Sibley v. City of Lakeland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LABLANCA SIBLEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2853-VMC-AEP

CITY OF LAKELAND,

NICHOLAS S. RIGGALL,

POLK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

JOHN DOES #1-10, and

JOHN DOES #11-20,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on consideration of

Defendants City of Lakeland, Polk County Sheriff’s Office,

John Does #1-20, and Nicholas S. Riggall’s Motion to Dismiss

Amended Complaint (Doc. # 35), filed on March 12, 2025.

Plaintiff LaBlanca Sibley responded on April 2, 2025. (Doc.

# 41). The Motion is granted as set forth below.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on

December 10, 2024, asserting claims arising from her arrest

and detention. (Doc. # 1). Defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint as a shotgun complaint and on the merits. (Doc. #

19). The Court granted the motion because the complaint was

a shotgun complaint but granted leave to amend. (Doc. # 21).

Although the Court did not address the merits arguments, the

Court “advise[d] Plaintiff to closely review all issues

raised in the motion to dismiss, including the inclusion of

John Doe defendants and the naming of the Polk County

Sheriff’s Office as a defendant, before amending the

complaint.” (Id.). The Court also advised that “Plaintiff

should be sure to specify in the amended complaint against

which Defendant or Defendants each count is brought.” (Id.).

On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed her amended

complaint, asserting four Section 1983 claims for excessive

force (Count I), false arrest (Count II), bodily integrity

(Count III), and for municipal liability (Count IV). (Doc. #

23). The amended complaint continues to name the Polk County

Sheriff’s Office and multiple John Does as Defendants. (Id.).

No count clearly specifies against which Defendants it is

brought and it does not appear that any count is actually

asserted against the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. (Id.).

The amended complaint contains the following factual

allegations. Plaintiff is an African-American woman living in

the City of Lakeland, in Polk County, Florida. (Id. at 3).

“On or around December 12, 2022, at approximately 12:41am,

Defendant Riggall” — a police officer employed by the City of

Lakeland — “arrives at ‘T-Bows 33 Lounge’ located at 4106

Lakeland Hills Boulevard, Lakeland, Florida (‘the

Establishment’), in response to a reported physical

alteration.” (Id. at 3-4).

“Upon arriving at the Establishment, Defendant Riggall

is approached by a reported victim of the physical alteration,

who tells him that an ‘unknown black female’ started a

physical altercation and then fled the area southbound on

Lakeland Hills Boulevard.” (Id. at 5). “At or about the same

time, Plaintiff is present in the parking lot of the

Establishment waiting for a Lyft driver to pick her up and

take her home.” (Id.). “Defendant Riggall approaches

Plaintiff in the parking lot of the Establishment and tells

her that he is a law enforcement officer.” (Id.). “Plaintiff

informs Defendant Riggall that she is unaware of the alleged

altercation within the Establishment and is not from the area

(Plaintiff, at the time, was living in Arizona) and proceeded

to walk past Defendant Riggall.” (Id.).

“Defendant Riggall does not inform Plaintiff that she is

being detained, is under arrest, or is otherwise required to

speak with him.” (Id.). “As Plaintiff walks past Defendant

Riggall, Defendant Riggall forcefully grabs Plaintiff’s arm.”

(Id.). “Surprised and scared for her safety, Plaintiff pulls

her arm away from Defendant Riggall.” (Id.). “Defendant

Riggall again grabs Plaintiff’s arm, forcibly bending and

torquing it behind her back and slamming her body against the

back of a police cruiser.” (Id.).

“Defendant Riggall then places Plaintiff in the back of

the police cruiser.” (Id.). “At this point, Plaintiff was

offered no explanation as to why she was forcibly detained

and placed in the back of a police cruiser.” (Id. at 6).

“Plaintiff pleads with the officers to explain why she is

being detained, and states that she has done nothing wrong.”

(Id.). “While handcuffed in the back of the police cruiser,

Defendant Riggall maces Plaintiff in the face without

justification.” (Id.).

“Plaintiff is then transported to Polk County Jail for

booking. Upon her arrival at the Polk County Jail, Defendant

Riggall and/or John Does #1-10 and/or John Does #11-20 remove

Plaintiff’s shirt and place her into a holding room for

multiple hours, while the mace remained on her face.” (Id.).

“Plaintiff is then placed into a holding cell apart from the

general jail population, where she remains for approximately

four days.” (Id.). “Plaintiff is charged with Resisting

Officer with Violence and Battery on a Law Enforcement

Officer.” (Id.). “Both charges against Plaintiff were dropped

in their entirety.” (Id.).

Now, Defendants again move to dismiss, arguing the

amended complaint is a shotgun complaint as well as raising

merits arguments. (Doc. # 35). Plaintiff has responded (Doc.

# 41), and the Motion is ripe for review.

II. Discussion

Defendants first argue that the amended complaint is a

shotgun complaint that should be dismissed with prejudice

because Plaintiff has already been given one opportunity to

amend. (Doc. # 35 at 3-6). The Court agrees the amended

complaint is a shotgun complaint and must be dismissed.

However, the Court will give Plaintiff one final chance to

amend.

“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule

10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as

‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s

Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). The Eleventh

Circuit has “identified four rough types or categories of

shotgun pleadings”: (1) “a complaint containing multiple

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all

preceding counts”; (2) a complaint that is “replete with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint

that does “not separat[e] into a different count each cause

of action or claim for relief”; and (4) a complaint that

“assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which of the defendants are responsible

for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the

claim is brought against.” Id. at 1322-23. “The unifying

characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they

fail to . . . give the defendants adequate notice of the

claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests.” Id. at 1323.

The amended complaint falls into the fourth category of

shotgun complaint. The Court previously warned Plaintiff to

“be sure to specify in the amended complaint against which

Defendant or Defendants each count is brought.” (Doc. # 21).

Yet, Plaintiff did not take this advice. None of the four

counts explicitly states against which Defendant or

Defendants it is brought. And the first three counts are all

asserted against Defendant Riggall and at least ten John Does.

Multiple allegations in the amended complaint impermissibly

lump Defendant Riggall and various John Does with the same

conduct. For example, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Riggall

and/or John Does #1-10 and/or John Does #11-20 remove[d]

Plaintiff’s shirt and place[d] her into a holding room for

multiple hours, while the mace remained on her face.” (Doc.

# 23 at 6). Another example: “While acting under color of

law, Defendant Riggall and/or John Does #1-10 and/or John

Does #11-20 deprived Plaintiff of her well-established right

to be free from excessive force.” (Id. at 7).

Plaintiff’s lumping of numerous John Doe Defendants in

each count along with Defendant Riggall deprives Defendant

Riggall of notice of what actions he has supposedly taken.

See Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)

(finding a complaint was a shotgun complaint because it

“name[d] fourteen defendants, and all defendants are charged

in each count” and was “replete with allegations that ‘the

defendants’ engaged in certain conduct, making no distinction

among the fourteen defendants charged, though geographic and

temporal realities make plain that all of the defendants could

not have participated in every act complained of”). Thus, the

Court would have to speculate about what actions Defendant

Riggall allegedly took in order to address Defendant

Riggall’s assertion of qualified immunity. See Milfort v.

Rambosk, No. 2:21-cv-366-SPC-MRM, 2022 WL 138097, at *3 (M.D.

Fla. Jan. 14, 2022) (“Yet the Court cannot decide [the

qualified immunity issue] given the Third Amended Complaint’s

shotgun nature. Without pure speculation about who did what,

the Court cannot determine the conduct each officer allegedly

engaged in to violate Plaintiffs’ rights.”). This the Court

will not do.

There are other issues with the amended complaint that

relate to the shotgun complaint analysis. In its order

dismissing the original complaint, the Court “advise[d]

Plaintiff to closely review all issues raised in the motion

to dismiss, including the inclusion of John Doe defendants

and the naming of the Polk County Sheriff’s Office as a

defendant, before amending the complaint.” (Doc. # 21). The

amended complaint fails to correct these issues.

It was impermissible for Plaintiff to name John Does as

defendants at all. “[F]ictitious-party pleading is not

permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d

734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). There is “a limited exception to

this rule when the plaintiff’s description of the defendant

is so specific as to be ‘at the very worst, surplusage.’” Id.

(citation omitted). That limited exception does not apply

here, as Plaintiff names twenty John Does and gives no

specific details about any of them. (Doc. # 23 at 3-6). Thus,

all claims are dismissed to the extent they are asserted

against the John Doe Defendants. See Vielma v. Gruler, 808 F.

App’x 872, 880 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he district court

correctly concluded that Plaintiffs failed to describe the

John Doe defendants with enough specificity to enable service

of process. . . . For some of the John Does, Plaintiffs’

provided no descriptions at all. The remaining descriptions

ranged in specificity from the highly generic (e.g., ‘a male

detective,’ ‘one of the officers at the hospital,’ or ‘an FBI

Agent’) to the ever-so-slightly less generic (e.g., ‘[a]

female white officer about 5 feet 10–11 inches in height’ or

‘a middle-aged white male [officer]’).” (citation omitted)).

Additionally, as Defendants have pointed out, “[t]he

Polk County Sheriff’s Office is not a legal entity subject to

suit.” (Doc. # 35 at 5); see Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013)

(“Florida law has not established Sheriff’s offices as

separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued. Thus,

the district court did not err by dismissing Faulkner’s claim

against MCSO because MCSO is not a legal entity with the

capacity to be sued under Florida law.”).

Even if the Sheriff’s Office were a proper defendant, no

count of the amended complaint appears to be asserted against

the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. Thus, this Defendant does

not have adequate notice of what claims are asserted against

it. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (explaining that a shotgun

complaint does not “give the defendants adequate notice of

the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests”). Even if the Court were to assume that the Monell

claim was intended to be asserted against both the Sheriff’s

Office and the City of Lakeland, it is unclear what policy of

the Sheriff’s Office supposedly exposes it to liability.

Indeed, Count IV fails to mention the Sheriff’s Office at

all. (Doc. # 23 at 13-16).

For all these reasons, the amended complaint is

dismissed without prejudice as a shotgun complaint. The Court

will not address Defendants’ merits arguments at this time.

See Bennett v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. CV 15–00165–KD–C,

2015 WL 5294321, at *13 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2015) (“The

Defendants advance several arguments to dismiss the breach of

contract and FDCPA claims, but the undersigned declines to

address those arguments until these claims are repleaded for

the reasons expressed below.”). The Court will allow

Plaintiff to file a final complaint — a second amended

complaint — by April 22, 2025. Because this is the final

opportunity to amend this Court will give Plaintiff,

Plaintiff must closely review all arguments from Defendants’

previous motions to dismiss before amending.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendants City of Lakeland, Polk County Sheriff’s

Office, John Does #1-20, and Nicholas S. Riggall’s

Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 35) is

GRANTED.

(2) The amended complaint is dismissed as a_ shotgun

complaint.

(3) If she wishes to pursue this action, Plaintiff must file

her second amended complaint by April 22, 2025. The

second amended complaint should correct the issues

addressed in this order.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 8th

day of April, 2025.

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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