noting that where “plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- noting that where “plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHARON BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
-against- 24-CV-7216 (LTS)
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION; UNITED
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
NATIONS; ANTONIO GUITERES; AMENESTY
INTERNATIONAL; PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
Defendants.
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Sharon Brown, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s
federal question jurisdiction. She alleges that Defendants “abused Israel and caused terrorism.”
(ECF 1, at 5.) She names as Defendants the World Health Organization, the United Nations,
António Guterres, Amnesty International, and Planned Parenthood.
By order dated September 25, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. On December 6, 2024, the Court
denied Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order. On
February 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. For the following reasons, the Court
dismisses the amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.
Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a
complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While
the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se
pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise
the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges the following: “All groups listed have abused Israel and caused terrorism
to initiate and persist and we’ve had to counter and dominate Gaza.”1 (ECF 1, at 5.) Plaintiff also
alleges that “they harm Israel in thought word or deed and we eradicate, eliminate, decimate and
dismantle them.” (Id.) Plaintiff proclaims that “[t]hey all speak harmful blood libels and
antisemitic words against the Bible.” (Id.) She claims that “[t]hey pretend Israel is mentally ill
for having invisible God who spoke to Abraham Isaac Jacob Adam and Eve Moses Joshua Caleb
Isaiah Zachariah Paul Peter etc and having angels speak to them.” (Id.)
In the injury section of the complaint, Plaintiff states that “[t]hey try to stop Jews, Israel
from living Bible, believing in Yahweh Elohim Hashem, believing in life.” (Id. at 6.) She seeks
to “seize all assets from Egypt, Islamic countries . . . stop pay to slay earning by terrorists who’s
families get paid when they explode or terrorize Israel.” (Id.) She includes in the relief section
the number 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, but it is unclear if she seeks this amount of money
in damages or if this number refers to something else entirely.
DISCUSSION
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts “to
the resolution of cases and controversies.” Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir.
1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation
are as in the original unless noted otherwise. The Court uses standardized capitalization.
2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of
the case-or-controversy requirement.” Arizonians for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64
(1997).
To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant’s alleged illegal conduct; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the
requested relief. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The burden of establishing standing to sue rests with the
party bringing the action. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Moreover, “a
generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing. A litigant raising
only a generally available grievance . . . and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large . . . does not state an Article III case or controversy.”
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, the complaint describes Plaintiff’s position on Israel. This position, however, is not
a claim because it lacks factual support demonstrating that a defendant caused Plaintiff to suffer
an actual injury that is redressable by a federal court. She therefore lacks standing to bring this
action, and consequently, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Mahon, 683 F.3d at 62 (noting that where “plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court has no
subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to
cure its defects but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,
657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Because the defects in Plaintiff’s amended complaint cannot be cured with amendment, the
Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter a civil judgment in this action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 7, 2025
New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge