Kruger v. Wexford Health Sources Inc

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

JOSHUA W. KRUGER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-01212-JEH

CHERYL HANSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center

(“Menard”), files a Second Amended Complaint alleging violations of his

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while he was incarcerated at Pontiac

Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). (Doc. 29). This cause is now before the Court for

a merit review of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. The Court is required

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to “screen” Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, and

through such process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the

entire action if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915A. In

reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court takes all factual allegations

as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d

645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)

(internal citation omitted).

I

Plaintiff alleges he suffers from a myopic astigmatism and requires

prescription glasses. Due to his worsening eyesight and outdated prescription,

Plaintiff alleges he suffered from migraines when he tried to read, write, or watch

television.

In early March 2023, Plaintiff saw Defendant Cheryl Hansen, a nurse

practitioner at Pontiac, and complained about his migraines and need for new

prescription glasses. Defendant Hansen allegedly told Plaintiff there was nothing

she could do because she was not an eye doctor. Defendant Hansen prescribed

Motrin for Plaintiff’s migraines, but she did not submit a referral request to send

Plaintiff to an outside specialist for an eye exam. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Hansen was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to refer

him to an eye doctor.

On an unspecified date, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Rodney Alford, the

Medical Director at Pontiac, about his worsening eyesight, migraine headaches,

blurred vision, and dizziness. Defendant Alford submitted a request to send

Plaintiff to an off-site eye doctor and advised Plaintiff that it could take a year for

Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. to approve the request. Defendant Alford

allegedly discontinued the prescription for Motrin for Plaintiff’s migraines and did

not give him an alternative medication. As a result, Plaintiff alleges he endured

extreme migraines for months. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Alford was

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by discontinuing his pain

medication for his migraines and not prescribing an alternative.

When Plaintiff saw Defendant Alford again in August 2023, Defendant

Alford reported he was still waiting for Defendant Wexford to approve his referral

request to send Plaintiff to Bond Eye Clinic in Pekin, Illinois.

On an unknown date, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance. The warden

deemed his grievance non-emergent and forwarded it to the grievance counselor.

The grievance counselor contacted Defendant Ginger Davis, the Health Care Unit

Administrator at Pontiac, about Plaintiff’s grievance. Despite knowing that

Pontiac did not have an on-site eye doctor, Defendant Davis allegedly “did not

take any steps to see why [Plaintiff] did not have an appointment date with Bond

Eye Clinic yet.” (Doc. 29 at p. 8).

On December 7, 2023, Plaintiff was seen at sick call for his migraines and

prescribed Motrin for six months.

On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Alford about his

migraines and need for new glasses. Defendant Alford told Plaintiff that he would

follow-up with Defendant Wexford about the referral request.

On March 4, 2024, Defendant Cathy Stewart-Stott, the Medical Records

Director at Pontiac, scheduled Plaintiff’s appointment with Bond Eye Clinic.

Plaintiff claims it took Defendant Stewart-Stott over ten months to schedule an

appointment.

On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff was transported to Bond Eye Clinic for an eye

examination with Dr. William Bond, who diagnosed Plaintiff with dry eye

syndrome and updated his prescription.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wexford was deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment by failing to staff an

on-site optometrist at Pontiac and delaying approval for Plaintiff to see an off-site

specialist. Plaintiff claims Defendant Wexford has an unwritten policy “to put

profit before the adequate health care of IDOC prisoners” and understaffs health

care units. (Doc. 29 at p. 9). Despite being contractually obligated to do so,

Defendant Wexford failed to employ a qualified optometrist at Pontiac. Even after

numerous letters, grievances, and lawsuits, including Lippert v. Baldwin, Case No.

1:10-CV-04603 (N.D. Ill.), Wexford allegedly continued to fail to hire a qualified

on-site optometrist at Pontiac.

Finally, Plaintiff attempts to allege state law negligence claims against

Defendants Alford, Davis, and Wexford.

II

It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is

actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516,

522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim of deliberate indifference contains both an objective

and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy

the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition

is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition

is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that

is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s

attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate

must demonstrate that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state

of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know of and disregard an

excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the

defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct

approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware

Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

The need for an eye examination alone is generally insufficient to establish

a serious medical need. Franklin v. McCaughtry, 110 F. App’x 715, 721 (7th Cir.

2004). Rather, a serious medical need arises where the defendants are aware that

the plaintiff's need for an eye prescription is so severe the plaintiff either hurts

himself or cannot function in the prison setting. Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88

(2d Cir. 1996) (plaintiff, who suffered from double vision and lack of depth

perception, suffered injuries from not having glasses, including almost complete

blindness); Benter v. Peck, 825 F. Supp. 1411 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (vision of 20/400 was

a serious medical need because eyesight fell within definition of blindness and

plaintiff was unable to work or function in general population without glasses);

Gevas v. Shering, No. 14-cv-134-NJR, 2016 WL 1221937, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2016)

(“significantly blurred vision, double vision, or loss of depth perception,

constitutes a serious medical need”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges the delay in medical treatment for his myopic

astigmatism caused his eyesight to deteriorate, made it difficult to conduct his

daily activities, and caused painful migraines, blurry vision, and dizziness. During

an examination with Defendant Hansen, Plaintiff alleges he informed her about

his eye issues, but she failed to refer him to an off-site specialist. Although

Defendant Alford submitted a referral request, Plaintiff claims that Defendant

Alford discontinued his prescription for pain medication for his migraines and did

not prescribe an alternative. The Court finds that Plaintiff stated a colorable Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Hansen and Alford.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Alford, Davis, and Stewart-Stott were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to follow IDOC

Administrative Directives about off-site medical services and quality

improvement and failed to supervise and train their staff. There is no respondeat

superior under § 1983. In other words, Defendants Alford, Davis, and Stewart-Stott

cannot be liable based solely on their supervisory roles. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928

F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Officials are accountable for their own acts; they are

not vicariously liable for the conduct of subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 667 (2009); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Davis and Stewart-Stott were

responsible for delaying his appointment at Bond Eye Clinic, but it is unclear when

Wexford approved the referral request. As Plaintiff admits, Defendant Alford

advised it could take a year for Wexford to approve the request. Additionally,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Stewart-Stott contacted Bond Eye Clinic on March

4, 2024, and his appointment occurred only seven days later on March 11, 2024.

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against Defendants Davis and

Stewart-Stott. They are dismissed without prejudice.

Private corporations, such as Wexford, have potential liability under Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978), if they perform

a governmental function and, in doing so, injure plaintiff through an

unconstitutional policy or practice. Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128

(7th Cir. 1982) (applying municipal liability to private corporations performing

governmental functions). “Liability may be based on (1) an express policy that,

when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that,

although not authorized by written law or express policy, is so permanent and

well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) a

constitutional injury caused by a person with final policy making

authority.” Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No.15-5190, 2016 WL 3227310, at

*4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2016) (citing McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324

(7th Cir. 2000)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Wexford has an unwritten policy to

put profit before the adequate health care of IDOC prisoners.” (Doc. 29 at p. 9).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wexford was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs by failing to staff an optometrist at Pontiac and intentionally

delaying approval for Plaintiff to receive off-site medical care at Bond Eye Clinic.

At this juncture, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed

on a Monell claim against Wexford based on the delay referring Plaintiff to an

outside eye doctor for treatment.

Plaintiff attempts to allege state law negligence claims against Defendant

Wexford for failing to hire an on-site optometrist at each IDOC prison and against

Defendants Alford and Davis for failing to, inter alia, monitor and supervise his

medical care, follow all applicable IDOC medical policies, and investigate his

grievances. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims. Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against (1) Defendant Cheryl Hansen

for allegedly failing to refer Plaintiff to an off-site eye doctor for an eye

examination, (2) Defendant Rodney Alford for allegedly discontinuing Plaintiff's

prescription medication for his migraines and failing to prescribe an alternative

medication, and (3) Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. based on the delay in

referring Plaintiff to an off-site eye doctor for an eye examination. Additional

claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on

motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is directed to ADD Wexford Health Sources, Inc. as a

Defendant.

3) Defendants Ginger Davis and Cathy Stewart-Stott are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

4) Defendants Hansen and Alford have returned their executed Waivers

of Service of Summons. (Doc. 13). Therefore, no waivers need to be issued for

Defendants Hansen and Alford. Defendants Hansen and Alford are DIRECTED to

answer Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint within 30 days of this Order.

5) All deadlines in this matter are STAYED and will be reset after

Defendant Wexford files an answer.

6) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Defendant Wexford, pursuant to this

District's internal procedures: 1) a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of

Summons; 2) a Waiver of Service of Summons; 3) a copy of the Second Amended

Complaint; and 4) a copy of this Order.

7) The Court will attempt service on Defendant Wexford by mailing a

waiver of service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the

Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps

to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will

require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

8) Defendant Wexford shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the

Clerk sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The

answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The

answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this

Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not

rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion.

Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If

Defendant has not filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of

the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service.

After Defendant Wexford files an answer, the Court will enter an order resetting

the deadlines in this matter.

9) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the

entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

10) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after defense

counsel has filed an appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to defense counsel copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed

with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly

to defense counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be

returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance and the

Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in

more detail.

11) Defense counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defense counsel shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

12) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change

in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court

of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this

lawsuit, with prejudice.

13) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records

upon request.

14) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to

release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization

to defense counsel.

15) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from

the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter

scheduling deadlines.

It is so ordered.

Entered: April 4, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge