The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION
CAMILA GASKEY, Civ. No. 6:25-cv-00401-AA
Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER
v.
HON. JUDGE MARK A. JUHAS,
Defendant.
_______________________________________
AIKEN, District Judge.
Pro Se Plaintiff Camila Gaskey seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) in this action. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s IFP Petition, ECF
No. 1, is GRANTED. However, the Complaint, ECF No. 2, is DISMISSED with
prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 4, is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District
Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for
meaningful access to federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees
associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make
two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to
pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess
whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
With regard to the second of these determinations, district courts have the
power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the
complaint on the defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim.
Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter,
668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal
pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the
claim and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. The court is not required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported
by alleged facts, as true. Id.
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by
attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). That is, the court should
construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefit of
any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.
1988). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the
complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot
be cured by amendment. Id.
DISCUSSION
When assessing an IFP petition, the Court first must determine whether the
plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of indigency. Here, the Court is satisfied with
Plaintiff’s showing of indigency, ECF No. 1, and the petition will be GRANTED.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hon. Judge Mark A. Juhas
is a California state court judge presiding over a child custody case involving Plaintiff.
Judge Juhas has issued a series of rulings adverse to Plaintiff, which Plaintiff asserts
are a violation of her constitutional and habeas corpus rights.
This action is brought against a state court judge. “Judges are absolutely
immune from liability for damages, declaratory relief, and generally for injunctive
relief sought as a result of judicial acts performed in their judicial capacity.” Rote v.
Comm. on Judicial Conduct and Disability, 577 F. Supp.3d 1106, 1126 (D. Or. 2021).
Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the award of damages and it “is
not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily
cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). To qualify for judicial immunity, a judge must have
performed judicial acts within the scope of his or her jurisdiction. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). “An act is judicial in nature if it is a function
normally performed by a judge and the parties to the act were dealing with the judge
in his judicial capacity.” Rote, 577 F. Supp.3d at 1126 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Judges have “absolute immunity even when their actions are
erroneous, malicious, or in excess of judicial authority.” Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d
572, 576 (9th Cir. 1989).
The allegations in this case establish that Judge Juhas is a California state
court judge who is presiding over a case in which Plaintiff is a party. The acts that
form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims are plainly judicial in nature. On the face of the
Complaint, Judge Juhas is entitled to absolute immunity for the claims against him.
The Complaint will therefore be dismissed. Because no amendment would remedy
the defects in the Complaint, dismissal is with prejudice and without leave to amend.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 4, is DENIED as MOOT.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s IFP petition, ECF No. 1, is
GRANTED and the Complaint, ECF No. 2, is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s
Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 4, is DENIED as MOOT. Final
judgment shall be entered accordingly.
It is so ORDERED and DATED this 3 rd day of April 2025.
/s/Ann Aiken
ANN AIKEN
United States District Judge