“Initially, it falls to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government practice complained of imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise.”
How later courts described this case
- “Initially, it falls to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government practice complained of imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise.”
- affirming trial court’s dismissal of 1These background facts are taken from Hodge’s Amended Complaint (ECF 30
- “RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for damages against [the defendants] in their official capacities…”
- “We have held that the application of [Section 1997e(e)] ... turns on the relief sought by a prisoner, and that it prevents prisoners from seeking compensatory damages for violations of federal law where no physical injury is alleged.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
THEOTIS LEE HODGE, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 2:22-CV-200-Z-BR
§
D. ZIMMERMAN, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT J. RILLEY
Before the Court is the Amended Complaint (ECF 30) filed by Plaintiff Theotis Lee Hodge
(“Hodge”) against Defendant J. Rilley (“Rilley”), alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hodge filed this lawsuit pro se while a prisoner at the Allred Unit of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), and has been granted permission to proceed in forma
pauperis. As such, his lawsuit is subject to preliminary screening as provided by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to such screening and for the reasons stated below, the
Magistrate Judge recommends that Hodge’s Amended Complaint, which only states claims against
Rilley, be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.
Given Hodge’s pro se status, the Court has liberally construed the Amended Complaint as
a supplement to Hodge’s initial Complaint, rather than a true amendment that would supersede all
claims against the ten remaining Defendants who are referenced in his initial Complaint. As such,
the findings, conclusions and recommendations set forth herein do not affect the claims alleged in
Hodge’s initial Complaint.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis by a prisoner against a
government entity or employee if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2017); see also Section 1915A(b)
(applying section to any suit by a prisoner against certain governmental entities, regardless of
whether the prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis). A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable
basis, either in fact or in law, for the wrong alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A complaint has no arguable basis in fact if it rests upon clearly fanciful or baseless factual
contentions, and similarly lacks an arguable basis in law if it embraces indisputably meritless legal
theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). When analyzing a
prisoner’s complaint, the court may consider reliable evidence such as the plaintiff’s allegations,
responses to a questionnaire, and authenticated prison records. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480,
483–84 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that responses to a questionnaire or testimony given during an evidentiary hearing are incorporated
into the plaintiff’s pleadings).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court accepts well-pleaded factual
allegations as true, but does not credit conclusory allegations or assertions that merely restate the
legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016).
While courts hold pro se plaintiffs to a more lenient standard than attorneys when analyzing
complaints, such plaintiffs must plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above a
speculative level. Id. (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Factual Background.1
In October 2022, Hodge filed his Amended Complaint, alleging that Rilley violated his due
process rights by not following TDCJ regulations in addressing grievances Hodge filed while
incarcerated at the Clements Unit. The grievances apparently are based on a disciplinary charge
that Hodge contends is unfounded. He also states in his Amended Complaint that he seeks to assert
a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) but does not
allege any facts supporting this cause of action. For the reasons stated below, the Amended
Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous.
B. Hodge’s Grievance-Based Claims.
Rilley, Hodge alleges, is the central grievance officer of TDCJ. (ECF 30 at 6). Hodge
alleges that Rilley violated Hodge’s due process rights by exhibiting “indifference” regarding
TDCJ’s grievance procedures and by not responding to Hodge’s Step 2 grievances in a timely
manner. Rilley’s delayed responses, Hodge alleges, violate Hodge’s due process rights. (Id.).
Hodge’s allegations related to the grievance process fail to state a claim because there is
no constitutionally protected right to a prison grievance system, and the fact that a grievance was
not investigated timely or resolved to Hodge’s satisfaction does not implicate any constitutionally
protected rights. See Schwarzer v. Wainright, 810 F. App’x 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)); Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374 (holding that prisoners do not have
a federally protected liberty interest in having grievances resolved to their satisfaction); Alexander
v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 951 F.3d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2020) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of
1These background facts are taken from Hodge’s Amended Complaint (ECF 30) and are assumed to be true
for the purpose of evaluating the merits of Hodge’s causes of action.
inmate’s claim that his grievances were mishandled or improperly denied, as prisoners have no
due-process rights in the inmate grievance process); Grogan v. Kumar, 873 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir.
2017) (“[I]t is well established that prisoners have no due process rights in the inmate grievance
process.”) (citation omitted); Mahogany v. Miller, 252 F. App’x 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (holding that plaintiff had no actionable Section 1983 claim based on prison officials’
failure to process his grievances); Edmond v. Martin, 100 F.3d 952, 1996 WL 625331, at *1 (5th
Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that inmate’s claim that defendant’s failure to investigate his
grievance “raises no constitutional issue”); Jenkins v. Henslee, No. 3-01-CV-1996-R, 2002 WL
432948, at *2 (N.D. Tex. March 15, 2002) (“An inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement
to [a] grievance procedure. Hence any alleged violation of the grievance procedure does not
amount to a constitutional violation.”) “Insofar as [the inmate] seeks relief regarding an alleged
violation of his due process rights resulting from the prison grievance procedures, the district court
did not err in dismissing his claim as frivolous.” Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374-5.
Hodge’s claim against Rilley based on alleged mishandling of Hodge’s grievances state no
constitutional violation. Accordingly, such claim should be dismissed as frivolous.
C. Hodge’s RLUIPA Claim.
Hodge’s Amended Complaint states that he “seeks to raise [a] claim under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act” (“RLUIPA”). (ECF 30 at 4). He alleges no facts
showing how Rilley, or any other Defendant, violated his RLUIPA rights. RLUIPA provides, in
relevant part, that:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition
of the burden on that person—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” broadly to include “any exercise
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-5(7)(A).
RLUIPA, however, does not provide a cause of action for individual capacity claims. Jones
v. Alfred, 353 F. App’x 949, 951 (5th Cir. 2009); Copeland v. Livingston, 464 F. App’x 326, 330
(5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (explaining that “RLUIPA does not create a private right of action
against individuals for damages”). Therefore, any RLUIPA claim against Rilley in his individual
capacity, as a matter of law, does not state a claim and should be dismissed as frivolous. Assuming
for the purpose of screening that Hodge is suing Rilley in his official capacity and as an agent of
TDCJ, the question becomes whether Hodge has stated a claim under RLUIPA against TDCJ.
Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff has the initial burden to show that the challenged law,
regulation, or practice substantially burdens the exercise of his religion. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393
F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Initially, it falls to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government
practice complained of imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise.”). While the statute
does not define “substantial burden,” the Fifth Circuit defined the term as follows:
[A] government action or regulation creates a “substantial burden” on religious
exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious
behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.... [T]he effect of a
government action or regulation is significant when it either (1) influences the
adherent to act in a way that violates his religious beliefs, or (2) forces the adherent
to choose between, on the one hand, enjoying some generally available, non-trivial
benefit, and, on the other hand, following is religious beliefs.
Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 529 F.3d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Adkins, 393 F.3d
at 570). Hodge’s claim fails at the outset because he has not alleged that Rilley’s actions created a
“substantial burden” on his religious exercise, i.e., he does not allege that he was pressured “to
significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs” by Rilley.
Id. He also fails to allege that he was unable to practice his religion due to Rilley’s actions.
In addition, RLUIPA creates a private right of action solely for injunctive and declaratory
relief, which Hodge does not seek in connection with his RLUIPA claims, as set forth below. See
Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub. nom., Sossamon
v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). The Fifth Circuit has made clear that monetary damages are not
available for claims against state officials under RLUIPA. DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 151
(5th Cir. 2011) (“RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for damages against [the defendants]
in their official capacities…”) (quotation omitted). Because Hodge seeks only compensatory
damages in connection with his RLUIPA claim, the RLUIPA claim should be dismissed against
Rilley in his official capacity.
D. Hodge’s Request for Damages.
1. Compensatory Damages.
Under the PLRA, no “[f]ederal civil action may be brought by a prisoner ... for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the
commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Fifth Circuit has held that this requirement
“applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation.” Geiger,
404 F.3d at 375. The application of Section 1997e(e) is based on “the relief sought, and not the
underlying substantive violation.” Id.; see also Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 605 (“We have held that the
application of [Section 1997e(e)] ... turns on the relief sought by a prisoner, and that it prevents
prisoners from seeking compensatory damages for violations of federal law where no physical
injury is alleged.”).
Hodge does not allege that he suffered any physical injuries in connection with his claims.
(ECF 30 at 4-6). Because he does not allege physical injury, he is not entitled to recover the
compensatory damages he seeks. See Hill v. Fagan, No. 1:16-CV-185-BL, 2018 WL 3244617, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2018) (recommending dismissal of prisoner’s claim for compensatory
damages against defendant because prisoner failed to allege a physical injury arising from the
purported due process violation), R. & R. adopted by 2018 WL 3242274 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2018).
Hodge’s claim for compensatory damages should be dismissed.
2. Punitive Damages.
The Fifth Circuit has “recognized that a prisoner can, absent a showing of physical injury,
pursue punitive or nominal damages based upon a violation of his constitutional rights.” Mayfield,
529 F.3d at 606 (citing Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)).
Punitive damages, however, “may be awarded only when the defendant’s conduct is motivated by
evil intent or demonstrates reckless or callous indifference to a person’s constitutional rights.”
Williams v. Kaufman Cnty., 352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sockwell v. Phelps, 20
F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation omitted). Hodge has alleged no facts indicating
that Rilley acted with evil intent or reckless indifference in relation to any of Hodge’s claims. See
McKnight v. MTC, No. 3:15-CV-1647-K-BK, 2015 WL 7730995, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2015)
(recommending a request for punitive damages under Section 1983 be dismissed because the
plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating the defendant’s conduct was “motivated by evil intent”
or demonstrated “reckless or callous indifference” to the plaintiff's constitutional rights), R. & R.
adopted, No. 3:15-CV-01647-K, 2015 WL 7735910 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2015). As shown above,
Hodge’s claims against Rilley, if true, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. As a
result, his request for punitive damages should be dismissed.
3. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
Hodge also seeks “a declaration that the acts and omissions described [in his Complaint]
violate[d] his rights under the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States’ Constitutional
Amendment at issue.” (ECF 30 at 6-7). In addition, Hodge seeks a “preliminary or permanent
injunction” ordering Rilley to either adhere to TDCJ policy AD-03.82, Management of Inmate
Grievances, or to amend the policy to reflect that any delay in processing all future grievances
must be an exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Id. at 7). Hodge’s requests for equitable relief
against Rilley fail.
When seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts evincing “a
substantial and continuing controversy between two adverse parties ... [that is] real and immediate,
and create[s] a definite, rather than speculative threat of future injury.” Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d
352, 358 (th Cir. 2003). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or
controversy ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). Rather, “[t]o obtain [declaratory or injunctive] relief for past
wrongs, a plaintiff must demonstrate either continuing harm or a real and immediate threat of
repeated injury in the future.” Id.; see Serafine v. Crump, 800 F. App’x 234, 236 (5th Cir. 2020)
(per curiam) (observing that, although Lyons addressed injunctive relief, its “reasoning applies
equally to declaratory relief”). Where the declaratory or injunctive relief is premised on past acts,
a plaintiff must establish “either continuing harm or a real and immediate threat of repeated injury
in the future.” Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1992). “The
threat of future injury must be ‘certainly impending’; mere ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’
do not suffice.” Adams v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., No. 21-60749, 2022 WL
2829756, at *3 (5th Cir. July 20, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 409 (2013)).
Here, Hodge asks the Court to declare as unlawful past conduct by Rilley—thus, he is
entitled to declaratory relief only if he has pleaded facts showing a continuing harm or immediate
threat of repeated harm. Herman, 959 F.2d at 1285. He has not. Nor has he alleged a substantial
threat of future injury such that he is entitled to injunctive relief. Further, as shown above, Hodge
has failed to allege facts stating any violation whatsoever by Rilley to support any equitable relief.
Accordingly, Hodge’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief should be dismissed as
frivolous.
E. Leave to Amend.
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint prior to
dismissal. Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767-68. The district court is not required to allow such an
opportunity, though, if the prisoner’s claims are clearly frivolous, Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9
(5th Cir. 1994), or if the prisoner has pled his best case in the current complaint. Mendoza-Tarango
v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020). Leave to amend would be futile because Hodge
cannot overcome the lack of personal injury resulting from Rilley’s actions, which is required
under the PLRA for his claim for compensatory damages to proceed. In addition, Hodge’s “best
case” against Rilley is frivolous because he has no constitutional right to a grievance process.
Further, amending his RLUIPA claim would be futile because he solely seeks compensatory
damages in connection with the claim, and such are unavailable under RLUIPA, even if Hodge
had pleaded a viable RLUIPA violation. Hodge has pleaded his best case against Rilley and stated
no valid claim; therefore, leave to amend is unnecessary.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Hodge’s claims against
Rilley should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1).
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
ENTERED March 6, 2025.
LEE ANN RENO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the
event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is
fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the
signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by
electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the
fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections
with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A
party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds
of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district
court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc),
superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS Recovery
Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (Sth Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275,
276-77 (Sth Cir. 1988).
10