MARTIN v. SEABOLT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

KA’LAH (KALAH) MARTIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:21cv906

)

GREGORY SEABOLT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration and a New Trial (Docket Entry 74) (the “Second

Reconsideration Motion”). For the reasons that follow, the Court

will deny the Second Reconsideration Motion.1

BACKGROUND

Alleging state and federal claims related to an incident on

February 28, 2019, Ka’lah (Kalah) Martin (the “Plaintiff”) sued

various employees of the Randolph County Sheriff’s Office,

including Deputies Travis Short, Kyle Gabby, and Jeremiah Harrelson

(collectively, the “Defendants”), as well as Sheriff Gregory

Seabolt. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 1, ¶¶ 2-4, 32.) Of relevance

here, Plaintiff sued Sheriff Seabolt solely in his official

capacity, but sued Defendants in both their official and individual

1 Pursuant to the parties’ consent, now-Senior United States

District Judge Loretta C. Biggs referred this case to the

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings.

(See Docket Entry 15 at 1.)

capacities. (See, e.g., id. at 1.)* After the parties engaged in

discovery (see, e.g., Docket Entry 16 at 2 (describing certain

discovery efforts)), the defense “move[d] for summary judgment on

all claims asserted in Plaintiff[’s operative] Complaint” (Docket

Entry 30 (the “Summary Judgment Motion”) at 1). Plaintiff opposed

the Summary Judgment Motion, but did not file her own motion for

summary judgment. (See Docket Entries dated Oct. 11, 2022, to Apr.

25, 2023.)

The Court granted in part the Summary Judgment Motion,

dismissing all official-capacity claims and allowing only

Plaintiff’s state-law assault and battery and Section 1983

excessive force claims against Defendants in their individual

capacities to proceed. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 35 (the “Summary

Judgment Opinion”) at 67; see also id. at 68 (explaining that, “as

to all other claims and all other [d]lefendants, the Court will

enter summary judgment against Plaintiff”).) As the Summary

Judgment Opinion noted, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims failed

because, inter alia, “Plaintiff has not presented evidence

sufficient to indicate the existence of a policy allowing for [the

challenged conduct]” (id. at 20; see also id. at 24, 43, 48) and,

as Plaintiff conceded, she “failed to allege or present any

evidence that Defendants waived sovereign immunity through the

2 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

purchase of liability insurance” (id. at 59 (internal quotation

marks omitted)), thereby defeating Plaintiff’s state-law official-

capacity tort claims (see id. at 58-59). However, genuine issues

of material fact precluded resolution, at the summary judgment

stage, of Plaintiff’s individual-capacity assault, battery, and

excessive force claims against Defendants, including regarding the

applicability of qualified immunity. (See id. at 25-42, 58-60.)

Plaintiff subsequently moved, purportedly pursuant to Rule 60

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”), for

reinstatement of her official-capacity claims. (Docket Entry 39

(the “First Reconsideration Motion”) at 1-2.) The First

Reconsideration Motion based its reconsideration request primarily

on the fact that, nearly two years after the traffic stop involving

Plaintiff, Deputies Gabby and Short participated in another traffic

stop, this time of an individual named Justin Collins, using a

patrol vehicle equipped with a dashboard camera, a situation that,

in Plaintiff’s view, establishes the existence of video camera

footage of the earlier incident involving Plaintiff. (See

generally Docket Entry 41; see also Docket Entry 43 (the

“Reconsideration Opinion”) at 10 (explaining that, “[a]ccording to

Plaintiff, the fact that [Deputy] Gabby’s patrol car contained

video cameras when he conducted a traffic stop of Collins in

February 2021 proves that the defense lied when it said that no

video of Plaintiff’s stop in February 2019 exists”).) Defendants

3

opposed the First Reconsideration Motion. (See Docket Entry 42

(the “Original Opposition”) at 1-10.)

For myriad reasons, the Court denied the First Reconsideration

Motion. (See Docket Entry 43 at 1-21.) To begin, as the

Reconsideration Opinion observed, “Plaintiff failed to reply to the

[Original] Opposition” (id. at 8), thereby conceding its “multiple

arguments for denial of the [First Reconsideration] Motion” (id.)

and “warranting denial of the [First Reconsideration] Motion on

this basis alone” (id. at 9). The Reconsideration Opinion also

explained that, “to the extent that Plaintiff suggests the Collins

incident renders manifestly unjust the dismissal of all

official-capacity claims, allegedly allowing [the d]efendants to

escape accountability for their actions, Plaintiff has not met her

high burden of showing that the [Summary Judgment] Opinion was

clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” (Id. at

13-14 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).) Further,

the Reconsideration Opinion noted, “the proffered evidence does not

support Plaintiff’s contentions” (id. at 10), as, inter alia,

the fact that, while on interdiction duty in 2021,

[Deputy] Gabby’s patrol vehicle contained video cameras

(see, e.g., Docket Entry 41-1 at 1-2) does not contradict

Sheriff Seabolt’s sworn statement (1) that “[t]here is no

camera footage of [Plaintiff’s] February 28, 2019,

traffic stop” (Docket Entry 41-3, ¶ 5); (2) that, “[i]n

2019, the Randolph County Sheriff’s Office patrol cars

were not equipped with dashboard cameras, except for

those patrol cars used by the Randolph County

interdiction team” (id., ¶ 6); (3) that, “[a]t the time

of the incident, Randolph County patrol vehicles used by

the interdiction team were the only vehicles with in-car

4

cameras” (id., @ 9); (4) that, as of April 3, 2023,

“Randolph County Sheriff’s Office patrol vehicles [we]re

still not outfitted with in-car cameras, except for those

used by the interdiction team” (id., 7 12); and (5) that,

“[i]n 2019, the Randolph County Sheriff’s Office patrol

deputies were not equipped with body-worn cameras” (id.,

Gq 7).

(Docket Entry 43 at 10-11 (emphasis and certain brackets in

original).)

Meanwhile, Defendants pursued an interlocutory appeal of the

Summary Judgment Opinion’s denial of qualified immunity. (See

Docket Entry 44 at 3.) The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity, agreeing

that material factual disputes in the then-existing record

precluded an award of qualified immunity to Defendants at the

summary judgment stage. (See id. at 3-10.) The matter then

proceeded to a three-day jury trial on Plaintiff’s individual-

capacity assault, battery, and excessive force claims against

Defendants. (See Docket Entries dated Nov. 18, 2024, to Nov. 20,

2024.) Defendants, Sheriff Seabolt, and Plaintiff each testified

during the trial. (See Docket Entry 67 at 1.) The jury promptly

found that Plaintiff failed to prove her claims against Defendants

(see Docket Entry 69 at 1-6), after which the Court entered

judgment in favor of the various defendants in the matter (see

Docket Entry 72 (the “Judgment”) at 1-2).

Four days later, Plaintiff filed the Second Reconsideration

Motion (see Docket Entries dated Nov. 25, 2024), moving

under Rule 59(1)(b)(d)(e) . . ., as well as Rule

60(5)(6); 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights violations and the

protections therein under Federal Law, The Code of

Conduct for United States Judges promoting public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

judiciary, and the United State Constitution; and or, the

inherent duties and powers of the Federal Court and

Judiciary.

(Docket Entry 74 at 1 (ellipsis added).)3 According to Plaintiff’s

memorandum in support of the Second Reconsideration Motion, the

jury’s verdict “did not support [Plaintiff] because, it should not”

(Docket Entry 76 (the “Reconsideration Memorandum”) at 4) and “the

jury was correct in reaching the verdict that they did;

individually, [Defendants] were not liable” (id. at 18), but the

verdict nevertheless “represents a manifest injustice to

[Plaintiff]” (id. at 4) because, in Plaintiff’s “[counsel’s]

opinion, . . . there should not be a blanket hard-line rule on the

immunity issue” (id. at 13 (ellipsis added)) and the dismissal of

Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims “for lack of [a] policy” (id.

at 10) harmed Plaintiff, Defendants, and the public at large (see,

e.g., id. at 10-13).

Defendants responded in opposition to the Second

Reconsideration Motion. (See Docket Entry 77 (the “Opposition”).)

Plaintiff did not reply to the Opposition. (See Docket Entries

dated Dec. 3, 2024, to present.) Nearly two months after

3 With the exception of bracketed alterations and, as noted,

certain ellipses, this Opinion accurately transcribes all

quotations from Plaintiff’s materials, without flagging

grammatical/scrivener errors.

6

Defendants filed the Opposition, however, Plaintiff filed a

suggestion of subsequently decided authority, which she maintains

“directly impact[s] th[e Second Reconsideration] Motion” (Docket

Entry 78 (the “Supplement”) at 1).

DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Standards

Plaintiff purports to bring the Second Reconsideration Motion

pursuant to “Rule 59(1)(b)(d)(e)” and “Rule 60(5)(6).” (Docket

Entry 74 at 1.)4 Construed liberally, the Second Reconsideration

Motion appears to pursue a motion for a new trial under Rule

59(a)(1), a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e),

and a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). (See

generally Docket Entries 74, 76.) The Fourth Circuit “ha[s]

squarely held, however, that a motion filed under both Rule 59(e)

and Rule 60(b) should be analyzed only under Rule 59(e) if it was

4 Rule 59(a) authorizes the Court, “on motion, [to] grant a

new trial,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1), whereas Rule 59(d) authorizes

“the [C]ourt, on its own, [to] order a new trial for any reason

that would justify granting one on a party’s motion,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(d). In turn, Rule 59(b) provides that “[a] motion for a new

trial must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of

judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), and Rule 59(e) specifies that

“[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later

than 28 days after the entry of the judgment,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e). For its part, Rule 60(b) provides that, “[o]n motion and

just terms, the [C]ourt may relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if,

inter alia, “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or

discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been

reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer

equitable,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), or for “any other reason that

justifies relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

7

filed no later than 10 days after entry of the adverse judgment and

seeks to correct that judgment.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp.

LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2010).5

A court may “grant a Rule 59(e) motion only in very narrow

circumstances: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in

controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at

trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest

injustice.” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks). Essentially,

[R]ule [59(e)] permits a district court to correct its

own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts

the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings. Rule

59(e) motions may not be used, however, to raise

arguments which could have been raised prior to the

issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue

a case under a novel legal theory that the party had the

ability to address in the first instance [before the

judgment].

Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403

(4th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

accord id. at 404 (“Rule 59(e) may not be used to raise new

arguments or present novel legal theories that could have been

raised prior to judgment.”).

Importantly, “mere disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e)

motion,” Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993)

5 Because Plaintiff filed the Second Reconsideration Motion

four days after the Court entered the Judgment (see Docket Entries

dated Nov. 21, 2024, to Nov. 25, 2024), this principle governs

consideration of the Second Reconsideration Motion.

8

(citing Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626

(S.D. Miss. 1990)), and Rule 59(e) does not give litigants “another

opportunity to argue a [m]otion denied by th[e] Court,” Atkins, 130

F.R.D. at 626. See also, e.g., Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879,

889 (E.D. Va. 1977) (observing that (1), “[the plaintiff’s] brief

in support of his [Rule 59(e)] motion is no more than an expression

of a view of the law contrary to that set forth in the [c]ourt’s

opinion,” (2), “[w]hatever may be the purpose of Rule 59(e)[,] it

should not be supposed that it is intended to give an unhappy

litigant one additional chance to sway the [court],” and

(3), “[s]ince the plaintiff has brought up nothing new except his

displeasure[,] th[e c]ourt has no proper basis upon which to alter

or amend the order previously entered”).

Moreover, “reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an

extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” 11 Charles

Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (3d

ed.). Accordingly, “the circumstances under which a Rule 59(e)

motion may be granted are so limited that . . . Rule 59(e) motions

typically are denied.” Sherrod v. Harkleroad, No. 1:12cv48, 2016

WL 9776807, at *1 (W.D.N.C. July 26, 2016) (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Meanwhile, “[t]he decision to grant or deny a new trial under

[Rule] 59 rests with the sound discretion of the district court,”

Nichols v. Ashland Hosp. Corp., 251 F.3d 496, 500 (4th Cir. 2001)

9

(internal quotation marks omitted), “and will not be reversed save

in the most exceptional circumstances,” Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A new trial is warranted when (1) the verdict is

against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the verdict is based

upon evidence which is false; or (3) the verdict will result in a

miscarriage of justice.” Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l,

Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 200 (4th Cir. 2000). “In considering a new

trial motion, the district court may weigh the evidence and

consider the credibility of the witnesses.” Id.

II. Preliminary Matters

Repeating her pattern with the First Reconsideration Motion

(see Docket Entry 43 at 8), Plaintiff failed to reply to the

Opposition (see Docket Entries dated Dec. 3, 2024, to present).

“The Opposition advances multiple arguments for denial of the

[Second Reconsideration] Motion” (Docket Entry 43 at 8), including

(1) that the jury possessed all necessary evidence in reaching its

verdict, which did not depend on qualified immunity; (2) that the

Second Reconsideration Motion improperly attempts to relitigate the

summary-judgment dismissal of Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims;

and (3) that none of the Rules that Plaintiff references in support

of the Second Reconsideration Motion provides grounds for relief.

(See Docket Entry 77 at 1-8.) In sum, the Opposition asserts:

[The Second Reconsideration Motion] attempts to

relitigate, for the third time, [Plaintiff’s] official

10

capacity claims against Defendants . . ., as well as

non-party Sheriff Seabolt. The Court once dismissed

those claims and then denied [Plaintiff’s first] motion

for reconsideration. There is no basis under Rules 59 or

60 to reopen that issue and give [Plaintiff] a new trial

or relief from judgment. [The Second Reconsideration

M]otion should be denied.

(Id. at 8.)

As with the First Reconsideration Motion,

[b]y failing to address the Opposition’s arguments,

Plaintiff concedes them, warranting denial of the [Second

Reconsideration] Motion on this basis alone. See, e.g.,

Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec Inc., No. 1:08cv918,

2010 WL 1667285, at *6-9 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23, 2010)

(examining implications of such failure, noting existence

of “general principle that a party who fails to address

an issue has conceded the issue,” and collecting cases).

(Docket Entry 43 at 9.)

Further, to the extent that the Second Reconsideration Motion

relies on Rule 50 or Rule 52, those efforts fall short. According

to the Reconsideration Memorandum, Ҥ1983 demands this Federal

Courts attention to act against a jury that did not make its

decision (1) with all facts available, (2) reasonably under the

existing law and it does so with Federal Rules of Procedure Rules

50, 52, 59, and 60.” (Docket Entry 76 at 8.) As Defendants

correctly assert (see Docket Entry 77 at 2 n.1), Plaintiff fails to

develop any argument regarding Rule 50 or Rule 52 (see Docket Entry

76 at 1-19). Accordingly, Plaintiff waived any argument for relief

based on either Rule. See, e.g., Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l

LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an argument

by failing to . . . develop [her] argument — even if [her] brief

11

takes a passing shot at the issue.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

In any event, as Defendants again correctly note (see Docket

Entry 77 at 2 n.1), neither Rule applies to the instant matter. A

party can only bring a post-trial motion under Rule 50(b) if the

party moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)

“before the case [wa]s submitted to the jury,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 50(a)(2). See Nichols, 251 F.3d at 501 & n.1 (explaining that,

in absence of Rule 50(a) motion, party’s “post-trial motion for

judgment as a matter of law” under Rule 50(b) “was effectively a

nullity, since a Rule 50(b) motion may only be made as a renewal of

a motion previously made on the same grounds under Rule 50(a)”).

Because Plaintiff failed to move for judgment as a matter of law

before submission of the case to the jury (see Docket Entries dated

Nov. 18, 2024, to Nov. 20, 2024 (reflecting that only Defendants

made Rule 50 motion)), she cannot now move for judgment as a matter

of law under Rule 50(b), see Nichols, 251 F.3d at 501 n.1. For its

part, Rule 52 applies only to actions tried “without a jury or with

an advisory jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). As the parties

conducted a jury, not bench, trial (see, e.g., Minute Entry dated

Nov. 20, 2024 (“Jury charged, retired, and returned with a verdict

at 1:56 p.m.”)), Rule 52 provides no basis for relief in this

matter, see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 52.

12

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Authority likewise fails to justify

relief. According to the Supplemental Authority, by virtue of

certain actions by North Carolina state officials in an ongoing

dispute regarding the results of a North Carolina Supreme Court

election, “the State of North Carolina has waived sovereign

immunity,” a development that allegedly necessitates reinstatement

of Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims. (Docket Entry 78 at 2.)

More specifically, the Supplemental Authority states:

A. As represented by Special Deputy of the North

Carolina Attorney General, appearing before the

United States Court of Appeals on behalf of the

State Board of Elections January 27, 2025; “the

North Carolina Department of Justice, appearing on

behalf of the State Board, Judge Griffin’s

extraordinary request to retroactively change

longstanding election rules, and thereby

disenfranchise more than 60,000 North Carolina

Registered Voters, should confront the Federal

Civil Rights Laws, in a Federal Forum, as Congress

intended, under Section 1443.” Appellant North

Carolina State Board Oral Argument, Riggs v.

Griffin, No. 25-1024(4th Cir. 01/27/2025).

B. The State of North Carolina removed an election case

on the objective of one official over another; both

presiding North Carolina Court of Appeals Judges,

and one North Carolina State Supreme Court Judge.

C. In Riggs v. Griffin, No. 25-1024(4th Cir.

01/27/2025); the Docket report highlights issues of

Randolph County in the recent election. Id. at

208-209, and at 210-355.

D. The State of North Carolina expressly consented to

being sued, by and through the Attorney General of

the State of North Carolina; in fact, it not only

consented; the State of North Carolina initiated

suit in Federal Court through the Board of

Elections, which includes, for this suits purposes;

13

Elected Official Gregory Seabolt as representative

of Randolph County, officially.

WHEREFORE, the State of North Carolina has waived

sovereign immunity; asserting and asking for Randolph

County’s involvement in a Federal Forum. [Plaintiff]

requests this Honorable Court Correct or Amend Judgment

as to all Official Capacity claims pending in this court;

and grant a new trial on all Official Capacity Claims

against Randolph County, as; an elected Sherriff is a

Representative of the County of Randolph, North Carolina

under law.

(Docket Entry 78 at 1-2.)

Nothing in the Supplemental Authority changes the conclusion

that sovereign immunity shields Defendants from Plaintiff’s

official-capacity assault and battery claims because, as Plaintiff

previously conceded, she failed to establish that “Defendants

waived sovereign immunity through the purchase of liability

insurance” (Docket Entry 35 at 59 (internal quotation marks

omitted)). (See Docket Entry 78 at 1-2.) Accordingly, the

Supplemental Authority does not warrant reconsideration of the

dismissal of Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims.

III. Rule 59 Challenges

Although its precise contours lack clarity, the

Reconsideration Memorandum appears to focus on an alleged need “to

correct injustice” (Docket Entry 76 at 19). (See id. at 1-19.)

Consistent with that view, the Second Reconsideration Motion

maintains that existing legal principles regarding qualified

immunity and official-capacity claims wrought a manifest injustice

upon Plaintiff, Defendants, and the public at large. (See Docket

14

Entry 74 at 1 (“In support of Plaintiff’s Motion for new trial,

Plaintiff relies on the law, the lack of law, and the Judicial

necessity to correct injustice, protect the public, and interpret

and apply the law for the benefit of the people as the need

presents itself upon the Court.”); see also, e.g., Docket Entry 76

at 6-7 (“In this case, everyone is harmed by the law, trial, any

verdict; motion, appeal; because the entity that is responsible can

skirt justice and place the blame on younger subordinates in their

individual capacities and a mentally ill black woman in a hooptie

and thus; this case, as it stands right now, violates Plaintiffs

and Defendants Rights against unconstitutional state action.”), 9

(“In this cases Judgment, this court must amend, reconsider, order

a new trial, correct and or amend the Judgement entered, in any

manner under the law [Plaintiff] receives justice, and we the

individual people receive justice.”).)6 Plaintiff thus urges the

Court to allow her to proceed on her official-capacity claims

against Sheriff Seabolt. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 76 at 10-13.)

These arguments lack merit.

6 Plaintiff chose to sue Defendants in their individual

capacities. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 1 at 1.) As such, her

contention that conducting the trial against Defendants in their

individual capacities represents a manifest injustice (see, e.g.,

Docket Entry 76 at 6-7; see also id. at 16 n.4 (asserting that, in

testifying, Deputy Short “should be there protected by official

capacity protection”)) warrants no relief. See Robinson, 599 F.3d

at 407-11 (affirming denial of Rule 59 relief based on party’s

strategic litigation choice, explaining that “[t]he consequences

stemming from th[e plaintiff’s] choice . . . cannot be classified

as manifestly unjust towards [the plaintiff]”).

15

To begin, rather than asserting that an intervening change in

law necessitates relief, the Reconsideration Memorandum proffers

various policy arguments for why the Court should take this “chance

to establish law for the public at large” (id. at 9). (See, e.g.,

id. at 10 (advancing a “COMPELLING CAUSE FOR CHANGE” with the

subheading “What are elected leaders for, where are we going with

the law as it stands, who are the people?”), 12 (proposing various

new legal rules for official-capacity liability, and maintaining

that “[t]here are countless fair and impartial mechanisms this

Court could set the stage and establish in this case with this

motion; and creativity in the law is often underused,”

notwithstanding that, “[i]n federal Court, in cases like these,

creativity in the law is required”).) “It is the Congress, not the

federal judiciary, that is assigned the policy-making role in the

federal system,” Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 840 (M.D.N.C.

1983), aff’d, 737 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 479

(1985), and thus, “to the extent that [Plaintiff] believes [her

preferred approach] promotes ‘better’ policy, that argument should

be made to the legislature — not the judiciary,” Lynn v. Monarch

Recovery Mgmt., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 612, 625 (D. Md. 2013). In

any event, despite Plaintiff’s perspective that “[t]his case

screams for relief and law[, which] . . . this Court has the power

to define” (Docket Entry 76 at 18 (ellipsis added)), only “an

16

intervening change of controlling law,” Robinson, 599 F.3d at 411,

not a proposal to change the law, warrants relief under Rule 59(e).

Relatedly, Plaintiff expresses displeasure regarding

applicable legal principles. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 76 at 5

(asking, “how can an officer be reasonable, individually” under

qualified immunity standard and asserting that “[t]he law does not

answer that question”), 12 (contending that “[the] policy of not

having a policy, and or the law in general, prevent the issues from

being heard as they should of in front of this jury”), 13

(expressing “[Plaintiff’s counsel’s] opinion, shared with many

other attorneys[, that] there should not be a blanket hard-line

rule on the immunity issue”).) As an initial matter, qualified

immunity played no role in the outcome of the trial. (See Docket

Entry 69 at 1-3 (reflecting jury determination that Plaintiff

failed to prove that Defendants violated her rights).)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding qualified immunity

miss the mark. Regardless, disagreement with established legal

principles provides no grounds for Rule 59 relief. See Durkin, 444

F. Supp. at 889; see also, e.g., Hutchinson, 994 F.2d at 1082

(“While plaintiffs disagreed with how the district court applied

the Christiansburg standard, mere disagreement does not support a

Rule 59(e) motion.”).

Moreover, prior to entry of the Judgment, Plaintiff could —

and often did — advance her arguments regarding official-capacity

17

liability and qualified immunity (see generally Docket Entry 76);

indeed, the Second Reconsideration Motion represents Plaintiff’s

third attempt to salvage her official-capacity claims. (See, e.g.,

Docket Entry 33 at 3-4 (opposing dismissal of official-capacity

claims at summary judgment), 15-16 (arguing that “[t]he record

strongly indicates Sheriff Seabolt implements a policy and or

custom that flagrantly ignores the duties of sheriff’s deputies in

responding to an infraction,” precluding summary judgment on

official-capacity claims); Docket Entry 39 at 1-2 (requesting, in

First Reconsideration Motion, reconsideration of dismissal of

“[a]ll official capacity claims”); Docket Entry 76 at 8-18 (seeking

reintroduction of official-capacity claims).) However, “Rule 59(e)

may not be used to raise new arguments or present novel legal

theories that could have been raised prior to judgment,” Pacific

Ins., 148 F.3d at 404, and does not “give an unhappy litigant one

additional chance to sway the [Court],” Durkin, 444 F. Supp. at

889. Plaintiff’s contentions thus fail to justify Rule 59(e)

relief. See, e.g., Thomas v. South Carolina Dep’t of Mental

Health, No. 23-2190, 2024 WL 4298146, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 26,

2024) (concluding that Rule 59 “motion provided no basis for

relief” where movant “admittedly relied on new, broader arguments

not made previously”); Durkin, 444 F. Supp. at 889 (denying

reconsideration request where party’s “brief in support of his

motion is no more than an expression of a view of the law contrary

18

to that set forth in the [c]ourt’s opinion”); see also U.S. Tobacco

Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 257 (4th

Cir. 2018) (explaining that, “where litigants have once battled for

the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without

good reason permitted, to battle for it again” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Furthermore, the Reconsideration Memorandum repeatedly

concedes that the jury reached the correct verdict based upon the

evidence presented in the parties’ three-day trial. (See, e€.g.,

Docket Entry 76 at 4 (“[The] verdict . . . did not support

[Plaintiff] because, it should not. The jury did what they could

with what they were presented.” (ellipsis added) 18

(“[I]ndividually, [Defendants] were not liable.”).) However, “a

[Section 1983 official-capacity] claim fails as a matter of law

where there is no underlying constitutional violation.” Russ v.

Causey, 732 F. Supp. 2d 589, 604 (E.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d in part,

468 F. App’x 267 (4th Cir. 2012); see also, e.g., Waybright v.

Frederick Cnty., 528 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The

[Section] 1983 claim against [individual, subordinate official] is

the gateway to all the other [Section] 1983 claims, for supervisors

and municipalities cannot be liable under [Section] 1983 without

some predicate constitutional injury at the hands of the individual

state officer, at least in suits for damages.” (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted)); Boston v. Davis, No. 3:llicv450,

19

2011 WL 6826812, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2011) (“Since there is no

underlying constitutional violation by [the defendant] in his

individual capacity, [the p]laintiff’s official capacity claims

against [the defendant] should also be dismissed.”). The jury’s

determination that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s rights

necessarily defeats any associated official-capacity claims against

Defendants or Sheriff Seabolt, thwarting Plaintiff’s attempt to

revive those official-capacity claims.

Plaintiff laments, however, the alleged impact of the

dismissal of her official-capacity claims on the evidence

introduced at trial. According to the Reconsideration Memorandum,

“the law does not allow [Plaintiff] to enter evidence for the jury

to understand a proper verdict” (Docket Entry 76 at 10),7 and thus,

“[i]nstead of presenting evidence that demands liability, just as

everyone in the room saw, three men and one woman were paying for

the unconstitutional actions of the state” (id. at 17). In

particular, the Reconsideration Memorandum suggests that the lack

7 More specifically, the Reconsideration Memorandum asserts:

Reasonable officer is a legal principal to the jury and

there was not time to make to a layperson understand the

facts as applied to the law. Time in trial is the

secondary issue to the primary; the law does not allow

[Plaintiff] to enter evidence for the jury to understand

a proper verdict. In this case, all [D]efendants

testified they did not act as a reasonable officer, they

did testify they acted as a reasonable individual

officer.

(Id.)

20

of official-capacity claims prevented Plaintiff from introducing

two pieces of evidence and regrettably necessitated the

introduction of a third kind of evidence. (See, e.g., id. at 14-

17.) These arguments fail to justify Rule 59 relief.8

First, Plaintiff maintains that the lack of official-capacity

claims prevented her from introducing a canine-focused police

magazine into evidence. (See id. at 16.) Per the Reconsideration

Memorandum:

[Deputy] Short also testified that after this incident he

was on the cover of a police magazine, where in an

official capacity claim as plead, [Plaintiff’s counsel]

could have allowed the jury to view the extremely clear

body camera that “does not exist,” as [Sheriff] Seabolt

testified three separate times under oath.

(Id.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to explain how the

existence or non-existence of the official-capacity claims impacted

the introduction of this magazine into evidence. (See id. at 15-

16.) Moreover, Deputy Short testified that, rather than a body

camera, the image in question — of another individual — involved a

device that enables a K-9 officer to remotely open a door for a

canine. Further, even if the image in question involved a body

camera, it still would not establish the existence of body camera

8 As discussed above, the Reconsideration Memorandum concedes

that the evidence introduced at trial supported the jury’s verdict.

Accordingly, Plaintiff does not appear to seek a new trial on the

grounds that “the verdict is against the clear weight of the

evidence,” Conner, 227 F.3d at 200. Regardless, these concessions

fatally undermine any such contention.

21

footage of the incident involving Plaintiff. As the

Reconsideration Opinion already explained, the fact that an

officer, in a different role, possessed a video camera years after

Plaintiff’s traffic stop does not contradict the defense’s

repeatedly reaffirmed assurances that no body camera footage exists

of the incident involving Plaintiff. (See Docket Entry 43 at 10-

11.)

Plaintiff next asserts that the lack of official-capacity

claims prevented her from introducing evidence regarding the

resolution of charges that Plaintiff incurred as a result of the

underlying incident. (See Docket Entry 76 at 17.) More

specifically, the Reconsideration Memorandum states:

[Sheriff] Seabolt looked directly at [Plaintiff], the

first time she started crying, and stated that he has

“agreements,” with DA, and they could always open up the

charges... five and a half years later. If [Sheriff]

Seabolt was in his official capacity, immediately

[Plaintiff’s lawyer] would have attempted to enter the

evidence she has of October, 2024; where there is

circumstantial evidence, someone might have tried to open

her record before trial. Which would explain the

unsolicited explanations of some “mental health

agreement,” in exchange for voluntary dismissal that most

certainly did not happen. The charges were dismissed

because the deputies did not show up, and the stop and

seizure was unconstitutional. Only [Sheriff] Seabolt and

the youngest, not promoted yet [Deputy] Harrelson

testified about that “agreement.” Which would be

directly contrary to his counselor’s advice, as

oppression against the mentally ill is one of the largest

punitive awards in a case.

(Id. (ellipsis in original).)

22

As with the magazine, Plaintiff does not explain how the

absence of official-capacity claims impacted her ability to

introduce whatever unspecified “evidence she ha[d] of October,

2024,” regarding the disposition of these charges. (Id.)°

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of

Sheriff Seabolt’s testimony regarding the disposition of

Plaintiff’s charges,’® she fails to present any evidence in support

of her assertion that “[t]he charges were dismissed because the

deputies did not show up, and the stop and seizure was

unconstitutional” (id.). (See Docket Entries 74-76.)*"

Importantly, as the Court has already cautioned Plaintiff, “‘an

attorney’s unsworn argument does not constitute evidence,’ United

9 Because Plaintiff possessed this evidence prior to the

trial, it — like the magazine — does not qualify as “new evidence”

under Rule 59(e). See, e.g., Pacific Ins., 148 F.3d at 403 (“The

Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to .. . present evidence that

could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

10 Plaintiff appears to contest the veracity of the rationale

for the dismissal of the charges rather than suggest that she

experienced any prejudice from the implication that she suffers

from mental health issues. Regardless, given that Plaintiff

explicitly testified to her mental health issues — issues which the

Reconsideration Memorandum repeatedly acknowledges (see, e.g., id.

at 7 (describing Plaintiff as “mentally ill”), 13 (same)) — any

such argument would not justify relief.

11 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks a new trial based on

allegedly false evidence (see, _e.g., Docket Entry 76 at 13

(asserting, without development, that trial contained “blatant

falsehoods”)), Plaintiff’s failure to identify or otherwise provide

evidence establishing such falsity (see Docket Entries 74-76)

precludes such relief.

23

States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir. 2004).” (Docket Entry

43 at 13; accord id. at 10 n.3.)

Finally, the Reconsideration Memorandum appears to suggest

that the absence of official-capacity claims obliged Plaintiff to

testify. For instance, the Reconsideration Memorandum states:

[Deputy] Gabby testified, in [Plaintiff’s counsel’s]

belief, truthfully. Had the official capacity claims

survived, that would have mattered; because the jury

would not have had to listen to testimony from a woman

suffering from PTSD struggle to testify about her

abusers, in front of her abusers, for the first time in

five and a half years.

(Docket Entry 76 at 14.) The Reconsideration Memorandum further

maintains:

[Deputy] Gabby testified [that Plaintiff] was erratic,

[Deputy] Short testified [that Plaintiff] was calm and

did not respond. The person telling the truth,

ironically, was [Deputy] Gabby. The person protecting

[Plaintiff], and the department on the stand, was

[Deputy] Short. The truth is, [Plaintiff] was being

erratic, and was being odd after she was on the ground,

she is an eggshell [p]laintiff. No attorney would

subject [Plaintiff] to further character assassination,

but [Plaintiff’s counsel] was prepared to use it in the

punitive stage, and prepared for them to bring it up.

[Plaintiff] showed [Deputy] Gabby’s truth on the stand,

but showed [Deputy] Short’s kindness as an individual,

albeit falsehood as an official on the stand.

(Id. at 15-16.)

As with the magazine and dismissal evidence, Plaintiff fails

to explain how the existence or non-existence of the official-

capacity claims impacted the introduction of her testimony. (See

id. at 14-16.) Moreover, regardless of the status of the official-

capacity claims, Plaintiff could not have succeeded on her assault,

24

battery, and excessive-force claims without testifying to her

version of events at trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s contentions

regarding her testimony miss the mark.

In sum, none of Plaintiff’s contentions, whether policy,

legal, or evidentiary, warrants Rule 59 relief.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff fails to justify a new trial or reconsideration of

the Judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Second Reconsideration Motion

(Docket Entry 74) is DENIED.

This 7th day of April, 2025.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

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