Opinion

Debra Sue Rodriguez and MacEdonio Coc Rodriguez v. Donna Marie Currey

Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
Apr 3, 2025
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.7%

“Erroneous disclosure of medical records qualifies as irremediable harm.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Erroneous disclosure of medical records qualifies as irremediable harm.”
  • explaining that Florida appellate courts “consistently require in-camera review of medical records so the trial court can ensure that only relevant, timely documents are disclosed”
  • “Discovery is limited to those matters relevant to the litigation as framed by the parties’ pleadings.”
  • “There is an important difference between a departure from the essential requirements of law where there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law and a case that involves an issue of law where the law is not yet settled.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D2024-3530

LT Case No. 2024-011299-CIDL

_____________________________

DEBRA SUE RODRIGUEZ and

MACEDONIO COC RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioners,

v.

DONNA MARIE CURREY,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit Court for

Volusia County.

Randell H. Rowe, III, Judge.

Jeremy K. Markman, of King & Markman, P.A., Orlando, for

Petitioners.

Kevin D. Franz and Nicholas R. Consalvo, of Boyd & Jenerette,

P.A., Boca Raton, for Respondent.

April 3, 2025

JAY, J.

The certiorari petition before us attacks an order that compels

the production of medical records. We grant relief and remand for

the trial court to inspect the records in-camera to prevent the

disclosure of records that are irrelevant to the pending lawsuit.

I.

Debra Rodriguez and Donna Currey had a car accident.

Rodriguez sued Currey for negligence. Currey served a notice of

production from non-parties. She requested Rodriguez’s medical

records from twenty healthcare providers, pharmacies, insurers,

and employers. Rodriguez objected on multiple grounds, one of

which was that Currey’s subpoenas were overbroad because they

sought all of Rodriguez’s medical records instead of just those

records relevant to the lawsuit. Rodriguez asked the trial court to

narrow the subpoenas by timing and subject matter or to inspect

the records in-camera to decide which of them were relevant.

The court ordered the production of all records from the five

years before the accident. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration.

She maintained that the court had to limit the subpoenas to

records about the body parts that she allegedly injured in the

accident. Alternatively, she again requested an in-camera

inspection of the records, arguing that the court would depart from

the essential requirements of law if it overruled her objections

without such an inspection. The court denied reconsideration.

II.

Rodriguez seeks certiorari relief from the order that compels

the production of all her medical records from the five years before

the accident. To succeed, she must first show that the order causes

her irreparable harm—in other words, a material injury that

cannot be corrected on appeal. See Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San

Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012). If she clears this

jurisdictional hurdle, she must then show that the order departs

from the essential requirements of law. See id. This occurs when

an order violates “a clearly established” legal principle. See id. at

355. “A classic example . . . is a trial court’s failure to follow binding

precedent.” State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 327 So. 3d 342,

344 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).

The irreparable harm analysis here is straightforward.

“Medical records are protected by the right to privacy in the

Florida Constitution.” Dominguez v. Omana, 381 So. 3d 1271, 1273

(Fla. 6th DCA 2024). The Supreme Court of Florida has held that

2

personal injury litigants only partially waive this right—that is,

they surrender the right for records relevant to the pending

lawsuit but retain it for those that are irrelevant. See Weaver v.

Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1132 (Fla. 2017) (“Dr. Myers further

asserts that Weaver has necessarily waived all constitutional

rights to privacy in this case by filing a claim of medical

malpractice. However, the anatomy of such a waiver under Florida

law is clear. Although a claimant may necessarily waive privacy

rights to the medical information that is relevant to a claim by

filing an action, this does not amount to waiver of privacy rights

pertaining to all confidential health information that is not

relevant to the claim.”); see also Dominguez, 381 So. 3d at 1273

(“By suing Respondents, Dominguez waived her right to privacy in

medical records that are relevant to her claims, but she still has

that right in medical records that are irrelevant.”).

Thus, when a court compels the production of irrelevant

medical records, the impacted litigant suffers irreparable harm.

See Dominguez, 381 So. 3d at 1273. This principle is well-

established. See, e.g., Tanner v. Hart, 313 So. 3d 805, 807 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2021) (“[A]n order that compels production of a party’s

medical records satisfies the jurisdictional element of irreparable

harm.”); Paylan v. Fitzgerald, 223 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA

2017) (“Orders that require disclosure of confidential medical

information meet the irreparable harm requirement for certiorari

review because once such information is improperly disclosed, the

harm caused by that disclosure cannot be undone.”); Zarzaur v.

Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Erroneous

disclosure of medical records qualifies as irremediable harm.”);

Scully v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 128 So. 3d 986,

988 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“Where, as here, an order permits

discovery of medical or other records that are protected by

constitutional or statutory privileges, this court has [certiorari]

jurisdiction to review the order because the harm caused by the

erroneous production of such records cannot be remedied on

appeal.”). Accordingly, if any of Rodriguez’s medical records are

irrelevant to the pending lawsuit, their disclosure will irreparably

harm Rodriguez. This activates our certiorari jurisdiction.

The next issue is whether the court departed from the

essential requirements of law. “[I]nformation sought in discovery

3

must be relevant to the issues to be litigated, as framed by the

pleadings.” Wharran v. Morgan, 351 So. 3d 632, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA

2022); see also Rousso v. Hannon, 146 So. 3d 66, 69 (Fla. 3d DCA

2014) (“Discovery is limited to those matters relevant to the

litigation as framed by the parties’ pleadings.”). This is because

pleadings “are designed to develop and present the precise points

in dispute,” Brickell v. McCaskill, 106 So. 470, 471 (Fla. 1925),

ensuring “that the parties and the court are absolutely clear” about

the issues to be decided. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis,

336 So. 3d 392, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022).

Here, both parties assert that the pleadings support their

respective positions. While Currey insists that all the subpoenaed

documents are relevant, Rodriguez argues that the requests “will

necessarily disclose irrelevant records.” As an alternative to

quashing the subpoenas, Rodriguez asks for an in-camera review.

We agree that the relevancy question here cannot be answered

without reviewing the actual records. See Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d at

1120 (explaining that Florida appellate courts “consistently

require in-camera review of medical records so the trial court can

ensure that only relevant, timely documents are disclosed”). An in-

camera review will allow the court to “segregate irrelevant

documents from relevant documents.” Wharran, 351 So. 3d at 637.

Because Rodriguez asserted her right to privacy in her

medical records, the court should have inspected the records to

ensure that Currey only received documents that are relevant to

the lawsuit.1 By ordering the production of all medical records for

1 The Sixth District recently denied certiorari relief in a case

where the petitioner did “not clarify which institutions were at risk

of producing supposedly irrelevant medical records” and did not

timely request an in-camera review. See Valyou v. Navedo, 50 Fla.

L. Weekly D685, 2025 WL 877154, at *2–3 (Fla. 6th DCA Mar. 21,

2025). Here, Rodriguez did both. The Sixth District also reasoned

that the petitioner failed to show a high probability that the

subpoenas would produce irrelevant records. See id. at *1–2. Our

review of the caselaw—including the Supreme Court’s binding

decision in Weaver—does not persuade us that litigants asserting

their constitutional right to privacy in medical records must show

a high probability of irrelevance to secure an in-camera review.

4

the five years before the accident without holding an in-camera

review, the court departed from the essential requirements of law.

See Zawistowski v. Gibson, 337 So. 3d 901, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

(“Despite the narrowly tailored requests, it is conceivable that

those records may still contain private, confidential medical

information not relevant to the accident that should be excluded

from evidence. For this reason, we conclude that the trial court

departed from the essential requirements of the law by failing to

conduct an in camera review of the records sought to be

produced.”); Tanner, 313 So. 3d at 808 (“[A] trial court departs from

the essential requirements of law by ordering production of

medical records without inspecting the records in camera to

prevent disclosure of information that is not relevant to the

litigation.” (cleaned up)); Muller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 So.

3d 748, 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“[T]he circuit court departed from

the essential requirements of the law by compelling Muller to

produce . . . all of his military medical records without first

conducting an in camera inspection.”); Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988–

89 (“The trial court did not limit the scope of the records that Ms.

Sahler was required to produce to a period more temporally-

related to the claims at issue in this case, nor did it require an in

camera review to ensure that only relevant records are produced.

By failing to do so, the trial court departed from the essential

requirements of law.”).

III.

In sum, we grant the petition, but only to the extent that it

seeks an in-camera review of Rodriguez’s medical records. In doing

so, we quash the order that compels the production of all her

medical records from the five years before the accident. On

remand, the trial court must inspect Rodriguez’s medical records

in-camera “to prevent disclosure of information that is not relevant

to this litigation.” See Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989; see also Muller,

164 So. 3d at 750 (“On remand the court should conduct an in

camera inspection and segregate any private documents that are

Regardless, even if that was the controlling standard, it would not

change the outcome here because Rodriguez made such a showing.

5

not relevant to Muller’s negligence action from the relevant

documents.”).2

PETITION GRANTED in part; ORDER QUASHED; REMANDED with

instructions.

MAKAR and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

2 Rodriguez also wants certiorari relief from the overruling of

her objection to the disclosure of records to a third-party discovery

vendor. She concedes that there are no Florida appellate opinions

on this subject. We decline her invitation to break new ground in

a certiorari proceeding. See State v. Garcia, 350 So. 3d 322, 326

(Fla. 2022) (holding that an order did not depart from the law’s

essential requirements since “there was no clearly established law

binding on the trial court”); San Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d at 355

(“There is an important difference between a departure from the

essential requirements of law where there has been a violation of

a clearly established principle of law and a case that involves an

issue of law where the law is not yet settled.”); N. Brevard Cnty.

Hosp. Dist. v. Deligdish, 398 So. 3d 1126, 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024)

(denying certiorari relief as to the portion of the petitioner’s claim

that was “beyond the established limits” of the applicable legal

doctrine).

6

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.