“Erroneous disclosure of medical records qualifies as irremediable harm.”
How later courts described this case
- “Erroneous disclosure of medical records qualifies as irremediable harm.”
- explaining that Florida appellate courts “consistently require in-camera review of medical records so the trial court can ensure that only relevant, timely documents are disclosed”
- “Discovery is limited to those matters relevant to the litigation as framed by the parties’ pleadings.”
- “There is an important difference between a departure from the essential requirements of law where there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law and a case that involves an issue of law where the law is not yet settled.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 5D2024-3530
LT Case No. 2024-011299-CIDL
_____________________________
DEBRA SUE RODRIGUEZ and
MACEDONIO COC RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioners,
v.
DONNA MARIE CURREY,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Petition for Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit Court for
Volusia County.
Randell H. Rowe, III, Judge.
Jeremy K. Markman, of King & Markman, P.A., Orlando, for
Petitioners.
Kevin D. Franz and Nicholas R. Consalvo, of Boyd & Jenerette,
P.A., Boca Raton, for Respondent.
April 3, 2025
JAY, J.
The certiorari petition before us attacks an order that compels
the production of medical records. We grant relief and remand for
the trial court to inspect the records in-camera to prevent the
disclosure of records that are irrelevant to the pending lawsuit.
I.
Debra Rodriguez and Donna Currey had a car accident.
Rodriguez sued Currey for negligence. Currey served a notice of
production from non-parties. She requested Rodriguez’s medical
records from twenty healthcare providers, pharmacies, insurers,
and employers. Rodriguez objected on multiple grounds, one of
which was that Currey’s subpoenas were overbroad because they
sought all of Rodriguez’s medical records instead of just those
records relevant to the lawsuit. Rodriguez asked the trial court to
narrow the subpoenas by timing and subject matter or to inspect
the records in-camera to decide which of them were relevant.
The court ordered the production of all records from the five
years before the accident. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration.
She maintained that the court had to limit the subpoenas to
records about the body parts that she allegedly injured in the
accident. Alternatively, she again requested an in-camera
inspection of the records, arguing that the court would depart from
the essential requirements of law if it overruled her objections
without such an inspection. The court denied reconsideration.
II.
Rodriguez seeks certiorari relief from the order that compels
the production of all her medical records from the five years before
the accident. To succeed, she must first show that the order causes
her irreparable harm—in other words, a material injury that
cannot be corrected on appeal. See Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San
Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012). If she clears this
jurisdictional hurdle, she must then show that the order departs
from the essential requirements of law. See id. This occurs when
an order violates “a clearly established” legal principle. See id. at
355. “A classic example . . . is a trial court’s failure to follow binding
precedent.” State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 327 So. 3d 342,
344 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).
The irreparable harm analysis here is straightforward.
“Medical records are protected by the right to privacy in the
Florida Constitution.” Dominguez v. Omana, 381 So. 3d 1271, 1273
(Fla. 6th DCA 2024). The Supreme Court of Florida has held that
2
personal injury litigants only partially waive this right—that is,
they surrender the right for records relevant to the pending
lawsuit but retain it for those that are irrelevant. See Weaver v.
Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1132 (Fla. 2017) (“Dr. Myers further
asserts that Weaver has necessarily waived all constitutional
rights to privacy in this case by filing a claim of medical
malpractice. However, the anatomy of such a waiver under Florida
law is clear. Although a claimant may necessarily waive privacy
rights to the medical information that is relevant to a claim by
filing an action, this does not amount to waiver of privacy rights
pertaining to all confidential health information that is not
relevant to the claim.”); see also Dominguez, 381 So. 3d at 1273
(“By suing Respondents, Dominguez waived her right to privacy in
medical records that are relevant to her claims, but she still has
that right in medical records that are irrelevant.”).
Thus, when a court compels the production of irrelevant
medical records, the impacted litigant suffers irreparable harm.
See Dominguez, 381 So. 3d at 1273. This principle is well-
established. See, e.g., Tanner v. Hart, 313 So. 3d 805, 807 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2021) (“[A]n order that compels production of a party’s
medical records satisfies the jurisdictional element of irreparable
harm.”); Paylan v. Fitzgerald, 223 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA
2017) (“Orders that require disclosure of confidential medical
information meet the irreparable harm requirement for certiorari
review because once such information is improperly disclosed, the
harm caused by that disclosure cannot be undone.”); Zarzaur v.
Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Erroneous
disclosure of medical records qualifies as irremediable harm.”);
Scully v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 128 So. 3d 986,
988 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“Where, as here, an order permits
discovery of medical or other records that are protected by
constitutional or statutory privileges, this court has [certiorari]
jurisdiction to review the order because the harm caused by the
erroneous production of such records cannot be remedied on
appeal.”). Accordingly, if any of Rodriguez’s medical records are
irrelevant to the pending lawsuit, their disclosure will irreparably
harm Rodriguez. This activates our certiorari jurisdiction.
The next issue is whether the court departed from the
essential requirements of law. “[I]nformation sought in discovery
3
must be relevant to the issues to be litigated, as framed by the
pleadings.” Wharran v. Morgan, 351 So. 3d 632, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA
2022); see also Rousso v. Hannon, 146 So. 3d 66, 69 (Fla. 3d DCA
2014) (“Discovery is limited to those matters relevant to the
litigation as framed by the parties’ pleadings.”). This is because
pleadings “are designed to develop and present the precise points
in dispute,” Brickell v. McCaskill, 106 So. 470, 471 (Fla. 1925),
ensuring “that the parties and the court are absolutely clear” about
the issues to be decided. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis,
336 So. 3d 392, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022).
Here, both parties assert that the pleadings support their
respective positions. While Currey insists that all the subpoenaed
documents are relevant, Rodriguez argues that the requests “will
necessarily disclose irrelevant records.” As an alternative to
quashing the subpoenas, Rodriguez asks for an in-camera review.
We agree that the relevancy question here cannot be answered
without reviewing the actual records. See Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d at
1120 (explaining that Florida appellate courts “consistently
require in-camera review of medical records so the trial court can
ensure that only relevant, timely documents are disclosed”). An in-
camera review will allow the court to “segregate irrelevant
documents from relevant documents.” Wharran, 351 So. 3d at 637.
Because Rodriguez asserted her right to privacy in her
medical records, the court should have inspected the records to
ensure that Currey only received documents that are relevant to
the lawsuit.1 By ordering the production of all medical records for
1 The Sixth District recently denied certiorari relief in a case
where the petitioner did “not clarify which institutions were at risk
of producing supposedly irrelevant medical records” and did not
timely request an in-camera review. See Valyou v. Navedo, 50 Fla.
L. Weekly D685, 2025 WL 877154, at *2–3 (Fla. 6th DCA Mar. 21,
2025). Here, Rodriguez did both. The Sixth District also reasoned
that the petitioner failed to show a high probability that the
subpoenas would produce irrelevant records. See id. at *1–2. Our
review of the caselaw—including the Supreme Court’s binding
decision in Weaver—does not persuade us that litigants asserting
their constitutional right to privacy in medical records must show
a high probability of irrelevance to secure an in-camera review.
4
the five years before the accident without holding an in-camera
review, the court departed from the essential requirements of law.
See Zawistowski v. Gibson, 337 So. 3d 901, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)
(“Despite the narrowly tailored requests, it is conceivable that
those records may still contain private, confidential medical
information not relevant to the accident that should be excluded
from evidence. For this reason, we conclude that the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of the law by failing to
conduct an in camera review of the records sought to be
produced.”); Tanner, 313 So. 3d at 808 (“[A] trial court departs from
the essential requirements of law by ordering production of
medical records without inspecting the records in camera to
prevent disclosure of information that is not relevant to the
litigation.” (cleaned up)); Muller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 So.
3d 748, 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“[T]he circuit court departed from
the essential requirements of the law by compelling Muller to
produce . . . all of his military medical records without first
conducting an in camera inspection.”); Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988–
89 (“The trial court did not limit the scope of the records that Ms.
Sahler was required to produce to a period more temporally-
related to the claims at issue in this case, nor did it require an in
camera review to ensure that only relevant records are produced.
By failing to do so, the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of law.”).
III.
In sum, we grant the petition, but only to the extent that it
seeks an in-camera review of Rodriguez’s medical records. In doing
so, we quash the order that compels the production of all her
medical records from the five years before the accident. On
remand, the trial court must inspect Rodriguez’s medical records
in-camera “to prevent disclosure of information that is not relevant
to this litigation.” See Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989; see also Muller,
164 So. 3d at 750 (“On remand the court should conduct an in
camera inspection and segregate any private documents that are
Regardless, even if that was the controlling standard, it would not
change the outcome here because Rodriguez made such a showing.
5
not relevant to Muller’s negligence action from the relevant
documents.”).2
PETITION GRANTED in part; ORDER QUASHED; REMANDED with
instructions.
MAKAR and KILBANE, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
2 Rodriguez also wants certiorari relief from the overruling of
her objection to the disclosure of records to a third-party discovery
vendor. She concedes that there are no Florida appellate opinions
on this subject. We decline her invitation to break new ground in
a certiorari proceeding. See State v. Garcia, 350 So. 3d 322, 326
(Fla. 2022) (holding that an order did not depart from the law’s
essential requirements since “there was no clearly established law
binding on the trial court”); San Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d at 355
(“There is an important difference between a departure from the
essential requirements of law where there has been a violation of
a clearly established principle of law and a case that involves an
issue of law where the law is not yet settled.”); N. Brevard Cnty.
Hosp. Dist. v. Deligdish, 398 So. 3d 1126, 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024)
(denying certiorari relief as to the portion of the petitioner’s claim
that was “beyond the established limits” of the applicable legal
doctrine).
6