Opinion

State of Tennessee v. Raymond Mays, Jr.

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Mar 29, 1996
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge J. C. McLin
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.2%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 5, 2007

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RAYMOND MAYS, JR.

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 93-1036 Donald H. Allen, Judge

No. W2006-02241-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 3, 2007

The defendant, Raymond Mays, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court,

revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this

appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in revoking his probation. Following our review

of the record, parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we determine no error exists in the court’s

revocation of probation, and thus affirm the court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J.C. MCLIN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS and ALAN E.

GLENN , JJ., joined.

Gregory D. Gookin, Assistant Public Defender, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Raymond

Mays, Jr.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Preston Shipp, Assistant Attorney General;

Jerry Woodall, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, Assistant District Attorney General,

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The record reflects that in January 1994, the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine

with intent to sell and driving on a revoked license. In exchange for his pleas, he received a total

effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender with sixty days in confinement and

the balance to be served in community corrections. After serving approximately two years of his

sentence in community corrections, the defendant was placed on probation on March 29, 1996. On

March 24, 2006, a probation violation warrant was issued, alleging the defendant had violated a

condition of his probation by being arrested for the unlawful possession of a firearm and discharging

a firearm in the city limits. Subsequently, on July 25, 2006, another probation violation warrant was

issued, alleging that the defendant had been arrested for possession of marijuana and drug

paraphernalia.

On September 18, 2006, the circuit court conducted a hearing. At the hearing, the defendant,

through counsel, admitted that he had recently pled guilty in federal court to felon in possession of

a handgun. However, the defendant, through counsel, did not concede guilt to the recent charge of

possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found

the following:

[The defendant] did admit that he had discharged this firearm. I believe he told me

that he had been shooting at a coon up in a tree is what he told me and based upon

his admission . . . . I think there was a coon up in a tree and he was trying to scare

it off as best I remember, and he did have a weapon and discharged a firearm which

obviously he could not do since he is a convicted felon.

So, it does appear he has pled guilty to that charge in Federal Court and he is

awaiting sentencing in Federal Court, so certainly he has violated his probation in a

substantial way by being in possession of a firearm and also by discharging a firearm

as a convicted felon.

The court then revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original twelve-year

sentence in confinement less the time the defendant had served in jail and on community corrections.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the revocation of his probation. Specifically, he argues

that he “had been on state probation from 1996 to 2006 with no major problems, and his sentence

was due to expire on January 20, 2007.” Therefore, the “court’s full revocation of [his] probation

violated the goals and purposes of sentencing, especially for a probationer who was so close to

termination of his sentence.”

We begin our review by noting that the decision to revoke probation lies in the sound

discretion of the trial court. State v. Leach, 914 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The trial

court may revoke probation upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has

violated the conditions of his or her probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310, 311(e); State

v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). The judgment of the trial court to revoke probation

will be upheld on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d at 82.

If the trial court has exercised “conscientious judgment in making the decision rather than acting

arbitrarily,” then there is no abuse of discretion. Leach, 914 S.W.2d at 107. Discretion is abused

only if the record contains no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that a

violation has occurred. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d at 82; State v. Gregory, 946 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1997).

In the instant case, the record reflects that the defendant violated the conditions of his

probation by possessing a handgun and discharging it. Therefore, the court’s determination to

revoke the defendant’s probation was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we are unable

to conclude that the court abused its discretion. The judgment of the circuit court if affirmed.

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___________________________________

J.C. McLIN, JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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