Neal v. Western Regional Jail

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

HUNTINGTON DIVISION

CHARLES LEE NEAL, II,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-00494

WESTERN REGIONAL JAIL,

ADMINISTRATOR CARL ALDRIDGE,

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, KYLE

MOORE, SERGEANT TYLER DEWEESE,

STEVE TARBETT, GOVERNOR JIM

JUSTICE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Pending before the Court are the following documents: an Application by Plaintiff

to Proceed without Prepayment of Fess or Costs, (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF

No. 3), and numerous letter-form motions to expedite, for a hearing, and for witnesses,

(ECF Nos. 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20). For the reasons that follow, these motions are

DENIED. Plaintiff is further ORDERED to file, within sixty (60) days, a correct and

complete Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or pay the $405

filing fee and to amend his Complaint as further described herein.

I. Relevant History

Plaintiff, Charles Lee Neal, II, is currently an inmate at Western Regional Jail and

Correctional Facility in Barboursville, West Virginia. On September 11, 2024, Plaintiff

filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of West Virginia. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff has also drafted numerous

handwritten letters as additional documentation in support of his complaint, (ECF Nos.

5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), and various letter form motions, (ECF Nos. 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20),

in which he repeatedly regurgitates the same “facts” and allegations. The named

defendants include Western Regional Jail, Administrator Carl Aldridge, State of West

Virginia, Kyle Moore, Sergeant Tyler Deweese, Steve Tarbett, and Governor Jim Justice.

The undersigned notes that Plaintiff simultaneously filed a separate § 1983 action

against Officer C.A. Varien, Officer Toler, Magistrate Steve Tarbett, Magistrate Melanie

Sang, Western Regional Jail Transportation, and Judge Richard Tatterson. Neal v. Officer

C. A. Varien, et. al., Case No. 3:24-cv-00493 (hereinafter the “Officer Varien matter”).

Plaintiff includes allegations for both matters (the Officer Varien matter and the present

matter against WRJ) in the documents filed in this case.

Relevant here, Plaintiff was arrested after a December 9, 2023, incident in Point

Pleasant, Mason County, by Sergeant Tyler Deweese. (ECF No. 11-1). The Criminal

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff stabbed his father, Charles Lee Neal, Sr., with a kitchen

steak knife, and Plaintiff’s father later succumbed to his injuries. (Id.). Plaintiff was

charged with murder under West Virginia Code 61-2-1. (Id.).

From a cursory review of the numerous handwritten documents, it appears that

Plaintiff is complaining about the criminal complaint and temporary commitment order

from this December 2023 arrest. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff asserts that Magistrate Tarbett

and Sergeant Deweese used an incorrect name and West Virginia Code section in an

arraignment order and criminal complaint, respectively. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that “Charles L. Neal, Jr.” and “Charles Lee Neal, Jr.” were used on the temporary

commitment jail order and criminal complaint, but Plaintiff’s name is Charles Lee Neal,

II. (Id.; See also ECF No. 7). He further complains that one document lists the date as 12-

9-2023 and the other lists it as 12-10-2023. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff also takes issue with

there being no time of arrival listed on the commitment order. (Id.). Lastly, Plaintiff

alleges that the listed West Virginia Code contains nine crimes and is an incorrect Code

for his case. (ECF Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7). Plaintiff provides no further facts or allegations on

concerning what protected civil right of his has been violated or how any official deprived

Plaintiff of those rights while acting under color of State law.

Similarly, concerning the other named Defendants, aside from listing their names

on page one of his complaint, (ECF No. 3 at 1), and then again listing their names in a

letter filed as an additional document in support of his Complaint, (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff

makes no allegations against Western Regional Jail, Administrator Carl Aldridge, State of

West Virginia, Kyle Moore, and Governor Jim Justice.

This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States

District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for

submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having performed an initial review of the complaint and the

numerous motions filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned

finds certain deficiencies in pleading that must be corrected by Plaintiff before this action

can proceed.

II. Deficiencies in the In Forma Pauperis Application

In this district, an in forma pauperis application (or Application to Proceed

Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs) is not complete until the institution of

incarceration has completed the certificate located at the bottom of page 2 of the

Application, or the prisoner has submitted a transaction record of his inmate account. By

obtaining this certification or transactional record, the court can verify whether the

prisoner is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.

Here, although Plaintiff completed the first portion of the application, the

Certificate at the bottom of page 2 has been crossed out with the signature line being left

blank, and Plaintiff failed to provide a copy of his transaction record of his inmate

account. It appears Plaintiff was housed at William R. Sharpe, Jr. Hospital at the time of

filing, but he has since been transferred to Western Regional Jail and Correctional

Facility. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1).

Therefore, the court ORDERS Plaintiff to fully complete, sign, and submit to the

court within sixty (60) days an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and

Costs that includes the completed Certificate at the bottom of page two. The form will be

provided to Plaintiff by the Clerk of Court. In the alternative, Plaintiff may pay the filing

fee of $405.

III. Deficiencies in the Complaint

As previously stated, in keeping with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned

preliminarily reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint to determine if the action is frivolous, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. Although pro se complaints, such as the one filed in this

case, must be liberally construed to allow the development of potentially meritorious

claims, the court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims that were never

presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), develop the

plaintiff’s legal theories for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993),

or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court. Beaudett v. City of

Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). At the same time, to achieve justice, the

court may allow a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint in order to

correct deficiencies in the pleading. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).

Pleading Requirements

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 sets forth the general rules of pleading. According

to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for a

court’s jurisdiction … a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief … and a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the

alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The operative words here are

“short” and “plain.” An unnecessarily detailed and repeated recitation of seemingly

unrelated events renders a complaint unintelligible.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 addresses the form of pleadings. Rule 10

requires the complaint to name all of the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, parties must be individuals, not units or entities. Perrin v. Nicholson, 2010 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 105121, at *4 (D.S.C. 2010); American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526

U.S. 40, 50-52 (1999). Therefore, groups like “Western Regional Jail” and “State of West

Virginia” are not properly named defendants. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant a

specific person who, while acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a

federally protected civil right, privilege, or immunity. Id.

In addition to naming persons as parties, Plaintiff is required to state his claims in

numbered paragraphs, “each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Along that line of thought, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20

discusses the parties that may be joined as defendants in the same action. According to

Rule 20(a)(2), individuals may be joined as defendants in one action if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with the respect to or arising out of the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any questions of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the

action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff simultaneously filed another § 1983 action, and

Plaintiff includes the “facts” and allegations from both actions in each letter form motion

and handwritten documentation filed in support of his Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff

must determine which claims are related and share common issues of law or fact and then

join those claims and defendants in one action and include only the relevant facts and

allegations for that specific matter. Allegations concerning the other matter must be

drafted and filed separately for that case.

Failure to State a Claim

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy to parties who are deprived of federally

protected civil rights by persons acting under color of any state “law, statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage.” To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege facts showing that: (1) an official deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected civil

right, privilege or immunity and (2) that the official did so under color of State law. 42

U.S.C. § 1983; see also Perrin v. Nicholson, C/A No. 9:10-1111-HFF-BM, 2010 WL

3893792 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2010). If either of these elements is missing, the complaint fails

to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For an official to be liable under § 1983,

it must be “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the

deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no

application under this section.” Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)

(quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Md. 1971)). Accordingly, Plaintiff

must ensure that the people he names as Defendants in his suit are not joined simply

because of their position at the Jail or with the government, because if that is the case,

then they should be summarily dismissed from the lawsuit. In light of this governing

principle, Plaintiff must amend his complaint to set forth factual allegations explaining

how each Defendant personally violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Immunity

Although it is unclear what constitutional rights violations claims Plaintiff is

bringing against Magistrate Tarbett and Governor Jim Justice, Plaintiff is advised that his

claims against these defendants may be barred by immunity pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment, judicial immunity, and/or qualified immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Judicial power of

the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced

or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens

or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Although the Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits

by citizens of other states, the United States Supreme Court has construed the

Amendment to “establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in

federal court by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.” Port. Auth. Trans-

Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (2009) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)) (markings omitted). The immunity created

by the Amendment protects both the State, itself, and its agencies, divisions, departments,

officials, and other “arms of the State.” Taylor v. Ozmint, Case No. 0:10–50–HMH–PJG,

2011 WL 286133, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (citing Will 491 U.S. at 70); see also Regents

of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1977) (“[I]t has long been settled that the

reference [in the Eleventh Amendment] to actions ‘against one of the United States’

encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but

also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”).

“The question of whether an agency or a state official is properly considered an

arm of the state and, therefore, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, is a question

of federal law.” Coonts v. Randolph Cty. Circuit Court Judge, No. 2:15-CV-21, 2015 WL

12791398, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 18, 2015) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v. Doe,

519 U.S. 425 (1997)). To determine whether an official is an arm of the state, the Fourth

Circuit applies a four-factor test, which considers “whether the state treasury will be

responsible for paying any judgment that might be awarded ... [W]hether the entity

exercises a significant decree of autonomy from the state, whether it is involved with local

versus statewide concerns, and how it is treated as a matter of State law.” Id. The inquiry

necessarily begins with the first factor because “the most important consideration is

whether the state treasury will be affected.” Id. (citations omitted). Importantly, “[t]he

Eleventh Amendment protects the State from the risk of adverse judgments even though

the State may be indemnified by a third party.” Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v.

Doe, 519 U.S. at 431).

In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court addressed circumstances under which

a State official was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, finding that not

all State officials qualified. Id., 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) The Court made a distinction

between officials acting in their official capacities and officials acting in their personal

capacities under color of state law. Id.; see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). The

Court concluded that an official sued in his official capacity was entitled to sovereign

immunity, while an official sued in his personal capacity was not. As the Court explained,

the real party in interest in an “official-capacity” suit is the governmental entity, rather

than the named official, and the target of the claim is the entity’s “policy or custom,” not

the individual official. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166). “Personal-

capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government

officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Id.

The determination of whether a defendant has been named in his official or

individual capacity is generally made by examining “the face of the complaint.” Amos v.

Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 609 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated

on other grounds by 524 U.S. 935 (1998). “[A] plaintiff need not plead expressly the

capacity in which he is suing a defendant in order to state a cause of action under § 1983.”

Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995). However, “[w]hen a plaintiff does not

allege capacity specifically, the court must examine the nature of the plaintiff's claims, the

relief sought, and the course of proceedings to determine whether a state official is being

sued in a personal capacity.” Id. at 61. In Foreman v. Griffith, the Fourth Circuit discussed

the significance of the factors outlined in Biggs:

With respect to assessing the nature of a plaintiff’s claim or claims, the

Biggs court stated that the plaintiff’s failure to allege that the defendant

acted in accordance with a governmental policy or custom or the lack of

indicia of such a policy or custom on the face of the complaint indicates that

a state actor has been sued in his individual capacity. With respect to the

nature of the relief sought, the Biggs court also stated that the plaintiff's

request for compensatory or punitive damages indicates an individual

capacity suit since such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits. Finally,

with respect to the course of proceedings, the Biggs court stated that the

defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity as a defense indicates an

individual capacity suit, since such a defense is only available in individual

capacity suits.

81 F. App’x 432, 435 (4th Cir. 2003). Ultimately, “the underlying inquiry remains whether

the [p]laintiff’s intention to hold a defendant personally liable can be ascertained fairly.”

Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61.

Turning to quasi-judicial and judicial immunity, it is well-settled that “judges are

absolutely immune from suit for a deprivation of civil rights brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983” even if such acts were allegedly done maliciously, corruptly, or in bad faith and no

matter “how erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences

[the judicial act] may have proved to the plaintiff.” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th

Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); Plotzker v. Lamberth, No. 3:08-cv-00027, 2008 WL

4706255, at *4 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2008) (citations omitted). This long-standing common

law doctrine is “for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be

at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of

consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Judicial immunity ensures that

while a judge’s actions are “subject to correction on appeal or other authorized review,”

they do “not expose him to a claim for damages in a private action, or put him to the

trouble and expense of defending such an action.” Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.

1985). “Magistrates are judicial officers, and are thus entitled to absolute immunity under

the same conditions as are judges.” Id.

Further, the “doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity applies to non-judicial officers

‘performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons

are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.’” Ward v. Plymale, No. 3:12-

cv-06186, 2013 WL 6164277, at *16 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 25, 2013) (quoting Bush v. Rauch,

38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Jackson v. Houck, 181 Fed. Appx. 372, 373 (4th

Cir. 2006) (“Absolute immunity applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel that are

basic and integral parts of the judicial function.”) (internal quotations omitted). “The

doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to

court support personnel such as [court] clerks because of the danger that disappointed

litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will

vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.” Boyd v. KLLM

Transp. Servs. Inc., No. 3:10-3208-JFA-PJG, 2011 WL 8318383, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 8,

2011) (internal quotations omitted).

There are only two conditions in which judicial immunity does not apply to bar a §

1983 claim for damages: (1) if the judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” or

(2) the judge’s action was not a “judicial act.” King, 973 F.2d at 356-57. Under the first

option, “[a] distinction is drawn between acts that are performed in ‘excess of jurisdiction’

and those performed in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter,’ with

the former type of act accorded immunity.” Id. Therefore, the question is “whether at the

time [the judge] took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter

before him, and, in answering that question, the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be

construed broadly.” Id. at 357 (internal quotations and markings omitted). In

determining whether the act at issue was a “judicial act,” the Court examines “whether

the function is one normally performed by a judge, and whether the parties dealt with the

judge in his or her judicial capacity.” Id. Notably, “the absolute immunity extended to a

judge performing a judicial action is not in any way diminished even if his or her exercise

of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Id. Such “errors do

not render the act any less judicial, nor permit a determination that the court acted in the

absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.

Lastly, claims against Governor Jim Justice may be shielded by qualified

immunity. Government officials performing discretionary functions may be protected

from monetary damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity when “their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified

immunity “is a judicially created doctrine that stems from the conclusion that few

individuals will enter public service if such service entails the risk of personal liability for

one’s official decisions.” Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994).

This doctrine protects law enforcement officers in the exercise of their official duties from

the risk of personal liability for making “bad guesses in gray areas,” ensuring that they are

only responsible for “transgressing bright lines.” Marciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295,

298 (4th Cir. 1992). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Pearson v.

Callahan:

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to

hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly

and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability

when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified

immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is “a

mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of

law and fact.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.

551, 567 (2004)). Because qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a

mere defense to liability,” it is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). “Where the defendant

seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings

so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive.”

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).

In determining the applicability of qualified immunity, the court must consider

two questions: (1) whether a constitutional or statutory right would have been violated on

the facts alleged by plaintiff, and (2) whether the right asserted was clearly established at

the time of the alleged violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. These questions may be

answered in any order that “[would] best facilitate a fair and efficient disposition of each

case.” Id. at 242. If a court finds that a claimed constitutional right was not clearly

established at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, the court may dispose of the case

without engaging in the pointless exercise of determining whether the facts alleged

actually establish a violation of that right. Id. Similarly, if a court determines that the facts

alleged by the plaintiff do not support a reasonable inference that a constitutional right

was violated, the analysis terminates, and the Complaint is subject to dismissal for failure

to state a claim.

One Single Document

Finally, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff has filed numerous letters in support

of his Complaint, some of which raise new allegations or provide additional explanation.

Plaintiff is advised that he should include all allegations and facts relevant to his claims

in one singular Amended Complaint and refrain from filing additional documents

afterwards.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is ORDERED, within sixty (60) days of the

date of this Order, to file an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the proper

form, which will be provided by the Clerk of Court. The amended complaint shall include

the names of the individual defendants who, acting under color of state law, violated

Plaintiff’s federal civil or constitutional rights. To the extent known to Plaintiff, the

amended complaint shall include the addresses of the defendants. The amended

complaint shall contain short and plain statements, arranged in numbered paragraphs,

setting forth the basic facts upon which Plaintiff’s claims are based, including what

constitutional right the named defendant has violated, the dates of these occurrence, and

the actions of the named defendant that caused the violation. The amended complaint

may include claims and defendants that are connected by an event or series of events or

transactions and that share common issues of fact or law. Plaintiff is further advised to

either type or ensure his handwriting is legible in all future filings and reminded to include

only the allegations relevant to the subject case.

Further, if Plaintiff wishes to file more than one complaint, he should bear in mind

that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 governs actions in which a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma

pauperis. Section 1915(g) of the statute includes a “three strikes” rule, stating as follows:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a

civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action

or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury.

Consequently, Plaintiff may wish to carefully review his prospective cases before he files

them to decide if they all meet the requirements of a § 1983 action. The amended

complaint shall not contain extraneous or unnecessary information or attachments. It

shall clearly and simply state the relief requested. Should Plaintiff, after review, decide he

no longer wishes to pursue his claims, he should file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal.

Plaintiff is hereby given notice that a failure to file the Application to

Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs and amend his complaint as

ordered may result in a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for

failure to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or for failure

to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and L. R. Civ. P. 41.1.

IV. Other Motions

Turning to Plaintiff’s other motions, Plaintiff has filed seven letter-form motions,

requesting a “speedy trial,” a hearing or court date, to expedite, and for “the State to get

witnesses.” Because these motions concern the originally filed Complaint, these motions

are DENIED as MOOT.

Moreover, concerning Plaintiff’s motion for a speedy trial or to expedite, (ECF Nos.

8, 20), to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy

trial, Plaintiff is hereby advised that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is applicable

only in criminal cases, and thus, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to a speedy trial in

this civil action. Construing Plaintiff’s motions as a motion to expedite instead, Plaintiff

is advised that civil actions are reviewed in the order in which they are filed, and Plaintiff

has failed to show good cause for expedited review.

Further, a hearing is not appropriate at this stage of the proceedings, and his

motions for such should be denied. (ECF Nos. 12, 16, 17, 19). As ordered herein, Plaintiff

is to file an amended complaint that legibly, succinctly, and completely describes the

allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights. He is also to either pay the filing fee

or file a complete and correct application to proceed without prepayment of costs.

Plaintiff’s motion for witnesses, (ECF No. 18), is also premature and inappropriate.

In his motion, Plaintiff claims, “it is of the importance for the State Representative of this

case to get witnesses and there [sic] names because I do not have the ability to do so and

it is up to the State and you, your Honor to do so.” Discovery has not yet been initiated in

this case, and even if it had started, the Court cannot compel the State to secure witnesses

on Plaintiff’s behalf, nor does the Court perform discovery tasks for any party to a civil

action. Rather, each party is obligated to conduct its own discovery. Furthermore,

assuming Plaintiff is filing a motion to compel, this type of motion is only appropriate

after discovery requests have been correctly served on a party, have not been timely or

completely answered, and a meet-and-confer session has failed to resolve the outstanding

issues. At some point, if discovery opens in this matter, Plaintiff will have to request

subpoenas from the Clerk of Court and will have to serve the non-parties with the

subpoenas.

Plaintiff is reminded of his obligation to notify the Clerk of Court of any changes in

his address.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to Plaintiff, along with an

Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs, a § 1983 complaint form,

instructions for filing the complaint, an Authorization for the Release of Institutional

Account Information and to Pay Fee, and the Explanation of Filing Fees.

ENTERED: April 3, 2025

(ts) J Oey K. Reeder

mt LO y United States Magistrate Judge