Farris v. Maury County Jail

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT COLUMBIA

CARLOS M. FARRIS )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-00024

)

MAURY COUNTY JAIL et al. )

TO: Honorable William L. Campbell, Jr., United States Chief District Judge

R E P O R T A N D R E C O M E N D A T I O N

By Order entered October 27, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 13), this pro se prisoner civil rights

action was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings.

Presently pending before the Court are the motion to dismiss of Defendant Trinity Services

Group (Docket Entry No. 72)1 and the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Roger Maddox,

David Baker, and Brandon Harris (Docket Entry No. 73). Plaintiff has not responded to the motions.

For the reasons set out below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the motions be

GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Carlos Farris (“Plaintiff”) filed this pro se and in forma pauperis lawsuit on April 14, 2023,

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights. See

Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1). Plaintiff’s lawsuit is based upon events that occurred at the Maury

County Jail (“Jail”) in Columbia, Tennessee, where he was an inmate at the time the lawsuit was

filed.2

1 This Defendant was incorrectly identified in the Complaint as Trinity Food Services.

2 Plaintiff is currently in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”).

See Notice of Change of Address (Docket Entry No. 30).

Plaintiff, who identifies as a “Gnostic Messanic Hebrew” and a “Hebrew vegetarian,” alleges

that Jail staff failed to properly accommodate his ability to practice his religious beliefs during

March-April 2023. He alleges that Jail staff recognized only Christian holidays, refused to

accommodate his non-Christian religious practices such as needing a prayer rug, fired him from his

kitchen job because he sought to exercise his religion by praying five times a day, and failed to

provide Hebrew or Gnostic religious services at the Jail. He further alleges that the food service

staff refused to accommodate his religious dietary need to not eat meat and provided him with less

food than other inmates due to his religious beliefs and practices. He also alleges that two food

service staff members retaliated against him for filing grievances by putting food in his meals that

conflicted with his religious dietary needs. See Complaint and Supplement (Docket Entry No. 5).

Upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2), the Court found that Plaintiff

stated colorable First Amendment free exercise of religion claims against Trinity Services Group

(“Trinity”), a private company that provides food service at the Jail, and a colorable First

Amendment retaliation claim against kitchen stewards f/n/u Scott (“Scott”) and f/n/u Kacy (“Kacy”).

See Order entered August 23, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 11). All other claims and defendants were

dismissed; however, Plaintiff was granted permission to amend his complaint to identify other

defendants for his colorable claims and to more fully develop his dismissed deliberate indifference

claim. Id. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 19). Upon review of

the amended complaint, the Court found that three additional defendants should be added to

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims – Roger Maddox (“Maddox”), Brandon Harris (“Harris”), and

Chaplain David Baker (“Baker”). See Order entered December 20, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 18).

Upon the filing of a joint answer by Defendants Maddox, Harris, and Baker, (Docket Entry

No. 32), a scheduling order was entered that provided for a period of discovery and pretrial activity

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in the case. (Docket Entry No. 35.) In lieu of an answer, Defendant Trinity has filed the pending

motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against Defendants Scott and Kacy was

denied by the Clerk on November 26, 2024, because there was no indication that they had been

served with process in the case. (Docket Entry No. 71.) Plaintiff has taken no other action with

respect to these two unserved Defendants. There are no motions pending in the case other than

Defendants’ dispositive motions. A trial has not yet been scheduled in the case pending resolution

of the motions.

II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

In accordance with the scheduling order deadlines, Defendants timely filed the pending

dispositive motions. Defendant Trinity seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to show that Trinity had an

unconstitutional policy or procedure regarding food service at the Jail. Defendants Maddox, Baker,

and Harris (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the Individual Defendants”) seek summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that (1) Plaintiff failed to

comply with the pre-suit exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996

(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity from any damage

liability. The Individual Defendants support their motion with a memorandum of law (Docket Entry

No. 74), a statement of undisputed material facts (Docket Entry No. 75), the declaration and exhibits

attached thereto of current Maury County Sheriff Bucky Rowland (Docket Entry No. 76-1), and their

own declarations (Docket Entry Nos. 76-2, 76-3, and 76-4).

Plaintiff was notified of the motions, informed of the need to respond, and given an extended

deadline of February 17, 2025, to file responses. See Order entered January 13, 2025 (Docket Entry

No. 77). Plaintiff was specifically warned that his failure to file timely responses could result in the

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dismissal of the action. Despite being given significantly more time to file responses than is

provided for by the Local Rules, Plaintiff has not filed a response of any kind to either motion.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed under the standard that the Court

must accept as true all the well-pleaded allegations contained in the complaint and construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10,

11-12 (6th Cir. 1987). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court is also required to view his

complaint with some measure of a liberal construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). Although the complaint need not

contain detailed factual allegations, the factual allegations supplied must be enough to show a

plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-61 (2007). See also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a plausible claim for relief, the alleged facts

must provide “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mik v. Federal

Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The

well pleaded factual allegations must "show entitlement to relief." League of United Latin Am.

Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

A motion for summary judgment is reviewed under the standard that summary judgment is

appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A genuine issue of

material fact is a fact which, if proven at trial, could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the

non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party

has the burden of showing the absence of genuine factual disputes from which a reasonable jury

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could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, at 249-50. Once the moving party has

presented evidence sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must

present significant probative evidence to support the complaint. Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559,

561 (6th Cir. 1991). In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must “look

beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial.”

Sowards v. Loudon Cnty., 203 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000). The

Court must view the evidence and all inferences drawn from underlying facts in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).

IV. ANALYSIS

Although the allegations in Plaintiff’s pleadings were sufficient to permit the case to survive

initial frivolity review, Plaintiff has not responded to the arguments for dismissal and for summary

judgment made by Defendants in their motions. Under Local Rule 7.01(a)(3), Plaintiff’s failure to

file a response indicates that there is no opposition to the motions. See also Scott v. State of

Tennessee, 878 F.2d 382, 1989 WL 72470 at *2 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision) (“if a

plaintiff fails to respond or to otherwise oppose a defendant's motion, then the district court may

deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the motion.”). Likewise, Plaintiff’s failure to take

action to defend against Defendants’ requests for the dismissal of his claims can be viewed as an

indication that he does not oppose the dismissal of his lawsuit and/or that he has abandoned his

claims. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court's

conclusion that the plaintiff abandoned certain claims by failing to raise them in his brief opposing

the government's motion to dismiss). Finally, after review of the motions and the record, the Court

finds that Defendants’ unrebutted arguments are legally sound and require that their motions be

granted.

A. Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Trinity

Defendant Trinity accurately sets out the relevant legal standard for a claim of constitutional

liability and points to the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s factual allegations. Given the lack of a response

from Plaintiff that rebuts Defendant Trinity’s argument that the allegations of his pleadings are not

sufficient to support a claim for relief, it is not the duty of the Court to “abandon its position of

neutrality in favor of a role equivalent to champion for the non-moving party: seeking out facts,

developing legal theories, and finding ways to defeat the motion.” Guarino v. Brookfield Township

Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 1992). See also Cunningham v. Enagic USA, Inc., 2016 WL

5415106 at *2 (M.D.Tenn. Sept. 28, 2016) (Sharp, J.) (“This Court is not required to develop legal

theories and arguments in Plaintiff’s stead in order to defeat the motion to dismiss.”);

Birmingham-Jefferson Cnty. Transit Auth. v. Boatright, 2009 WL 2601926 at *1 (M.D.Tenn. Aug.

20, 2009) (Campbell, J.) (favorably citing Guarino in review of motion to dismiss for which there

was no response). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is appropriately granted.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment of the Individual Defendants

When a motion for summary judgment is filed and properly supported under Rule 56, such as

the Individual Defendants’ motion here, the non-moving party may not merely rest on the allegations

contained in the complaint, but must respond with affirmative evidence supporting his claims and

establishing the existence of genuine issues of material fact that requires that the action proceed to

trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24; Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th

Cir. 2003); Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s pro se

status does not relieve him of this obligation, which is a threshold requirement for all non-moving

parties when summary judgment is sought by an opposing party. Sixty Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander,

822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court cannot supply or assume facts supporting Plaintiff’s

case and is not required to make legal arguments on his behalf. Thompson v. A.J. Rose Mfg. Co.,

208 F.3d 215, 2000 WL 302998 (6th Cir. 2000); Bell v. Tennessee, 2012 WL 996560, *9 (E.D.

Tenn. March 22, 2012). See also Guarino, supra. Additionally, Plaintiff has not responded to the

Individual Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts as required by Local Rule 56.01(f),

which permits to the Court to rely upon the facts set forth in the statement as the undisputed facts.

The Individual Defendants present a valid failure to exhaust defense. The PLRA requires

that a prisoner must first exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The requirement is mandatory

and requires the prisoner plaintiff to present his grievance through “one complete round” or through

all the steps of the administrative grievance procedure. Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 733 (6th

Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006); Hartsfield v. Vidor,

199 F.3d 305, 306 (6th Cir. 1999). Once the PLRA defense is raised and supported by the moving

party, the prisoner plaintiff must present affirmative evidence showing that he has complied with the

PLRA’s requirement of exhaustion. Napier v. Laurel Cnty., Ky., 636 F.3d 218, 225 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Individual Defendants set forth evidence that the Jail has a process permitting inmates to

file grievances and grievance appeals, but that the Jail records show that Plaintiff either failed to file

a grievance about some of the alleged events at issue or failed to pursue a grievance appeal

subsequent to an initial grievance. See Declaration of Bucky Rowland (Docket Entry No. 76-1);

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Docket Entry No. 75) at ¶¶ 1-6 and 14, 23, 26-37. In the

face of this evidence, Plaintiff must rebut the exhaustion defense by presenting “significant probative

evidence” showing compliance with the PLRA. Napier, supra. Plaintiff has not set forth any

evidence meeting this burden. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s lawsuit is properly dismissed because of his

failure to comply with the mandatory exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.

The Individual Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity also provides a basis for granting

summary judgment. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages “unless

(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct

was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Reich v. City of Elizabethtown, Ky., 945 F.3d 968, 977 (6th

Cir. 2019) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). When the defense of

qualified immunity is asserted by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming the

defense and affirmatively showing that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Mosier v.

Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 546 (6th Cir. 2024); McDonald, 814 F.3d at 812; Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai,

707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Individual Defendants’

assertion of qualified immunity is a sufficient basis upon which to grant the motion for summary

judgment based on qualified immunity. Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2024) (the

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff’s cursory briefing makes no attempt

to meet his burden of showing that the defendant violated his clearly established rights); Winter v.

City of Westlake, Ohio, 2018 WL 838283, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2018) (“Having moved for

qualified immunity, Defendants have raised the defense and Plaintiffs’ failure to respond militates in

favor of judgment for Defendants since Plaintiffs have not met their burden.”).

C. Defendants Scott and Kacy

Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure requires that defendants be served with

process within 90 days of the date the action was filed and provides that, in the absence of a showing

of good cause by the plaintiff for why service has not been timely made, the Court "must dismiss"

the action without prejudice. Defendants Scott and Kacy have not been served with process within

the mandatory 90-day period, and Plaintiff has not taken any steps to have process re-issued to them.

Because these two Defendants have not been served with process and because good cause does not

appear to exist for their failure to be timely served, this action must be dismissed as to them in

accordance with Rule 4(m).

RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set out above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:

1) The motion to dismiss of Defendant Trinity Services Group (Docket Entry No. 72) and the

motion for summary judgment of Defendants Roger Maddox, David Baker, and Brandon Harris

(Docket Entry No. 73) be GRANTED.

2) Defendants f/n/u Scott and f/n/u Kacy be DISMISSED from this action under Rule 4(m)of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of timely service of process.

3) This case be DISMISSED in its entirety.

ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14)

days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with particularity the specific

portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. See Rule 72(b)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). Failure to file written objections within

the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District Court's Order regarding

the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.

Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Any response to the objections must be filed within fourteen

(14) days after service of objections. See Federal Rule 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.02(b).

Respectfully submitted,

United States Magistrate Judge