Vincent Harris v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued April 3, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-23-00549-CR

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VINCENT HARRIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1716998

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Vincent Harris was convicted of murder involving a shooting and

sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment. In three issues, Harris challenges his

conviction based on an alleged violation of the Confrontation Clause involving

admission of evidence and jury-charge error. We affirm.

I. Background

On the evening of September 11, 2020, Daniel Partida, who had recently been

discharged from a halfway house, consumed alcohol and illegal drugs before falling

asleep at a bus stop with his possessions nearby in plastic bags. These possessions

were stolen and brought to a nearby Citgo gas station where they were placed inside

the station’s food mart. A group of men, including Harris (who is also known as

Airline Lil Mac), gathered at the Citgo station that evening and into the early hours

of September 12, 2020. Harris and his acquaintance Cornelius Watson1 placed

handguns inside the Citgo station’s food mart, as captured by video cameras.

When he awoke, Partida saw that his possessions, including his wallet and cell

phone, were missing and went to the Citgo station to find them. The men at the

Citgo station did not return the possessions, but some of them, including Ricky

Nacoste, assaulted Partida. Partida then left. Harris testified that he approached the

fight and told the men to leave Partida alone and not take advantage of him, but that

Partida “cussed” at Harris and stated he was going to “get his stuff back by any

means.” Harris’s account that he was acting altruistically in trying to help Partida

1

Our court previously affirmed Watson’s murder conviction involving the same

events as this case. See Watson v. State, No. 01-23-00172-CR, 2024 WL 3350262

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication).

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was contradicted by video showing that, after this confrontation, Harris was laughing

and reenacting the fight.

Around an hour later, Partida returned to the Citgo station. Partida testified

he did not have any weapon at any point that night and returned to the station because

he needed his possessions. According to Harris, Partida declared that, if his

possessions were not returned, “he was going to call his people and they were going

to shut this bitch down,” which Harris took to be a threat of violence. But Partida

testified his cell phone had been stolen and he could not make any calls.

Nacoste again started fighting Partida. Harris testified he tried to stop the fight

because he was concerned “one of them could hit their head the wrong way and die.”

Nonetheless, Harris eventually joined the fight and admitted he was punching at

Partida as he was trying to walk away. Harris admitted Partida did not have a

weapon and that Harris could have stopped fighting and returned to the Citgo station.

The fighters moved into the street and then into the parking lot of a Shell station

across from the Citgo station. Around that time, Jarmel Joiner, who was in a

wheelchair, traveled by the scene. Harris knew Joiner as someone who frequents

the area and washes car windows to make money.

At the time of this fight, Ingrid Ramirez was riding in a truck with her

husband, coming from the other side of a highway overpass that ran parallel to the

Citgo and Shell stations. They came to a stop at a traffic light on the side of the

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overpass where the Citgo and Shell stations were located. At that point, Ramirez

saw Partida fighting with Nacoste. Ramirez believed Nacoste was the aggressor in

the fight because Partida was moving backward and appeared to be losing. Ramirez

observed the fight move across the road into the median, during which time Harris

joined Nacoste in fighting Partida. She then saw the fight move into the Shell station

parking lot.

While Harris and Partida were fighting in the Shell station parking lot, a blue

car pulled up to the men for about five seconds. Describing video from the Shell

station, a law-enforcement officer testified that Harris appeared to gesture to the car

to “get out of here.” Partida testified that it was a “random vehicle,” whereas Harris

testified it appeared the driver of the blue car knew Partida.

Harris initially testified that the driver of the blue car jumped out of the car,

but then clarified the driver only partially came out of the car and reached for a

handgun. According to Harris, a female passenger in the blue car prevented the

driver from exiting. Harris claims he told the driver to take Partida and leave, but

the driver stated, “[A]nybody standing on the corner fixing to get it.”

Ramirez also observed the blue car pull up to the men, where she says an

occupant spoke to Partida for two or three seconds. Ramirez saw the car then make

a U-turn out of the Shell station, drive under the overpass, and turn left to get onto

the feeder road on the other side of the overpass; she did not see the blue car again.

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Ramirez did not see anyone in the blue car display a weapon, although she admitted

she could not tell if they were armed or not.

As the blue car began to leave, Harris and Watson ran back to the Citgo station

food mart. Partida followed them, and Joiner was still nearby. Harris and Watson

emerged from the food mart holding guns. Harris claims he was retrieving his gun

to defend himself and others because of the threat made by the driver of the blue car.

However, Harris conceded that nothing prevented him or others from leaving the

area or taking cover inside the Citgo station food mart.

At this point, Partida and Joiner turned around and started traveling away from

the Citgo station with their backs to the store. Harris and Watson followed in the

direction of Partida and Joiner and began shooting once they reached the adjacent

street. According to Harris, he saw the blue car had made a U-turn on the other side

of the overpass and was moving around three miles per hour. Harris claims that the

driver of the blue car then fired two shots from a gun inside the car. Harris testified

he told Watson, “[T]hey’re shooting at us,” so he and Watson defensively returned

fire. Harris stated there was a gap of about two to three seconds between when the

driver of the blue car fired shots and when Harris and Watson returned fire.

During this time, Ramirez and her husband were parked in the Shell station

parking lot with a good view of the shooting events. Ramirez testified she saw Harris

and Watson fire shots in the direction of Partida and Joiner, who were around five

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feet apart from each other and still had their backs to Harris and Watson. Ramirez

testified she was one-hundred percent sure that the men shot in the direction of

Partida and Joiner.2 Ramirez stated they fired more than ten shots, and she did not

hear any other gunshots.

An investigating officer testified that law enforcement spoke to multiple

witnesses following the shooting, and the witnesses’ statements were generally

consistent except from one witness who stated the men were “shooting at a car near

the underpass.”

During the shooting, Joiner was hit by a bullet and died quickly thereafter.

Harris and Watson returned to the Citgo station, and Harris left in a vehicle that sped

past Joiner’s body on the street. Watson left the scene on foot. Ramirez called 911

to report that Joiner had been shot. Ramirez’s husband checked Joiner for a pulse

and determined he was dead.

2

On appeal, Harris contends Ramirez conceded her trial account of the shooting was

inconsistent with her original account when she told officers the shooters were

shooting in the direction of the blue car. Ramirez did not make such a concession.

During cross-examination at trial, Ramirez remained adamant that Harris and

Watson were shooting in the direction of Partida and Joiner, not the blue car. She

was then shown a transcript of a hearing from February 2023 where she apparently

may have said it was possible they were shooting in the direction of a car. However,

on re-direct examination, she explained she corrected the questioner in the prior

hearing by explaining she did not say it was possible the men shot in the direction

of a car.

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Harris did not attempt to aid Joiner or communicate with police despite

knowing within a few minutes of the shooting that Joiner had died. Harris also could

not produce his gun at trial, claiming he had his then-girlfriend keep it to use to

exonerate him should he become a suspect in the shooting, but explaining he does

not communicate with her anymore.

Fourteen shell casings were found near where Joiner was shot. Forensics

established that the casings came from two guns, one that fired 9 mm ammunition,

and one that fired .380 caliber ammunition. Harris testified his gun was a .380

caliber. A crime-scene investigator testified she searched the area under the

overpass and did not see any casings in that area. Trial witnesses testified that

casings can be moved as cars drive over them and that casings will stay inside a gun

if a revolver is used or stay inside a car if the gun was fired while inside the car.

The investigation eventually led to Harris and Watson, both of whom were

indicted for murder. At trial in Harris’s case, he admitted the first time he told his

self-defense story was during the trial. He conceded he lied in January 2021 when

he told police he knew nothing about the shooting, and he recognized he did not tell

police about the blue car and his alleged self-defense story. Additionally, Harris

admitted that, when speaking on the phone to a friend in April 2023 about the

charges, Harris stated, “I know it’s my fault. I ain’t gonna never blame it on any

other person. It’s my fault, but damn.”

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The jury charge contained several disjunctive application paragraphs

regarding alternative theories for how Harris was responsible for Joiner’s murder.

The charge also submitted defensive instructions that required acquittal if the jury

found, or had a reasonable doubt as to whether, Harris reasonably believed the use

of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself or a third person from

another’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. These instructions further

provided that the use of force is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone,

and that a person who did not provoke the other person against whom deadly force

is used, and who was not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is

used, is not required to retreat before using deadly force.

During closing arguments, Harris argued he acted in defense of himself and

others when he lawfully fired shots in response to the driver of the blue car shooting.

Harris also argued that the driver of the blue car may have shot Joiner. The State

argued Harris was guilty of murder because the evidence refuted the story he

fabricated to justify Joiner’s shooting. The State further contended that, even if the

jury believed Harris’s story, he was not entitled to acquittal based on defense of

himself or others because the driver of the blue car engaged in mere verbal

provocation and Harris provoked the situation.

The jury unanimously found Harris guilty of murder, and the trial court

sentenced him to sixty years’ imprisonment. Harris now appeals.

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II. Confrontation Clause

In his first issue, Harris contends that admission of the report regarding

Joiner’s autopsy, and testimony about the report, violated Harris’s right to

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, requiring reversal. We disagree.

A. Legal standards

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution—the Confrontation

Clause—provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. CONST. amend.

VI. “The main purpose behind the Confrontation Clause is to secure for the opposing

party the opportunity of cross-examination because that is ‘the principal means by

which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.’”

Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citation omitted).

To implicate the Confrontation Clause, an out-of-court statement must

(1) have been made by a witness absent from trial and (2) be testimonial in nature.

Henriquez v. State, 580 S.W.3d 421, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet.

ref’d). If those initial requirements are met, the statement is admissible and does not

violate the Confrontation Clause only if (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the

defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. “An autopsy

report is considered testimonial when an objective medical examiner would

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reasonably believe that the report would be used in a later prosecution.” Id. at 427–

28.

In assessing the harm arising out of a violation of constitutional rights, we

must reverse a judgment of conviction unless we determine beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).

The critical inquiry is not whether the evidence supported the verdict absent the

erroneously admitted evidence, but rather the likelihood that the constitutional error

was a contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations. Henriquez, 580 S.W.3d at 429

(citations and quotations omitted). When reviewing harm for violations of the

Confrontation Clause, we consider: (1) how important the out-of-court statement

was to the State’s case; (2) whether the out-of-court statement was cumulative of

other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or

contradicting the out-of-court statement on material points; and (4) the overall

strength of the prosecution’s case. Gutierrez v. State, 516 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d).

B. Analysis

Tabitha Ward, M.D. performed the autopsy of Joiner, and Lucile Tennant,

M.D. reviewed the report. At trial, Dr. Ward and Dr. Tennant were not available to

testify, so the State called Ana Lopez, M.D. to testify about the autopsy and the

manner of Joiner’s death. Harris objected to admission of the autopsy report and Dr.

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Lopez’s testimony because Dr. Lopez was not involved in the autopsy, meaning

Harris was unable to cross-examine the doctors who actually performed the autopsy,

violating his right to confrontation. The trial court overruled the objection and

admitted the autopsy report.

Dr. Lopez testified that she is a board-certified forensic pathologist who has

performed over 5,000 autopsies. Dr. Lopez reviewed the autopsy photographs, the

crime-scene photographs, and the findings of Dr. Ward and Dr. Tennant as stated in

their autopsy report. Dr. Lopez agreed with the autopsy-report findings that Joiner

was shot in the right side of his back from a distance of greater than 2.5-to-3 feet,

and the bullet exited the left side of his body near the chest. But Dr. Lopez also

testified she independently observed the gunshot wounds in the autopsy photographs

(which were admitted into evidence without objection3), and she explained why the

wound on Joiner’s back was the entry wound and the wound near the left side of his

chest was the exit wound. During cross-examination, Dr. Lopez went over the

autopsy photographs again and explained in detail why the back wound is an entry

3

The photographs admitted into evidence were of Joiner’s body, and specifically his

gunshot wounds, before any autopsy-related cutting began. “[A]utopsy

photographs are considered nontestimonial in nature and do not implicate the

Confrontation Clause.” Henriquez, 580 S.W.3d at 428.

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wound because it is a circular wound with a rim of abrasion, and the front wound is

an exit wound because it is slit-shaped and does not have a rim of abrasion.

Assuming the autopsy report was testimonial in nature, and assuming

admission of the report and Dr. Lopez’s testimony about the report violated the

Confrontation Clause, we hold the violation was not harmful. Harris argues the

autopsy report and Dr. Lopez’s testimony about the report were “crucial evidence

for the State” because they detailed that Joiner was shot in the right side of his back,

with the bullet exiting the left side of his chest. Harris contends this was important

for the State to prove because there was a “valid disagreement about the trajectory

of the bullet” and it was unknown what caliber gun fired the bullet and from how

far. But the autopsy report simply describes the bullet’s path through Joiner’s body

and does not pertain to where the shooter was aiming when the fatal shot was fired,

where Joiner was facing at the time of the shooting, or what the bullet’s caliber was.

Moreover, Harris argued during trial and argues on appeal that the trajectory of the

bullet path as described in the autopsy report is consistent with the defense theory

that Harris and Watson fired at the blue car in self-defense—meaning, per Harris,

the autopsy report aided his defense.

Harris also argues “Dr. Lopez could only parrot Dr. Ward’s conclusions from

the autopsy report,” but that is wrong. Based on the photographs, Dr. Lopez was

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able to explain independent of the autopsy report why the bullet wound on Joiner’s

back was the entry wound, and the wound to the left of his chest was the exit wound.

Accordingly, the autopsy report was not critical to the State’s case but set forth

an uncontested fact4 of where the bullet entered and exited Joiner’s body and was

cumulative of Dr. Lopez’s testimony regarding her own review of the photographs.

Moreover, Harris argued that the autopsy report supported his theory of self-defense.

Based on the relevant considerations, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

any Confrontation Clause violation stemming from admission of the autopsy report

and testimony did not contribute to Harris’s conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a);

Henriquez, 580 S.W.3d at 429–30 (concluding error was harmless because autopsy

report added little beyond autopsy photographs and testifying doctor’s testimony

based on her independent review, both of which were properly admitted). We

overrule Harris’s first issue.

III. Jury Charge

In his second issue, Harris argues that trial court erred by denying his request

to modify language in the jury charge stating that the jury’s duty was to determine

4

Some of the emergency and law-enforcement personnel who came to the scene of

the shooting noted the wound near the left side of Joiner’s chest was the entry

wound. However, these personnel admitted their preliminary belief was merely a

guess and they would defer to the medical examiner’s opinion. Harris did not argue

at trial that the front wound was the entry wound but adopted Dr. Lopez’s opinion

that the back wound was the entry wound.

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“guilt or innocence.” In his third issue, Harris contends the disjunctive application

paragraphs in the jury charge allowed him to be convicted by a non-unanimous

verdict in violation of the Texas Constitution.

A. Legal standards

We review alleged charge error by first determining whether error exists in

the charge. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If error

exists, we analyze the harm resulting from the error to determine whether reversal is

required and apply separate standards of review depending on whether the defendant

timely objected to the jury instructions. Id.; see also Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d

840, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

The purpose of the jury charge is to instruct the jurors on the law applicable

to the case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14; Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d

361, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The abstract portion of the court’s charge sets

forth the law in general terms, including statutory definitions and offense elements.

See Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 366–67. The application paragraphs then apply that law

to the particular facts. Id. A jury charge that improperly states the law or the

elements of an offense is erroneous. Hollins v. State, No. 01-22-00776-CR, 2024

WL 4982504, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 5, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication).

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B. There is no jury-charge error regarding “guilt or innocence”

Regarding Harris’s second issue, the charge provided, “Your sole duty at this

time is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant under the indictment in

this cause and restrict your deliberations solely to the issue of guilt or innocence of

the defendant.” Harris’s counsel argued this was a misstatement of the law because

the jury does not consider whether a defendant is innocent. Harris’s counsel asked

the trial court to modify the language to read, “Your sole duty at this time is to

determine whether the State has proved the elements under the indictment in this

cause beyond a reasonable doubt and restrict your deliberations solely to that issue.”

The trial court denied this request.

Our sister court has previously held that this exact same instruction is not

improper but tracks the requirement in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that

the jury first consider “the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant” before the

punishment phase of trial. Avila v. State, 15 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 2(a)). The

court further explained that there was no risk that this instruction could mislead or

confuse the jury into believing the defendant had the burden to prove his innocence

because other instructions in the charge made it clear the “law does not require a

defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all.” Id. (emphasis in

original). The charge here similarly contained instructions making it clear that

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Harris was presumed innocent and had no burden to prove his innocence. The trial

court did not err in rejecting Harris’s proposed instruction. We overrule Harris’s

second issue.

C. There is no jury-charge error regarding unanimity

Regarding Harris’s third issue, the indictment charged him with two

alternative theories for Joiner’s murder, first for intentionally and knowingly causing

Joiner’s death by shooting him with a firearm, and second for intending to cause

serious bodily injury to Joiner and causing his death by intentionally and knowingly

committing an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting him with a firearm.

See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1), (2).

The jury charge authorized conviction pursuant to three application

paragraphs as follows: (1) on a finding beyond a reasonable doubt (a) that Harris

intentionally and knowingly caused Joiner’s death by shooting him with a firearm

or (b) that Harris was criminally responsible as a party by promoting or assisting

Watson, who intentionally and knowingly caused Joiner’s death by shooting him

with a firearm; or (2) on a finding beyond a reasonable doubt (a) that Harris intended

to cause serious bodily injury to Joiner and did cause his death by intentionally and

knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting him with

a firearm or (b) that Harris was criminally responsible as a party by promoting or

assisting Watson, who intended to cause serious bodily injury to Joiner and did cause

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his death by intentionally and knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to

human life by shooting him with a firearm; or (3) on a finding beyond a reasonable

doubt that Harris, acting alone or with Watson as a party, intentionally and

knowingly shot a firearm at a known or unknown person or persons, intending or

knowing that serious bodily injury or death would occur to that person or those

persons, and hit Joiner, causing his death. Thus, the jury charge submitted both

indicted theories for Joiner’s murder and allowed for Harris’s conviction under law-

of-parties and transferred-intent theories. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.04(b)(2)

(transferred intent), 7.01–.02(a)(2) (law of parties).

“When alternate theories of committing the same offense are submitted to the

jury in the disjunctive, it is appropriate for the jury to return a general verdict if the

evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the submitted theories.”

Lazarine v. State, No. 01-19-00982-CR, 2021 WL 5702182, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). This applies when alternative theories for committing murder are

submitted because “the theories are alternative manners and means of committing

the offense of murder, rather than distinct offenses.” Braughton v. State, 522 S.W.3d

714, 727–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017), aff’d, 659 S.W.3d 592 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2019). It also applies when application paragraphs authorize a murder

conviction based on law-of-parties and transferred-intent theories because they are

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likewise alternative manners and means of committing murder. See Holford v. State,

177 S.W.3d 454, 463 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (pertaining

to the law of parties); see also Small v. State, No. 01-14-00421-CR, 2016 WL

4126725, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (explaining section 6.04(b)(2) authorizes a

murder conviction when defendant kills a person different than the person he

intended to kill).

In Holford, we determined disjunctive application paragraphs involving a

murder charge and the law of parties did not violate the unanimity requirement:

Each of the disjunctive paragraphs thus describes a different means of

committing the same act. The paragraphs instructing on conspiracy and

law of parties include a transferred intent as a potential means of

committing the offense, but the transferred intent ultimately relates to

the same actus reus. . . . [T]he actus reus of Holford’s offense was

murder. We hold that the trial court’s instructions require the jurors to

agree that Holford committed that single act (either directly or via

transferred intent), and thus the trial court did not err in failing to

instruct the jury that it must agree unanimously on the manner of

[decedent’s] murder.

177 S.W.3d at 463; see also Sanchez v. State, No. 03-13-00050-CR, 2013 WL

4487562, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 15, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (“[The Court of Criminal Appeals] makes it clear that

multiple theories of party liability under section 7.02 may be listed disjunctively in

the jury charge without running afoul of the constitutional unanimity requirement.”).

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Harris relies on inapplicable cases in which the jury charge erroneously did

not require unanimity regarding the specific offense committed or the specific

incident that constituted commission of the offense. See Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d

706, 716–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding unanimity required for type of

“injury to a child” committed); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005) (concluding unanimity required for specific incident of “credit card abuse”

committed); Francis v. State, 36 S.W.3d 121, 122–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

(concluding unanimity required for specific incident of “indecency with a child”

committed). Here, the charge required unanimity regarding the offense committed

and the incident that constituted commission of the offense, specifically Joiner’s

murder by shooting.

Accordingly, for each theory that was submitted in the present case, the

criminal act was the same—Joiner’s murder. Harris cannot avoid criminal

responsibility for Joiner’s murder merely because Watson, whom Harris was aiding,

fired the fatal shot, or because Harris and Watson intended to shoot another person

when one of them shot Joiner. The charge required the jury to unanimously find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris was responsible for causing Joiner’s murder

by shooting, albeit via alternative theories regarding the means and modes of

committing the murder, and thus satisfied the Texas Constitution. See Hernandez v.

State, No. 01-15-00492-CR, 2016 WL 5920768, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

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Dist.] Oct. 11, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Jury

unanimity is required on the essential elements of the offense, but is generally not

required on the alternate modes or means of commission.”). We overrule Harris’s

third issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Andrew Johnson

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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