“[T]he provisions of 23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he provisions of 23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 REBECA BRINKLY WARD, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00698-CAB-DEB
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER:
13 v.
(1) GRANTING MOTION TO
14 PAD PROPERTIES GROUP, LP, et al.,
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;
15 Defendants.
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
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On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff Rebeca Brinkley Ward filed a complaint against
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Defendants PAD Properties Group, LP, West Star Properties, C&J Legacy Residential,
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LLC, and Adain Perone. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required
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by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, she filed a motion to proceed in forma
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pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] For the reasons outlined
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below, Plaintiff’s IFP motion is GRANTED, and her complaint is DISMISSED with leave
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to amend.
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I. Motion to Proceed IFP
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Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See
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28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.5(a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the
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court may authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit without
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1 payment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her
2 assets, showing that he or she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support
3 of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs
4 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th
5 Cir. 2015). “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity,
6 definiteness and certainty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The granting or denial
7 of leave to proceed IFP in civil cases is within the sound discretion of the district court.
8 Venerable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
9 In support of her application, Plaintiff lists no assets. [Doc. No. 2 at 3.] She receives
10 $1,030 in public assistance. [Id. at 2.] She lists her average monthly expenses at $2,135
11 and provides some detail to support this amount. [Id. at 4–5.] Her expenses are greater
12 than her source of income, which appears to be solely public benefits. Based on the
13 “particularity, definiteness and certainty” in the information provided, the Court is
14 persuaded that Plaintiff lacks the funds to pay the filing fee and “still afford the necessities
15 of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. The motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED.
16 II. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
17 Nevertheless, upon granting a request to proceed IFP, the Court must additionally
18 analyze a complaint’s sufficiency under 28 U.S.C § 1915. A plaintiff seeking to proceed
19 IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte dismissal if the complaint is
20 “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks
21 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
22 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of
23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). Congress enacted this safeguard
24 because “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an
25 economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.”
26 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
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1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint liberally. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
2 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff alleges a series of state and common law claims related
3 to a residential property she rented at some point. [See Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff does not
4 assert a single federal claim.
5 The only way this Court would have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint is
6 through diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete diversity between the parties. 28
7 U.S.C. § 1332. More simply, Plaintiff cannot be a citizen of a state that is the same as any
8 Defendant. Id.; see Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989).
9 As alleged in her complaint, Plaintiff is a California resident along with Defendant PAD
10 Properties Group, LP.1 [See Doc. No. 1-1 (“County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
11 [PAD Properties Group, LP]: San Diego”).] Thus, the parties are not diverse and the Court
12 lacks jurisdiction over this case.
13 Plaintiff may amend her complaint to either properly plead complete diversity or a
14 federal claim. Plaintiff is instructed to clearly identify the citizenship of each Defendant
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1 Plaintiff also appears to establish in her complaint caption that Defendant Adain Perone resides at
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l II. Conclusion
2 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES □□□□□□□□□□□
3 || complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff shall have until April 24, 2025 to amend
4 ||her complaint. Plaintiff's amended complaint must be complete by itself without reference
5 her original pleading. Defendants not named and claims not re-alleged in the amended
6 ||complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1(a); see also Lacey v.
7 || Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffis reminded that federal courts
8 required to examine jurisdiction sua sponte—meaning on their own initiative. See
9 || Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
10 It is SO ORDERED.
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12 Kb
13 Dated: April 3, 202° Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
14 United States District Judge
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