Walden v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

APRIL S. WALDEN; MAHLEEK M.

RAWLINS,

No. 3:25-CV-00494-AB

Plaintiffs,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and

UNITED KINGDOM,

Defendants.

BAGGIO, District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff April S. Walden1 has filed a complaint against Defendants “United States

of America/50-States” and “United Kingdom/Entire Country,” Compl., 22, and seeks leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, (“Appl. For Leave to Proceed IFP”, ECF 2). Plaintiff has established

that she has minimal income and assets. Accordingly, the Court grants her application for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis. As explained below, however, the Court dismisses her complaint

without leave to amend.

1 Plaintiff also appears to name Mahleek M. Rawlins as a plaintiff. Complaint (“Compl.”,

ECF 1), 1. Because it is well settled that pro se plaintiffs cannot represent other parties, to the

extent Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of Mahleek M. Rawlins, the Court dismisses these

claims. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well

established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by § 1654 is personal to the

litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities.”); see also Johns v. Cnty of San Diego,

114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing a pro se plaintiff’s complaint because a parent

cannot bring suit in federal court on behalf of a minor without first retaining an attorney).

2 The pagination for the complaint refers to the CM/ECF pagination at the top right.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the in forma pauperis statute, a court may at any time, including before service of

process, dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis “if the court determines that . . . the action . .

. fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(2)(B)(ii); see also

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only

permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim”); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”). The statute gives the district court the

power to “dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989). “As those words suggest, a finding of factual

frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly

incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts to contradict them.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

Section 1915(e) allows a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails

to state a claim but that has “curable defects” with leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. And

the general rule is that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend

was made unless it determines that it is impossible to cure the pleading defects. See id.; Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that her rights have been violated under “[t]he Articles of Confederation,

the United States Constitution, the Amendments, the oath, the peace treaties, the Nobel Peace

Prize, and obstruction of Justice against the Lady of Liberty” because her former actions were

“rejected by Clerks of the Court of the Mark O’Hatfield Courthouse in Portland, Oregon.”

Compl., 6. In her complaint, Plaintiff recounts the events that formed the basis of her prior

complaints against Providence Health & Services, see Walden v. Providence Health & Services,

3:19-cv-01717-AC; Walden v. Hernandez, 3:24-cv-01707-AB, and asks “the Court for a

Constitutional Investigation” of these claims. Compl. 6-7. Plaintiff further describes her

complaint filed against the Department of Children & Family Services, see id. at 10 (citing

Walden v. Dept. of Children & Family Services, 2:24-CV-0570-ODW-AJRX), and alleges that

this complaint was “illegally dismissed without a Federal Investigation.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff seeks

as relief “personal injury and pain & suffering at state, city, and county level.” Id. at 4. As

discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations “clearly baseless,” Denton, 504 U.S. at

33, and dismisses her complaint without leave to amend.

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against the United States, and Even if Plaintiff

did State a Claim Against the United States, Sovereign Immunity Bars the

Claims

First, Plaintiff names the “United States of America/50-States” as a defendant and alleges

that her prior actions in federal court were “rejected by the Clerks of the Court,” and “illegally

dismissed.” Compl., 2, 13. She appears to claim that she was injured by the alleged illegal

dismissal of her prior complaints. Id. at 13. A judicial act—including the dismissal of a claim—

that is taken by a judge within their jurisdiction cannot form the basis of a viable claim. See

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (finding that judges are immune from liability for

judicial acts taken within their jurisdiction); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)

(same). Because Plaintiff does not plead any other facts sufficient to enable the Court to draw a

reasonable inference that the United States, through the actions of the United States District

Court, violated her constitutional rights, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a

claim against the United States. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 971-72 (9th Cir.

2009) (concluding that a plaintiff’s complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to allege a

constitutional right violation, which is required by Bivens); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

(requiring that a pleading “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Moreover, even if

Plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim against the United States, sovereign immunity would bar the

claim. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity

shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

against the United States are “clearly baseless” and must be dismissed. Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against the United Kingdom, and Even if

Plaintiff Did State Claims Against the United Kingdom, Foreign Sovereign

Immunity Bars the Claim

Plaintiff also names the United Kingdom as a defendant in her complaint. Compl., 2.

Nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint, however, does she allege that the United Kingdom violated her

rights. See generally Compl. Without facts sufficient to enable the Court to draw a reasonable

inference that the United Kingdom violated her constitutional rights, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to state a claim against the United Kingdom. See Moss, 572 F.3d

at 971-72; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Further, even if Plaintiff could state a claim against the United

Kingdom, her claims would be barred by foreign sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604

(“Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of

enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the

United States[.]”). As such, Plaintiff’s claims against the United Kingdom are “clearly baseless”

and must also be dismissed. Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.

C. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed with Prejudice

The Court is mindful that dismissal with prejudice, especially of a pro se plaintiff’s

complaint, is generally disfavored. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130–31. As detailed above, however,

after careful consideration, the Court is convinced that the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint

are “clearly baseless.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims against the United

States are barred by sovereign immunity, see F.D.I.C., 510 U.S. at 475, and her claims against

the United Kingdom are barred by foreign sovereign immunity, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604. The

Court therefore finds that “it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect[s]” in her

current complaint. Cf. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application, [2], is GRANTED, and her Complaint, [1], is

DISMISSED without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _4_t_h_ day of April, 2025.

_/_s_/ _A_m__y_ M__._ B_a_g_g_i_o_______

Amy M. Baggio

United States District Judge