The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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TIMOTHY ANDREW ROODENBURG,
Plaintiff,
-v- 5:23-CV-963
PAUL SANDY, et al.,
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
TIMOTHY ANDREW ROODENBURG
Plaintiff, pro se
P.O. Box 173
DeRuyter, NY 13052
BARGNESI BRITT PLLC JASON T. BRITT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Jay A. Supnick JULIE M. BARGNESI, ESQ.
350 Main Street, Suite 1105
Buffalo, NY 14202
GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP DAVID E. LEACH, ESQ.
Attorneys for Remaining Defendants
5786 Widewaters Parkway
Syracuse, NY 13214
DAVID N. HURD
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2023, plaintiff Timothy Andrew Roodenburg (“Roodenburg”
or “plaintiff”), acting pro se, filed a complaint against City of Cortland Police
(“Cortland Police”) Chief Paul Sandy, Cortland Police Lieutenant Cheyenne
Cute, Cortland Deputy Police Chief David Guerrera, Cortland Police
Commission Chairman Jim Sponaugle, Cortland Police Commission Membes
Trish Hansen, Liz Starr, Cheryl Michales, and Michael Whitlock, Cortland
Common Council Members Wayne Schutt II, Kathryn Silliman, Mary Clare
Pennello, Patricia Lane, Seth Thompson, Bill Carpenter, Cortland Police
Psychiatrist Thomas Michales , and the City of Cortland (collectively the
“defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff’s one-
count complaint alleges that defendants deprived him of his constitutional
right to due process.1 Id. While not specified as a cause of action, plaintiff
has also alleged termination on the grounds that he was discriminated
against when he was terminated for having mental health issues. On
December 15, 2023, plaintiff moved for leave to amend his complaint. Dkt.
1 While not specified as a cause of action, plaintiff has also alleged termination on the grounds
that he was discriminated against when he was terminated for having mental health issues. Infra.
No. 52. That motion was granted.2 Dkt. No. 53. Roodenburg filed this
amended complaint on July 16, 2024. Dkt. No. 63.
On July 26, 2024, all defendants except for Police Psychiatrist Jay A.
Supnick (“Supnick” or “defendant”) answered the amended complaint and
filed a counterclaim. Dkt. No. 67. Supnick has since moved to dismiss
plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 83 or, in the alternative, Rule 12(e). Dkt. No. 78-5. The motion has
been fully briefed and will be considered on the basis of the submissions
without oral argument. Dkt. Nos. 63, 78-5, 81, 86, 90.
II. BACKGROUND
This case arises from plaintiff’s employment as a police officer with the
Cortland Police. On December 5, 2021, plaintiff received a conditional offer of
employment to work as a police officer for the Cortland Police. Am. Compl. ¶
5. One condition of plaintiff’s employment was completing an 18-month
probationary period. Id. Another was the passage of both a medical and
2 The purpose of plaintiff’s motion was to replace named defendant Cortland Police Psychiatrist
with Police Psychiatrist Jay A. Supnick, Ph.D., ABPP. Dkt. No. 52.
3 Supnick’s motion to dismiss makes no mention of Rule 12(b)(6). See generally Def’s Mem.
Rather, it argues that plaintiff has failed to satisfy Rule 8(b) because his complaint “fails to identify
any action taken by Dr. Supnick under color of law that deprived Mr. Roodenburg of a right,
privilege, or immunity actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, while Rule 8 indeed governs the
pleading requirements, Rule 12(b)(6) is the appropriate legal basis for challenging a complaint’s
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Accordingly, Supnick’s motion will be properly construed as having been
brought under Rule 12(b)(6).
psychological examination. Id. In the midst of this probationary period,
plaintiff completed the medical exam and was scheduled to take a
psychological exam at a Cortland County personnel office. Id.
The sequencing of the events in plaintiff’s amended complaint is confusing
and, at times, difficult to decipher.4 Nevertheless, the Court understands the
general facts underlying plaintiff’s claim, and they are broadly construed as
follows. In January of 2022, shortly after the start of his probationary period
with the Cortland Police, Roodenberg alleges he went to a Cortland County
personnel office to complete the requisite psychological exam. Am. Compl. ¶
5. Plaintiff alleges that two hours into his psychological exam, the personnel
officer conducting the exam received a call from Cortland Police Chief Paul
Sandy (“Sandy”).5 Id. Sandy requested the psychological examination be
terminated because: (1) plaintiff had already completed a psychological
examination for a previous job;6 and (2) Sandy was concerned that failing the
exam would jeopardize plaintiff’s hopes of employment at Cortland.7 Id.
4 Plaintiff alleges Sandy wrote a letter to the New York State Department of Criminal Justice
on June 14, 2022 supporting the dismissal of plaintiff for two incidents of misconduct.
5 It appears this exam was conducted in January 2022. Am. Compl. ¶ 5.
6 Plaintiff alleges that, at some point prior to receiving his conditional offer of employment from
Cortland Police, he was previously employed by the Village of Homer Police Department. Am.
Compl. ¶ 5.
7 Namely, it is unclear why Sandy held reservations about plaintiff as of January 2022, and
whether those concerns pertained to off-duty conduct related to plaintiff in his previous employment,
off duty conduct subsequent to being hired by Cortland Police, or both. Am. Compl. ¶ 3
Plaintiff claims that he was unaware that Sandy held any prior concerns
about the outcome of his psychological examination. Id.
Thereafter, on June 11, 2022, plaintiff alleges that Sandy conversation he
had with Supnick regarding two misconduct incidents involving plaintiff.8 It
is entirely unclear from plaintiff’s complaint what led to this conversation
between Sandy and Supnick. Nevertheles, plaintiff alleges that Supnick9
proceeded to review these misconduct incidents involving plaintiff and
thereafter supported terminating plaintiff, finding his conduct to be
“disrespectful to the badge.” Id. Plaintiff alleges Supinck told Sandy that, so
long as Roodenberg was employed by Cortland Police, he would continue to be
a disciplinary problem. Id.
On June 14, 2022, plaintiff claims Sandy wrote a letter to the New York
State Department of Criminal Justice regarding Roodenberg.10 Plaintiff
8 Plaintiff alleges this conversation between Sandy and Supnick took place on May 11, 2022.
Am. Compl. ¶ 5. It would appear that this related to events that occurred after his probationary
employment began.
9 Based on a review of the record, and as best as this Court can infer, these incidents of
misconducted occurred during plaintiff’s probationary period with the Cortland Police but after his
aborted psychological examination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–8. Specifically, the first misconduct
incident took place on February 28, 2022, while the second occurred on April 20, 2022. Id. One
involved alleged driving while intoxicated while the other involved a public disturbance at a local
restaurant. Id.
10 Having reviewed plaintiff’s amended complaint, it appears that plaintiff is alleging that
Sandy cited Supnick’s conclusions regarding plaintiff’s fitness for employment in this letter and that
this letter served as a recommendation for plaintiff’s termination from the Cortland Police. See
generally Am. Compl. However, this is never explicitly stated.
argues that Supnick engaged in “misconduct” by providing a medical and/or
psychological evaluation of plaintiff to Sandy regarding plaintiff’s mental
status without ever personally engaging or interacting with plaintiff. Am.
Compl. ¶ 5.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual
allegations must be enough to elevate the plaintiff’s right to relief above the
speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). So
while legal conclusions can provide a framework for the complaint, they must
be supported with meaningful allegations of fact. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). In short, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
To assess this plausibility requirement, the court must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in
the pleading, any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it
by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v.
Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Concord Assocs., L.P.
v. Ent. Props. Tr., 817 F.3d 46, 51 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016)).
B. Rule 12(e)
A motion for a more definite statement may be granted where “a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(e). Motions pursuant to Rule 12(e) are not favored and are
appropriately granted where “the complaint is so excessively vague and
ambiguous as to be unintelligible and as to prejudice the defendant seriously
in attempting to answer it.” Bower v. Weisman, 639 F. Supp. 532, 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The
purpose of the complaint is to ‘inform the defendant as to the general nature
of the action and as to the incident out of which a cause of action arose.’”
Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Envtl. Sys. Testing, 211 F.R.D. 71, 76
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Bower, 639 F. Supp. at 538).
Rule 12(e) is “designed to remedy unintelligible pleadings, not merely to
correct for lack of detail.” Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff'd 23 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Therefore, a motion
for a more definite statement should be granted only if the complaint is
missing a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
IV. DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court notes that Roodenburg’s amended complaint only
expressly asserts a claim against Supnik for violations of his procedural due
process rights. See generally Am. Compl. However, a review of the pleading
and the allegations therein reveals a second claim for employment
discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that, in addition to denying him his due
process by providing an assessment of his mental health to his employer
without personally screening him, that Supnik also discriminated against
him in the context of his employment on the basis of his mental health. Am.
Compl. ¶6. Thus, in light of Roodenburg’s pro se status, the Court will
construe the amended complaint to assert two claims against Supnick: (1)
violations of plaintiff’s due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment; and (2) unlawful employment discrimination pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). Am. Compl. ¶ 5.
Supnick has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a plausible claim for which relief could be granted
or, in the alternative, pursuant to 12(e) for an order directing plaintiff to
make a more definite statement in order to permit defendant to respond.
Def.’s Mem, Dkt. No. 78-5 at 4–5. These arguments will be addressed in
turn.
A. Procedural Due Process
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part that “every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . .
subject . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in action at law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but instead provides “a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Barker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144, n. 3 (1979).
To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim at
this posture, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that they “possessed a protected
liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without
due process.” McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 907 (1998).
Procedural due process requirements “apply only to the deprivation of
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty
and property.” Flood v. Cty. of Suffolk, 820 F.Supp. 709, 712 (E.D.N.Y. May
14, 1993) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)).
“Property interests are determined and created by state laws that ‘secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.’” Id.
(quoting Roth at 577). “In the employment context, a property interest arises
only where the state is barred, whether by statute or contract, from
terminating (or not renewing) the employment relationship without cause.”
Id. (quoting S & D Maintenance Co., Inc v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 967 (2d Cir.
1988)).
Plaintiff asserts that Supnick deprived him of procedural due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when, without any professional
interaction with plaintiff, he: (1) provided Sandy with a medical evaluation as
to plaintiff’s mental state; and (2) recommended termination of plaintiff’s
employment.11 Am. Compl. ¶ 5; Roodenburg Aff., Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 4. Supnick,
in opposition, argues that plaintiff fails to identify any action taken by
defendant under the color of state law that deprived him of any protected
right or deprived him of due process. Def’s Mem. at 3.
Upon review, Supnick’s motion to dismiss will be granted. As a threshold
matter, plaintiff has failed to allege the possession of any protected liberty or
property interest which he was subsequently deprived of. There is no factual
dispute that plaintiff was a probationary hire subject to an 18-month period
of contingent employment. Am. Compl. ¶¶4–5; Def’s Mem. at 1. Thus, the
11 To be clear, plaintiff failed to specify what legally cognizable due process right he was denied
in his complaint but clarified that it was a denial of due process pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment in a subsequent reply brief. Roodenburg Aff., Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 4.
fact that plaintiff was terminated without first having a professional
interaction with Supnick, absent more, does not constitute the denial of a due
process right because plaintiff does not have a cognizable property interest in
his probationary employment with the Cortland Police.
Therefore, Roodenburg has not identified the deprivation of a
constitutional right. Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Supnick
will be dismissed.
B. Employment Discrimination
Next, turning to plaintiff’s discrimination claim.12 The ADA was
established to ensure that “individuals are able to obtain and maintain
employment without regard to whether they have a disability.” See e.g.,
McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2013). In order for a
disability discrimination claim to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
must plausibly allege that: “(1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to
perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of
12 As stated supra, plaintiff did not specify discrimination as a cause of action in his amended
complaint. However, plaintiff stated in the body of his complaint that “Timothy Roodenburg was
discriminated against when Timothy Roodenburg was terminated from job on the basis[sic] of
mental health.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5. It is unclear whether this was directed at Sandy, Supnick, or an
otherwise unspecified party. However, because plaintiff is pro se, his complaint “must
be construed liberally and interpreted “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006).
his disability.” Id. at 125 (quoting Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d
161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006).
Roodenburg alleges that he was terminated from his job on the basis of his
mental health. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. As discussed, plaintiff does not overtly
assert this cause of action in his amended complaint. In addition, he has
failed to plausibly allege that: (1) that any of the defendants are subject to
the ADA; (2) that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) that he
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or
without reasonable accommodations; and (4) that the adverse employment
action he suffered was the result of his disability. Accordingly, this claim,
insofar as plaintiff intended to bring it, will be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible inference
that he was denied any constitutional due process rights by Supnick. The
undisputed fact that plaintiff was a probationary employee makes clear that
he likely had no cognizable property interest in his employment. Further,
plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege an employment discrimination claim
against Supnick.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to plaintiffs Section
1983 claim for deprivation of a constitutional right to due process and
plaintiff's employment discrimination claim;
2. Plaintiff's amended complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as to
defendant Supnick;
3. Plaintiff shall have thirty (80) days from the entry of this Order to file a
Second Amended Complaint as to defendant Supnick;
4. If Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended Complaint as to defendant
Supnick within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order, his complaint shall
be DISMISSED with prejudice as to defendant Supnick; and
5. If Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty (30)
days, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a judgment dismissing this
action as to Supnick and terminating Supnick as a party without further
Order of the Court.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
U.S. Disfrict Judge
Dated: April 2, 2025
Utica, New York.
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