Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-00280-FWS-DFM Date: April 3, 2025

Title: Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

Present: HONORABLE FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Rolls Royce Paschal N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present Not Present

PROCEEDINGS: ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND [12]

Plaintiff Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza (“Plaintiff”) filed this case in state court

asserting fourteen claims against Defendant B. Braun Medical, Inc. (“Defendant”) related to

sexual harassment and other wrongs Plaintiff allegedly experienced while Defendant employed

him. (Dkt. 1-1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). Defendant removed the case to this court on the

basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1 (“Notice of Removal” or “NOR”).) Before the court is

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Dkt. 12 (“Motion” or “Mot.”).) Defendant opposes the Motion.

(Dkt. 14 (“Opposition” or “Opp.”).) Plaintiff filed a reply in support of the Motion. (Dkt. 16

(“Reply”).) The court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining

motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15 (authorizing courts to “dispense

with oral argument on any motion except where an oral hearing is required by statute”).

Accordingly, the hearing set for April 17, 2025, is VACATED and off calendar. Based on the

state of the record, as applied to the applicable law, the court DENIES the Motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff began working for Defendant full time as a form fill seal operator on March 3,

2014, for $25.00 per hour. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Although “Plaintiff was required to use his personal

cellphone throughout the workday for work-related matters,” Defendant “fail[ed] to reimburse

Plaintiff for his expenses related to the use of his personal cell phone.” (Id. ¶ 11.) In addition,

_________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-00280-FWS-DFM Date: April 3, 2025

Title: Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

“[c]ontrary to what was recorded on his timecards, Plaintiff almost always missed his meal/rest

breaks due to shortage of staff,” and “Plaintiff’s supervisor, Mr. Jesus Chabarria, actively

prevented Plaintiff from going on his lunch breaks on numerous occasions due to shortage of

staff.” (Id. ¶ 12.) “Mr. Chabarria, fabricated [Plaintiff’s] timecard to falsely indicate that he

was taking timely and duty-free lunch breaks.” (Id.)

“In addition, during his employment, Plaintiff witnessed and personally experienced

multiple instances of sexual harassment from Mr. Chabarria. On several occasions, Mr.

Chabarria would approach Plaintiff and attempt to give him a massage by grabbing his

shoulders, which made Plaintiff very uncomfortable and distressed, especially considering that

Mr. Chabarria, as his supervisor had superiority and authority over him.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

“Additionally, Mr. Chabarria made inappropriate comments about female employees,

frequently commenting on their physical appearance, such as making remarks about their ‘big

booty.’” (Id.) “However, the most distressing incident for Plaintiff was when Mr. Chabarria

grabbed his private parts, causing him extreme discomfort and significantly impacting his

emotional safety and well-being at work.” (Id.)

Although “Plaintiff reported the incidents of harassment by Mr. Chabarria to Human

Resources (‘HR’) and was informed that they were going to do a follow up investigation,” “no

investigation was ever conducted.” (Id. ¶ 15.) “Worse, Plaintiff was advised by the HR

personnel manager, Mr. Christian Cardona, that he could simply move to a different location or

resign.” (Id.)

“Thereafter, Plaintiff was also notified by Mr. Cardona that he was prohibited from

working in the same department as his girlfriend, who was also employed with Defendant.” (Id.

¶ 16.) “This directive came as a surprise to Plaintiff as, to his knowledge, it was not a policy

that was reflected anywhere in Defendant’s official employee handbook.” (Id.) “Subsequently,

the HR Manager, Walter Jose, verbally instructed Plaintiff to leave the company.” (Id.) “As

the environment had become unbearably hostile, Plaintiff was forced to tender his resignation

on December 16, 2022.” (Id.)

_________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-00280-FWS-DFM Date: April 3, 2025

Title: Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

Based on these facts, Plaintiff brings claims for (1) sexual harassment in violation of the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), (2) failure to prevent harassment in

violation of FEHA, (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA, (4) constructive discharge in violation

of FEHA, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) negligent infliction of emotional

distress, (7) failure to pay overtime in violation of the California Labor Code, (8) failure to

compensate for every hour worked in violation of the California Labor Code, (9) failure to

provide meal periods in violation of the California Labor Code, (10) failure to maintain accurate

employment records in violation of the California Labor Code, (11) failure to furnish accurate

wage statements in violation of the California Labor Code, (12) failure to timely pay all wages

earned and due upon termination of employment in violation of the California Labor Code,

(13) failure to reimburse work-related expenses in violation of the California Labor Code, and

(14) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. (Id. ¶¶ 18-126.)

II. Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction over only

those suits authorized by the Constitution or Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a suit originates in state court, a defendant may remove to

federal court only when the suit could have been filed in federal court originally. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). “In civil cases, subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred upon federal district

courts either through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or federal question jurisdiction,

28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Peralta v. Hisp. Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).

Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between the parties and that the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267

(1806); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)

(“[D]iversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State

from each plaintiff.”); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete

diversity and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.”); Lee v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d

997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The diversity jurisdiction statute, as construed for nearly 200 years,

_________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-00280-FWS-DFM Date: April 3, 2025

Title: Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

requires that to bring a diversity case in federal court against multiple defendants, each plaintiff

must be diverse from each defendant.”). Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction where there

is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a). The amount in controversy is the total “amount at stake in the underlying

litigation.” Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005). In

measuring the amount in controversy, courts assumes the allegations in the complaint are true

and that the jury will return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on all claims. See Kenneth

Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002);

LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2015) (directing courts to first

look to the complaint in determining the amount in controversy). A removing Defendant has

the burden to “prove that the amount in controversy . . . exceeds the jurisdictional threshold by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 795

(9th Cir. 2018).

When a defendant initially removes a case, it must submit only a “short and plain

statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). And when the basis for removal is

diversity jurisdiction, the amount in controversy allegation in the removal notice “need include

only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional

threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014).

However, if the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s allegations, evidence

establishing the amount is required. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B). The Ninth Circuit

recently explained that following such a challenge, the defendant must make its showing with

“summary-judgment-type evidence.” Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794.

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The removal statute is strictly

construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls

to the party invoking the statute.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988));

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if

_________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-00280-FWS-DFM Date: April 3, 2025

Title: Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”) (citing Libhart v. Santa

Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)).

III. Discussion

In the Motion, Plaintiff argues Defendant has failed to establish that the court has

diversity jurisdiction over this case. (See generally Mot.) The court is not persuaded.

First, Plaintiff argues Defendant has not met its burden to show the requisite amount in

controversy. (Mot. at 1-2.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s calculations include

“speculat[ion] that Plaintiff’s counsel attorneys’ fees ‘would exceed the sum of $75,000.00 for

Plaintiff through trial.’” (Mot. at 2 (citing Dkt. 1-4 (Declaration of David Jacobs) ¶ 7); Reply at

4.) But Plaintiff fails to acknowledge or challenge the statements in the Notice of Removal that,

“[b]ased on Plaintiff’s annualized pay and status as a full-time employee, Plaintiff’s back pay

claim alone is $116,211.20 for the approximate 112 weeks between his December 16, 2022,

date of separation and the date of this Notice of Removal.” (NOR ¶ 20.c.) The court finds

Defendant adequately demonstrated the required amount in controversy.1 See Dart Cherokee,

574 U.S. at 89 (“And when the basis for removal is diversity jurisdiction, the amount in

controversy allegation in the removal notice need include only a plausible allegation that the

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.”) (internal quotation omitted).

1 In the Reply, Plaintiff—without citation—argues that Plaintiff has “provided substantial

evidence indicating that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.” (Reply at 2; see

also id. at 4 (“Plaintiff has consistently maintained that his claims do not exceed $75,000, and

his allegations are supported by the record.”).) However, the court is not aware of any evidence

indicating the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000, and indeed, the court notes that

in the parties’ Joint Rule 26(f) Scheduling Conference Report, filed the same day as the Reply,

“Plaintiff estimates his economic damages include . . . [l]ost wages and benefits” of

approximately “$150,000+.” (Dkt. 15 at 4.)

_________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-00280-FWS-DFM Date: April 3, 2025

Title: Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

Second, Plaintiff argues Defendant has not met its burden to show complete diversity

because “Defendant’s assertion that its principal place of business is in Pennsylvania lacks

sufficient support.” (Mot. at 2.) The court disagrees. On this issue, the Notice of Removal

states:

At the time of the filing of the Complaint, [Defendant]’s headquarters

and principal place of business was located in Bethlehem,

Pennsylvania. (Wheeler Decl., ¶ 3.) As of the date of this Notice of

Removal, Defendant’s headquarters and principal place of business

remains in Bethlehem. (Id.) From the executive and administrative

offices at this location, [Defendant]’s officers direct, control, and

coordinate [Defendant]’s nationwide services and overall business

operations. (Id.) [Defendant]’s corporate officers perform their

primary fundamental operations out of Pennsylvania, not California.

(Id.) [Defendant] thus is a citizen of Pennsylvania for purposes of

diversity jurisdiction under the “nerve center” test. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(c)(1); Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 78 (2010) (holding that a

corporation’s “principal place of business” under section 1332(c)(1) is

typically its corporate headquarters so long as the headquarters is the

actual center of direction, control, and coordination rather than an

office to hold board meetings).

(NOR ¶ 9.) Together with the Notice of Removal, Defendant also submitted a declaration from

Diane Wheeler, Defendant’s Director of Human Resources, who testified to the facts underlying

Defendant’s statements regarding Defendant’s citizenship. (Dkt. 1-3 (Declaration of Diane

Wheeler) ¶¶ 1-3.) The court finds Defendant submitted a sufficient “short and plain statement

of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Indeed, “[a] removing defendant . . . need

only allege facts sufficient to establish a party’s citizenship in its notice of removal; it need not

adduce evidence supporting those facts.” Zeppeiro v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2014 WL

12596312, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2014); see Acad. of Country Music v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 991

_________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-00280-FWS-DFM Date: April 3, 2025

Title: Jose Alfredo Gutierrez Esparza v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Here, the district court erred as a matter of law in requiring

that the notice of removal ‘prove’ subject matter jurisdiction.”).

Finally, Plaintiff argues “removal was procedurally deficient.” (Mot. at 2 (caps and bold

removed from heading).) Plaintiff does not identify any way in which removal was purportedly

procedurally deficient, but rather only contends that “Defendant bears the burden of

compliance” with the removal statute and that “Defendant’s Notice of Removal fails to provide

clear and convincing evidence of jurisdiction.” (Id.) The court is not persuaded that any

procedural deficiency exists in Defendant’s removal of this case.

In summary, the court finds Defendant adequately demonstrated that the requisite

$75,000 is in controversy in this case and that there is complete diversity because Defendant is

a citizen of Texas and Pennsylvania, and Plaintiff is not a citizen of either of those states.2

IV. Disposition

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES the Motion.

2 With the Motion, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a First Amended Declaration of Jacob N. Whitehead

Disclosing New Information Regarding Change in Plaintiff’s Residency. (Dkt. 13.) In this

declaration, counsel states, “[i]n the interest of full disclosure to the Parties and to this Court,”

that counsel “learned . . . on Friday March 14, 2025” that Plaintiff now lives in North Carolina.

(Id. ¶ 2, Ex. B.) Whether Plaintiff is a citizen of California or North Carolina has no impact on

whether the court has diversity jurisdiction over this case because Defendant is not a citizen of

either California or North Carolina.