Goss v. Warden Greene

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD GOSS, : No. 3:24-CV-1133

Petitioner :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

WARDEN GREENE, :

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Ronald Goss filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while confined at the Federal Correctional

Institution, Allenwood Low, in White Deer, Pennsylvania. He alleges that the

Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has failed to properly apply time credits he has

earned under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA), Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194

(2018), toward time in prerelease custody, in violation of the plain language of

the Act. After careful consideration, the court is constrained to hold that Goss’s

prerelease custody claim is not cognizable on habeas review, so his Section

2241 petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. Goss is currently serving a

156-month sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Pennsylvania for a controlled substance offense. (Doc. 10-2 □ 3). He

is also serving a concurrent state sentence of 7 to 14 years’ incarceration for

aggravated assault. (See Doc. 10-5 at 3 J 7; Doc. 10-8 at 2).

Goss’s projected statutory release date for his federal sentence, applying

only good conduct time, is August 12, 2026. (See Doc. 10-3 at 2, 3). Goss is no

eligible for prerelease benefits under the Second Chance Act of 2007 (SCA),

Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008), because of his existing state detainer

(See Doc. 10-8 at 2, 3).

Goss Is eligible, however, to earn and receive the benefit of FSA time

credits. (See Doc. 10-3 at 3). As of June 29, 2024 (the latest calculation

provided to the court), Goss had earned 365 FSA time credits toward early

release and an additional 610 FSA time credits toward time in prerelease custod\

either at a Residential Reentry Center (RRC) or on home confinement. (See

Doc. 10-7 at 2); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2). The BOP has applied 365 FSA credits

toward early release, advancing Goss’s statutory release date one year and

creating a projected FSA release date of August 12, 2025. (See Doc. 10-3 at 3).

The dispute in the instant petition involves application toward time in

prerelease custody of Goss’s remaining 610 FSA credits, hereinafter referred to

as “excess” credits. Goss maintains that he is statutorily eligible for application o

these excess credits and that the plain language of the FSA requires the BOP to

apply all excess credits toward time in prerelease custody. According to Goss,

and as confirmed by the BOP, application of these credits would have resulted in

his transfer to prerelease custody at least as early as March 2024. (See Doc. 10:

5 J 6; Doc. 10-8 at 2).

Goss, however, was not transferred to prerelease custody at that time. It

appears that the BOP denied his placement in prerelease custody based on the

existence of his state detainer. (See Doc. 10 at 16; Doc. 10-5 8). Then, on

September 10, 2024, while the instant Section 2241 petition was pending, Goss

was transferred to the custody of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3623 to serve the remainder of his federal sentence in state

custody. (See Doc. 14-5 at 2-3 (citing BOP Program Statement 5140.35,

“Transfer of a Prisoner to State Custody Prior to Release from the Federal

Sentence”); Doc. 14-2 J 3). According to Respondent, “there are no plans for his

return to federal custody.” (Doc. 14 at 3 (quoting Doc. 14-2 {J 4)).

Following Goss’s transfer to state custody, Respondent initially asserted

that Goss was no longer “in custody” for federal habeas purposes. (See Doc. 14

at 4). When pressed on the accuracy of this position, Respondent conceded that

Goss was still serving the remainder of his federal sentence in state custody and

therefore was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2241. (See Doc 21 at 1).

Respondent, however, continues to oppose Goss’s habeas petition. After

supplemental briefing, that petition is ripe for review.

ll. DISCUSSION

Goss’s argument is straightforward. He maintains that (1) he is statutorily

eligible—under the prerequisites set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)—for application

of the FSA time credits that he has earned by successfully participating in FSA

programming; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) requires the BOP to apply his

excess credits to time in prerelease custody; and (3) the agency’s failure to do sc

violates the First Step Act. Goss also correctly points out that the existence of a

state detainer does not preclude an inmate from earning FSA time credits or

having those credits applied toward time in prerelease custody. (See Doc. 11 at

2-3 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Change Notice to

Program Statement 5410.01, First Step Act of 2018 — Time Credits: Procedures

for Implementation of 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) (Feb. 6, 2023 & Mar. 10, 2023),

https:/Awww.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5410.10_cn2.pdf) (last visited Apr. 1,

2025))).

Respondent first asserts that Goss’s petition should be dismissed because

he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent next argues that

Goss’s petition is not judicially reviewable—or alternatively should be denied on

the merits—because Goss has no right or entitlement to a particular amount of

time in prerelease custody and the BOP has exclusive discretion regarding

designation of place of confinement.

Because Goss’s petition involves an issue of purely statutory construction,

administrative exhaustion is excused. See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431,

433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050,

1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). The court, however, cannot reach the merits of Goss's

FSA prerelease custody claim. That is because such a claim, which involves the

execution of his sentence, is not cognizable on habeas review in this circuit.

Thus, the court must dismiss his habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The core of habeas corpus primarily involves a challenge to the fact or

duration of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88, 500

(1973). In Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005),

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that—in addition to

the fact or duration of confinement—a prisoner may also challenge the

“execution” of their sentence via a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See id. at

241-44. In Woodall, the petitioner asserted a challenge to BOP regulations that

affected whether he served a portion of his sentence in a federal penal institutior

or in a “Community Corrections Center” (CCC).' See id. at 237.

The term “Community Corrections Center” is the precursor to what is now referred to by th

BOP as a “Residential Reentry Center,” sometimes colloquially called a halfway house. Se

Brown _v. Warden Fairton FCI, 617 F. App’x 117, 118 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam

(nonprecedential) (‘In 2006, the BOP began referring to ‘Community Corrections Centers’ a

‘Residential Reentry Centers’ (‘RRCs’)[.]”).

The Third Circuit agreed with the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits

and held that habeas jurisdiction lies for prisoners challenging the “manner of

their imprisonment,” including the place of confinement, when the differences in

custody reflect more than a “simple” or “garden variety” prison transfer. See

Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242-43. The panel highlighted the significant disparities

between carrying out a sentence in a CCC and carrying out a sentence in an

ordinary penal institution and concluded that the petitioner's claim was a “proper

challenge to the ‘execution’ of his sentence,” and thus “habeas jurisdiction lies.”

Id. at 243-44.

Following Woodall, confusion arose as to what exactly “execution of the

sentence” meant for a habeas petitioner. Even the Woodall panel conceded that

the precise meaning of this phrase is “hazy.” Id. at 242.

In Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), the court of appeals

endeavored to clarify execution-of-sentence habeas challenges in the Third

Circuit. The Cardona panel first performed an in-depth review of Woodall and

McGee y. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 2010), precedential decisions that had

considered execution-of-sentence habeas claims and had determined that the

claims presented were cognizable under Section 2241. See Cardona, 681 F.3d

at 536-37.

From these decisions, the Cardona panel distilled that the linchpin for

habeas jurisdiction for an execution-of-sentence claim was whether the □□□□□□□□□□

was challenging the “carrying out” or “put[ting] into effect” of their sentencing

order. See id. The reason the petitioners in Woodall and McGee could seek

review of the execution of their sentences under Section 2241, the court of

appeals explained, was because their petitions “both challenged BOP conduct

that conflicted with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.”

Id. at 536. The Cardona panel thus held that “[i]n order to challenge the

execution of [a] sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner] would need to allege that

[the] BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or

recommendation in the sentencing judgment.” Id. at 537. In that case, the

petitioner had not made such an allegation, so the panel found that he was not

properly challenging the “execution” of his sentence and therefore the district

court had no jurisdiction to consider his Section 2241 petition. See id. at 537,

538.

The same is true for Goss’s petition. Goss has not alleged, let alone

established, that the BOP’s conduct is somehow inconsistent with an express

command or recommendation in his sentencing judgment. Indeed, there is

nothing in Goss’s sentencing judgment discussing or even alluding to prerelease

custody. See United States v. Goss, No. 1:14-cr-00016, Doc. 57 (M.D. Pa. Apr.

27, 2015). Accordingly, his petition does not properly challenge the “execution”

of his sentence as defined by Cardona v. Bledsoe, so this court has no

jurisdiction to consider his habeas claim. See Cardona, 681 F.3d at 537, 538.

The court is aware that case law within this circuit undoubtedly creates

confusion as to jurisdiction for Section 2241 execution-of-sentence claims

challenging prerelease custody placement. Most notably, in Vasquez v. Strada,

684 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)—a precedential decision issued just 18

days before Cardona v. Bledsoe—the Third Circuit plainly stated that a prisoner

“may resort to federal habeas corpus to challenge a decision to limit his RRC

placement.” Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 433 (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243-44). In

Vasquez, the petitioner was not asserting that a BOP action was inconsistent

with a command or recommendation in his sentencing judgment; rather, he

claimed that the BOP had failed to comply with the federal prisoner reentry

initiative with respect to RRC placement and that the BOP had improperly

amended 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) by adding a sixth factor. See id. Nevertheless,

the court of appeals did not find that the Section 2241 petition must be dismissec

for lack of jurisdiction based on the substance of the petitioner's habeas claim.

Instead, the panel perfunctorily found the petitioner's prerelease custody claim tc

be cognizable. See id. (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243-44)?

Additionally, multiple nonprecedential Third Circuit decisions have stated

that challenges to the execution of a sentence involving placement in prerelease

custody are cognizable under Section 2241. See Brown v. Warden Fairton FCI,

617 F. App’x 117, 118 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (nonprecedential) (“Brown's

challenge to the BOP’s failure to transfer him to an RRC lies under § 2241[.]’

(citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243-44)); Wilson y. Strada, 474 F. App’x 46, 48 (3d

Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (nonprecedential) (“Wilson may resort to federal habeas

corpus to challenge a decision to limit his RRC placement[.]"(citing Woodall, 432

F.3d at 243-44)): Guess v. Werlinger, 421 F. App’x 215, 217 (3d Cir. 2011) (per

curiam) (nonprecedential) (finding that habeaas jurisdiction lies for challenge to

BOP policy involving prerelease custody placement, concluding that petitioner's

challenge “implicates the execution of his sentence” (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at

243)). None of these cases involved an allegation that the BOP’s conduct was

2 Vasquez v. Strada was initially issued on June 1, 2012, as a nonprecedential decision. Se

Vasquez, No. 12-1114, Doc. 003110916790 (3d Cir. June 1, 2012). Four days later, th

government (appellee) moved to designate the decision as precedential under Third Circu

1.O.P. 5.2. See id., Doc. 003110919478 (3d Cir. June 5, 2012). That motion was granted o

June 20, 2012, when the opinion was designated as a precedential opinion by the circuit. Se

id., Doc. 003110933704 (3d Cir. June 20, 2012). It does not appear that the government eve

raised a jurisdictional challenge (other than failure to exhaust administrative remedies) t

Vasquez’s petition with the district court or the court of appeals. See generally Vasquez \

Strada, No. 3:11-cv-01710, Doc. 8 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2011).

inconsistent with a sentencing command or recommendation, even Brown v.

Warden Fairton FCI, which opinion issued three years after Cardona v. Bledsoe

was decided. See Brown, 617 F. App’x at 118 (claiming failure to transfer to

prerelease custody pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)); Wilson, 474 F. App’x at 47

| (raising challenge to BOP’s application of Second Chance Act with respect to

length of petitioner’s RRC placement); Guess, 421 F. App’x at 217 (challenging

validity of BOP policy regarding timing of prerelease custody review). Yet the

court of appeals did not find jurisdiction lacking for these petitions based on the

substance of the petitioners’ claims.

There are, on the other hand, numerous nonprecedential Third Circuit

decisions that rely on Cardona v. Bledsoe to find a lack of jurisdiction for certain

Section 2241 execution-of-sentence claims, although the court has been unable

to locate such a decision that specifically concerns transfer to prerelease

| custody. See, e.g., Morgan v. Warden of USP-Allenwood, No. 24-1508, 2025

WL 325753, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2025) (nonprecedential); Reynolds v. Warden

| Schuylkill FCI, No. 24-1942, 2024 WL 4164271, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2024)

(nonprecedential); Moslem v. Warden, F.C.I. Fort Dix, No. 23-2819, 2024 WL

| 658976, at *1-2 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (nonprecedential); Johnson v. Warden

Lewisburg USP, 694 F. App’x 59, 59-60 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential);

| Johnson v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 668 F. App’x 415, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2016)

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(nonprecedential); Rinaldi v. Warden Allenwood FC!, 598 F. App’x 809, 809-10

(3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential); Gillette v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 563 F.

App’x 191, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential); Share v. Krueger, 553 F.

App’x 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential); Cardona v. Thompson, 551 F.

App’x 630, 632 (3d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential); Shelton v. Thomas, 537 F.

App’x 63, 63-64 (3d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential); Shelton v. Samuels, 523 F.

App’x 177, 177 (3d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential). In one case, the petitioner was

challenging his confinement on home detention, but the court of appeals

explained that a period of home detention was expressly ordered in his judgment

of sentence and therefore he was actually challenging the “validity of [his]

judgment, not its execution.” See Kaetz v. United States, No. 22-1286, 2022 WL

1486775, at *1-2 (3d Cir. May 11, 2022) (nonprecedential).

In light of the seemingly contradictory nature of the foregoing precedential

and nonprecedential decisions, it is understandable why a pro se petitioner like

Goss would attempt to seek relief through Section 2241 for his prerelease

custody claim. After all, neither Cardona v. Bledsoe nor its nonprecedential

progeny confronted the type of issue presented here: the right to be transferred

from a federal correctional institution to prerelease custody based on mandatory

language contained in a federal statute.

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Nevertheless, this court is bound by Cardona’s jurisdictional requirements

or Section 2241 petitions. Cardona is the latest precedential decision to fully

| consider and delineate the jurisdictional boundaries of execution-of-sentence

claims raised in Section 2241 petitions in this circuit. Under Cardona’s rigid

boundaries, Goss’s habeas petition is simply not cognizable. The court offers nc

opinion regarding the availability of other potential avenues of review for Goss’s

| First Step Act claim involving prerelease custody, only that it cannot be pursued

through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

CONCLUSION

Under Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), execution-of-

| sentence habeas claims in the Third Circuit are tightly circumscribed. Goss’s

Section 2241 petition, which challenges the BOP’s failure to timely transfer him t

: prerelease custody based on the First Step Act—but does not allege that the

BOP’s conduct is somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in

| his sentencing judgment—fails to meet the stringent jurisdictional requirements

set forth ir Cardona. Accordingly, Goss’s Section 2241 petition must be

dismissed fof lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate Order follows.

Date: HY bs. C75 OURT:

JUDGEULIA K. MUNL

United States District Court

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