The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION
RAYMOND BROWN, )
) Civil Action No.:
) 2:23-CV-01649-CBB-MRH
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) United States Magistrate Judge
) Christopher B. Brown
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER C. )
)
FOWLER, COORECTIONAL SGT.
)
JOHN DOE, SUED INDIVIDUALLY )
AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND )
COORECTIONAL OFFICER JOHN )
)
FOE, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
REVOKING STATUS
Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Raymond Brown is a state prisoner in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and currently incarcerated at SCI-
Phoenix. Before the Court is Defendant C. Fowler’s motion to vacate order on
motion for leave to proceed (“IFP”). ECF No. 75. The motion is
fully briefed and ripe for disposition. ECF Nos. 76, 79, 80. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will grant Defendant Fowler’s motion, revoke Brown’s IFP status
1 A motion to proceed is a non-dispositive motion and appropriately decided
by a federal magistrate judge. , 76 F.4th 184, 195–98 (3d Cir. 2023)
(concluding an IFP motion is a non-dispositive pretrial motion and, as such, magistrate judges
maintain jurisdiction to decide an IFP motion).
and dismiss this action without prejudice to Brown reopening it by paying the full
statutory and administrative filing fees totaling $405.00.2
I. Factual Background
This action was initiated on September 15, 2023 by Brown submitting an IFP
motion. ECF No. 1. His original motion was denied as insufficient and he again
filed a motion to proceed IFP which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 6, 9.
Distilled to its essence, Brown’s operative complaint alleges that he was
subjected to loud music and a loud vehicle interior during a seven-hour transport
from SCI-Smithfield to SCI-Greene which caused pain, suffering and hearing loss.
ECF No. 60 at ¶¶ 6-24.
After the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, and allowed Brown to file a second amended complaint, this case proceeded
to discovery. ECF No. 65. On January 7, 2025, Brown filed a motion for injunctive
relief to prevent Defendants from transporting him in a lockbox and on a bus. ECF
No. 66. Thereafter, on January 15, 2025, this Court entered a briefing order
requiring the parties to brief whether Brown’s IFP status should be revoked, as it
came to the attention of the Court that he filed several other 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases
about the conditions of his confinement under several different names, including “R.
Brown,” “Raymon Brown,” “Raymond Scott Brown,” “Cordiro Raymond Brown,”
“Cordiro R. Brown,” and “Raymond Cordiro Brown” and because several other
2 The filing fee is $350.00 plus a $55.00 administrative fee, for a total of $405.00.
https://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/fee-schedule.
courts had found that Brown was three-struck from proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) several years before he initiated this action. ECF No. 68.
II. The Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Three Strikes Rule
The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, allows indigent litigants to bring an action
in federal court without prepayment of filing fees, ensuring that such persons are
not prevented “from pursuing meaningful litigation” because of their indigence.
, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted), 533 U.S. 953 (2001). “[I]n response to the
tide of substantively meritless prisoner claims that have swamped the federal
courts,” Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) in 1996.
, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up),
, 575 U.S. 532 (2015).
Among other things, the PLRA implemented the so-called “three strikes
rule,” which provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal
a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this
section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,
while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an
action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, under the PLRA, prisoners with three prior strikes can
proceed IFP only if they are in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
“[A] strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the entire action or appeal is (1)
dismissed explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a claim’ or
(2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that is limited solely to
dismissals for such reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C. §§
1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.” , 715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013). “A strike-call
under Section 1915(g) . . . hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal,
regardless of the decision’s prejudicial effect.” , 590 U.S. –,
140 S. Ct. 1721, 1724-1725 (2020). In other words, “a prisoner accrues a strike for
any action dismissed on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted” and applies to dismissals “issued both with and without prejudice
to a plaintiff’s ability to reassert his claim in a later action.” . at 1724 (cleaned
up). That said, “mixed dismissals – where a district court dismisses a prisoner’s
federal claims on grounds enumerated in § 1915(g) and declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the prisoner’s state law claims” do not count as
strikes. , 15 F.4th 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2021).
Prisoners with three strikes who cannot satisfy the imminent danger
exception are not barred from filing additional federal actions, rather they are
denied the privilege of proceeding IFP and must pay the requisite filing fee in full
prior to commencing a new action. , 239 F.3d at 314. Thus, when
denying or revoking a prisoner’s IFP status because of the accrual of three strikes,
the Court must determine what strikes the prisoner accrued prior to initiating the
action immediately before the Court. , 160 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir.
1998). If determined to have three qualifying strikes to their name, then the Court
must consider whether the prisoner qualifies for the “imminent danger” exception.
When deciding whether a prisoner meets the “imminent danger” exception, a
Court must examine the situation faced by the prisoner at the time of the filing of
the complaint, and a showing of danger in the past is insufficient to demonstrate
“imminent danger.” , 239 F.3d at 312. Allegations of imminent danger
must be evaluated in accordance with the liberal pleading standard applicable to
pro se litigants, although the Court need not credit “fantastic or delusional”
allegations that “rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.”
, 160 F.3d 962, 966–67 (3d Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted) (
, , 239 F.3d 307).
A plaintiff’s IFP status may be revoked at any time that the improperly
obtained status is determined, either on motion or by the Court
, No. CV 16-86, 2017 WL 1364104 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2017);
, No. CIV.A. 10-1714 GEB, 2011 WL 345964
(D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2011); , No. CIV.A 08-52E, 2010 WL 2512345
(W.D. Pa. May 27, 2010).
III. Discussion
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Brown has at least three
qualifying strikes within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g):
(1) , 2:14-cv-2866-ER (E.D.Pa. 2014)
(case initiated May 19, 2014 and all claims dismissed for failure to
state a claim and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) at ECF No. 7
and affirmed on appeal ECF No. 21);
(2) , 2:15-cv-2217-TON (E.D.Pa.
2015) (case initiated on April 24, 2015 and all claims dismissed for
failure to state a claim and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) at
ECF Nos. 4 and 5 and appeal dismissed ECF No. 26);
(3) , 3:18-cv-487-MEM-DB
(M.D.Pa. 2018) (case initiated on February 28, 2018 and all claims in
the complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim at ECF No. 44 and
appeal dismissed ECF No. 69);
(4) , 2:22-cv-2499-CMR (E.D.Pa.
2022) (case initiated on June 24, 2022 and all claims in the complaint
dismissed as barred by , 512 U.S. 477 (1994) at ECF
No. 8).3
It does not appear that Brown disputes that he has three strikes, rather he
argues here the “imminent danger” exception to the three-strike rule. ECF Nos. 79,
3 “[T]he dismissal of an action for failure to meet favorable-termination requirement
counts as a PLRA strike for failure to state a claim.” , 17 F.4th 419, 427 (3d Cir.
2021).
80. Indeed, he has admitted he has three-strikes in other cases, including in
another case pending before the undersigned.4
Although Brown has at least three “strikes,” he may be entitled to proceed
IFP under the “imminent danger” exception to the three strikes rule which is an
argument he advances. To satisfy the imminent danger exception, he must allege
facts showing that he was in imminent danger at the time the complaint was filed;
allegations that the prisoner has faced imminent danger in the past are insufficient
to trigger the exception to section 1915(g). , 239 F.3d
307 (3d Cir. 2001) (overruling , 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Brown alleges he suffered pain and hearing loss as result of being
transported in a noisy vehicle for seven hours when he was transferred to another
facility on one occasion. He made these allegations in the original complaint filed in
September of 2023 which was several months after his transport in July of 2023.
ECF No. 1. Past allegations like these are insufficient to show imminent danger.
Therefore, after reviewing the allegations contained in the second amended
complaint filed over a year later in November of 2024, the undersigned finds Brown
has not satisfied the imminent danger exception as he did not allege facts that
would indicate he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury from any
defendant at the time he initiated this lawsuit.
4 , 3:25-cv-00046-CBB (W.D.Pa. 2025) (ECF No. 1-2: “I have
3 strikes under 28 [U.S.C. §] 1915(g).”); , 2:20-cv-00512-CCW-
MPK (W.D.Pa. 2020) (ECF No. 1: indicating Brown has three strikes under § 1915(g)).
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, Brown’s IFP status is revoked in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) and this action will be dismissed without prejudice to Brown
reopening it by paying the full statutory and administrative filing fees, totaling
$450.00.5 A separate Order follows.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
s/Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: RAYMOND BROWN
LT6439
SCI PHOENIX
1200 Mokychic Drive
Collegeville, PA 19426
5 Brown is advised that if he pays the filing fee, the case will still be subject to statutory
screening under § 1915A because he is a prisoner. Thus, the Court may dismiss the complaint, or
any portion of the complaint, if it is determined that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. If his complaint is dismissed under § 1915A, Brown
will not be entitled to the return of his $405.00 filing fee.