“[A]n identification by even one eyewitness who lacks an apparent grudge against the ac- cused person is sufficient to demonstrate probable cause.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A]n identification by even one eyewitness who lacks an apparent grudge against the ac- cused person is sufficient to demonstrate probable cause.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NATHANIEL MCGEE, )
) No. 1:23-CV-01925
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Judge Edmond E. Chang
ANGEL GOMEZ, MELISSA ALTMAYER, )
and CITY OF CHICAGO, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Nathaniel McGee was arrested by Chicago police officers Angel Gomez and
Melissa Altmayer after being suspected of pulling out a gun and threatening a
woman. R. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 5–6, 8, 10–11, 14, 17.1 But McGee argues that the officers
lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id. ¶ 23. So he sued Gomez and Altmayer, bring-
ing false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against them. Id. at 3–4.2 McGee
also brought an indemnification claim against the City of Chicago. Id. at 4–5.
The Defendants now move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting that
Gomez and Altmayer did have probable cause to arrest McGee. R. 22, Defs.’ Mot. Be-
cause the officers had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest, they are entitled
to qualified immunity, which is fatal to all of McGee’s claims. So the Defendants’
1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,
a page or paragraph number.
2The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. And the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law indemnifica-
tion claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
motion to dismiss is granted. For now, the dismissal is without prejudice to give
McGee a chance to amend the complaint.
I. Complaint Allegations
At the pleading stage, the ordinary rule is to accept the Complaint’s allegations
as true. But there is a body-worn camera video recording of some of the underlying
events. As explained in more detail in the next section, that means some of the facts
are supplied by the video recording. This section sets forth the allegations in the Com-
plaint. On March 31, 2021, around 2:00 a.m., Nathaniel McGee was dropped off in
the parking lot of his fiancé’s apartment complex. Compl. ¶ 8. McGee alleges that as
he walked across the parking lot, Chicago Police officers Angel Gomez and Melissa
Altmayer stopped him, suspecting that he was the perpetrator of an assault that had
been reported at the apartment complex. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. McGee says that he immedi-
ately disclosed to the officers that he was lawfully carrying a concealed firearm. Id.
¶ 11. The officers then allegedly ordered McGee to get on his knees, and they pro-
ceeded to search him. Id. ¶ 12. McGee claims that he peacefully complied. Id. ¶ 13.
According to McGee, although he asked the officers to examine his concealed-carry
license, they refused to do so. Id. ¶ 15. Instead, they arrested McGee and took him to
the police station. Id. ¶¶ 14, 19.
McGee also alleges that the arrest was improper because there is an “audio”
recording of the officers admitting that McGee was not the perpetrator of the assault.
Id. ¶ 18. McGee says that the officers arrested him despite knowing that he did not
commit the crime. Id. ¶ 19. McGee then spent two days in jail. Id. ¶ 20. He claims
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that he suffered damages from the arrest and detention, including the loss of employ-
ment, loss of liberty, emotional distress, and financial expenses. Id. ¶ 21. So McGee
brought this lawsuit. He brings a claim for false arrest, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
Gomez and Altmayer. Compl. at 4. And he also seems to bring a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim against the two officers. Id. Finally, McGee brings an indemnifica-
tion claim against the City of Chicago. Id. at 4–5.
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-
fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).3 The Seventh Circuit has explained that this
rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on
the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of
court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police
of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain
3This opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,
and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,
18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
3
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). These allegations “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,
rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
III. Analysis
Before getting into the merits of McGee’s claims, it is worth explaining why
the Court considers Gomez’s and Altmayer’s body-worn camera footage at the plead-
ing stage. It is true that courts are typically limited to the four corners of the plead-
ings in evaluating a motion to dismiss. Here, however, McGee himself references and
relies on the “audio recording” in his Complaint. Compl. ¶ 18. Also, when the defense
relied prominently on the video recordings in moving to dismiss, McGee did not re-
spond by arguing that the Court should not rely on the recordings. See R. 31, Pl.’s
Resp. Br. Indeed, in his response brief, McGree repeatedly referred to and relied on
the footage for various facts. Id. So it is fair game for the Court to rely on the footage
at this stage to determine what actually took place in the leadup to, and during,
McGee’s arrest. At the same time, the Court bears in mind that off-camera facts are
still limited to the four corners of the Complaint.
Moving on to McGee’s claims: Officers Gomez and Altmayer argue that they
are entitled to qualified immunity on both the false arrest and malicious prosecution
claims. Defs.’ Mot. at 12. Specifically, they contend that the officers are entitled to
4
qualified immunity because they had “arguable probable cause.” Id. That argument
succeeds and undermines all of McGee’s claims.
In applying qualified immunity to the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause re-
quirement, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if arguable probable cause ex-
isted to detain the plaintiff. Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014). “Ar-
guable probable cause exists when a reasonable officer in the same circumstances
and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably
believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established law.” Id. (cleaned up).
Probable cause “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient
to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed an offense.”
Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the facts and circumstances within Gomez’s and Altmayer’s knowledge
were enough to constitute arguable probable cause. The officers arrived at the scene
in response to a call saying that someone matching McGee’s description had a gun
and was threatening a woman. R. 25, Gomez Body Cam at 3:00–10; R. 25, Altmayer
Body Cam at 6:00–20. Then, once they got to the parking lot, Gomez and Altmayer
found McGee detained by private security guards who had been patrolling the lot.
Gomez Body Cam at 2:20–3:00. McGee immediately declared to the officers that he
had a gun on him and said, “I’m licensed,” which meant that he had a concealed-carry
license. Id. Altmayer then searched McGee and found the gun in his waistband. Id.
at 3:05–15.
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Once the officers recovered McGee’s gun, they discovered that the gun had a
modification switch on it that allows it to become fully automatic. Gomez Body Cam
at 4:50–5:30; 6:55–7:05. Under Illinois law, it is illegal to possess a converted fully
automatic gun like this. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(a)(7)(i). And when Gomez told
McGee that the gun was fully automatic and that he was not allowed to have a
weapon like that, McGee did not protest or deny either statement. Gomez Body Cam
at 11:50–12:30. So recovering McGee’s illegal firearm gave the officers an independ-
ent and sufficient basis for arguable probable cause to arrest McGee.
But that is not all. Gomez and Altmayer also interviewed the assault victim
and asked her what happened. She told the officers that McGee “pulled up in a white
car … jumped out, [and] pulled a gun on her.” Gomez Body Cam at 9:15–30. And the
victim later confirmed that it was McGee who committed the assault, describing to
the officers what he was wearing. Id. at 19:20–40 (“That guy has a black skull cap
and a red vest.”).
Finally, Gomez spoke with the security guard who initially detained McGee.
The guard explained that he got a call from the victim about someone who came out
of a white car and pulled a gun on her. Gomez Body Cam at 13:00–55. Then the guard
arrived at the parking lot and saw McGee walking around. Id. When the guard ap-
proached McGee, McGee lifted his shirt, showed the guard his gun, and told him, “I’ve
got a gun too.” Id. Thus, both the victim and the security guard corroborated that
McGee had a gun on him and committed the assault. Id. at 9:15–30, 13:00–55, 19:20–
40. This information, especially combined with the fact that the officers found McGee
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with an illegal automatic firearm on his person, was more than enough for Gomez
and Altmayer to reasonably believe that McGee had committed a crime, warranting
his arrest. See Moorer v. City of Chicago, 92 F.4th 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2024) (“[A]n
identification by even one eyewitness who lacks an apparent grudge against the ac-
cused person is sufficient to demonstrate probable cause.”).
It is also worth noting that the body cam footage disproves several of the alle-
gations in McGee’s Complaint. First, McGee alleges that the officers ordered him to
get on his knees for a search. Compl. ¶ 12. But the footage shows that McGee volun-
teered to get on the ground, telling officers, “I can get down on the ground.” Altmayer
Body Cam at 2:10–20. Second, McGee claims that the officers refused to examine his
concealed-carry license. Compl. ¶ 15. But the video shows that Altmayer removed the
license from McGee’s wallet, and then Gomez ran it through a database, along with
McGee’s driver’s license. Altmayer Body Cam at 3:30–4:30; Gomez Body Cam at 7:50–
8:00. Third, McGee alleges that the officers “are heard on audio recording admitting
that [he] was the wrong person for the assault arrest.” Compl. ¶ 18. But there is no
admission like that at all on either Altmayer or Gomez’s body cam footage. See Gomez
Body Cam; Altmayer Body Cam. They never say that they have the wrong person for
the assault. See Gomez Body Cam; Altmayer Body Cam. Rather, as explained above,
all of the officers’ statements leading up to, and after, McGee’s arrest confirm that
they believed that McGee committed the assault.
So key allegations in McGee’s Complaint do not hold up, and Gomez and Alt-
mayer did have arguable probable cause to arrest him. Because they had arguable
7
probable cause, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest and
malicious prosecution claims. Huff, 744 F.3d at 1007. And because Gomez and Alt-
mayer had qualified immunity, they are shielded from liability on those claims. White
v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79 (2017). Thus, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
granted.
Lastly, McGee brings an indemnification claim against the City of Chicago,
arguing that the City should have to pay McGee for the damages he sustained due to
Gomez and Altmayer’s actions. Compl. at 4–5. But “[a]n indemnification claim neces-
sarily will be tied to an underlying claim for liability.” Baskins v. Gilmore, 2018 WL
4699847, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018). Again, Gomez and Altmayer are shielded
from liability on the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims due to qualified
immunity. So there are no successful underlying claims for liability, and McGee’s in-
demnification claim fails as well. The Defendants’ motion to dismiss is thus granted.
IV. Conclusion
The Defendants’ motion to dismiss, R. 22, is granted, but the claims are dis-
missed without prejudice for now. McGee may file an amended complaint by April 23,
2025, if he believes that he can fix the problems (though the Court is skeptical that
he can).
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: April 8, 2025
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