Mills v. Kinnan, Kinnan

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

RICK MILLS and TROY PUMPHREY,

Petitioners,

v.

JOSEPH KINNAN and LINDA KINNAN,

Respondents.

Nos. 2D2024-0891, 2D2024-0896

CONSOLIDATED

April 4, 2025

Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Manatee County;

Hunter W. Carroll, Judge.

David A. Wallace of Bentley Goodrich Kison, P.A., Sarasota; and Robert

K. Robinson of Rob Robinson Attorney, P.A., Sarasota, for Petitioner Rick

Mills.

Robert K. Robinson of Rob Robinson Attorney, P.A., Sarasota, for

Petitioner Troy Pumphrey.

Jennifer Seymore of Seymore Justice, Tallahassee; John Romano and

Corey Friedman of Romano Law Group, West Palm Beach; and Elizabeth

Zwibel, Saint Petersburg, for Respondents.

ATKINSON, Judge.

Rick Mills and Troy Pumphrey have each petitioned this court for a

writ of certiorari seeking review of the trial court's order denying their

respective motions for summary judgment. They request that this court

quash the portion of the trial court's summary judgment order that

denied their claimed entitlement to common law absolute immunity from

Joseph and Linda Kinnan's malicious prosecution claims. We

consolidate their petitions for purposes of this opinion. Because the trial

court departed from the essential requirements of law by denying them

common law absolute immunity from the Kinnans' malicious prosecution

claims, thereby causing material injury that cannot be corrected on

postjudgment appeal, we grant their petitions and quash the trial court's

order in part.

Background

The underlying litigation concerns the Manatee County School

Board's investigations into alleged misconduct of plaintiff Joseph Kinnan,

the school district's then-business manager and athletic director.

Defendant Rick Mills was the school district's superintendent, and

defendant Troy Pumphrey was an investigator in the school district's

Office of Professional Standards (OPS).

Two investigations of Mr. Kinnan were conducted by Mr. Pumphrey

at Mr. Mills' direction. The first investigation concerned the Manatee

High School baseball program. Mr. Pumphrey prepared a written report

that, in relevant part, detailed the scope of his investigation, explained

his findings regarding the allegation that Mr. Kinnan knowingly allowed

the high school's baseball coach to serve as a paid coach without the

proper certification, and alleged that Mr. Kinnan's conduct violated the

Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in

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Florida. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-10.081. Mr. Pumphrey sent a copy

of his report to the Florida Department of Education, as well as an

employee misconduct reporting form that summarized the allegations.

The second investigation was prompted after the publication of a

newspaper article containing statements from Mr. Kinnan that allegedly

misrepresented the facts concerning the investigation of the high school's

baseball program. Mr. Pumphrey investigated the issue and sent a

second employee misconduct reporting form to the Department of

Education reporting that Mr. Kinnan "intentionally provided false

information to the news media regarding an internal School Board

investigation."

A school district disciplinary committee reviewed Mr. Pumphrey's

findings and recommended disciplinary sanctions against Mr. Kinnan,

and school district superintendent Mr. Mills agreed with the committee's

recommendations. The School Board filed a complaint against Mr.

Kinnan in the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking disciplinary

sanctions, but the School Board dismissed the complaint after Mr.

Kinnan retired.

The Department of Education conducted its own investigation,

following which it notified Mr. Kinnan that it found probable cause to

justify sanctions against his Florida Educator Certificate. The

Department of Education filed an administrative complaint with the

Education Practices Commission—the state agency responsible for

applying the standards of professional practice and imposing discipline

upon educators—seeking sanctions against Mr. Kinnan's certificate, but

it later voluntarily dismissed the complaint.

Mr. and Mrs. Kinnan filed a multicount complaint against the

School Board, superintendent Mr. Mills, and investigator Mr. Pumphrey,

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but the only claims relevant to this opinion are their claims against Mr.

Mills and Mr. Pumphrey for malicious prosecution. Their fifth amended

complaint alleged that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey knowingly fabricated

the allegations against Mr. Kinnan and that their provision of those

fabricated allegations to the Department of Education caused the

department to file the administrative complaint without probable cause

to do so. They specifically alleged the following in the count against Mr.

Mills:

352. The [Department of Education] Administrative

Complaint was initially caused to be filed by MILLS, who

supervised PUMPHREY, against J. KINNAN under dubious

circumstances and relied upon a deeply flawed investigation

that was forwarded to [the Department of Education].

353. The actions instigated by MILLS were done with

malice and were commenced without probable cause because

the "probable cause" that did exist was a fabrication from

MILLS and PUMPHREY and were used to cause J. KINNAN to

retire under duress.

354. [The Department of Education]'s finding of

"probable cause" stemmed from false allegations in [the first

employee misconduct reporting form] that J. KINNAN had

"direct knowledge" of [the baseball coach]'s expired

certification and "allowed" [the baseball coach] to coach

anyway.

355. [The Department of Education]'s finding of

"probable cause" was influenced by the [Manatee High School]

Report [concerning the baseball program investigation] and

[the School Board's] Administrative Complaint which were full

of misrepresentations and false allegations.

356. After J. KINNAN responded to the initial

[Department of Education] preliminary investigation letter of

November 8, 2013, with responses to [the Department of

Education] on November 24, 2013, and February 6, 2014, in

which [the school district] clearly became aware of, MILLS

orchestrated and directed the following misrepresentations to

be made to [the Department of Education]:

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a. On January 28, 2014, Glisson faxed a document to

[the Department of Education] that misrepresented her

role in monitoring coaching certifications. This

communication is believed to be in response to J.

KINNAN's November 24, 2013, information.

b. On February 11, 2014, Saunders, who directly

reported to MILLS, faxed to [the Department of

Education] information that misrepresented J.

KINNAN's contracted position with [the school district].

This communication is believed to be in response to J.

KINNAN's February 6, 2013, amended response to [the

Department of Education]. Curiously, MILLS had met

with Florida Superintendent of Education, Pam Stewart,

the day before on February 10, 2014.

c. On March 12, 2014, PUMPHREY sent a second

[employee misconduct reporting form], EMRF2, to [the

Department of Education], falsely claiming that " . . .

Kinnan intentionally misrepresented the facts of the

SCHOOL BOARD investigation in order to influence the

public's opinion. Further, Kinnan intentionally provided

false information to the news media regarding an

internal SCHOOL BOARD investigation."

The Kinnans made identical allegations for the malicious prosecution

claim against Mr. Pumphrey.

Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey jointly moved for summary judgment.

One of their arguments was that they were entitled to absolute immunity

from the malicious prosecution claims because the claims were

predicated upon allegedly false statements that they made within the

scope of their employment. The trial court denied their motion.

Analysis

To obtain certiorari relief, a "petitioner must establish (1) a

departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in

material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected

on postjudgment appeal." Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works,

Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). "The last two elements are

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jurisdictional and must be analyzed before the court may even consider

the first element." Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011).

I.

This court has certiorari jurisdiction to review a trial court's denial

of absolute immunity because the immunity, when applicable, "protect[s]

a public official from having to defend a suit at all," and "[t]his

entitlement is lost if the defendant is required to go to trial." Stephens v.

Geoghegan, 702 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Absolute immunity

provides immunity from suit. As such, being forced to defend the suit is

itself a material injury to an immune public official. And because a

public official who is forced to defend a suit "cannot be reimmunized

after-the-fact . . . , an appeal after final judgment would not be an

adequate remedy" to review whether the immunity was erroneously

denied. Id.; see also Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Monk, 68 So. 3d 316,

318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ("[A]bsolute immunity protects a party from

having to defend a lawsuit at all, and waiting until final appeal to review

an order denying dismissal on immunity grounds renders such immunity

meaningless if the lower court denied dismissal in error."); Crowder v.

Barbati, 987 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ("[A]ny remedy that

enforced immunity upon final appeal, after the case had been fully

defended, would be meaningless." (citing Jenne v. Maranto, 825 So. 2d

409, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002))). Thus, Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey have

satisfied the jurisdictional elements necessary for certiorari review.

II.

A departure from the essential requirements of law occurs "when

there has been a violation of [a] clearly established principle of law

resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1133

(quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla.

6

1995)). This court in Stephens explained when a trial court's denial of a

public official's claim to immunity from suit meets this standard:

We hold that when a public official moves for summary

judgment on the ground that he or she enjoys immunity from

suit arising under either state or federal law, and the record

conclusively demonstrates that the public official is entitled to

immunity, it is a departure from the essential requirements of

law to deny it.

702 So. 2d at 525.

A.

"Public officials who make statements within the scope of their

duties are absolutely immune from suit for defamation." Id. at 522. The

immunity applies "regardless of the branch of government or the level of

the official," Cassell v. India, 964 So. 2d 190, 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007);

see also Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 522 (providing that absolute immunity

protects "low-level, as well high-placed, public officials"), and it applies

no matter how "false, malicious, or badly motivated the words may be,"

Harrison v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 382 So. 3d 695, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA

2023) (quoting Gay v. Jupiter Island Compound, LLC, 358 So. 3d 780,

786–87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)). This court has recognized that the

rationale for such a broad immunity is that it is "in the end better to

leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject

those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." See

Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 522 (quoting McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428,

431 n.12 (Fla. 1966)).

The Kinnans argue that absolute immunity cannot apply in this

case because they sued Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey for malicious

prosecution, not defamation. However, the specific cause of action is not

dispositive. It is the public official's underlying conduct that is afforded

absolute immunity—that is, statements made within the scope of the

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official's duties. Absolute immunity protects a public official from a

defamation suit because such suits are necessarily predicated on the

alleged falsity of the defendant's statements, which is the type of conduct

protected by absolute immunity. See Kieffer v. Atheists of Fla., Inc., 269

So. 3d 656, 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("Clearly, a false statement about

another is a required element of defamation." (citing Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v.

Reakes, 840 So. 2d 277, 279–80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003))). Several recorded

opinions clearly establish that absolute immunity also protects a public

official when a plaintiff "retool[s]" a defamation claim by recasting it as

another cause of action. See Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 525 ("We hold that

the defendants' writings and comments, for which they are immune from

suit for defamation, are likewise protected against a retooling of the claim

couched in terms of intentional infliction of emotional distress.");

Harrison, 382 So. 3d at 698 ("The privilege applies to other torts beyond

defamation, such as tortious interference and infliction of emotional

distress." (first citing City of Stuart v. Monds, 10 So. 3d 1134, 1134 (Fla.

4th DCA 2009); and then citing Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 196)); Prins v.

Farley, 208 So. 3d 1215, 1217–18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (granting

certiorari on the basis that absolute immunity applied because

"Respondent's complaint [w]as, in essence, a retooled defamation claim"

(citing Lock v. City of W. Welbourne, No. 6:12-cv-680, 2015 WL 1880732,

at *27 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2015))); Monds, 10 So. 3d at 1134 (concluding

the trial court's refusal to apply absolute immunity to claims for tortious

interference and negligent violation of a statute departed from the

essential requirements of the law and rejecting the argument "that the

doctrine of absolute immunity is inapplicable because of the absence of a

defamation claim"); Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 196 ("We further hold that

absolute immunity bars India's claim of intentional infliction of emotional

8

distress. This claim is simply a recast of the defamation claim; it too is

barred by the privilege." (citing Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 525)).

Thus, decisional authority clearly establishes that it is not the

specific type of cause of action against a public official that gives rise to

absolute immunity; rather, it is liability for statements made by a public

official within the scope of his or her duties that is precluded by the

immunity. Consequently, courts cannot determine the applicability of

the immunity in the abstract simply by identifying the specific cause of

action asserted; no type of cause of action against all public officials is

categorically barred by absolute immunity, but rather a specific type of

conduct is categorically protected by absolute immunity—statements

made in the scope of a public official's duties, requiring a case-by-case

examination of the public official's underlying conduct upon which the

cause of action is premised.

In this case, a review of Mr. and Mrs. Kinnan's fifth amended

complaint confirms that their malicious prosecution claims are premised

on allegedly false statements that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey made or

otherwise caused to be made about Mr. Kinnan. Malicious prosecution

occurs when the following elements have been established:

(1) an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding against the

present plaintiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present

defendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding

against the present plaintiff as the defendant in the original

proceeding; (3) the termination of the original proceeding

constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor

of the present plaintiff; (4) there was an absence of probable

cause for the original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the

part of the present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered

damage as a result of the original proceeding.

Debrincat v. Fischer, 217 So. 3d 68, 70 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Alamo Rent-A-

Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla. 1994)). The Kinnans

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allege that it was Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey who maliciously caused

the Department of Education to file its administrative complaint against

Mr. Kinnan. While they acknowledge that the Department of Education

found probable cause to file the complaint, they allege that "the 'probable

cause' that did exist was a fabrication" that "stemmed from false

allegations" in the materials Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey provided to the

Department of Education or "orchestrat[ed]" others to provide to the

Department of Education. So, according to Mr. and Mrs. Kinnan's

complaint, it is the falsity of the allegations made against Mr. Kinnan by

public officials that demonstrates the absence of probable cause for the

Department of Education's administrative complaint. Indeed, the

Kinnans' response brief in these certiorari proceedings succinctly sets

forth the theory "that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey intentionally and

maliciously submitted false complaints of misconduct against [Mr.

Kinnan] to the Florida Department of Education, which filed an

Administrative Complaint against Mr. Kinnan[] that was ultimately

dismissed." Their claims are therefore contingent on establishing that

the statements were false, demonstrating that they seek to hold Mr. Mills

and Mr. Pumphrey liable for the type of conduct protected by absolute

immunity. Cf. Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 525 ("The Geoghegans attempt to

salvage their emotional distress action by arguing that the defendants'

memorandum to police personnel, which serves as a partial basis for the

defamation claim, was 'intentionally drafted to deceive' those who read it,

setting it apart from the defamation claim. This argument emasculates

the notion of absolute immunity—letting survive a claim that the

offending speech or writing was intentionally designed to provoke a given

response, while protecting the tortfeasor from the substantive tort of

defamation itself."). Accordingly, under the circumstance of this case,

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absolute immunity protects Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey from having to

defend the malicious prosecution claims—provided that their conduct

occurred within the scope of their respective duties.

B.

"The controlling factor in deciding whether the absolute privilege

applies is 'whether the communication was within the scope of the

officer's duties.' " Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 194 (quoting City of Miami v.

Wardlow, 403 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 1981)). "The scope of an officer's

duties is to be liberally construed" and is "not confined to those things

required of the officer, but rather extends to all matters which he is

authorized to perform." Id. (citing Goetz v. Noble, 652 So. 2d 1203, 1205

(Fla. 4th DCA 1995)); see also Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 523 (reasoning

that "the scope of an official's duties extends beyond enumerated,

required tasks, and includes discretionary duties that are associated

with a given position" (citing Wardlow, 403 So. 2d at 416)). Conduct is

within the scope of the officer's duties "if it is the type of conduct which

the employee is hired to perform, the conduct occurs substantially within

the time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be

performed, and the conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to

serve the employer." Alfino v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 676 So. 2d

447, 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (citing Craft v. John Sirounis & Sons, Inc.,

575 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)).

Here, the record conclusively demonstrates that Mr. Mills' and Mr.

Pumphrey's conduct was within the scope of their respective duties. Mr.

Pumphrey was hired as an OPS investigator. The School Board's

personnel manual authorized—and in fact required—OPS investigators to

"conduct investigations into alleged employee misconduct or other

matters concerning the school district and make recommendations as to

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the disposition of such complaints or matters," as well as to "report

legally sufficient complaints concerning certificated employees" to the

Department of Education. As the superintendent, Mr. Mills had overall

responsibility for all school district employees. The superintendent's role

in the investigative process was to review OPS reports concerning alleged

employee misconduct, decide whether to send them to a disciplinary

review committee, and make the final decision regarding disciplinary

measures. Mr. Mills also had a statutory obligation to report certain

employee matters to the Department of Education. See § 1012.795(5)(b),

Fla. Stat. (2013) ("Each district school superintendent . . . shall report to

the department the name of any person certified pursuant to this chapter

. . . [w]ho that official has reason to believe has committed or is found to

have committed any act which would be a ground for revocation or

suspension [of an educator certificate] under subsection (1) . . . .");

§ 1012.796(1)(d) ("Each school district shall file in writing with the

department all legally sufficient complaints within 30 days after the date

on which subject matter of the complaint comes to the attention of the

school district."); see also § 1012.795(1)(j) (providing that the Education

Practices Commission may revoke or suspend an educator certificate if

the educator has "violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the

Education Profession prescribed by the State Board of Education rules").

The Kinnans argue that the conduct was outside the scope of Mr.

Mills' and Mr. Pumphrey's duties because it was "not taken in the

interest of the public good" but rather to serve their "political interests

and personal animosity" against Mr. Kinnan. But even presuming for the

sake of analysis that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey had such interests or

animosity—an issue this court need not and does not decide in this

proceeding—whether it was in the interest of the public good to

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investigate Mr. Kinnan and report his alleged misconduct to the

Department of Education does not bear upon the question of whether

such conduct was within the scope of their duties.

The decisions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation

upon the immunity that the official's act must have been

within the scope of his powers; and it can be argued that

official powers, since they exist only for the public good, never

cover occasions where the public good is not their aim, and

hence that to exercise a power dishonestly is necessarily to

overstep its bounds. A moment's reflection shows, however,

that that cannot be the meaning of the limitation without

defeating the whole doctrine. What is meant by saying that

the officer must be acting within his power cannot be more

than that the occasion must be such as would have justified

the act, if he had been using his power for any of the

purposes on whose account it was vested in him.

Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 572 (1959) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177

F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)); see also Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 195 ("The

fact that Cassell's statement may be viewed as having an unworthy or

non-public purpose does not destroy the privilege." (first citing Barr, 360

U.S. at 575; and then citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 591 cmt. d

(Am. L. Inst. 1977))). Evidence that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey acted

with personal or political motives at most speaks only to the manner or

appropriateness of how they carried out their duties, not whether those

were among their duties in the first place.

The Kinnans further argue that while Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey

were "authorized to make legally sufficient complaints to the Department

of Education, [they were] not authorized to make false or misleading

complaints," so if they "knew the complaints were false or misleading or

otherwise legally insufficient, then [they] certainly w[ere] acting outside

the scope of [their] employment." (Emphasis in original.) But this

argument (a tacit admission that the task of submitting complaints of

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employee misconduct to the Department of Education was in fact within

the scope of their duties) conflates whether their conduct was tortious

with whether their conduct was within the scope of their duties.

Evidence that a public official knowingly makes a false statement about

another person may support the conclusion that the statement is

defamatory or otherwise tortious, but it does not inform the question of

whether that defamatory statement was or was not made within the

scope of the official's duties. In fact, the doctrine of absolute immunity

itself presupposes that a public official can defame someone within the

scope of his or her duties, demonstrating that the falsity of the statement

does not impact whether the statement was made within the scope of the

official's duties. See Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 522, 525 (granting

certiorari because absolute immunity protected a public official from suit

based on statements from public officials that "supposedly

misrepresented the results of the shooting review board"); Harrison, 382

So. 3d at 698 (referring to absolute immunity's application no matter

how "false, malicious, or badly motivated the words may be" (emphasis

added) (quoting Gay, 358 So. 3d at 786–87)); Gay, 358 So. 3d at 788

("[T]he landowners' allegations that the public official falsely and

repeatedly stated she had not engaged in ex parte communications

regarding the landowners' construction applications is not relevant to

whether those actions occurred in the scope of her duties as an IRC

member and as its chair." (emphasis omitted) (first citing Hauser v.

Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1970); and then citing Fridovich v.

Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 1992))); Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 192, 195

(concluding absolute immunity applied to alleged "false statements to

several individuals suggesting that India was fraudulently obtaining

workers' compensation benefits" because whether "Cassell

14

misrepresented his belief or suspicion of fraud as a fact or reported

India's impending arrest without any foundation does not change the fact

that he was acting within the scope of his authority"). A necessary

implication of the Kinnans' argument that the alleged tortious nature of

the statements—that they were "false or misleading"—is what takes the

conduct beyond the scope of the defendants' duties is the manifestly

unreasonable corollary that every instance of defamation would be

outside the scope of a public official's duties, meaning the doctrine of

absolute immunity would never apply.

Likewise, Mr. Mills' and Mr. Pumphrey's obligation to submit

"legally sufficient" complaints to the Department of Education does not

mean that the submission of a "legally insufficient" complaint is conduct

outside the scope of their duties. The salient conduct subsumed within

the scope of their duties was the submission of complaints concerning

employee misconduct to the Department of Education. The contrary

argument that whether the submission of complaints fell within their

duties depends on whether the complaints satisfied a standard of legal

sufficiency is meritless for two reasons.

First, the contention that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey acted

beyond their duties by submitting legally insufficient complaints is based

on a faulty premise that legal sufficiency is determined by the veracity of

the allegations. "A complaint is legally sufficient if it contains ultimate

facts that show a violation has occurred as provided in s. 1012.795 and

defined by rule of the State Board of Education." § 1012.796(1)(d). Like

the pleading standard in civil litigation, the legal sufficiency of a

complaint sent to the Department of Education is evaluated by a review

of the ultimate facts contained within the complaint itself. Cf. Reyes ex

rel. Barcenas v. Roush, 99 So. 3d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (providing

15

that in evaluating legal sufficiency the court "was not allowed to

determine the veracity" of the complaint's allegations but only whether

they were "properly pleaded"). Whether a public official submits a

complaint that includes false or misleading allegations certainly bears on

the ultimate success of the complaint—that is, whether the educator

committed a violation—but it has no bearing on the complaint's legal

sufficiency. Indeed, the very determination of legal sufficiency typically

requires a presumption that the allegations are true. Cf., e.g., Williams

Island Ventures, LLC v. de la Mora, 246 So. 3d 471, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA

2018) (explaining that when determining the legal sufficiency of a civil

complaint, "a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true" and

"construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader"); Van v.

Unifund CCR, LLC, 154 So. 3d 522, 522 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("In

determining the legal sufficiency of the motion [to disqualify the trial

judge], we must presume the facts alleged to be true."). Therefore, the

falsity of the statements in the complaints would not even make the

complaints legally insufficient, much less bring the act of preparing and

submitting the complaints outside the "ambit" of the defendants' duties.

See Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 523.

Additionally, even the legal sufficiency of a particular complaint has

no bearing on whether the public official's submission of the complaint

was within the scope of his or her duties. How competently or poorly a

public official performs a certain task has no bearing on whether that

task is one that is within the scope of his or her duties. "Conduct is

within the scope of one's employment if it is the type of conduct which

the employee is hired to perform," Alfino, 676 So. 2d at 449 (emphasis

added)—not if the conduct satisfies applicable performance standards.

The Kinnans have pointed to no authority supporting the proposition

16

that if the conduct is of the type a public official was hired to perform, it

nonetheless falls outside of the scope of the official's duties if the quality

of the official's performance falls short of a standard—such as legal

sufficiency—governing the fulfillment of the official's obligations, whether

that standard be informal or formally established by rule or statute. In

fact, such a formulation of the concept of the scope of duties is

incongruous with the broad language used by courts of this state to

describe that scope. See, e.g., Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 523 ("While the

defendants' respective job descriptions may not have required

participation in these proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court has

decided that the scope of an official's duties extends beyond enumerated,

required tasks, and includes discretionary duties that are associated

with a given position." (citing Wardlow, 403 So. 2d at 416)); Cameron v.

Jastremski, 246 So. 3d 385, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ("The term 'duties'

is not confined to those things required of the officer, but rather extends

to all matters which he is authorized to perform." (quoting Cassell, 964

So. 2d at 194)). If, under established Florida law, "the scope of an

official's duties extends beyond enumerated, required tasks," Stephens,

702 So. 2d at 523, it cannot be that a task explicitly enumerated as an

assigned duty nonetheless falls outside of the scope of duties simply

because it was performed in a manner that fell short of a standard for

the quality of its performance. Thus, even if the Kinnans could establish

that the complaints at issue were not "legally sufficient"—as opposed to

sufficiently pled but based on untruthful allegations—this would not

bring the act of submitting a complaint outside the scope of the duties of

the public officials seeking absolute immunity.

17

III.

The record before the trial court conclusively demonstrated that

Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey were entitled to absolute immunity from the

Kinnans' malicious prosecution claims, and the trial court departed from

the essential requirements of law by denying them the immunity. See id.

at 525. We therefore grant their petitions for writ of certiorari and quash

the portion of the trial court's order that denied their motions for

summary judgment.

Petitions granted; order quashed in part.

NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs.

KHOUZAM, J., Concurs specially.

KHOUZAM, Judge, Concurring specially.

I join fully in the majority opinion. I write only to address the rule

limiting certiorari relief to cases where there has been a violation of a

clearly established principle of law. See Allstate Ins. v. Kaklamanos, 843

So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003) ("A district court should exercise its

discretion to grant certiorari review only when there has been a violation

of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of

justice." (citing Ivey v. Allstate Ins., 774 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000);

Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla. 1995)).

Although the existence of a clearly established law is a prerequisite

to certiorari relief, the mere fact that a case involves a narrow issue of

first impression does not necessarily preclude such relief where the legal

principle at issue is sufficiently clear. See, e.g., Orthopedic Ctr. of S. Fla.

v. Sode, 274 So. 3d 1127, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (granting

certiorari with respect to "a matter of first impression" by applying

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principles from decades-old precedent); see also Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d

at 889-90 (A court "too narrowly interpret[s] what constitutes 'clearly

established law' for purposes of certiorari review" by denying relief due to

the mere absence of appellate cases on the same policy endorsement.).

Here, no one has identified any appellate cases on the application

of absolute immunity to malicious prosecution claims in this context.

But, the majority illustrates in section II that Florida law is already well

settled on the mechanics and scope of such immunity. I therefore believe

that the law is sufficiently clearly established in this regard. Cf. Ill. Union

Ins. v. McGinley, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D119, 2025 WL 21587 at *2 (Fla. 2d

DCA Jan. 3, 2025) (granting prohibition despite the absence of any

Florida decisions on the same question because "the resolution here is

merely a straightforward application of longstanding legal principles").

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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