Al-Barr v. Garrett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

DELTA DIVISION

LORD JUDAH AL-BARR, PLAINTIFF

Reg. # 40258-509

v. 2:25CV00025-BSM-JTK

CHAD GARRETT, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United

States District Judge Brian S. Miller. Any party may file written objections to all or part of this

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or

legal basis for your objections; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14)

days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of

fact.

DISPOSITION

I. Introduction

Lord Judah Al-Barr (“Plaintiff”) is in custody at Forrest City Medium Federal Correctional

Institution (“FCI-Forrest City”). (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff sued FCI—Forrest City officials

alleging: equal protection violations; 1 violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth

Amendment;2 due process violations; negligence; assault; false imprisonment, and intentional

1 Plaintiff refers to this claim as a discrimination claim.

2 Plaintiff refers to cruel and unusual punishment and “decent conditions,” which the

Court interprets as an unlawful conditions of confinement claim.

infliction of emotional distress. (Id.). On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff paid the $405 filing and

administrative fee to initiate this lawsuit. (Doc. No. 8). The Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a

governmental entity, officer, or employee, regardless of fee status. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a); Lewis

v. Estes, 242 F.3d 375 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (§ 1915A’s screening requirement applies

regardless of fee status).

II. Screening

The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a

governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a

complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or

malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(b).

An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Whether a plaintiff is represented by counsel or is appearing

pro se, his complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent,

780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985).

An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a pro se complaint under ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must

give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts

alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

III. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff sued former FCI-Forrest City Warden Chad Garrett, Assistant Warden Edge,

Associated Warden Hailaire, Case Manager Coordinator Jefferson, Unit Manager Wilson, Case

Manager Barrett, and Counselors Williams and Pike (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1).

Plaintiff asserts Defendant Barrett refuses to correct an error in Plaintiff’s BOP records. (Id. at 4-

5). Plaintiff says Defendant Barrett’s refusal to correct the error has prevented Plaintiff from

being eligible for earlier release from federal custody. (Id. at 4-5). According to Plaintiff, all

other Defendants conspired with Defendant Barrett for the error in his files to go uncorrected. (Id.

at 4-6).

Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 8).

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff’s federal claims fail for the reasons set out below and should be dismissed.

Plaintiff also raised state-law claims. If the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court

should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.

A. Federal Claims

Plaintiff alleges Defendants, through a conspiracy, violated Plaintiff’s equal protection

rights, due process rights, rights under the Eighth Amendment, and falsely imprisoned him.

1. Equal Protection

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall

‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).

Plaintiff says Defendants violated his equal protection rights, but he does not provide any

factual allegations in support of his equal protection claim. Plaintiff provides no explanation as

to how Defendants treated him differently than similarly situated individuals. To the extent

Plaintiff claims his equal protection rights were violated, that claim is conclusory. Bare

allegations void of factual enhancement are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

2. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff claims Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and unlawful

conditions of confinement. These allegations constitute a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate

violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (internal citations

omitted). Again, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory. Plaintiff does not identify any

substantial risk of harm and does not explain how any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to

that risk.

3. False Imprisonment

Plaintiff maintains he is falsely imprisoned. He says Defendants conspired to allow

Defendant Barrett’s failure to correct an error in Plaintiff’s BOP records, which harmed Plaintiff

by “hindering [his] ability to apply time-earned credits that would all [him] to drop in custody and

advance toward freedom.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4).

To the extent that states a federal claim, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Supreme

Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The crux of Plaintiff’s claim is that

he could be released sooner if Defendants corrected the error in his records.

As the United States Supreme Court has instructed:

[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must

consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has

already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s

action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding

criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in

the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. This approach prevents “a collateral attack on the conviction through the

vehicle of a civil suit.” Id. at 485 (internal citations omitted). To succeed on his claims here,

Plaintiff would need to establish the unlawfulness of the length of his sentence considering he was

prevented from applying “time earned credits,” which is the type of claim barred by Heck. See

Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff cannot challenge the length of

his sentence in this civil rights action; his only federal recourse is habeas corpus. See Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).3

4. Due Process

Plaintiff also claims Defendants violated his due process rights. Plaintiff’s claims fall

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Id.

at 3-4). “[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suit brought against state officials under . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006). A claim under Bivens is

the same as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “except that the former is maintained against federal

officials while the latter is against state officials.” Sanchez v. U.S., 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir.

1995) (per curiam). Generally, case law analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims applies to Bivens

cases. See Ibrahim v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a habeas action on December 2, 2024. Al-Barr v.

U.S.A., 3:24-cv-00238-BSM (E.D. Ark.). The Court further notes that Plaintiff also filed a

Motion for Compassionate Release and Pro Se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct sentence

in his federal criminal case. United State v. Al-Barr, 3:21-cv-00014-1-BSM (E.D. Ark.)

In determining whether Plaintiff’s allegations may proceed under Bivens, the first question

is whether his case is “the type for which a Bivens remedy is available.” Farah v. Weyker, 926

F.3d 492, 497 (8th Cir. 2019). The United States Supreme Court has recognized an implied

cause of action under Bivens on only three occasions. (Id. at 497-98). The three cases in which

the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens claim included: the ground-breaking Bivens case itself,

403 U.S. 388 (allegedly unlawful arrest and warrantless search in violation of the Fourth

Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (failure to treat prisoner’s asthma in violation

of the Eighth Amendment); and Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (sex discrimination in

violation of Fifth Amendment due process rights).

In a more recent case, the Supreme Court warned that while “Bivens is well-settled law in

its own context . . . expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Ziglar

v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to

extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants . . . .” Id. (internal citation

omitted). “[F]or almost 40 years, [the Supreme Court] [has] . . . rebuffed requests to add to the

claims allowed under Bivens.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020). Instead, “private

rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” Id. at 742 (internal citation

omitted).

Courts now undertake a two-step analysis to determine if an implied cause of action under

Bivens exists. Farah, 926 F.3d at 498. The first step is to ascertain whether the case presents “one

of ‘the three Bivens claims the [Supreme] Court has approved in the past’ or whether, instead,

allowing the plaintiffs to sue would require us to extend Bivens to a new ‘context.’” Id. If the

claim presented is not one that has been previously recognized, courts consider whether “special

factors counsel[] hesitation” in extending Bivens to the claims at hand. Id.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants conspired to allow for Defendant Barrett’s failure to correct

an error in Plaintiff’s BOP records, which harmed Plaintiff by “hindering [his] ability to apply

time-earned credits that would all [him] to drop in custody and advance toward freedom.” (Doc.

No. 1 at 4).

a. New Context

In Davis v. Passman, noted above, the plaintiff alleged violation of her due process rights.

Passman, 442 U.S. 228. Here, too, Plaintiff says his due process rights were violated. (Doc. No.

1 at 4).

While both this case and Passman involve a due process claim against federal actors, the

facts of the cases and the nature of the alleged violations are different. As such, the Court must

determine if the differences “‘are meaningful enough to make [this] context a new one.’” Farah,

926 F.3d at 498. The context will be considered new if “the case is different in meaningful way

from the previous Bivens cases” decided by the Supreme Court. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. In

deciding whether a context is new, courts consider the following factors, among others:

the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or

specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer

should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other

legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion

by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; [and] the presence of

potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.

Farah, 926 F.3d at 498 (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859-60).

In Passman, the issue was discrimination. The plaintiff, a congressional staffer, was

terminated from her employment on the basis of sex. Passman, 442 U.S. at 230. She sought

damages in the form of backpay for the alleged violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at

231. Here, Plaintiff, an inmate with administrative remedies available to him, alleges his due

process rights were violated when Defendants refused to correct an error in his prison file.

The factual differences between this case and Passman are vast, with respect to both how

the claims arose and the damage alleged. “When . . . meaningful differences exist, it is not enough

to identify a few similarities.” Ahmed v. Weyker, 984 F.3d 564, 570 (8th Cir. 2020). When

meaningful differences exist, a modest extension is nonetheless an extension, “even if [the claim]

involves ‘the same constitutional provision.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). In cases more

similar to the one at hand than Passman, courts have found “new context” for Abbasi purposes.

For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that a federal prisoner’s due

process claim arising out of disciplinary proceedings against him was a new context under Abbasi.

Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2018). And other courts that considered an

inmate’s due process claims in connection with the loss of personal property have found that

allowing the claim to proceed would extend Bivens to a new context. See Berry v. Bureau of

Prisons, No. 5:20-CV-424-KKM-PRL, 2021 WL 4166181, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2021).

While not binding, such decisions are informative.

Considering the differences between Passman and this case, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

claims present a new context for the purposes of Abbasi.

b. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation

Because the Court determined Plaintiff’s claims present a new context, the determination

as to whether an implied cause of action under Bivens exists proceeds to the second step of the

analysis: do any “special factors counsel[] hesitation” in allowing the case to proceed as a new

Bivens cause of action in the absence of affirmative action by Congress? Farah, 926 F.3d at 500.

The Court finds there are special factors that counsel hesitation in allowing this case to

proceed under Bivens. An inmate may seek relief through the BOP’s grievance procedure.

Allowing Plaintiff’s claims to proceed under Bivens would engage the courts in disputes that could

be and should be raised administratively, which is disfavored. (See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865;

Farah, 926 F.3d at 501-02; 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19). Providing a damages remedy for

Defendants’ alleged wrongs in this case lies in Congress’s realm. See Id. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s due process claims should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.

B. State-Law Claims

In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff brought the state-law claims of negligence,

assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). This Court may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if no live federal claims remain

in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. “‘[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction

doctrine . . . will point towards declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.’” King v. City of Crestwood, Missouri, 899 F.3d 643, 651 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal

citation omitted). Having already determined that Plaintiff’s federal claims should be dismissed,

the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.

V. Conclusion

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s federal claims be DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

3. This action be DISMISSED.

4. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis

appeal from any Order adopting these recommendations and accompanying Judgment would not

be taken in good faith.

Dated this 7 day of March, 2025. ir é

JEROME T. KEARN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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