, the suit is one against the State
and is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id.
The sovereign-immunity doctrine applies to state agencies and state employees sued
in their official capacities. Muntaqim, 2022 Ark. App. 76, at 7, 641 S.W.3d at 42. This is
because a suit against a state employee in his or her official capacity is essentially a suit against
that official’s agency and, as such, is no different than a suit against the State itself. Id. at 6,
641 S.W.3d at 42. A claim of sovereign immunity may be surmounted, however, if the state
agency is acting illegally, and this court has long recognized that a state agency or officer may
be enjoined from an action that is ultra vires. Id. at 7, 641 S.W.3d at 42. But the scope of
these limited exceptions to sovereign immunity does not extend to claims for monetary
damages. Id., 641 S.W.3d at 42; see also Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Harris, 2020 Ark. 30, at
3–4, 592 S.W.3d 670, 673 (“[W]e have not recognized an exception to sovereign immunity
for unconstitutional acts or acts that are ultra vires, arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith when
a plaintiff seeks monetary damages.”). An exception to sovereign immunity, moreover, is not
exempt from the court’s fact-pleading requirement. Harmon v. Payne, 2020 Ark. 17, at 4, 592
S.W.3d 619, 623. The complaint must plead sufficient facts establishing an unconstitutional
or unlawful act that would avoid application of sovereign immunity. Id.; see also Ark. Dep’t of
Fin. & Admin. v. 2600 Holdings, LLC, 2022 Ark. 140, at 7, 646 S.W.3d 99, 103 (“A lawsuit
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against the State seeking declaratory relief may survive a sovereign-immunity challenge only
if the complaint alleges that the State acted illegally, unconstitutionally, or ultra vires.”).
With respect to individual state actors, Arkansas Code Annotated section 19-10-
305(a) (Repl. 2016) provides state officials and employees with statutory immunity from civil
liability and from suit for nonmalicious acts made within the course and scope of their
employment. In determining whether state actors are entitled to statutory immunity, the
court has traditionally been guided by the federal standard for qualified immunity.
Muntaqim, 2022 Ark. App. 76, at 7, 641 S.W.3d at 42. Under that standard, a state official
is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the plaintiff has alleged facts that demonstrate
the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation such that a reasonable official would have known that his
actions were unlawful. Id. Our supreme court has said that individual state actors are entitled
to statutory immunity unless they transgress “clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harmon, 2020 Ark. 17, at 5, 592
S.W.3d at 623 (citation omitted). To counter a defense of statutory immunity, the complaint
also must allege sufficient facts to support a claim that the state officer or employee acted
with malicious intent. Id.; see also Rutledge v. Remmel, 2022 Ark. 86, at 7, 643 S.W.3d 5, 9–
10 (defining malice as “intent and disposition to do a wrongful act greatly injurious to
another”).
ACRA imposes liability when state officials acting under color of state law deprive
persons of their rights under the Arkansas Constitution. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105(a)
9
(Repl. 2016). In construing ACRA, this court may look for guidance to state and federal
decisions interpreting the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Muntaqim v. Payne,
2021 Ark. 162, at 5, 628 S.W.3d 629, 635. To state a claim under ACRA, a prisoner must
plead that the state official, through his or her own individual actions, violated the
constitution. Id. at 10, 628 S.W.3d at 638. “A bare allegation that someone in supervisory
authority has been deliberately indifferent without any specification of that person’s contact
in fact with the prisoner or even an explicit charge of inadequate training or supervision of
subordinates is not sufficient[.]” Id.
Koontz’s constitutional claims for monetary damages against appellees in their official
capacities are claims against the State and are therefore barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. See Muntaqim v. Payne, 2024 Ark. App. 455, at 11. Accordingly, we hold that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing those claims. Koontz also seeks
declaratory relief against appellees in their official capacities, and he has asserted that
appellees in their individual capacities violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, we must
determine whether Koontz pleaded facts relating to his constitutional claims upon which
relief can be granted, which will include the consideration of whether he pleaded facts
sufficient to demonstrate that appellees acted “ultra vires.” With respect to Koontz’s
individual-capacity claims, we must determine whether he has alleged facts that demonstrate
appellees, acting with malicious intent, transgressed “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harmon, 2020 Ark.
17, at 5, 592 S.W.3d at 623 (citation omitted).
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IV. Housing Review
Koontz claims that he was denied due process in connection with ADC’s policy and
procedures relating to periodic review of his assignment to various forms of restrictive
housing.2 Prisoners have a constitutional right to receive due process during prison
proceedings only if they implicate a liberty interest. Muntaqim, 2024 Ark. App. 455, at 14.
Prison policy and procedures do not create a liberty interest to which due process can attach.
Id. Rather, any alleged liberty interest must be an interest in the nature of the prisoner’s
confinement, not an interest in the procedures by which the State believes it can best
determine how a prisoner should be confined. Id.; see also Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d
640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (there is no federal constitutional liberty interest in having state
officers follow state law or having prison officials follow prison regulations). Accordingly, to
maintain an action for deprivation of a right to due process, the prisoner, as a threshold
matter, “must show an atypical and substantive deprivation that was a dramatic departure
from the basic conditions of his confinement.” Muntaqim, 2024 Ark. 455, at 14 (citation
omitted). To do so, the prisoner must allege facts sufficient to “show some difference
between his new conditions” and the basic conditions of his confinement which amounts to
2
According to Koontz’s allegations, he has been transferred between multiple units
with varying levels of security, including a brief placement in the general prison population
at one of these units, and he has spent much time assigned to a restrictive housing step-down
program, which, among other things, gradually increases participants’ out-of-cell time and
other privileges. Koontz submitted documents below showing that in November 2017, the
Classification Committee approved his placement in Level IV of the step-down program, the
highest level within the program imposing the least restrictions.
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an atypical and significant hardship. Smith v. McKinney, 954 F.3d 1075, 1082 (8th Cir. 2020).
The duration and degree of restrictions bear on whether a change in conditions imposes
such a hardship. Spann v. Lombardi, 65 F.4th 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2023).
While Koontz asserts that the duration of his assignment to restrictive housing and
restrictions on his out-of-cell time, exercise, showers, shaves/haircuts, and personal
possessions impose an atypical and significant hardship sufficient to create a liberty interest
protected by due process, his due-process claim is not based on a change in the conditions of
his confinement. He does not assert any constitutional deprivation with respect to his initial
placement in restrictive housing.3 Instead, he contends that the periodic housing-assignment
reviews he has received were not meaningful in that he was told by unspecified individuals
that only the director could authorize his transfer to general population from restrictive
housing and was not provided with any reason for the continuation of his assignment to
restrictive housing. Even assuming for the sake of analysis that Koontz enjoyed a liberty
interest vis-à-vis his continued assignment to restrictive housing, his complaint fails to plead
3
Koontz previously sought judicial review of ADC’s actions and procedures relating
to his major disciplinary convictions for, among others, “rape or forced sexual assault with
staff or person of another inmate” and “assault-any willful attempt or threat(s) to inflict injury
upon staff,” which resulted in his classification as an inmate subject to ADC’s Prison Rape
Elimination Act (“PREA”) policy and transfer and placement in administrative segregation
at the Varner Supermax Unit in June 2012, as well as a subsequent determination that he
“would remain in administrative segregation based on his status as a sexual predator.” Koontz
v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 232, at 2–3 (per curiam).
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sufficient facts to state a claim against appellees for the denial of his constitutional right to
due process.
In the context of a prisoner’s placement in segregated confinement, only informal,
non-adversary due-process procedures are required. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229
(2005). Informal due process requires that an inmate be given notice of the reasons for his
placement in segregated confinement, an opportunity to present his views to a neutral
decisionmaker, and periodic review of his placement in segregated confinement. Spann, 65
F.4th at 992. Further, the Eighth Circuit has held that there is no clearly established
constitutional right to adequate justification for continued placement in segregated
confinement. See Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1179–80 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding that
prisoner failed to identify any “circuit precedent holding that an inadequate justification for
administrative segregation or shortcomings in review of a prisoner’s placement violate the
Due Process Clause”). Taking Koontz’s allegations as true, as we must, the procedures
afforded to him with respect to periodic review of his restrictive housing were adequate under
the informal-due-process standard. See Spann, 65 F.4th at 992–93 (periodic-review
requirement satisfied by assessing prisoner’s status in administrative segregation every ninety
days).
Additionally, as appellees note, Koontz’s complaint mentions only four defendants
by name, alleging that “[i]n December 2016 January 2017, [Koontz] was told by Deputy
Director Dale Reed[,] then Deputy Warden James Dycus[,] and unit Warden Jeremy
Andrews that [he] would have to complete re-entry/step-down program” before he could be
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released from restrictive housing. The complaint also alleges that in “October 2017,” Koontz
was transferred from the East Arkansas Regional Max Unit to the Ester Unit, placed in
general population, and transferred back to restrictive housing at the East Arkansas Regional
Max Unit the “same day” by Deputy Warden Anthony Jackson. The alleged statements by
appellees Reed, Dycus, and Andrews that Koontz would have to complete required prison
programming do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Irving v. Dormire, 519
F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008) (generally, even verbal threats are insufficient to violate the
constitution). Nor does the mere allegation that appellee Jackson transferred Koontz back to
the East Arkansas Regional Max Unit in 2017. See Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th
Cir. 1993) (an inmate may be transferred “for whatever reason or for no reason at all,” so
long as retaliation for exercise of a constitutional right was not the actual motivating factor).
Koontz failed to state sufficient factual allegations that any appellee was personally involved
in actions that could amount to a constitutional due-process violation and therefore also
failed to allege any acts that were malicious or that violated a clearly established
constitutional right. Because Koontz’s complaint does not allege sufficient facts to state a
due-process claim and, similarly, fails to sufficiently plead an exception to sovereign
immunity and to preclude statutory immunity, we hold that the circuit court’s dismissal of
his restrictive-housing claim was not an abuse of discretion.
V. Federal Stimulus Funds
Koontz argues that the taking of his federal stimulus funds “without notice, hearing,
or any other process” deems Act 1110 of 2021 unconstitutional. As with his restrictive-
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housing claim, Koontz failed to allege that any appellee was personally involved in actions
with respect to enforcement of Act 1110 vis-à-vis his federal stimulus funds. See Muntaqim,
2021 Ark. 162, at 10, 628 S.W.3d at 638 (a bare allegation that a prison official has been
deliberately indifferent without any specification of that person’s contact in fact with the
prisoner is insufficient to state a claim). The circuit court, therefore, properly dismissed
Koontz’s complaint against appellees for failure to state facts upon which relief can be
granted.
Moreover, as the circuit court acknowledged, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas has addressed and resolved the constitutional issue relating to
Act 1110, concluding, inter alia, that there is no unconstitutional taking when prisoners’
stimulus funds are used to pay off their existing court fines, fees, costs, or restitution. See
Hayes v. Graves, No. 4:21-CV-347-LPR, 2022 WL 822881, at *6. In its final order, the federal
court entered a permanent injunction, covering “all prisoners to whom Act 1110 applied,
applies, or could apply[,]” as follows:
1. The Court orders Defendants to return any confiscated federal relief or
stimulus funds currently held in the sequestered account that are not being
used to pay off a prisoner’s court fines, fees, costs, or restitution.
Defendants have 90 days from the date of this Order to return such funds
to the prisoner or former prisoner from whom those funds were
confiscated.
2. Defendants may continue to collect prisoners’ federal relief or stimulus
funds pursuant to Act 1110 so long as the confiscated funds are deposited
into the sequestered account. Otherwise, the confiscation may not occur.
For any future confiscations of federal relief or stimulus funds, Defendants
will have 90 days from the date of confiscation to determine whether a
prisoner has existing court fines, fees, costs, or restitution. Defendants may
15
use the confiscated funds to pay off existing court fines, fees, costs, or
restitution. However, on or before the 90th day, Defendants must return
to the prisoner or former prisoner any confiscated funds that are in excess
of the identified court fines, fees, costs, or restitution.
3. Defendants shall continue to maintain specific and detailed records of: (a)
which prisoner’s federal relief or stimulus funds have been deposited into
the sequestered account; (b) how much of each prisoner’s federal relief or
stimulus funds have been deposited into the sequestered account; and (c)
how much of each prisoner’s federal relief or stimulus funds in the
sequestered account have been used to pay court fines, fees, costs, or
restitution.
4. When a prisoner or former prisoner has federal stimulus or relief funds in
excess of his or her identified court fines, fees, costs, or restitution, and
Defendants return the excess funds to the prisoner or former prisoner,
Defendants must provide that prisoner or former prisoner with
documentation detailing: (a) the date or dates the federal relief or stimulus
funds were confiscated; (b) the amount of confiscated funds used to pay
court fines, fees, costs, or restitution; (c) the amount of confiscated funds
that have been returned; and (d) the date the confiscated funds were
returned.
5. Defendants may not otherwise use in any manner or disburse the federal
relief or stimulus funds in the sequestered account. This includes, but is in
no way limited to, placing any confiscated federal relief or stimulus funds
into an inmate welfare fund or the Division of Correction Inmate Care
and Custody Fund Account.
Id. at *12–13.
The record in this case shows that ADC correctly applied Act 1110, in compliance
with the federal court’s permanent injunction, to Koontz’s federal stimulus funds.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court’s dismissal of Koontz’s Act 1110 claim was not
an abuse of discretion.
VI. The State Prison Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement Act
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Koontz argues that Act 715 of 1981, commonly known as the State Prison Inmate
Care and Custody Reimbursement Act (codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-29-501 to -507
(Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2023), formerly Ark. Stat. Ann. § 46-1701), allows the State to take
funds that inmates receive from gifts and inheritances to pay for their housing, but the State
does not pay inmates for the work they perform in the State’s prisons. The court properly
dismissed Koontz’s claim because his complaint states purely conclusory allegations. Koontz
did not allege that any appellee was personally involved in actions with respect to Act 715.
Nor did he allege that the Act was, or even might be, applied to him. His conclusory
allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Additionally, as the circuit court noted in its order, our supreme court has
consistently upheld the constitutionality of Act 715. See MacKool v. State, 2012 Ark. 287, at
6, 423 S.W.3d 28, 32 (upholding Act 715 on multiple grounds, including equal protection);
see also Burns v. State, 303 Ark. 64, 66–70, 793 S.W.2d 779, 780–82 (1990) (holding that Act
715 does not violate petitioner’s “due process or equal protection rights,” is not “an ex post
facto law, as it is not focused on the crimes committed by [the petitioner], nor is it additional
punishment,” and does not constitute a bill of attainder). Accordingly, we hold that the
circuit court’s dismissal was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
THYER and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Morris Koontz, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Noah Watson, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
17