Johnson v. State of Tennessee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

ZACHARY MICHAEL JOHNSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:24-cv-00985

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Zachary Johnson is a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Davidson County Sheriff’s

Office. He filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc.

No. 1) and paid the five-dollar filing fee. (Doc. No. 4.) The Petition is before the Court for initial

review.

I. INITIAL REVIEW

A. Legal Standard

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (“Habeas

Rules”)1 requires the Court to examine the Petition to ascertain as a preliminary matter whether “it

plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief in the district court.” Habeas Rule 4. The Court is not only “authorized to dismiss summarily

any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face,” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,

856 (1994), but “has a duty to screen out” such petitions. Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th

Cir. 1970) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243).

1 These Rules apply to § 2241 cases as well as § 2254 cases. See Habeas Rule 1(b).

B. The Petition

The Petition challenges the legality of proceedings in Davidson County case numbers

2023-B-785 and 2023-C-1486. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) In these cases, Petitioner is under indictment on

charges which include two counts of attempted first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated

assault. (Id. at 13.) Petitioner asserts his rights to a speedy trial and the effective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment, his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments, and his rights to avoid double jeopardy and the setting of excessive

bail. (Id. at 6–7; Doc. No. 1-1 at 1–4.) He alleges that he has been in jail since October 2022,

during which time he has been denied an evidentiary hearing and a second bond reduction hearing

and has received no help from the lawyers who have been appointed to represent him. (Doc. No.

1 at 6.) He claims that his right to avoid double jeopardy is violated by the addition of his two

attempted first-degree murder charges (via indictment) on top of the earlier two charges of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, though he concedes that “[m]aybe this is not double

jeopardy.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 3.) Petitioner states that he has filed motions for “speedy public trial,

speedy trial or dismissal”; “alter[ation] [of] bond conditions”; “to dismiss all charges”; and “to

have counsel to withdraw and seek new counsel.” (Doc. No. 1 at 11.) He claims that the Davidson

County court told him that they would “e-file the speedy trial motion,” but otherwise gave him no

relief. (Id.) Petitioner has also written the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility three

times to complain about his counsel’s lack of attention to his case. (Id.)

Petitioner otherwise complains about the overcrowded conditions in the Davidson County

Jail and the denial of his prescribed medication for opioid use disorder while there. (Id. at 6; Doc.

No. 1-1 at 1–2.) He requests the following relief: “If I cannot be represented by effective counsel

and be given a speedy trial, I would like to be released from custody so I can work and hire an

attorney that will help me.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 5; see also Doc. No. 1 at 7 (requesting to be released

in order to “work and hire an attorney” because he “want[s] to go to trial”).)

C. Analysis

Petitioner challenges the legality of his pretrial detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which

authorizes the Court to entertain a habeas application from a person “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Section 2241

petitions filed while state charges are still pending are typically dismissed as premature, unless

they present exhausted claims that the prosecution violates double jeopardy or speedy trial rights,

Ealy v. Schrand, No. CV 2:20-21-DCR, 2020 WL 1031026, at *1–2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2020)

(citing, e.g., Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981) and In re Justices of Superior

Court Dept. of Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2000)), or that the setting of bail

pending trial was unreasonable. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 549. While “[a] state pretrial detainee may

bring a federal habeas action to demand a speedy trial” pursuant to Section 2241, he “may not

generally seek habeas relief to forestall state prosecution altogether.” Abernathy v. U.S. Marshal

Serv., No. 2:08-CV-14663, 2008 WL 4858442, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2008) (citing Braden

v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–91 (1973)).

Even when a colorable Section 2241 claim is presented, the Court must abstain from

exercising habeas jurisdiction as a matter of comity “if the issues raised in the petition may be

resolved either by trial on the merits or by other available state procedures.” Abernathy, 2008 WL

4858442, at *1 (citing Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546). “Intrusion into state proceedings already underway

is warranted only in extraordinary circumstances.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546; see Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). The requirement that a federal habeas petitioner first exhaust his available

state remedies is thus “especially forceful in a situation involving a speedy trial claim,” because

the remedy for such a violation will either involve dismissal of the indictment (if the petitioner

establishes that the delay has prejudiced his defense) or a federal order requiring the state to bring

the petitioner promptly to trial––remedies which “could not be more disruptive of pending state

actions.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546–47.

Here, although the Petition refers to multiple appearances in the trial court (see Doc. No.

1-1 at 2) and reveals that Petitioner succeeded in filing a motion (presumably pro se) asserting his

speedy-trial rights (see id. at 1), it does not demonstrate that he “availed himself fully of the state

machinery in attempting to have the state commence trial on the charges pending against him,” as

required to properly exhaust a speedy trial claim. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 547. In particular, the Petition

does not suggest that Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s denial of his speedy-trial motion or,

if the motion was not decided, that he sought mandamus or other relief in the Tennessee Court of

Criminal Appeals to remedy the trial court’s failure to rule. Nor does it appear that Petitioner ever

appealed the denial of his bond reduction motion. Moreover, while the Petition claims that

Petitioner may have been exposed to double jeopardy (Doc. No. 1-1 at 3), it does not give any

indication that a double-jeopardy claim was exhausted in the state trial and appellate courts.

By way of comparison, the Supreme Court has found the exhaustion requirement met

where the claimant demonstrated that he had made “repeated demands for trial to the courts of

Kentucky, offering those courts”––trial and appellate–––“an opportunity to consider on the merits

his constitutional claim of the present denial of a speedy trial.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 490 (noting

that “[i]t is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts” in their efforts to exhaust). And

the Sixth Circuit has found an unreasonable bail claim exhausted only after the claimant appealed

the matter to the intermediate state appellate court and sought leave to further appeal to the state

supreme court. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 550. Here, the Petition fails to support an inference that

Petitioner’s speedy-trial, excessive-bail, or double-jeopardy claims have been fully exhausted.

The Petition’s due process and ineffective-assistance claims, even if colorably stated, are

not properly before the Court in this pretrial habeas case and will therefore be dismissed. As this

Court has previously stated:

As to both Petitioner’s due process claim and his ineffective-assistance claim,

moreover, a Section 2241 habeas petition is not the proper vehicle to consider these

claims. That is because they “fall within the rule that federal courts generally

abstain from intervening in pending state proceedings to address issues that ‘may

be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state courts or by other state

procedures available to the petitioner.’” MPawinayo v. Hall, No. 3:20-cv-01097,

2021 WL 1984944, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 18, 2021) (citing Atkins v. People of

State of Mich., 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981)) (rejecting pretrial detainee’s

federal habeas claims of ineffective assistance and “prosecution by valid indictment

or presentment”). If Petitioner is convicted in state court, he may bring due process

and/or ineffective-assistance claims in a federal habeas petition filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, following the proper exhaustion of state court remedies for those

claims. See Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 287–88 (6th Cir. 1979) (rejecting due

process claim in pretrial habeas petition because “post-conviction habeas corpus

remedies are available in the federal courts” “[a]fter exhaustion of remedies in the

state courts”); Williams v. Burt, 949 F.3d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 2020) (addressing

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim brought in “a petition for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254” “[f]ollowing [petitioner’s] state court proceedings”). In this pretrial

habeas proceeding, however, these two claims will be summarily dismissed.

Taylor v. Hall, No. 3:22-CV-00616, 2022 WL 6225465, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2022).

Finally, even if Petitioner’s claims concerning the conditions of his confinement and

medical treatment in the Davidson County Jail are cognizable in this action seeking release from

confinement, see Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020) (involving federal inmates’

claim that risks to vulnerable inmates from COVID-19 could “be remedied only by release” under

Section 2241); but see Rummelt v. Cheeks, No. 21-10757, 2021 WL 4921203, at *2 (E.D. Mich.

Oct. 20, 2021), (finding that “section 2241 does not furnish a basis for redress of the petitioner’s

claims” because “[h]e does not assert that the only remedy that will vindicate [his Eighth

Amendment] right . . . is release from custody”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

state detainees such as Petitioner must in all events exhaust their available state remedies before

pursuing habeas relief, and there is no indication that Petitioner has done so. Nor is the Court

convinced that these claims are in fact cognizable under Section 2241, as Petitioner does not

contend that release is the only remedy for the allegedly harsh conditions at the Jail. Rummelt,

supra. Whether unexhausted or noncognizable, these conditions-of-confinement claims are not

properly before the Court at this time.

In sum, given the ongoing proceedings against Petitioner in state court and his failure to

exhaust available remedies there, the Court cannot find that his “only recourse was to the federal

courts by way of a petition for habeas corpus.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 550. Accordingly, the Court

must refrain from exercising jurisdiction under Section 2241.

II. CONCLUSION

As explained above, upon initial review of the Petition it plainly appears that Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief in district court at this time. Further proceedings in this Court are not

warranted.

Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED as premature, without prejudice to Petitioner’s

ability to refile a habeas petition after fully exhausting his state remedies, or to his ability to pursue

a separate civil rights lawsuit over the conditions of his confinement.

Because “a plain procedural bar is present” in this case and jurists of reason could not find

that it was incorrectly invoked or that Petitioner should be allowed to proceed further, no certificate

of appealability shall issue. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). For the same reasons, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this

dismissal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

It is so ORDERED.

WILLIAM L. CAMPB ELL.

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE