PAYNE v. HOMERIVER GROUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BROOKE PAYNE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00643-TWP-TAB

)

HOMERIVER GROUP, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

DENYING MOTIONS FOR TRO AND FOR EMERGENCY HEARING,

ENTRY SCREENING COMPLAINT, AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

On April 2, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Brooke Payne ("Payne") initiated this action by filing a

Complaint for Emergency Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 1), Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt.

2), Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("Motion for TRO") (Dkt. 3), and Emergency Motion

for Hearing and Restoration of Possession ("Motion for Emergency Hearing") (Dkt. 4). Payne is

seeking to stop an eviction that was scheduled to take place on April 1, 2025. Because she is

seeking to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, this action is subject to screening pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

For the reasons explained below, Payne's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied,

this action is subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and because the Court lacks jurisdiction,

Payne's Motions for TRO and Emergency Hearing are denied.

I. DISCUSSION

The Court will address Payne's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, screen her Complaint,

and then discuss her Motions for TRO and for Emergency Hearing.

A. Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 2)

Payne has filed two documents titled "Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis" and "AO 240:

Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs", though neither is the

AO's or Court's form Request to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. (Dkt.

2). In her pleading, Payne states that she is unable to pre-pay the filing fee because she is

unemployed, receives public assistance, and does not own significant assets or have access to

financial resources. Id. at 2. This very limited information is not enough for the Court to determine

whether Payne qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis. Her motion (Dkt. 2) is therefore denied,

but Ms. Payne is granted leave to refile this request, using Court's form Request to Proceed in

District Court Without Prepaying the Filing Fee, which will assist Ms. Payne in providing the

information needed. A copy of the Court's form will be sent to Payne with this Entry.

B. Screening the Complaint

1. Screening Standard

"[D]istrict courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and

non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); McGore, 114 F.3d at 608.

Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). District courts have an obligation under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on the defendant and must dismiss the

complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states

a claim, the court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).

To survive dismissal under federal pleading standards,

[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a "plaintiff must do better than putting a few

words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to [him] that might be redressed by the law." Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,

403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).

2. Payne's Complaint

In her Complaint, Payne seeks "declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief due to

imminent and unlawful eviction scheduled for April 1, 2025, in violation of her Fourteenth

Amendment rights to due process and equal protection under the law." (Dkt. 1). Attached to Payne's

Complaint are several documents described as "Proof of Payment" and "Court Denials With No

Explanation." (Dkt. 1-2). Her claims arise from her eviction from her apartment by Defendant

HomeRiver Group ("HomeRiver"), which was scheduled for April 1, 2025.

In December 2024, HomeRiver filed an action in Franklin Township Small Claims Court

(the "State Court"), seeking to evict Payne from her apartment for nonpayment of rent (the

"Eviction Case").1 In response, Payne, acting pro se, filed several motions attempting to delay her

eviction or have the Eviction Case dismissed, all of which were denied. On February 19, 2025, the

State Court held an eviction hearing and issued a Prejudgment Order for Possession holding that

HomeRiver was entitled to possession of the apartment on March 5, 2025.2 On February 21, 2025,

Payne filed a letter asking for additional time to pay the outstanding rent and to have the February

1 Notice of Claim for Possession of Real Estate and Summons, HomeRiver Grp. v. Payne, Case No. 49K09-2412-EV-

001151 ("Payne I") (Franklin Township Small Claims Ct. filed Dec. 18, 2024).

2 Prejudgment Order for Possession, Payne I (filed Feb. 19, 2025).

19, 2025 Prejudgment Order vacated. The State Court denied that request, and on February 24,

2025, it issued a Writ of Possession.3

On February 28, 2025, Payne filed another letter requesting additional time to pay the rent

owing. A few days later, on March 3, 2025, Payne appealed the Eviction Case to the Indiana Court

of Appeals.4 The Indiana Court of Appeals stayed the State Court's February 19, 2025 Order of

Possession through March 31, 2025.5 Payne then filed several motions with the State Court and

Indiana Court of Appeals requesting that the stay be extended through the conclusion of her appeal,

but those requests were all denied, and the stay expired on March 31, 2025. Payne's Eviction Case

remains pending, with a damages hearing set for April 14, 2025, and the appeal remains pending.

Payne initiated this federal action on April 2, 2025, seeking to stop her April 1, 2025

eviction. Stated another way, she seeks to vacate the State Court's Prejudgment Order of Possession

and Writ of Possession.

A summary of events leading up to this federal action, though not alleged in the Complaint,

is based on public state court records, some of which are attached to Payne's Complaint.

3. Dismissal of the Complaint

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction, and "[n]o court

may decide a case without subject-matter jurisdiction, and neither the parties nor their lawyers may

stipulate to jurisdiction or waive arguments that the court lacks jurisdiction. If the parties neglect

the subject, a court must raise jurisdictional questions itself." United States v. County of Cook, 167

F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 1999); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).

3 Writ, Payne I (filed Feb. 24, 2025).

4 Notice of Appeal, Payne v. HomeRiver Grp., Case No. 25A-EV-00483 (Ind. Ct. App. filed Mar. 3, 2025).

5 Order, Case No. 25A-EV-00483 (filed Mar. 4, 2025).

"Courts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,

even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514

(2006). A court "must raise the issue sua sponte when it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is

lacking." Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 749 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Evergreen Square

of Cudahy v. Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., 776 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 2015) ("federal courts are

obligated to inquire into the existence of jurisdiction sua sponte"). "When a federal court concludes

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety."

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514, quoted in Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2010); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,

the court must dismiss the action.").

To survive dismissal, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation

marks omitted). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, mere "labels,"

"conclusions," or "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of

Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009) ("it is not enough to give a threadbare recitation of the

elements of a claim without factual support").

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, this Court does not have jurisdiction to

adjudicate Payne's claims because Payne is barred from challenging the State Court's orders under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Section 1983 is inapplicable to HomeRiver, Payne alleges no

conspiracy under Section 1985, and Payne's factual allegations fail to adequately assert a federal

claim to give rise to federal question or diversity jurisdiction in this Court.

a. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from two decisions of the United States Supreme

Court: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). According to this doctrine, lower federal courts are

precluded from exercising jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments or over

claims "inextricably intertwined" with state court determinations. See, e.g., Long v. Shorebank Dev.

Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal

jurisdiction over these claims because, no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court

judgment may be, the Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal court that could have

jurisdiction to review a state court judgment." Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990,

996 (7th Cir. 2000).

Here, Payne plainly seeks review of the orders issued by the State Court in the Eviction

Case. This Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Payne's proper course of action to challenge the State Court's orders is to appeal those

orders to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which Payne has done.

b. Inapplicability of Section 1983 to HomeRiver

Payne's Section 1983 claim against HomeRiver must also be dismissed because

HomeRiver is not a state actor. "Liability under § 1983 requires proof of two essential elements:

that the conduct complained of (1) 'was committed by a person acting under color of state law' and

(2) 'deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States.'" Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor,

451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327, 331–32 (1986)). Payne's Complaint fails to satisfy the first element because it does not allege

that HomeRiver acted "under color of state law." Private businesses, like HomeRiver, are not state

actors and are therefore not subject to liability under Section 1983. See Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr.,

746 F.3d 782, 797−98 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating there is no Section 1983 for private individuals not

acting under color of state law).

c. Failure to Allege Conspiracy under Section 1985

Section 1985 "permit[s] recovery from a private actor who has conspired with state actors."

Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 2009). To state a claim under Section 1985, a

plaintiff must allege:

(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any

person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges

and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)

whereby a person is either injured in [her] person or property or deprived of any

right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Milchtein v. Milwaukee Cnty., 42 F. 4th 814, 827 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). "Additionally,

the plaintiff must plead that the conspiracy was motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'" Id. (quoting Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980

F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1992)). Payne's Complaint does not allege any conspiracy between

HomeRiver and any state actor, much less one motivated by discriminatory animus. Payne has

therefore failed to adequately allege a claim for relief under Section 1985

d. Lack of Jurisdiction Due to Insufficient Pleading

As a more general matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction because Payne has failed to

adequately plead claims establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. Payne alleges that

HomeRiver is liable for violating her due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment, but Payne has not adequately alleged a violation of either of those rights.

Payne does not specify whether she is asserting a procedural due process claim, substantive

due process claim, or both. Regardless, the Complaint does not adequately assert either type of

due process claim. Payne does not allege any specific constitutionally protected interest of which

she was deprived, or any legal process to which she was entitled but did not receive prior to that

deprivation. See LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Will. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 –44 (7th Cir. 2010)

("To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for the deprivation of a property interest without due

process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he had a constitutionally protected property interest,

(2) he suffered a loss of that interest amounting to a deprivation, and (3) the deprivation occurred

without due process of law.").

Further, Payne does not allege conduct by HomeRiver that rises to the level of a substantive

due process violation. Conduct "shocking to the conscience" such that it violates substantive due

process exists in only the most "egregious" of circumstances and is reserved for "truly horrendous

situations." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). The eviction of a tenant

pursuant to a valid court order does not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.

Payne's equal protection claim is also insufficient. The constitution protects one from

disparate treatment based on membership in a protected class. Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358,

370 (7th Cir. 2000). Payne's Complaint contains no allegation that she was discriminated against

by HomeRiver because of her membership in a particular class. Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44

F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted).

Because Payne has failed to plead any viable federal claims against HomeRiver, the Court

lacks federal question jurisdiction over her claims. And even though Payne does not assert any

state law claims against Payne, the Court would lack jurisdiction over such claims because Payne

has not alleged diversity of citizenship. Payne appears to be an Indiana citizen, but the Complaint

does not allege the citizenship of HomeRiver. According to public records, HomeRiver is a limited

liability company, so its citizenship is the citizenship of all of its members (and the members of

those members).6 Thomas v. Guardsmark, LLC, 487 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2007) ("For diversity

jurisdiction purposes, the citizenship of an LLC is the citizenship of each of its members.").

Without knowing the citizenship of HomeRiver, the Court cannot determine whether diversity of

citizenship exists.

For all of the above reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Payne's claims.

C. Motions for TRO and for Emergency Hearing (Dkt. 3, Dkt. 4)

As explained above, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Payne's claims. Payne's single-page

Motions for TRO and Emergency Hearing include no additional allegations and merely restate

Payne's conclusory claims and request for relief. These Motions identify no basis for emergency

relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, nor do they establish this Court's jurisdiction.

Accordingly, at this time, the Motions for TRO and for Emergency Hearing must be denied.

D. Opportunity to Show Cause

Payne shall have through Monday, May 5, 2025, by which to show cause why judgment

consistent with this Entry should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,

1022 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show

cause, an [] applicant's case could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely

notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.").

If Payne elects to file an amended complaint, she should conform to the following

guidelines: (a) the amended complaint shall comply with the requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) of the

6 According to Indiana Secretary of State records, "HomeRiver Group" is the assumed business name of "Brick Lane

Property Management LLC." This information can be found using the Secretary of State's public business search:

https://bsd.sos.in.gov/publicbusinesssearch.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that pleadings contain "a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," which is sufficient to provide the defendants with

"fair notice” of the claim and its basis; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); (b) the amended complaint

must include a demand for the relief sought; (c) the amended complaint must identify what legal

injury Payne claims to have suffered and what persons are responsible for each such legal injury;

and (d) the amended complaint must include the case number referenced in the caption of this

Entry. The amended complaint also should demonstrate that jurisdiction is proper in this Court.

Il. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Payne's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2) is

DENIED. Payne shall pay the $405.00 filing fee to the Clerk of the District Court or submit the

necessary motion to proceed in forma pauperis no later than Monday, May 5, 2025, or this action

will be dismissed and final judgment entered without further notice. The Clerk is directed to send

a copy of the form "Request to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Non-

Prisoner)" to Payne with this Order.

Further, having screened the Complaint, the Court finds it is subject to dismissal for lack

of jurisdiction, and Payne's Motion for TRO (Dkt. 3) and Motion for Emergency Motion for

Hearing and Restoration of Possession (Dkt. 4) are DENIED. Payne is granted leave to file an

amended complaint by no later than Monday, May 5, 2025. If no amended complaint is filed by

that date, this action will be dismissed for the reasons set forth above.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 4/3/2025 ¢ \a an 4 \ Jaton \rcatt

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

10

Distribution:

BROOKE PAYNE

7905 Housefinch Lane

Indianapolis, IN 46239