Schneider v. Unknown Named Federal Employees

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LUCAS CANTON SCHNEIDER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 25-cv-00153-SPM

v.

UNKNOWN NAMED FEDERAL

EMPLOYEES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

This case was severed from Schneider v. Unknown Named Federal Employees, 25-cv-

00120-NRJ, on February 3, 2025, and is limited to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages relating

to allegations that federal officials in Belleville, Illinois, released chemicals into his home. (Doc.

2). Along with the Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (IFP)

was filed in this case, which is now before the Court. (Doc. 3).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent party may commence a federal court action without

paying required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit asserting the inability “to pay such

fees or give security therefor” and stating, “the nature of the action, defense or appeal and the

affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The Court is satisfied

from the affidavit submitted by Plaintiff that he is indigent. He currently has no source of income,

no money in his checking or savings accounts, and no property of value. (Doc. 3). But the Court’s

inquiry does not end there because 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires careful threshold scrutiny of a

complaint filed by a plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP. The Court may dismiss a case and deny an

otherwise qualified plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, if the action is clearly frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim, or is a claim for money damages against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003). As detailed below,

Plaintiff cannot meet the second prong required to proceed IFP because the Complaint fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted, and the motion to for leave to proceed IFP will be denied.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that since being released from the Alaska Department of Corrections and

moving to Illinois, he has been experiencing “malicious and vindictive behavior from local federal

authorities.” (Doc. 2, p. 2). He claims that the federal authorities have been releasing excessive

chemicals into the air of his father’s house, where he resides, forcing him to leave the home.

Plaintiff asserts that the federal authorities are trying to “make [him] homeless.” (Id.).

To survive preliminary review under Section 1915(e)(2)(B), a Complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(a)(2), which includes “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). The Complaint must also associate specific

defendants with specific claims, so that defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against

them and they can properly answer the Complaint. Id. at 555.

Plaintiff’s vague claims against “federal authorities” are not sufficient to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. While Plaintiff may use John Doe designations to refer to parties

whose names are known, he must still follow Rule 8 pleading standards and include a short, plain

statement of the case against each individual. He must make plausible claims against individuals.

By stating that an indefinite number of unknown people or agencies have harmed him without

providing more information, all Plaintiff has done is establish that there is a “sheer possibility”

that someone or entity in that group harmed him. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding the phrase “one or more of the

Defendants” did not adequately connect specific defendants to illegal acts, and thus failed to

adequately plead personal involvement). Because the Complaint does not describe the individual

defendants or their conduct, Plaintiff has not formed the basis of his claims against a suable person

or entity.

The Court further notes that even if Plaintiff had identified someone by name, he cannot

sue federal employees under 42 U.S.C. §1983. See King v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d

634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing that Bivens “authorizes the filing of constitutional tort suits

against federal officers in much the same way that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes such suits against

state officers”); Case v. Milewski, 327 F. 3d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 2003) (“an action brought pursuant

to §1983 cannot lie against federal officers acting under color of federal law”). Nor do the facts,

as pled, state a viable constitutional claim for damages as recognized under Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Fed’l Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and subsequent case law. See

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017); Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022); Gerlach v. Rotika,

95 F. 4th 493, 498 (7th Cir. 2024); Brooks v. Richardson, No. 24-1651, 2025 WL 815763, at *1

(7th Cir. 2025) (observing that in “the 45 years after Carlson, the Justices have rejected every

proposed extension of Bivens that they have considered.”). For these reasons, the Complaint is

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The usual practice in civil cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected. See Abu-

Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018). Here, however, granting leave to

amend would be futile as the relief Plaintiff seeks is unavailable under Section 1983 and Bivens.

See Esco v. City of Chi., 107 F.4th 673, 683 (7th Cir. 2024) (“District courts have broad discretion

to deny leave to amend the pleadings where the amendment would be futile.”); Guise v. BMW

Mortgage, LLC, 377 F.3d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 2004) (leave to amend may be denied because of

futility, undue delay, or dilatory motive). Additionally, Plaintiff appears to have abandoned the

prosecution of this case. First, after this case was severed, Plaintiff was directed two times to notify

the Court by March 10, 2025, regarding whether he wished to proceed with this lawsuit. (Doc. 6,

7). Plaintiff failed to do so. Second, Plaintiff has also not updated his address with the Court, and

a document sent to him on February 24, 2025, has been returned as undeliverable. (Doc. 11).

Before the initial case was severed, Plaintiff was warned of his obligation to keep the Court

informed of his current address. See Schneider v. Unknown Named Federal Employees, No. 25-

cv-00120-NJR, Doc. 8 (S.D. Ill.). Plaintiff has not expressed interest in pursuing this litigation,

and the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. Accordingly, the Court will not

grant leave to amend.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is

DENIED (Doc. 3), and the Complaint and this entire case are DISMISSED with prejudice for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred

at the time the action was filed. Therefore, the filing fee of $405.00 remains due and payable. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court within

thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) If Plaintiff does choose to appeal,

he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See

FED. R. APP. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir.

2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. He must list

each of the issues he intends to appeal in the notice of appeal. A proper and timely motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R.

APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the

entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 7, 2025

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge